Ordinatio

On the basis of what has been said I reply to the first question [nn.124, 141]. And first, speaking of theology in itself as to its necessary truths, I say that the first object of theology in itself cannot be anything but God; which I prove through three reasons. The first is taken from the idea of first object, and I argue thus: the first object contains virtually all the truths of the habit of which it is the first object; nothing contains virtually all the theological truths except God; therefore etc. – Proof of the minor: nothing else contains them as cause, or as that to which they have attribution, except God, because God is attributed to no other thing; nor does anything contain those truths as an effect by a ‘demonstration that’, for no effect demonstrates that God is triune [n.41] (which is most of all a theological truth) and the like; therefore etc.¹

Secondly thus: theology is of things that are naturally known to the divine intellect alone, therefore it is of an object naturally known to God alone; but God alone is naturally known to himself alone; therefore etc. – Proof of the first proposition: if this science is of certain things naturally known to another intellect, then there are, in addition to those things, some other things naturally knowable to the divine intellect alone, because it is infinite and therefore has cognition of more things than a finite intellect; therefore, there will still be another science superior to the one that is about things naturally known to a created intellect. – Proof of the minor: every created essence can be naturally known to some created intellect; therefore, the uncreated essence can alone be known to an uncreated intellect alone.

Third thus: in no science is as distinct a knowledge or cognition handed on about any other thing that is not its first object as would be handed on in the science that would be about that other thing as about its first object, because in no science is as distinct a cognition handed on about its non-per se subject as about its per se subject; for then there would be no reason why that subject would be more its subject than another one. Therefore, if God be not here the subject, there is not handed on here as distinct a cognition of him as would be handed on in some other science in which he could be the subject; but he can be the subject in some other science; therefore, that one would be prior to this one.²

Besides these three reasons there are other persuasive considerations. The first is as follows: theology according to Augustine On the Trinity 13 ch.1 n.2; 14 ch.1 n.3 [and cf. 14 ch.19 n.24] is in some part of itself wisdom, and in another part of itself it is science; but if it were about something non-eternal formally, it would be a science formally about it, and in no way wisdom, because eternal things are not attributed to temporal things.

The second one is that the superior part of reason has some perfection corresponding to itself. But if this perfection is about a non-eternal subject as its first subject, since the eternal is not attributed to the non-eternal, it follows that in no way is it about eternal things, and thus neither does it perfect the superior part of reason.³ Therefore there would be some intellectual habit nobler than it perfecting that part, which is inappropriate.

The third is that, according to Augustine On the Trinity 13 ch.9 n.12 or 14 ch.1 n.3, this science is about things whereby faith is “generated, defended, and strengthened” [cf. n.140], therefore it is about the same object that is the first object of faith; but faith is about the first truth; therefore etc.

The fourth is that “the noblest science is about the noblest genus” [Metaphysics 6.1.1026a21-23, On the Soul 1.1.402a1-4]; but this science is admitted to be noblest; therefore, it must be that it is about God as about its object [cf. nn.40, 135].