Ordinatio

To the arguments of the second question. To the authority of the Philosopher in On the Soul [n.223] I say that he is speaking there of the end as known; for the intellect that is calculating for the sake of something is calculating for the sake of the end as known and as it is a principle of demonstration.

To the second authority from the Metaphysics [n.224] I say that the practical is not for the sake of use as per se end; yet it does have some relation to use, such that use is its per se object, or something that virtually includes use, of which sort the Philosopher did not posit there to be any being save a being for the end; and every such object is less noble than an object of speculation; and therefore such order to action proves the ignobility of the practical with respect to the speculative.

To the third from the Metaphysics [n.225] I say that the speculative and practical have diverse ends speaking of per se ends within the genus of knowledge, but those ends do not first distinguish them, but there is a prior distinction from the objects, as was said before [nn.252-255, 259, 265-266].

To the reasons for the opposite position when argument is given against distinction through objects: To the first [n.249] I say that a speculative habit and a practical habit cannot be about the same object. – But when the opposite is proved through the remark of the Philosopher in On the Soul that “the intellect is made practical by extension,” I say that the Philosopher does not say this, namely that the speculative intellect is made practical by extension; but Aristotle, when he posits three grades of intellect, of which the first considers speculables only, the second considers doables, not by commanding to pursue or flee, he says that “by extending itself further it wants to pursue or flee,” so that this extension is of intellect imperfectly practical to consideration perfectly practical, to wit from apprehension of things terrible to a complete command about them, prescribing flight or pursuit. A concession, however, that the speculative intellect is made practical is not to the purpose, because ‘speculative’ and ‘practical’ are accidental differences of the intellect, although they are essential differences of habits and acts, and therefore habits and acts are not extended.

To the other about medicine [n.250], someone says that the universal habit is speculative but when from it the particular habit is acquired, it then becomes practical. – On the contrary: then from speculative principles a practical conclusion would follow, which is unacceptable.

Therefore it must be said in another way that, when there are extreme opposites, the more something departs from one of the opposites, so much the more does it approach the other; the most actual idea of the practical does the consideration have that is of a nature to be immediately conform formally to the action to be elicited; therefore the more something departs from this, so much the more does it approach the speculative; therefore the universal habit, which is not of a nature to be immediately conform to action, can be said in some way to be speculative with respect to some habit that is immediately of a nature to be conform to the action to be elicited. In this way art could be set down as a speculative habit with respect to the habit of the expert, because art, as being a more universal habit, is not so immediately directive, as appears from Metaphysics 1.1.981a14-24, “the artisan will frequently err, the expert will not err.” In this way can medicine be distinguished into the speculative, which namely is about universal causes and cures, which knowledge is more remote from the action to be elicited, and into the practical, which is about particulars and things closer to action and more immediately conform to the action to be elicited. However, in truth the more universal knowledge, which is called speculative comparatively, is simply and most truly practical, because it virtually includes the particular knowledge formally conform to action.

To the other about goodness and malice [n.251] I say that not every good act is good first from the circumstance of the end as end, nay some act is good from the circumstance of the object, to wit when the end is object, and there the circumstance of the end as object first gives rectitude to the act [nn.263-264]; for the act is simply good from the object alone, as ‘to love God’ is simply good without other circumstances. Therefore it is false that from the end as the end is distinguished from object is the first goodness of the moral act taken, nay it is false in a second way, because, although an act about a being for the end have the end for first circumstance, yet from the object there is a prior goodness, by which an act is said to be good in its kind; there is a third response, directly to the purpose [n.362], because although a circumstance formally circumstances action so that it be good, yet it does not formally circumstance practical understanding; for the intellect does not command an act moderately or in a middle way, so as to be circumstanced by this circumstance to give command moderately, but the intellect gives command according to the utmost of its power; but the ‘commanding’ is right from the principle, and the principle is taken from the first object.

Against that [n.362] is that the distinction is not through objects. The proof is because everything formally of a certain sort is of that sort through something intrinsic to it, therefore, if a habit is formally practical, this is by something intrinsic to it; but this is not the object; therefore etc. Example: the sun is not formally hot although it is virtually hot.

Further, the object does not distinguish the habit save as an efficient cause; efficient causes do not distinguish the effect by species, because an effect the same in species can be from causes diverse in species, as a hot thing the same in species is generated equivocally and univocally by fire and by the sun.

To the first [n.363] I say that to be practical states something intrinsic to knowledge just as an aptitudinal respect states something intrinsic to the foundation, and that some knowledge is naturally apt to be referred, that is, by a nature intrinsic to knowledge, which nature it has from the object as from an extrinsic cause. I say then that a habit is practical by what is intrinsic as by a formal cause, but by the object, which is extrinsic, as by an efficient cause.

To the second [n.364] I say that although from essentially ordered causes, one of which is univocal and the other equivocal, there can, when each is causing, be an effect of one idea, as is exemplified of heat, when however proximate efficient causes of the same order to the effect cause something insofar as these causes are distinct, especially if each is univocal with the effect (whether the univocity is complete or diminished), there cannot be from such distinct causes an effect of the same idea. I say univocity is complete when there is likeness in the form and in the mode of being of the form; I say univocity is diminished when there is likeness in the form although it have another mode of being, in the way that the house outside is from the house in the mind of the builder (hence the Philosopher calls this generation ‘in some way’ univocal, Metaphysics 7.9.1034a21-25). Because therefore the object is proximate cause with respect to knowledge and is univocal, although in a diminished way, it follows that the formal distinction of objects, since these cause knowledges insofar as they are distinct, necessarily proves a formal distinction of knowledges.