Ordinatio

To the first argument of the second question, when argument is made by Hugh of St. Victor and Cassiodorus [nn.133-134], it is said that they are not speaking here of the formal object but of the proximate matter (which is more diffusively dealt with in Scripture), because of the more immediate order they have to the end.

To the second [n.135] I say that metaphysics is not about God as about its first subject. The proof is that, in addition to the special sciences, there needs to be some common science in which are proved all the things that are common to the special ones; therefore, in addition to the special sciences, there needs to be some common science about being, in which the knowledge of the properties of being may be dealt with, which knowledge is presupposed in the special sciences; if then there is some science about God, there is in addition to it some naturally known science about being insofar as it is being. But when it is proved by the Philosopher in the Metaphysics [n.135] that the science of metaphysics is about God, I say that his reasoning concludes as follows: ‘the noblest science is about the noblest genus’, either as first subject, or as considered in that science in the most perfect way in which it can be considered in any naturally acquired science. But although God is not the first subject in metaphysics, he is yet considered in that science in the noblest way that he can be considered in any science naturally acquired.¹

To the Commentator on the Physics [n.136] I say that Avicenna – whom the Commentator contradicts – spoke well and the Commentator badly. The proof is: first, because if the existence of any separate substances were a supposition in the science of metaphysics and a conclusion in natural science, then physics would be simply prior to the whole of metaphysics, because physics would show the ‘whether it exists’ about the subject of metaphysics, which is presupposed to the whole knowledge of the science of metaphysics. – Second, because by every condition of an effect can it be proved of the cause that it exist, which condition cannot be in the effect unless the cause exist; but many properties are considered in metaphysics that cannot be present save from some first cause of such beings; therefore, on the basis of such properties, metaphysics can demonstrate that there is some first cause of those beings. The proof of the minor is that the multitude of beings, their dependence, composition, and the like – which are the properties of metaphysics – show that there is actually something simple, altogether independent, and necessarily existent. Also, the existence of a first cause is much more perfectly shown from the properties of caused things considered in metaphysics than from natural properties when a first mover is shown to exist; also there is a more perfect and more immediate knowledge of the first being to know it as first being, or as necessarily existent, than to know it as first mover.

To the other [n.137] I say that the relation of end is not the noblest idea of knowledge, but that which is the end (as the idea of the foundation of this relation) is the noblest idea; but the deity is the founding idea of the relation of end to creatures; therefore, the deity will be the first object, which I concede. And so the argument is for the opposite. But when proof from Metaphysics II about the good is given [n.137], I say that if through some appropriation goodness is the foundation of the end, still the deity is the root and first foundation of it. But the consequence is good: ‘if there is no final end, then there is no good’, because if there is no perfect good there is no good; but no good is perfect which is ordered to some further good, because a good of this sort has a diminished goodness. However, it is not necessary that goodness is the proper idea of the end, but essence is more proper and fundamental. Hereby is it clear, as to the remark of Avicenna on Metaphysics VI [n.137], that it must not be understood of the end, but of the fundamental idea in respect of the end.