Ordinatio

Now that these points have been seen, it is necessary to respond to the first question [n.217], where there are five ways holding the negative side of the question [sc. that theology is not a practical science]. [First way] – One way speaks thus, declaring that there is a double act of the will, one perfecting the will, the other being perfected by it, as is maintained by Henry of Ghent in his Summa and see it in a.8 q.3 ad3.^[Interpolation [from Henry of Ghent: “First act is with respect to the end and is the perfect operation which the will elicits within itself and unites itself to the last end; second act is with respect to things that are for the end, hence it is a good action by which the will tends to something else outside itself, just as is any action directive to the end. In the first act the will does not need something directive but mere showing of the end is sufficient; for there is speculation in it only so as to show perfectly to the will the object of its operation so that it may at once tend to it with a perfect operation. Now such act simply looks to speculative knowledge. In the second act the will needs something directive, and this pertains to practical science, because in it there is speculation to direct action, which is proper to practical science. But the act that is perfected by the will is not the end of this science (unless the end is under an end) but another one which perfects the will: and from this does this science have that it is most perfectly speculative, because the act principally intended in this science is an act of the will about the end, in which it does not need a directive act but only a showing of the object. Therefore, it is not practical science, but only simply speculative, since in its own principal act it does not need a directive act.’ So Henry of Ghent, ‘For this way’ etc. [n.271].”]

For this way there is the authority of Augustine in his sermon On Jacob and Esau (Sermon 88 ch.5 n.6): “All our works,” he says, “are for the purpose of purifying the eye whereby God is seen.”

Again, it can be argued thus: something directive is not required save where there can be error; practical science is directive, therefore the science of the blessed is not practical, because the blessed cannot err; therefore, neither is our science practical, because it is the same as that of the blessed.

Again, it can be argued according to his understanding elsewhere [Henry of Ghent, Summa a.36 q.4]: God does not have practical science; but he most of all or alone has this science; therefore etc.

Against this I argue, and first I lead the idea of their position to the opposite, in four ways. First thus: although the will cannot err about the end displayed in a universal way, yet it can err about the end displayed in a particular way; therefore, in order for it to act rightly about the end displayed in a particular way, direction is required. The showing of the end in theology is of the end not universally but in particular, because the showing of it universally belongs to the metaphysician.¹

Further, a directive habit is not posited because of the substance of an act but because of its circumstance, as temperance is not posited because of the substance of the act of eating, or of another act of the sort, but because of its circumstance; therefore, although the will were determined to the substance of an act tending to the end in particular, yet direction would be required as to the circumstances of the act, to which the direction that is about the substance of the act does not extend. – From these two reasons the argument is made that wherever it is possible in action to err and to act rightly, there practical knowledge is necessary for giving direction; in this action, which is love of the end as it pertains to theology, error happens in two ways, as the reasons show, both by reason of the object in particular and by reason of the circumstances of the act; therefore etc.

Further, third: that of which the love is principally intended outside the genus of knowledge, of that the knowledge is principally intended inside the genus of knowledge; but love of the end for them is principally intended outside the genus of knowledge; therefore, knowledge of the end is principally intended inside the genus of knowledge. But in any science is principally intended knowledge of the first subject of it, therefore the end is the principal subject of this science. From the end are taken practical principles; but practical principles conclude to practical conclusions; therefore this science, which first intends love of the end outside the genus of knowledge, is practical.

Further, to the same genus, according to action or speculation, belong the principles and conclusions; for practical conclusions are resolved to practical principles, not speculative ones; therefore since knowledge of the end is directive in acts about what is for the end, and since knowledge of what is for the end is a sort of conclusion concluded in knowledge of the end as of a sort of principle, then if knowledge of what is for the end is knowledge of practical conclusions, the knowledge of the end will be practical, because it is of a practical principle. Thus is plain the response to this way’s first reason [n.270], because it takes what is false (as though the will were determinate of itself), which the first two reasons prove [nn.274-275]. Likewise, if the will were determinate, yet still the knowledge would be practical, as the two final reasons prove [nn.276-277].

To the authority they appeal to [n.271] (it seems to conclude that the vision of God is the end of this science, which they do not concede) I reply that the authority is speaking of these external operations, which are fastings, vigils, and prayers; yet any external act is of a nature to be conformed to any interior act by which it has its goodness, and also of a nature to be ordered to some interior act, and finally to an act of willing.

To the third [n.272] I reply: an agent intends per se to induce a form and does not intend the removal of a contrary save per accidens. Thus, a habit per se directs, but it per accidens excludes error; and if the habit is perfect it is not compatible with error, nay if it is compatible it is not perfect. Therefore, although the blessed be not able to err, it does not follow that they do not have also a directive habit, because, if it were per impossibile removed, they could err, but once it is posited, all error, because of the perfection of it, is excluded.

Discussion of the fourth [n.273] will be given below, after the solution of this first question, by solving the fourth objection against it [nn.324-331].

[Second way (n.270)] – The second way, although it could rightly and not rightly be elicited, yet denies that love of the end is action because it is not about a contingent object. For the Commentator says on the Ethics [Eustratius, Explanations of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 1 ch.1 3E] that action is operation according to choice; choice is only about the contingent, from Ethics 3.4.1111b29-30, because it is deliberative appetite; deliberation is only about the contingent (Ethics 3.5.1112a21-22, 30-31). From this too is the description of action posited in the first article of the solution [n.228] proved to be insufficient, because it omits the precise object. Consequently, this way says that no knowledge is practical that is extended to volition of the final end alone, because this end is not a true contingent.

Against this way is the fourth reason set down against the preceding one [n.277]. Again, in truth action is that operation to which appetitive virtue inclines, because any such virtue is a habit of choice, from Ethics 2.6.1106b36-7a2, and choice is action, as will be shown against the third way directly [nn.287-289]; but to love of the end not only does charity incline but also acquired love, which is appetitive virtue, because the acquired habit or appetite is in agreement with right reason. The motive for this way will be solved in the solution of the second principal reason for the first question [nn.346-351].

[Third way (n.270)] – The third way posits that either volition is not properly action but only the act posterior to it is, or if it is action, it is not so save in order to some commanded act of a lower power, to wit of the sense appetitive or the motive power or the like.

For this third way it is argued that all action follows choice. The proof is from the Philosopher in Ethics 6.2.1139a31-32: “The principle of an act is choice, not for the sake of which, but the source of motion,” that is, not the final principle but the effective one; the effective principle naturally precedes the effect; therefore etc.

Further, a practical habit is generated from actions; but a practical habit is generated from acts that follow choice; therefore, they are actions.

Again, the Commentator on the Ethics [Eustratius, id. 1 ch.1 3E] says: “Action is operation in accord with choice;” therefore action follows choice.

Against this, that not only an act which follows choice is action, the proof is because in Ethics 6.2.1139a33-34 the Philosopher says that choice is not right without right reason and the habit of virtue; therefore virtue is per se required for right choice; but it would not be required if it were a habit generated from acts posterior to choice, because it would not then incline per se save to the acts posterior to choice. Therefore, the argument proceeds under another form, because a habit is generated from the same acts to which it inclines, from Ethics 2.1.1103b21-23; but moral virtue per se inclines to right choice, because, as is clear from its definition in Ethics 2.6.1106b36-7a2, virtue is “a habit of choice” etc.; therefore moral virtue is per se generated from choices, and as a result not only the acts following choice are actions.

Further, not only is it false to deny that choice is action, which is argued by the reason just given, but, as was proved in the first article [nn.230, 234], an elicited act of the will is first action, and a commanded act is so only because of it; therefore if a choice be on its own, without order to commanding an act, to wit because of the lack of matter for the external act, it alone will be truly action. This is made clear thus: someone without money, to whom however money is presented in imagination before the choice of any action be an effective principle or a principle for commanding someone, if he choose to distribute the money liberally were he to have it, then, as to the act and habit of virtue, no further prosecution [of the act] or distribution is required, because when some object has been presented in imagination that there could be an act of liberality about, the choice is had completely from which liberality is generated or which is elicited from liberality; nor is there required any further prosecution [of the act], or anything external, or any order to what is external, if the matter of the external act be lacking.

Further, this order can only be of a cause for causing the ‘because’ of the effect; but it seems unacceptable that a cause in itself not be of itself such as is prior to the effect but only because it is actually ordered to bringing about the effect, since a cause gets nothing from the effect, nor from its order to the effect.

Then to the authority from the Ethics [n.284] I say that in the same place the Philosopher at once adds: “But of choice (supply: the principles are) appetite and reason that are for the sake of something” (that is, practical). Also, in order for choice to be right, virtue is required in appetite; hence there follows: “Choice (namely right choice) is not without moral habit.” Therefore, virtue has an elicited act more immediate to it than the act of which choice is principle as giving command; for the elicited act of the will, which is choice, is a good act before the external act commanded by good choice is good. The proof is given by the Philosopher; for he immediately adds (after the remark ‘nor is choice without a habit’): “For a good act is not without custom.” But if this is the major premise to prove what he said before about choice, let this minor premise be assumed under it, ‘good choice is a good act’. I concede, therefore, the authority that affirms choice to be the principle ‘from which’ of an act, because an act commanded by choice is also a moral act; but from this it does not follow that it alone is an act or action, nay rather choice is a prior action, on account of which it too is a good action.

To the second [n.285], if the major is true, I say that a practical habit is generated from choices, as was said above about someone choosing frequently to give liberally [n.288]; even without the commanded act, should the means not be available, liberality can be generated in him. But because, when the commanded acts are impossible, the will does not commonly choose rightly often about the matter of these acts – because that which is believed impossible for someone either he does not will or wills weakly, according to Augustine [On the Trinity X.1 n.2] – therefore commonly the practical habit which is virtue is not generated without the commanded actions subsequent to the choices; it is however not generated from those subsequent actions but from the choices, where moral goodness exists formally; in commanded actions it only exists materially.

To the third [n.286], to the Commentator, it is necessary that the ‘according to’ not be there an indication of efficient cause if the description has to be convertible with the thing described, as was already proved by Aristotle in the Ethics [n.290]; but the ‘according to’ must be understood effectively or formally, or let choice there be taken for liberality or for controlling power, or let choice be taken for the eliciting of an act of willing which is not choice or any volition. But every action [praxis] is action in the genus of action in accord with the choice, as though in accord with its active principle, whether the action be choice or what follows choice, because action in the genus of action is reduced to an effective principle.

These three ways [nn.270, 281, 283] posit that theology is purely speculative, notwithstanding the fact that it be extended to love of the end – whether the will is as it were naturally determined to that when a showing of it precedes [n.270], or whether the will is freely and contingently related to it (not however about a contingent and doable object [n.281]), or third whether it is related in any way at all about any object at all, not however by doing it, that is, not however in its order to the commanded act, but by stopping at the first elicited act [n.283].

But that such extension does not prove it is practical is persuasive because then any knowledge would be practical, because some delight or love accompanies any knowledge at all.

Likewise in Ethics 10.9.1179a22-24, the happy man “is most dear to God,” and yet the Philosopher posits that happiness to be speculative and not practical.

Against this conclusion, common to these ways, it seems to follow that there is some operation in the power of man such that it is truly a human act and yet is not properly speculation or action, to wit love of the end; the consequent seems unacceptable.

Further, that directive knowledge in any volition is not practical, since ‘truth is agreement with right appetite’, seems unacceptable, because such truth is the proper work of the practical mind, from Ethics 6.3.1139a29-31.

What is added about delight [n.294] is nothing to the purpose, because since delight is a passion naturally consequent to perfect operation, whether it be about the speculation or the thing speculated about, from this is no practical knowledge posited because of extension to delight, because neither is it action properly speaking; this will be touched on in Ord. III Suppl. d.15 q. un. But to love and desire a known object, and this circumstanced in such or such way, is truly action, nor is it naturally consequent to apprehension but is can freely be rightly or not rightly elicited.

What is added about the happy contemplative, that he is most dear to God [n.295], is not made compelling by the authority, for it speaks passively as it were, the happy man ‘is most loved by God’, not actively, as is plain there; for it adds: “if the gods have any care for human things, it is reasonable that they (supply ‘the gods’) take joy in what is best and most like them; but this is the intellect,” and then: “to those therefore who love this (that is, the intellect) it will be reasonable for the gods to give reward, as to their friends,” etc.

But, setting that authority aside, is it the case that the happy contemplative is most loving according to Aristotle in the way that to love is distinguished from to be delighted, whether about the object speculated on or about the speculation? – I reply: in Metaphysics 12.7.1072b3 he holds the first mover moves as something loved; therefore a lower intelligence loves the first mover, and yet he would place its happiness in speculation, as is plain from Ethics 10.8.1178b7-32; therefore he himself comprehends under speculation not only delight but loving. Therefore, neither because of extension to that will the knowledge be practical, according to him, but speculative.

But why then is he not held to this result, since the idea of practical and of speculative science is adopted by him? – and so the first two ways, denying it [sc. that theology is practical] in positing theology to be speculative, do well posit it, even according to the Philosopher – I reply: the ‘to love’ that he would posit in the intelligence he would posit to be in the will by natural necessity, so that it would not happen there that it errs and acts rightly, so that, with respect to it, the knowledge would be only ostensive, not directive, either as to the object in particular or as to any condition of it or any circumstance of the act of willing.

The theologians would not speak in this way about the act of love of intelligible creatures in regard to God in particular and as to the circumstances of the act, as was argued against the first way in the first two reasons [nn.274-275]. If therefore he [= the Philosopher] had agreed with us, positing that loving the end can freely and rightly and not rightly be elicited, and that it cannot be rightly elicited unless it is elicited in conformity with a right reason not only showing the object but also bidding it to be thus elicited, perhaps he would, with respect to such, have posited a practical knowledge, because a knowledge in agreement with right appetite. Therefore, it is better for the theologian, who must disagree with him in the minor premise, by consequently saying he disagrees in the conclusion, than to agree in the conclusion that he himself [= the Philosopher] would not posit if he were not holding the minor along with the theologian.² When, therefore, you say that we get from him the idea of practical and speculative, it is true, and we agree in the major premise that it [= theology] is speculative, which although it were extended to love as pointing out the object, yet in no way would it be directive in the act as it can be circumstanced or as it is of this object in particular; but the minor that he himself assumes under the major we have to deny in the case at hand.³

[Fourth way] – And therefore there is a fourth way, which says that theology is affective. Which can be understood in a good way if affective is set down as something practical; but if it is set down as a third member, distinct from the practical and speculative, it is in this way contrary to what was said in the first article, where it was shown that love is truly action [nn.228-235], and also against many authorities that believe precisely that science is divided into the practical and the speculative, and there is no third member.

[Fifth way] – The fifth way says that theology is contemplative. For this way Augustine is adduced in On the Trinity 12 ch.14 n.22, where his meaning is that wisdom is in respect of contemplation, science in respect of action; since, therefore, theology is properly wisdom and not science, it will not be practical but contemplative. I reply that Augustine in On the Trinity 12 ch.4 n.4 says that the two parts of the soul, the superior and the inferior, are only distinguished according to their functions; and in each there is a trinity (but in the superior the image of the Trinity), and yet only the superior is contemplative, because it has regard to things eternal. Therefore, the contemplation of which he speaks is not distinguished from speculation within the genus of science; for the contemplative contains memory, intelligence, and will, and so in the contemplative there can be an extension outside the genus of science, just as there can be in the active, that is, in the inferior part, which regards temporal things, and it too contains a trinity. If then it is contemplative as Augustine speaks there, it is not for this reason prevented from being practical if it is extended to practice in the superior part.

[Another opinion] There is another opinion, discordant from the preceding ones in its conclusion that science is speculative and practical. The proof for it is twofold. One way is as follows: just as a teaching in which there are some things written about law and other things about philosophy would be speculative and practical, whether they were written in separate books or intertwined and mixed, so too in this teaching [of theology] speculative and practical things are treated of together, not in separate books and chapters but intertwined and mixed; therefore it is speculative and practical.

Again it is proved in this way, because no speculative knowledge treats more distinctly of doable things than the knowledge of them is necessary for speculation, nor does any practical science treat more distinctly of things to speculate than is required the knowledge of them because of the action it is extended to; this science treats more distinctly of doable things than is the knowledge of them necessary for speculation, and more distinctly of things to speculate than is the knowledge of them required for practical knowledge; therefore it is speculative and practical. – The major is plain, because things to speculate are considered in practical science only on account of practical consideration, and doable things are considered in speculative science only on account of speculative consideration. The minor is plain, because this science treats of doable things as distinctly as if it were precisely about them, and of things to speculate as distinctly as if it were precisely about them.

Against this it is argued as follows: a habit that does not get evidence from its object is not distinguished according to distinction of objects (for then it would be necessary to posit two infused faiths); this habit [of theology] does not get evidence from its object, therefore it is not distinguished according to distinction of objects; therefore it is not two habits because of the distinction between things to do and things to speculate.

Further, although the said opinion about two habits could have some probability about theology as it is handed down in Scripture, yet about theology in itself, whose subject is the divine essence as this essence (as is said about the subject of theology [n.167]), it does not seem probable; for about that object, since it is most truly a single knowable, some knowledge truly one is of a nature to be first had about it; if another be granted which is not about it but about some other first thing, that other knowledge will not be theology in itself. Therefore, theology is a habit simply one, although perhaps there could along with it exist in Scripture some knowledge that is about some other subject.

Again, it is plain that the order of sciences with respect to eminence stops at one thing alone, because there cannot be two sciences first simply; that single and sole eminence I say is theology, which alone is first about the first subject of theology.

Further, I take the reason for it [n.306] to the opposite conclusion: that knowledge is practical in which determination is not made of things to speculate about more than the knowledge of them pertains to practice or practical knowledge; this knowledge [of theology] does not treat of things to speculate on more distinctly than the knowledge of them is required for directing practical knowledge or practice; therefore etc. – Proof of the minor: any knowledge at all of the conditions of the desirability of the end, and of the conditions of the things that are for the end insofar as they are for the end, and third of the conditions of whatever is of this sort or of other things, about which conditions the operative power can err unless it be directed, is necessary for practical knowledge; no knowledge is here here handed on about the end or about what is for the end without being of this sort; therefore etc. Or at any rate it is possible for an ignorant will to err about them, as will be said in the solution of the third objection [n.322] against the principal solution of the question.⁴

The assumption is plain, because all of the conditions handed down about the end are rather of a nature to show the desirability of the end, and the conditions of the things that are for the end are of a nature to show rather the things ordered to the end.

To the argument [n.306], it is plain that the minor is false. For proof I say that the end known and the things for the end could not be treated of so distinctly without the whole knowledge being practical for a created intellect, because the whole of that knowledge is of a nature to show the end under the idea of desirability and to show the things that are for the end under the idea of their order to the end, or whatever a non-directed will could err about.

[Another opinion] – Another opinion holds the same conclusion, but posits along with this that theology is one habit simply.⁵

[On the theology of necessary things] – To the question [n.217], therefore, I reply that since an elicited act of will is most truly action, even if no commanded act accompanies it (as is plain from the first article [nn.230, 232, 234-235]), and since extension of practical knowledge consists in conformity to action and in aptitudinal priority (this is plain from the second article [nn.236-237]), it follows that that knowledge is practical which is aptitudinally conform to right volition and is naturally prior to it; but the whole of theology necessary for a created intellect is thus conform to the act of the created will and prior to it; therefore etc. – The proof of the minor is because the first object of theology is virtually conform to right volition, because from the idea of it are taken the principles of rectitude in volition; it also determines the created intellect to knowledge of the determinate rectitude of the action as to all necessary theological things, naturally before any created will wills them, otherwise they would not be necessary; therefore from the first object follows both the conformity and the priority of theology to volition, and thus extension to action, from which extension knowledge itself must be called practical. A confirmation of this reason is because, since the first object of theology is the ultimate end, the principles too in the created intellect taken from the ultimate end are practical principles, therefore the principles of theology are practical; therefore the conclusions too are practical.

If objection be made against this from what was said in the preceding question, where it is said that God is not the first subject here as end but as this essence [nn.167, 195]; but the principles taken from the end as it is end are practical; therefore etc.

Again, knowledge of the ultimate end is not immediately conform to, nor of a nature to be conform to, the eliciting of action; therefore it is not proximately practical.

Again, the first object virtually includes conformity to right action, but not the knowledge thus conform alone; otherwise there could not be speculative science about it, which seems unacceptable. For how is this truth practical ‘God is triune’ or ‘the Father generates the Son’? Therefore, the first object includes some speculative knowledge. Therefore, from the virtual conformity of the first object to action it does not follow that theology is practical, since the truths most theological insofar as theology is distinguished from metaphysics are speculative.

Again, then the science of God, which is about the same first subject, would be practical, and it seems that the idea of the solution to the question [n.314] could be applied to the divine intellect just as to the created one.

To the first [n.315] I say that the respect of the end is not what the principles in any science are taken from, but the absolute subject is on which the respect is founded; that subject is ‘this essence’.

To the second [n.316] I say that what virtually contains conform knowledge is virtually conform, and thus is practical knowledge, because practical conclusions have practical principles; but the knowledge proximate to this one which is about the end is knowledge of enjoyment of the end, and it is of the nature to be formally conform to the action of enjoyment.

To the third [n.317] I say that the first object only includes knowledge conform to right volition, because by virtue of it nothing about it is known that is not either rectitude of some volition or virtually includes knowledge of such rectitude. And I concede what is inferred as unacceptable in the consequent, that about it there can be no speculative science; for necessarily knowledge of it and of anything intrinsic known through it is aptitudinally conform to action and prior, if what is known is necessary.

When objection is made about those truths, which seem to be most truly theological and not metaphysical, ‘God is triune’, ‘the Father generates the Son’ [n.317], I say that these truths are practical. The first indeed virtually includes knowledge of the rectitude of love tending toward the three persons, such that if an act were elicited about one of them alone, excluding another (as an unbeliever would elicit it), the act would not be right; the second includes knowledge of the rectitude of the act which is about two persons one of whom is thus from the other [Ord. I d.1 p.1 q.2 n.2, 5, 11].

And if it be objected against this, that nothing save an essential is reason for terminating an act of love; but theology is more properly about the personals than about the essentials, because many essentials can be known by the metaphysician; therefore theology as distinguished from metaphysics as to what is most proper to it is not practical. The proof of the first proposition is that otherwise there would be some idea of lovability in one person that would not be in another, which is false, because then no person would be blessed in himself. I reply: an essential is absolutely the idea of terminating an act of loving as ‘that because of which’, but the persons terminate an act of loving as whom are loved. For it is not sufficient for rectitude of the act that it have the fitting formal idea in the object, but there is also required that it have the fitting object in which such formal idea exists. So, besides the knowledge of rectitude which includes the essential in the act of loving God, the personals include the further proper knowledge of the required rectitude.

As to the fourth [n.318], it could be conceded that the theology of God about necessary things is practical, because in his intellect the first theological object is of a nature as it were to generate the knowledge conform to right volition that is naturally prior to the volition. That it is conform is plain. That it is also prior is proved because the intellect first naturally understands the first object before the will wills it; therefore naturally prior to volition it can have all the knowledge sufficient for it virtually included in the understanding of the first object; of such sort is any necessary knowledge whatever of the first object. The consequence supposed is plain, both because, with all will per impossibile excluded, the intellect could have all sufficient knowledge virtually included in the understanding of the first object, since that understanding precedes all volition; – and because the divine intellect is not discursive; so it does not naturally understand the first object before it understands anything virtually included in it as to knowledge; therefore, if it understands the first object before the will wills anything, it understands anything as to knowledge that is included in the first object before the will wills (this second proof of the consequence is less strong).

If it be objected that the divine will will not be the first rule of itself in its act if its act is preceded by the knowledge to which it should be conformed in acting so as to act rightly; the consequent seems unacceptable, because it takes away the supreme freedom of the divine will if it is determined by another, and not first by itself, to its first act. But if all its acts are preceded by practical knowledge, it will be determined to its first act by the intellect, because it cannot dissent from it; for then it could sin.

Again, it was said above [nn.300-301] that the Philosopher consequently speaks well if the intelligence naturally loves God when seen; therefore a knowledge that shows God is not practical. Let there be a like consequence about God naturally loving himself.

Again, what directs is a cause in respect of what is directed, so there is a real distinction between them; but there is no such distinction of God’s intellection to his willing. A confirmation of the reason is because, when it is understood that an act of will has already been elicited, the intellect is not directing, for it only directs about something to be elicited as if prior to it; but in God the willing of himself does not follow the will’s existence, so his willing is never there something as it were to be elicited but is always as it were elicited; therefore etc.

It seems here that, in consequence of what has been said [nn.274-277, 310-312, 314, 319-320, 322-323], one must say that, when one takes rule for what gives right guidance in action, the first rule is the ultimate end, which virtually first includes the knowledge of the necessary rectitude of any action, just as the first object of speculative science first includes knowledge of truths of speculation. But this first rule, which is the end, makes right in ordered way the intellect and will as these powers are of a nature to act rightly in ordered way, such that it first as it were generates knowledge conform to right action before right action, or before it makes action right; and thus, while the power is acting, there will be another power previously right, so that the consequent inferred in the first reason [n.325] seems it must be conceded. When it is rejected [n.325], one could say that, just as universally freedom stands along with previous apprehension, so supreme freedom stands along with the most perfect previous apprehension; but the most perfect apprehension of action includes knowledge of the conformity when it necessarily belongs to action.

When it is further argued that it would be determined by something else [n.325], one must deny this by speaking of the determination that is done by a sufficient agent. For although it could not disagree with knowledge that is right and prior to action, yet this is not as if the intellect be by its knowledge a sufficient cause actively determining the will to act, but is from the perfection of the will, that it is only of a nature to act in conformity with the prior power in acting, when that prior power acts first perfectly about its object, that is, when it knows first as much as it can know. But I say this for contingent things, of which the divine intellect does not have all the knowledge possible to it before all act of the will; therefore, as to those contingent things, it is not necessary that it act in conformity with the prior power, because it does not first conformably know such object. But as to knowables necessary of themselves it always happens otherwise, because they contain the most perfect knowledge of themselves without an act of will.¹

Now although this response [n.328-329] seem to avoid the argument [n.325], and although the subsequent arguments [n.326-327] could be avoided, yet one must say otherwise, that necessary theology in the divine intellect is not practical, because there is no natural priority of intellection to volition that is, as it were, of the conformative to what needs to be conformed or of directive to something that needs to be directed: because once any knowledge whatever of rectitude of the action has been posited, although it could of itself conform a conformable or directable power from elsewhere, yet not the divine will with respect to its first object, because it is rectified of itself alone with respect to the object, for either it naturally tends toward it or, if it tends freely, it is not of itself in any way as it were indifferent to rectitude or as it were in any way from elsewhere possessed of it, such that determinate knowledge of rectitude is not necessarily prior to volition as if the volition require it so as to be rightly elicited; but it only pre-requires the ostension of the object; and the knowledge that is of itself directive it does not pre-require as directive but only as ostensive, such that if ostension alone of the object could precede volition and knowledge of the necessary rectitude of the action could follow (as will be said of action about contingents [n.333]), volition would be equally rightly elicited then and now. Therefore, intellection is not now prior and conformative or regulative.

To the argument, therefore, that proves the priority of knowledge of rightness to right action [n.324], it can be replied that though there be some priority of intellection to volition, yet it is not in such way prior that it require right cognition to be prior to action, because such priority is of rule to ruled, of which sort there cannot be when the will is in every way rule of itself in acting. The sum of this controversy about the science of God with respect to himself, whether it be practical, consists in this: if the knowledge, which of itself would be directive in action (given that the rectifying or acting power in the knower were directable in acting), be practical from the fact alone that thus it would be directive, or not practical from the fact that the doing power in the knower is not directable – let him who holds either one of the sides speak accordingly.

[About the theology of contingents] – From this is introduced the second article of the question, namely about the theology of contingents, whether it be practical [nn.314, 324, 330; 1 d.38 q. un. nn.1-4]. I say that in that intellect alone can the theology of contingent things be practical which can have determinate knowledge of the rectitude of action before all volition of the understander or before the elicited action, because only there is this theology of contingent things able to be or is conform to action and prior to it. Of such sort is every created intellect, because of no created understander does the will first determine the contingent rectitude befitting its action.

But in the divine intellect contingent theology cannot be practical if one holds onto these two points, namely that practical knowledge and the action to which it is extended ought necessarily to belong to the same supposit,² and that of God as operating there is no action save volition (not positing in him a third power other than intellect and will), for no knowledge conform to action or to contingent right volition precedes in the divine intellect its right action or the volition of God, because by volition is such rectitude first determined to such action.

The first point is true, for if any knowledge at all about the action of another be practical, then my knowledge about this, which is ‘God creates the world’ or about this, which is ‘an intelligence moves the heavens’, will be practical. At least this seems to prove that practical knowledge cannot belong to a lower intelligence or understander when something else is operating according to that action or, by parity of reasoning, belong to a higher or an equal if it do nothing for the action of the operator; but if it do do something, already does the superior have its proper action with respect to which its knowledge is practical.

Again, if practical knowledge has any causality with respect to the action to which it is extended, and is not of a nature to have such causality save first in respect of the action that is in the one who understands, the thing proposed [n.333] seems to follow.

On the contrary: therefore, about the same thing one intellect would have practical knowledge and another speculative, if action were possible to one intellect and not the other. It can be said that perfect rectitude of action includes the circumstance of the one operating and also the other circumstances, so that without it there is no rectitude. For if ‘God is to be loved’ is taken, unless it be added by what, namely by the will, it is not a practical truth completely, because God is not to be loved by a brute; therefore this perfect truth ‘God is to be loved by God’ is practical in any intellect whatever; thus too this one, ‘man should sometimes fast’, is practical not only to a man who knows it but also to an angel and to God; so also is this practical for man and God ‘the heaven is to be moved by an angel’, – and I concede as unacceptable what the first proof infers [n.334].

And if it be objected that the priority of practical knowledge to action is not preserved – for love with respect to himself is right before a man or an angel could understand ‘God is to be loved by God’ – I reply: this priority ought to be from the object and the intellect, that is, that it naturally determine the intellect to knowledge of determinate rectitude of action, namely as far as it is of itself in advance of action; in this way this object is of a nature to determine any intellect whatever to the knowledge ‘God is to be loved by God’ as far as it is of itself in advance of action, although some intellect, because of its own imperfection, is not determined before the acting power, because of its own perfection, acts.

To the other objection [n.336] I say that just as the will can be a superior cause with respect to the action of the moving power, not however any will at all with respect to any power at all, for example, not my will with respect to the motive power of an angel, but when it is in the same subject, so that if it be a practical cause with respect to action, this is in the same understander and the same operator; nor is it necessary that in another it be non-practical, save by taking practical strictly for what is immediately applicable to a work to the extent it depends on the identity of supposit of knower and doer, which sort of immediacy is denoted by the infinitive that signifies action when construed with the verb ‘to know’ – for in this way it is conceded that only God knows that he loves himself infinitely, although an angel may know that he is to be infinitely loved by himself.

He who thus responds must from the beginning concede that every truth about the actions of created agents is known by some acting intellect, because all of them, whether by the object if they are necessary or by something else if they are contingent, are of a nature to be first conform to actions or first to determine the rectitude of action before actions be elicited. But all truths about divine volition, when necessary indeed are practical, but not when contingent, because before the elicited action to which they are extended, they do not have conformity, because no determination of rectitude; for example, God knows practically that man should repent and the angel should move, but not that God must wish a holy man to repent or an angel to move.

If you ask of what sort theology of contingents is in itself, when not compared with this intellect or that, it can be said that it is such in itself as it is from its object; but it is not from its object conform to action in advance of every action, because from the object no determinate knowledge of contingent rectitude is of a nature to be had; therefore from its object it is not practical, therefore it is speculative, if these sufficiently divide knowledge [n.303]. Congruent with this is that in the divine intellect it is denied to be practical [n.333]; for a thing seems to be such in itself as it is in a perfect instance in the genus, not as it is in an imperfect one.

If it be objected that then knowledge speculative in itself is practical for someone, to wit for a created intellect, therefore the practical is not repugnant to the speculative, I reply: to be speculative from the object is to be per se speculative; so, to be practical from an object that sufficiently determines the intellect to knowledge of rectitude – and if sufficiently then prior to volition – is to be per se practical. In this way are these two opposed, as also these ‘not-extendable to action’ and ‘extendable to action’. But to be practical from something other than the object, to wit from an extrinsic cause, as from the will determining the intellect to knowledge of action, is to be accidentally practical; so I concede that the theology of contingent things is practical for us, though in itself it is speculative.

Against this: that to which one opposite per se belongs the other opposite belongs to neither per se nor per accidens; therefore knowledge per se speculative is not practical either per se or per accidens. I reply: although the antecedent could be expounded of per se in the first or the second mode, not however in the third mode insofar as it states the same as the solitary [Posterior Analytics 1.4.73a-34-b10], yet I concede that in no mode of inhering does the opposite inhere of this predicate which is ‘per se practical’ or of this predicate ‘per se speculative’, because contingent theology per se in the second mode is per se practical or speculative, such that both the inherence is per se and the predicate is determined by the ‘per se’. But per accidens to be practical per accidens is not opposed to that, just as to be black simply and to be white in some respect are not opposed; for ‘in some respect’ and ‘simply’ determine predicates as denominative. If it is argued ‘it per se is per se speculative, therefore it per se is speculative’, I concede it, nor to this predicate is the predicate ‘per accidens practical’ opposed.

But if the other of these two [n.333] that this response holds [n.340] be not held, then it can be conceded that contingent theology, although it not be in itself practical because not so from its object, yet in every intellect created and uncreated it would be practical per accidens, because it can in the divine intellect be conform to action before the action be elicited by a created will; for the intellect of God knew that the adult sinner in the New Law ought to be ground down before the sinner is ground down. And by not holding to the first of those, the knowledge of God about the action of some other actor is practical; by not holding also to the second of them, to wit by positing the acting of God extrinsically to be an action of his different from the volition of God formally, although the divine intellect did not know that a must be created before his will will it, yet he did know before he create, and so conform knowledge precedes the external action, although it is not conform from the object but from elsewhere.

This at any rate I hold to, that the theology of contingents is not per se practical or from its object; yet for a created intellect it can be per accidens practical, and this in the intellect doing the understanding to which it belongs to act according to the action for which rectitude is determined by the divine will. But as to whether it is practical for the divine intellect, it is plain by holding those two positions [n.333] or the opposites [n.343] what should be said as a consequence. These three things, however, seem probable: first, that the practical is regulative in the action of what is contingent, and second that it is regulative of the power of the doer who is rectifiable from elsewhere than from himself, and third that in God there is no power of doing save will. From the first and third it follows that if divine knowledge were practical, it would be rectificative or regulative in divine volition; but this is false from the second of them [n.333], because the will of itself first rightly elicits willing with respect to the first object, but with respect to second ones, which it is of contingently, it is determined from itself alone, not by any preceding knowledge of rectitude.