Ordinatio
John Duns Scotus (1266–1308)
John Duns Scotus's Ordinatio (also called the Opus Oxoniense) is his revised, authorially prepared commentary on Peter Lombard's Sentences. Scotus began arranging it for publication around 1300 after lecturing at Oxford and continued revising material associated with Paris until his death in 1308; the work therefore remains unfinished and textually layered. Its disputations on God, creation, individuation, freedom, grace, and the Incarnation helped establish Scotism as a major alternative within late-medieval scholastic theology. Schola uses the Vatican critical-edition tradition for the Latin and a separately sourced English translation.
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Prologus I: Prologus Totius Operis
Pars I: Pars 1 - On the Necessity of Revealed Doctrine
Quaestio I: Single Question: On the Necessity of Revealed Doctrine - Whether it be necessary for man in this present state for some doctrine to be supernaturally inspired
Articulus I: 1. Controversy between Philosophers and Theologians
Section I: A. Opinion of the Philosophers
Section II: B. Rejection of the Opinion of the Philosophers
Articulus II: II. Solution of the Question
Articulus III: III. About the Three Principal Reasons against the Philosophers
Articulus IV: IV. To the Arguments of the Philosophers
Articulus V: V. To the Principal Arguments
Pars II: Pars 2 - On the Sufficiency of Revealed Doctrine
Quaestio I: Single Question: On the Sufficiency of Revealed Doctrine Whether the supernatural knowledge necessary for the wayfarer is sufficiently handed on in Sacred Scripture.
Articulus I: I. On the Truth of Sacred Scripture
Articulus II: II. Principal Response to the Question
Articulus III: III. To the Principal Arguments
Pars III: Pars 3 - On the Object of Theology
Quaestio I: Question 1: Whether theology is about God as about its first object.
Quaestio II: Question 2: Whether Theology is about God under some Special Idea
Quaestio III: Question 3: Whether Theology is about All Things from the Attribution of them to its First Subject
Articulus I: I. Preliminary Remarks
Articulus II: II. About Necessary Theology
Section I: A. To the First Question, speaking of Theology in itself
Section II: B. To the Second Question, speaking of Theology in itself
Section III: C. To the First Question, speaking of Our Theology
Articulus III: III. On Contingent Theology
Articulus IV: IV. On Christ as First Object
Articulus V: V. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question
Articulus VI: VI. To the principal Arguments of the Second Question
Articulus VII: VI. To the Third Question
Section I: A. Opinion of Others
Section II: B. Scotus’ own Response
Articulus VIII: VII. To the principal Arguments of the Third Question
Pars IV: Pars 4 - On Theology as a Science
Quaestio I: Questions 1 and 2 - Whether theology in itself is a science, and whether it is subalterning or subalternate
Articulus I: I. To the First Question
Articulus II: II. To the Second Question
Pars V: Pars 5 - On Theology insofar as it is a Practical Science
Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether theology is a practical or a speculative science
Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether a science is called practical per se from order to action as to its end
Articulus I: I. What Action [Praxis] is
Articulus II: II. How Practical Knowledge is Extended to Action
Articulus III: III. From what Source Knowledge has Extension to Action
Articulus IV: IV. To the Second Question
Articulus V: V. To the First Question
Section I: A. The Opinion of Others
Section II: B. Scotus’ own Opinion
Articulus VI: VI. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question.
Articulus VII: VII. To the Principal Arguments of the Second Question
Book 1
Distinctio I: First Distinction
Pars I: First Part - On the Object of Enjoyment
Quaestio I: Question 1: Whether the object of enjoyment per se is the ultimate end
Articulus I: I. To the Question
Tractatus I: II. To the Principal Arguments
Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether the ultimate end has only the one idea of enjoyability
Articulus I: I. To the Question
Section I: A. On the Enjoyment of the Wayfarer as to its Possibility
Section II: B. On the Enjoyment of the Comprehender when Speaking of the Absolute Power of God
Section III: C. On the Enjoyment of the Comprehender when Speaking of the Power of the Creature
Section IV: D. On the Enjoyment of the Comprehender and of the Wayfarer when Speaking of the Fact
Articulus II: II. To the Arguments
Section I: A. To the Principal Arguments
Section II: B. To the Reasons for the Opposite
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To the reasons for the opposite. To the first [n.27] I say that there is only one ultimate end in itself, yet it has several distinct ideas which are not formally ideas of the ultimate end, and so one can enjoy it under the idea of the ultimate end without enjoying it under those ideas.
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To the second [n.28] I say that, as was said in the preceding question [n.14], that it is per accidens that the idea of efficient cause and the idea of end come together in the same thing, yet in fact one is the formal idea of the end itself just as one is the formal idea of the efficient cause itself, but in that one idea the power can be at rest although it is not at rest in the personal ideas that are in the end. As to the confirmation when it is said that ‘one person cannot cause unless the other cause, therefore one person cannot terminate the act of enjoyment unless the other terminate it’ [n.28], I say that the conclusion does not follow; for it does well follow that one person from the nature of the thing is not the end unless another person is the end, but it does not follow about the end of the act as the act is elicited by the power, because the end of the act as elicited is the one to which the power as eliciting orders the act and because of which it elicits the act. But the end from the nature of the thing is the good, to which the act of its own nature is of a nature to be ordered, not indeed in idea of the object which is attained by the act, but in the way that all created natures are in their degree ordered to the ultimate end. To the authority of Augustine On the Trinity [n.28], it is plain that he is speaking there of the fact and of the formal idea of it.
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To the final point about adoration [n.29] I say that there is one habitual adoration of the three persons, because whoever adores one of them habitually is subjecting himself to the whole Trinity; but this need not be the case actually; for he need not think actually of another person when he adores one of them, as is plain about someone praying to one of the persons by a prayer that is not directed actually to another person, as is plain of the hymn ‘Come, Creator Spirit’, and of many prayers established in the Church. Hence the prayers of the Church are frequently directed to the Father and at the end the Son is brought in as mediator; therefore while someone is actually directing his intention to adoring the Father, he need not then actually think of the Son or of the Holy Spirit, until after he introduces the Son in his adoration and thought, namely as mediator. And just as it is the same adoration in habit but not in act, so it is the same enjoyment in habit although not necessarily the same in act.