Ordinatio

From these statements I make reply to the second question [nn.133, 141]. For the understanding of it I posit an example: man is understood as rational animal, as substance, as tame, as noblest of animals. In the first he is understood according to his proper quidditative idea, in the second in common, in the third per accidens in a property, in the fourth in relation to something else. But the most perfect knowledge of man cannot be in relation to something else, because a relation presupposes knowledge of an absolute; nor can it be of man under the idea of a property, because knowledge of a property presupposes knowledge of the subject; nor can it be about man in common or universally, because that is confused knowledge. Therefore, the noblest cognition of man is according to his quidditative idea. – So some science could be posited of God under the idea of relation to something outside him, as some posit knowledge of him under the idea of repairer [cf. n.133], or glorifier, or head of the Church [cf. n. 134]; or some science could be posited of God under the idea of something attributal to him, which is a sort of property, as some posit this science to be of God under the idea of good [cf. n.137]; or it could be posited of him under a general or universal idea [cf. n.146-147], as of being, or infinite being, or necessary existence, or some such thing.

Argument against all these positions. First against the one about common idea, for no common concept said of God contains virtually all the properly theological truths pertaining to the plurality of persons; for if so, since those common concepts are naturally conceived by us, then immediate propositions about those concepts can be naturally known and understood by us, and through those immediate propositions we could know the conclusions, and so acquire the whole of theology naturally.

Second, because from the fact common concepts are not to God alone naturally known, therefore neither are the truths included in those common concepts; therefore theology, if it were of God under such a common concept, would not be naturally known to God alone, the opposite of which was shown in the first question [n.152].

Against the other position about the attributal idea [n.158] argument could be made through the same reasons, but I argue nevertheless through other special ones. First, because cognition of him according to what he is is the most perfect cognition, according to what the Philosopher says, Metaphysics 7.1.1028a36-b2; therefore knowledge of this essence is a more perfect cognition of God than is knowledge of any attributal property that is disposed as a feature of this nature, according to Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith 1 ch.4.

Second, because if those properties differ in reality from God’s essence,¹ his essence would be really cause of them; therefore, just as they differ in idea, so the essence in its idea has the idea of what is uncaused, and the others, although they be uncaused because of their identity with the essence, yet do not according to their formal idea first include their own being uncaused.

Third, because that seems, according to its own proper idea, to be more actual in itself to which communicability to several things extrinsic to it is repugnant; but to essence in itself is communicability to many things extrinsic to it repugnant, and not to any attributable property, except insofar as the property is of the essence, or is the same as this essence insofar as it is infinite. If it be said that any property is infinite and therefore incommunicable, on the contrary: the infinity is because of infinity and identity with the essence as from the root and foundation of every intrinsic perfection.²

Against the way too about relations to what is extrinsic [n.158] it can be argued as it was against the other two ways, but I give special reasons. First, because relation to what is extrinsic is a relation of reason;³ but a science that does not consider its subject under a real idea is not a science about reality, just as neither is logic about reality although it consider real things as second intentions are attributed to them; therefore theology would not be a science about reality, which is false.

Second, because what is absolute and what is relational do not form any concept per se one; therefore, a concept that gathers these two into itself is a concept per accidens one. But no first science is about a concept per accidens one, because such presupposes the sciences of each part; and therefore, if a subalternate science be about anything per accidens one, it presupposes the two sciences that treat the parts of the whole separately. Therefore, if theology were of such a per accidens one, there could be another science prior to it, which would be of a concept per se one.

Third, no relation to what is extrinsic is shown to belong necessarily to God;⁴ therefore nothing theological will belong necessarily to him as he is the subject of theology, which is false. – Proof of the consequence: what belongs to something under the idea of not being necessarily inherent does not belong to it necessarily; but every relation to what is extrinsic is of this sort; therefore etc. And so no theological truth is necessary. And this conclusion is proved by the first and second reasons set down for the first question [nn.151-152], namely about the idea of the first subject and about what is naturally known only to God.

I concede, therefore, the fourth member [n.158], namely that theology is about God under the idea by which namely he is this essence, just as the most perfect science of man would be of man if it were of him according as he is man, and not under some universal or accidental idea.