Ordinatio

To the first argument [n.62] I say that fruit is the final thing that is expected from a tree, not as something to be bodily possessed, but as something to be had by the act of the power that attains it as object; for an apple is not the fruit insofar as it is expected as something to be possessed but insofar as it is expected as something to be tasted and to be attained by the act of tasting, which tasting is followed by delight; if therefore fruit be said to be that which is to be enjoyed, delight is not fruit but that which is to be expected last; but delight will not be the enjoying either if the first thing by which I attain the expected thing as expected is to enjoy it, – which seems probable, since fruit is what is expected under the first idea, under which it is expected as needing to be attained by the power.

To the second [n.63] I say that the authority is to the opposite. For since the authority says that ‘acts are not fruits but passions are’, it follows that to enjoy is not to be delighted, because fruit is the object of enjoyment; but a passion cannot be thus the object first of itself as it can be the object of an act; therefore to enjoy, if it is of a passion as of its object, as the authority indicates, will not be a passion but some act, able to have those passions for objects as it were proximate to its first object. – And when it is said that ‘we take joy in fruit per se’, this is not to be understood as formal principal idea, in the way ‘it is hot by heat’ is to be understood, but in the idea of object, as if one were to say that ‘we take love in the lovable’; now enjoyment is what, in idea of formal cause, we have joy by. But the authority does not say that something consequent to act is enjoyment but that fruit is, that is, the object of enjoyment.

The opinion that love and delight are the same, for four reasons: first, of the same power about the same object there is a single act; second, the same knowledge is followed immediately only by the same thing; third, things whose opposites are the same are themselves also the same; fourth, things that have the same effects and the same consequences are the same. – Love and delight differ in idea as from this to that and conversely; also as union and resting, privation of division and privation of motion. On the contrary: the definition of love in Rhetoric 2.4.1380b35-81a2 and the definition of delight in Rhetoric 1.11.1369b33-35 are different. Response: On the contrary about sadness in four ways: not to want exists both in God and in the blessed; not to want does not require apprehension of the existence of a thing, or it is about that which neither exists in reality nor is apprehended as existing; most intense not-wanting before the coming to be of the thing; I voluntarily do not want. On the contrary about love: delight is per se the object of love, as also of the preceding desire, Augustine On the Trinity IX ch.12 n.18: “The desire of him who yearns, etc.” Again, Lucifer is able to love himself supremely, Augustine On the City of God XIV ch. 28 and Anselm On the Fall of the Devil ch.4. Again, the more intense the love the less the delight [cf. Ethics 3.12.1117b10-11, about the happier and more virtuous man being sadder at death]. Against the first distinction of the idea [n.76, end of first paragraph], different agent; against the second, union is a relation [ibid.]. The solution is in Ethics 10.2.1174a4-8.¹