Ordinatio

I say first, then, that the action to which practical knowledge is extended is the act of a power other than the intellect, naturally posterior to intellection, of a nature to be elicited in conformity with right intellection so as to be right. The first condition is clear, because when standing precisely on acts of the intellect there is no extension of the intellect, because it does not tend outside itself save as its act has regard to the act of another power. And if you say that one act of the intellect is extended to another, being directed by it, the second act is not for this reason action as we are now speaking of action, nor is the first act practical knowledge, because then logic would be practical, because it directs in acts of discursive thought.

The second condition is plain, because acts not having an order to the intellect, of which sort are vegetative acts and acts naturally preceding the intellect, as sense acts, are not called actions, nor is practical knowledge said to be extended to them as they are prior to understanding. Similarly, the act of the power of sense appetite, insofar as it precedes the act of the intellect, is not action; for in this way it is common to us and the brutes. Nor is any knowledge practical in respect of these acts, save because it moderates these acts in some way and these acts follow the intellection moderative of them as they are moderated by it.

From these two conditions follows a corollary, namely that the action to which the practical habit is extended is only an elicited or commanded act of the will, for no other act from intellection or beside intellection is essentially posterior to intellection, for let any other act be given of the same idea as it is, it could be prior, as is plain by running through the acts of all the powers.

This is plain secondly thus: because action is an act that is in the power of the knower. The proof is from Ethics 6.5.1140b22, because an artisan needs a virtue for acting rightly; but he does not need a virtue with respect to what is not in his power; therefore an artisan has the act of making in his power; much more does the prudent man have action in his power, because he is formally virtuous. From this follows further: if all action is in the power of the knower and nothing is in the power of the will save either an elicited or commanded act, the proposed conclusion follows as before [n.230].

Against this condition: it seems that then some intellection will be action, because some intellection can be an act commanded by the will just as the act of another power is commanded by it. And then further: therefore the first condition is false, namely that action is the operation of a power other than the intellect. – I reply: although speculation be a certain operation and so action in an extended sense, yet in the way action is said to be the only operation to which the intellect can be extended, no understanding is action; and in this way is action taken when practical knowledge is said to be extended to action. When, therefore, it is argued that ‘understanding is commanded by the will, therefore it is action’, this does not follow, but what follows is ‘therefore it is action or practical’; for it is of a nature to be as it were accidentally denominated by the action to which it is extendable, but it cannot be the term of such extension. However, conversely, I do well concede that all action is an elicited or commanded act of the will. Hence, to infer from this second condition the opposite of the first is to commit the fallacy of the consequent, by positing the consequent.¹

Proof of the third condition. First from the remark of the Philosopher in Ethics 6.2.1139a22-25, that right choice necessarily requires right reason. This remark is not only true of choice taken strictly but, by parity of reason, of any right volition, because it requires the right reason in conformity with which it is elicited; but all action either is volition or follows volition, from the preceding corollary [n.230]; therefore all action, in order for it to be right, is naturally elicited in conformity with right reason. Second from the remark of Augustine On the Trinity XV ch.5 n.10, ch.7 n.13, that the intellect understands for itself and for other powers. Therefore, just as it can judge about its own act, so can it about the acts of other powers; therefore, it can about an act naturally posterior to its own act naturally judge before that act be elicited; and consequently, if it judge rightly, that act must be elicited in conformity with that judgment if it ought to be right.

From the two final conditions of action [nn.228, 229, 233] it follows that an act commanded by the will is not primarily action but as it were per accidens, because neither is it first posterior to intellection nor is it first of a nature to be elicited in conformity with right reason. Some other act, then, must be action first; that act is only volition, because through volition the commanded act has the said conditions; therefore the first idea of action is saved in an elicited act of the will. And then further: whenever something is first of such a sort when conjoined with another, it would still be of such a sort if it could be separated from that other; therefore if an act of will can be separated from the act of another power, it will be action when separated from that posterior act. But it is separated with respect to anything that can be the object of an act of will with respect to which there cannot be an act of another power, of which sort are all immaterial things; therefore about every such thing there is an act of will, and it on its own is action.

Second, the same is proved from the intention of the Philosopher On the Soul 3.10.433a17-18, where he inquires about the motive principle and, after he has concluded that there are two motive principles namely will or appetite and reason, he subjoins: “The intellect does not move without appetite, for will is appetite.” And consequently he says that the two appetites are sometimes contrary to each other: so it is to posit as it were one mover in species, because common to the two appetites is the idea of the intermediate species, namely the idea of appetite. Therefore he expressly means that just as the sense appetite has the idea of a motive principle along with sense and imagination, so the will has the idea of a motive principle along with intellect and reason. Therefore, just as an act of sense appetite without any transition to what is extrinsic is truly action when it follows an act of intellect, so an act of will, which is posited to be equally a motive principle, will truly be action, for it always follows an act of intellect; and this act too if it be on its own without a commanded act, nay if it be with an act in sense appetite opposed to the act which it would command, because it is, as having that sometimes opposed appetite, a motive and operative principle, whose operation is action.