Ordinatio

In this question one must see first about the concepts themselves and second about the thing signified by the name.

As to the first I say that just as there are in the intellect two acts of assenting to some proposition – one by which assent is given to something true for its own sake, as to a principle, another by which assent is given to some true proposition, not for its own sake, but for the sake of something else true, as to a conclusion – so there are in the will two acts of assenting to the good, one by which assent is given to some good for its own sake, another by which assent is given to some good for the sake of something else to which that good is referred, just as assent is given to the conclusion because of the principle, because the conclusion gets its truth from the principle. This likeness can be taken from the Philosopher in Ethics 6.2.1139a21-22, where is said that “in the mind there is affirmation and negation, but this in appetite is pursuit and flight;” and so, further, just as in the mind there is a double affirmation, because of itself and because of another, so there is in the appetite a double prosecution or adhering, both because of itself and because of another.

There is between these, however, a double difference. First, because the two assents of the intellect are distinguished by the nature of their objects; for they are different according to the different evidence of this and that truth, and therefore they have distinct objects corresponding to them and causing them. Here however these assents are not from distinction of objects but from a distinct act of a free power accepting its object in this way or in that, because, as was said before [n.16], it is in its power to act in this way or in that, referring or not referring it [sc. to another]; and so distinct proper objects do not correspond to these acts, but any willable good at all can the will have as object according to this act or according to that. The second difference is that the two assents of the intellect constitute a sufficient division of the assent of the intellect in general, nor is there any middle between them, because there is on the part of the object no intermediate evidence from which could be received a truth other than the truth of a principle or of a conclusion. But there is in addition to the two assents of the will some intermediate assent, because to the will can be shown some good that is apprehended absolutely, not under the idea of something good for its own sake or good for the sake of something else. Now the will can have an act in respect of such a good thus shown, and not necessarily a disordered act; therefore it can have some act of willing the good absolutely, without relation to something else, or without enjoyment for its own sake; and further, the will can command the intellect to inquire into what sort of good that is and how it should be willed, and then can it thus assent to it, – and the whole idea of the difference on this side and on that is the freedom of the will and natural necessity on the part of the intellect.

From this further: an act of an assent to a good for its own sake is a perfect act; but on a perfect act delight follows, from Ethics 10.4.1174b14-23; therefore on an act of willing a good for its own sake some delight follows. We have, therefore, as to the matter in hand four distinct things: an imperfect act of willing a good for the sake of something else, which is called use, and a perfect act of willing the good for its own sake, which is called enjoyment, and a neutral act, and a delight consequent to the act.

On the second principal point [n.65], namely to which of these the term ‘enjoying’ belongs, the answer can be collected from the authorities that speak about the word ‘enjoying’ [from Augustine, nn.70-72]; it is plain that it is not a neutral act, nor is an act of use an act of enjoying, but there is only dispute about perfect act and the delight that follows it. I reply: some authorities seem to say that enjoying is this perfect act alone, some that it is the delight alone; some that it includes both, and then it does not signify any being that is per se one but one by aggregation from two beings, or a being per accidens: nor is it unacceptable that one name signify many things, because the Iliad, according to the Philosopher Metaphysics 7.4.1030a6-10, is able to signify the whole Trojan War.

That it is only the act is seen from the authority of Augustine 83 Questions q.30: “All perversity, which is named vice, is to use things which are to be enjoyed and to enjoy things which are to be used.” Perversity exists formally in an elicited act of the will, not in delight, since delight is only depraved because the act is depraved, and delight is only in the power of the one delighted because the act is in his power; but sin insofar as it is sin is formally in the power of the sinner. This too Augustine seems manifestly to say On Christian Doctrine I ch.4 n.4: “To enjoy is to inhere with love in some thing for its own sake.” This inhering seems to be through the moving power of the inherer, just as in the case of bodies (from which this name ‘inhere’ there is adopted) inhesion is by virtue of the inherer.¹

But that enjoying is only delight seems to be said by the authority of Augustine On the Trinity I ch.8 n.18: “Full joy is to enjoy the Trinity;” but if the authority is not twisted toward causality or to some other understanding, which the words do not signify, joy is delight formally. Likewise too in the question alleged before from Augustine: “We enjoy the thing from which we take pleasure;” if the phrase is meant as identity or as it were a definition, then ‘to take pleasure’ is to enjoy essentially.

But that enjoying may be taken for both things, namely for the act and the delight together, is proved from the definition of ‘to enjoy’ in On the Trinity X ch.10 n.13: “We enjoy things known, wherein the will delighted for its own sake rests.” For to the act pertains what is said, that ‘we enjoy the things we know’, because to the act of will the object known is presupposed; but afterwards there is added ‘wherein the will delighted for its own sake rests’ etc., which, if delight were an accident of enjoyment, should not be placed in the definition of it. Likewise, if it be posited that both the act and the ensuing delight essentially pertain to beatitude [cf. n.70 footnote], then all the authorities that say to enjoy is the highest reward or is our beatitude say that it includes each of them, both the act and the delight. This minor is stated by the authority of Augustine in On Christian Doctrine I ch.22 n.35: “Supreme reward is that we enjoy him himself.”²

But one should not contend about the signification of the word, because according to Augustine Retractions I ch.15 n.4: “when the thing is clear, one should not force the words.” The thing is clear, because the will has a triple act, and a fourth, to wit the ensuing passion [n.68]; and to two of the acts this name in no way belongs [n.69]; some people seem to use the word for either of the other two and for both together, and then it will be equivocal, – or if it is univocal some of the authorities [nn.70-72] must be expounded as speaking causally or concomitantly.