Ordinatio
John Duns Scotus (1266–1308)
John Duns Scotus's Ordinatio (also called the Opus Oxoniense) is his revised, authorially prepared commentary on Peter Lombard's Sentences. Scotus began arranging it for publication around 1300 after lecturing at Oxford and continued revising material associated with Paris until his death in 1308; the work therefore remains unfinished and textually layered. Its disputations on God, creation, individuation, freedom, grace, and the Incarnation helped establish Scotism as a major alternative within late-medieval scholastic theology. Schola uses the Vatican critical-edition tradition for the Latin and a separately sourced English translation.
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Prologus I: Prologus Totius Operis
Pars I: Pars 1 - On the Necessity of Revealed Doctrine
Quaestio I: Single Question: On the Necessity of Revealed Doctrine - Whether it be necessary for man in this present state for some doctrine to be supernaturally inspired
Articulus I: 1. Controversy between Philosophers and Theologians
Section I: A. Opinion of the Philosophers
Section II: B. Rejection of the Opinion of the Philosophers
Articulus II: II. Solution of the Question
Articulus III: III. About the Three Principal Reasons against the Philosophers
Articulus IV: IV. To the Arguments of the Philosophers
Articulus V: V. To the Principal Arguments
Pars II: Pars 2 - On the Sufficiency of Revealed Doctrine
Quaestio I: Single Question: On the Sufficiency of Revealed Doctrine Whether the supernatural knowledge necessary for the wayfarer is sufficiently handed on in Sacred Scripture.
Articulus I: I. On the Truth of Sacred Scripture
Articulus II: II. Principal Response to the Question
Articulus III: III. To the Principal Arguments
Pars III: Pars 3 - On the Object of Theology
Quaestio I: Question 1: Whether theology is about God as about its first object.
Quaestio II: Question 2: Whether Theology is about God under some Special Idea
Quaestio III: Question 3: Whether Theology is about All Things from the Attribution of them to its First Subject
Articulus I: I. Preliminary Remarks
Articulus II: II. About Necessary Theology
Section I: A. To the First Question, speaking of Theology in itself
Section II: B. To the Second Question, speaking of Theology in itself
Section III: C. To the First Question, speaking of Our Theology
Articulus III: III. On Contingent Theology
Articulus IV: IV. On Christ as First Object
Articulus V: V. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question
Articulus VI: VI. To the principal Arguments of the Second Question
Articulus VII: VI. To the Third Question
Section I: A. Opinion of Others
Section II: B. Scotus’ own Response
Articulus VIII: VII. To the principal Arguments of the Third Question
Pars IV: Pars 4 - On Theology as a Science
Quaestio I: Questions 1 and 2 - Whether theology in itself is a science, and whether it is subalterning or subalternate
Articulus I: I. To the First Question
Articulus II: II. To the Second Question
Pars V: Pars 5 - On Theology insofar as it is a Practical Science
Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether theology is a practical or a speculative science
Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether a science is called practical per se from order to action as to its end
Articulus I: I. What Action [Praxis] is
Articulus II: II. How Practical Knowledge is Extended to Action
Articulus III: III. From what Source Knowledge has Extension to Action
Articulus IV: IV. To the Second Question
Articulus V: V. To the First Question
Section I: A. The Opinion of Others
Section II: B. Scotus’ own Opinion
Articulus VI: VI. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question.
Articulus VII: VII. To the Principal Arguments of the Second Question
Book 1
Distinctio I: First Distinction
Pars I: First Part - On the Object of Enjoyment
Quaestio I: Question 1: Whether the object of enjoyment per se is the ultimate end
Articulus I: I. To the Question
Tractatus I: II. To the Principal Arguments
Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether the ultimate end has only the one idea of enjoyability
Articulus I: I. To the Question
Section I: A. On the Enjoyment of the Wayfarer as to its Possibility
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About the first I say that it is possible for the wayfarer to enjoy the divine essence without enjoying the person, and this is also possible as to ordered enjoyment. My proof for this is that according to Augustine On the Trinity VII ch.1 n.2: “if essence is said relatively it is not essence, because every essence which is said relatively is something after the relative has been removed;” from which he concludes, ibid.: “wherefore, if the Father is not something in himself, he is not something which may be said relative to another.” The divine essence, then, is some conceivable object in whose concept relation is not included, therefore it can be thus conceived by the wayfarer; but essence thus conceived has the idea of the supreme good, therefore also the perfect idea of enjoyability; therefore it is possible to enjoy it too in ordered way.
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A confirmation of this reason is because it can be deduced from purely natural facts that there is one supreme good, and yet from those natural facts we do not conceive God as he is three; therefore about the supreme good thus known it is possible to have some act of will, and not necessarily a non-ordered act; therefore it will have an ordered act of enjoyment about the essence and not about the person as we conceive person. The converse, however, is not possible, namely that one enjoy the person in an ordered way without enjoying the essence, because the person includes the essence in the idea of itself.
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Second I say also that the wayfarer can enjoy in an ordered way one person without enjoying another. I prove this, because with respect to the three persons there are three distinct articles of faith; therefore one person can be conceived to whom one article corresponds while another person is not conceived to whom another article corresponds, and then in the former person the idea of the supreme good is conceived; one can therefore enjoy the person thus conceived without enjoying another. If you say that ‘person’ is relative, therefore it cannot be conceived unless its correlative be conceived, I reply: although the knowledge of a relative require knowledge of its correlative, it is nevertheless not necessary that the knower and enjoyer of one relative know and enjoy the other relative, because it is possible to enjoy God insofar as he is Creator without enjoying the creature that is nevertheless the term of that relation. – Likewise, although the Father is said correlatively to the Son and therefore cannot be understood insofar as he is Father without the Son being understood, yet he is not said relatively to the Holy Spirit insofar as he is Father; therefore it will be possible to conceive the Father as Father and to enjoy him without conceiving and enjoying the Holy Spirit.