Ordinatio

[About divine theology] – Therefore I say differently that divine theology is about all knowables, because the first object of God’s theology makes everything else actually to be known in his intellect, such that, if in the first moment of nature his essence is known first to his intellect, and in the second moment of nature the quiddities are known that contain virtually their own truths, in the third moment are known to him the truths that are virtually contained in those quiddities; if this is so, there is not an order of the second to the third according to causality, as if these quiddities caused something in his intellect, but there is only an order of effects ordered in respect of the same cause, to wit, because his own essence first in nature as it were causes these quiddities to be known before the truths about them are known [cf. 1 d.3 p.1 q.4 nn.18-19]. An example: if the sun illuminated some part near itself, and another part more distant from the sun were only able, on account of its opacity, of being illuminated by the sun, the sun, and not the part illuminated before first, would illuminate that distant part; there would, however, be an order between the near part and the remote part like the order of effects of the same cause, and yet not an order of cause to effect, because the part illuminated does not do anything on the remote opaque part. So it is in the matter at hand. The essence of God in his own intellect makes some quiddities actually known, and later as it were it naturally makes the truths contained in them known to the intellect; yet those quiddities have no power in respect of effecting a change in God’s intellect, because God’s intellect is not of a nature to be perfected by those quiddities, because it is infinite and those quiddities are finite, and the infinite is in no way perfected by the finite.

In this way, then, does God have only theological knowledge of all knowables, because he has knowledge only by virtue of the first theological object actuating his intellect, such that the theology of God is not only about all things but is also the whole knowledge possible for God about them, and absolutely it is about whatever all knowledge is of which does not of itself include some imperfection, because it alone includes no limitation about any knowable at all; but any other knowledge, because it is from a limited cause, necessarily includes limitation.

[On the theology of the blessed] – But, as to the created intellects of the blessed, things are otherwise, because their intellects are of a nature to be changed by the created quiddities as to knowledge of the truths included in them; and therefore, besides this theological truth that they have about the quiddities as shown in the essence of God, they can have a natural knowledge of the same things by their proper motion. Therefore, the theology of the blessed about certain created things is not the whole knowledge about them possible for such an intellect.

But there is a doubt whether their theology is about everything, although there be some other theology about certain knowables. Here a distinction must be made about theology in itself and as it is a habit perfecting the blessed created intellect. In the first way it is about all knowables, because they are all of a nature to be known by virtue of the first theological object; in the second way, I say that it is possible for it to be about any knowable, because it is about all knowables, for all the knowables are not infinite.¹ De facto, however, it has no limitation save from the will of God displaying something in his essence; and therefore the knowledge of the blessed is in actuality about as many things as God voluntarily shows them in his essence.

[On our theology] – About our theology I say that is not actually of everything, because just as the theology of the blessed has a limit, so also does ours, from the will of God revealing. But the limit prefixed by the divine will as to general revelation is of the things that are in divine Scripture, because – as is contained in the last chapter of Revelation 22.18 – “he who adds to these things, to him will God add the plagues that are set down in this book.” Therefore, our knowledge is de facto only of the things contained in Scripture and of the things that can be elicited from them.

About the power of our theology I say that it cannot be about everything, both because of the defect of our intellect, which is not able to conceive specifically many quiddities, – but revelation according to common law is only of things whose terms can commonly be naturally conceived by us, – and because of the defect of our theology, because it cannot stand with evident knowledge of the same knowables, according to some, and consequently our revealed theology cannot stand with evident knowledge of some things naturally known to us.²

[On theology taken together] – However all theology, whether God’s or the blessed’s or ours, is about all beings as to some things that are knowable about them, namely as to the relations they have to the divine essence as it is this essence, because a relation cannot be known without knowledge of both extremes; and so the relation that is to this essence as this cannot be known without knowledge of this essence as it is this. So then, to speak truly, theology is about everything, and is all the knowledge that does not include imperfection. Therefore, the intellect of God, which cannot have any imperfect knowledge, has all knowledge, but it is not simply all knowledge, because in addition to it another knowledge can be had about some special quiddity moving the created intellect. Also theology alone is knowledge of all things as to some knowables, namely as to their relation to this essence as this, provided however this essence as this terminates some relation of a creature and not under the idea of some attribute naturally intelligible to us. And this perhaps is the reason that we cannot know about the created intellect that it is ordered to this end as it is this, because we cannot know the relation founded on intellectual nature to this essence as to its proper end, because neither can we know the extreme to which it is the relation, and therefore we cannot know the relation of the image with respect to this nature in itself, in the way the saints speak about the image.³