Ordinatio

208. After this I ask whether theology in itself is a science, and whether it has toward any other science the relation of subalterning or subalternate.

[On theology in itself and in God] – To the first question I say that science taken strictly includes four things, namely: that it be certain knowledge, without deception and doubt; second, that it be about a necessary known thing; third, that it be caused by a cause evident to the intellect; fourth, that it be applied to the thing known by a syllogism or syllogistic discourse. These things are clear from the definition of ‘know’ in Posterior Analytics 1.2.71b9-12. The last condition, namely that science is caused discursively from the cause to the thing known, includes imperfection¹ and also potentiality of the receiving intellect. Therefore, theology in itself is not a science as to this last condition of science; but as to the other three conditions it is a science in itself and in the divine intellect.

209. [On the theology of the blessed as it is a science] – But whether as to the fourth condition it is a science as it is in the intellect of the blessed there is doubt. And it seems that it is not, from Augustine On the Trinity XV ch.16 n.26: “Perhaps they will not there be willable,” etc., “but we will see our whole science in a single intuition;” therefore the intellect of the blessed is not discursive, and so they will not have science as to this fourth condition of science. But the opposite seems to be the case, because the quiddity of the subject, in whatever light it is seen, contains of itself virtually the truths that it can make known to the intellect, namely to an intellect that can be acted on by such an object. Therefore, if the quiddity of line seen in the natural light can make the truths included in itself known to our intellect, by parity of reasoning also as seen in the divine essence; but every truth caused in our intellect by something that is naturally first known is caused discursively, because a discursive process does not require succession of time nor the order of it, but the order of nature, namely that the principle of the discursion is first naturally known, and so that in this way it be causative with respect to the other term of the discursion.² This can be conceded, namely that the blessed can truly have theological science as to all the conditions of science, because all the conditions of science truly concur in the knowledge of it. The authority of Augustine On the Trinity [n.209] is not cogent, because he speaks hesitantly with a ‘perhaps’; nor does he intend to assert it, but that our word will not be equal to the divine Word, however perfect even our word may be. In like way can be expounded Augustine’s authority about the blessed vision [n.209], which only has respect to the essentialities in God.³

210. [On the science of contingents as a science] – But there is another doubt in this question, because contingent things pertain to theology just as do necessary things [n.150]. The thing is plain about our theology, because all the articles about the incarnation are about contingents, even in the theology of the blessed, because everything knowable about God in respect of creatures extrinsically are about contingents. But it does not seem that there can be science about contingents; it is plain from the definition of science [n.208]; therefore it seems that the whole of theology, as it extends itself to all its contents, cannot have the nature of science, whether it is discursive or not.

211. Here I say that in science that is of perfection which would be certain and evident knowledge;⁴ but that it be about a necessary object, this is a condition of the object, not of knowledge, because however much science be of a necessary object, it can in itself be contingent and be destroyed by being forgotten. If therefore some other knowledge is certain and evident and, as far as concerns itself, perpetual, it seems to be in itself formally more perfect than a science that requires the necessity of its object. But contingents, as they pertain to theology, naturally are of a nature to have a knowledge certain and evident and, as far as depends on the part of the evidence, perpetual. This is clear, because all theological contingents are of a nature to be seen in the first theological object, and in the same object is the conjunction of those contingent truths of a nature to be seen. But the vision of the extremes of a contingent truth and of their union necessarily causes evident certitude about such evident truth. As far as depends too on the part of the theological object showing them, such truths are of a nature to be seen in such perpetual object, as far as depends on itself. Therefore, contingent things, as they pertain to theology, are of a nature to have a more perfect knowledge than a science acquired about necessary things.

212. But is knowledge of them be science? I say that according to the idea of science posited in Posterior Analytics [n.208], which requires necessity of the object, there cannot be science of them, because to know a contingent thing as necessary is not to know a contingent thing; however, according as the Philosopher takes science in Ethics 6.3.1139b15-18, as it is divided against opinion and suspicion, there can very well be a science of them, because a habit too whereby we determinately say what is true.

213. [On theology as wisdom] – More properly, however, it can be said that theology is wisdom in itself, because it has evidence and necessity and certitude about the necessary things contained in it, and the most perfect and highest and noblest object. But as to contingent things, it has manifest evidence about contingent things seen in themselves as in the theological object, and it does not have evidence begged from other prior things; hence the knowledge of contingents, as it is possessed in theology, is assimilated rather to the understanding of principles than to the science of conclusions.

214. To the second question [n.208] I say that this science is not subaltern to any science, because although its subject would be in some way under the subject of metaphysics, yet it does not receive any principles from metaphysics, because no theological property is demonstrable in it through the principles of being or through reasoning taken from the idea of being. Nor too does this science subaltern any other science to itself, because no other science takes its principles from it, for anything else in the genus of natural knowledge has its resolution ultimately to some immediate principles naturally known.

215. On the contrary: resolution does not stand at knowables save at the most perfect knowable, nor stand on the same, save at it as most perfectly known; line is more perfectly known in the Word than through its own movement; therefore, the resolution of conclusions about line does not stop save at the quiddity of line, or at the principles of it as seen in the Word. But the resolution is had through the Word seen. Therefore, the resolution of any conclusions and principles whatever stops at the vision of the Word. Therefore, that vision subalterns to itself the other knowledges, to all of which it gives evidence.

216. To this I reply that although a metaphysician who knows distinctly the quiddity of a line or a whole would more perfectly know some immediate principle about a line or about a whole than a geometer who knows line and whole only confusedly, yet to the geometer is that immediate proposition per se known. Nor is it proved through the metaphysician’s proposition, if from a confused concept the truth of the combination or connection of the terms is evident, but only the metaphysician knows the same per se known truth more perfectly; this would be all the more so if it was only through diverse motives that line were known by diverse people and equally distinctly on the part of the object, albeit not with equal clarity. So it is in the proposed case. An immediate principle about line can be evident to an intellect moved by a line, and more clearly evident to an intellect moved by the Word to knowledge of line as line is more clearly seen; yet a principle known in one way does not prove itself known in another way, but in each way it is per se, although more clearly this way or that. But subalternation would require that the knowledge of the principles of a higher science be the cause of knowledge of the principles of a lower science, etc.¹