Ordinatio
John Duns Scotus (1266–1308)
John Duns Scotus's Ordinatio (also called the Opus Oxoniense) is his revised, authorially prepared commentary on Peter Lombard's Sentences. Scotus began arranging it for publication around 1300 after lecturing at Oxford and continued revising material associated with Paris until his death in 1308; the work therefore remains unfinished and textually layered. Its disputations on God, creation, individuation, freedom, grace, and the Incarnation helped establish Scotism as a major alternative within late-medieval scholastic theology. Schola uses the Vatican critical-edition tradition for the Latin and a separately sourced English translation.
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Prologus I: Prologus Totius Operis
Pars I: Pars 1 - On the Necessity of Revealed Doctrine
Quaestio I: Single Question: On the Necessity of Revealed Doctrine - Whether it be necessary for man in this present state for some doctrine to be supernaturally inspired
Articulus I: 1. Controversy between Philosophers and Theologians
Section I: A. Opinion of the Philosophers
Section II: B. Rejection of the Opinion of the Philosophers
Articulus II: II. Solution of the Question
Articulus III: III. About the Three Principal Reasons against the Philosophers
Articulus IV: IV. To the Arguments of the Philosophers
Articulus V: V. To the Principal Arguments
Pars II: Pars 2 - On the Sufficiency of Revealed Doctrine
Quaestio I: Single Question: On the Sufficiency of Revealed Doctrine Whether the supernatural knowledge necessary for the wayfarer is sufficiently handed on in Sacred Scripture.
Articulus I: I. On the Truth of Sacred Scripture
Articulus II: II. Principal Response to the Question
Articulus III: III. To the Principal Arguments
Pars III: Pars 3 - On the Object of Theology
Quaestio I: Question 1: Whether theology is about God as about its first object.
Quaestio II: Question 2: Whether Theology is about God under some Special Idea
Quaestio III: Question 3: Whether Theology is about All Things from the Attribution of them to its First Subject
Articulus I: I. Preliminary Remarks
Articulus II: II. About Necessary Theology
Section I: A. To the First Question, speaking of Theology in itself
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On the basis of what has been said I reply to the first question [nn.124, 141]. And first, speaking of theology in itself as to its necessary truths, I say that the first object of theology in itself cannot be anything but God; which I prove through three reasons. The first is taken from the idea of first object, and I argue thus: the first object contains virtually all the truths of the habit of which it is the first object; nothing contains virtually all the theological truths except God; therefore etc. – Proof of the minor: nothing else contains them as cause, or as that to which they have attribution, except God, because God is attributed to no other thing; nor does anything contain those truths as an effect by a ‘demonstration that’, for no effect demonstrates that God is triune [n.41] (which is most of all a theological truth) and the like; therefore etc.1
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Secondly thus: theology is of things that are naturally known to the divine intellect alone, therefore it is of an object naturally known to God alone; but God alone is naturally known to himself alone; therefore etc. – Proof of the first proposition: if this science is of certain things naturally known to another intellect, then there are, in addition to those things, some other things naturally knowable to the divine intellect alone, because it is infinite and therefore has cognition of more things than a finite intellect; therefore, there will still be another science superior to the one that is about things naturally known to a created intellect. – Proof of the minor: every created essence can be naturally known to some created intellect; therefore, the uncreated essence can alone be known to an uncreated intellect alone.
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Third thus: in no science is as distinct a knowledge or cognition handed on about any other thing that is not its first object as would be handed on in the science that would be about that other thing as about its first object, because in no science is as distinct a cognition handed on about its non-per se subject as about its per se subject; for then there would be no reason why that subject would be more its subject than another one. Therefore, if God be not here the subject, there is not handed on here as distinct a cognition of him as would be handed on in some other science in which he could be the subject; but he can be the subject in some other science; therefore, that one would be prior to this one.2
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Besides these three reasons there are other persuasive considerations. The first is as follows: theology according to Augustine On the Trinity 13 ch.1 n.2; 14 ch.1 n.3 [and cf. 14 ch.19 n.24] is in some part of itself wisdom, and in another part of itself it is science; but if it were about something non-eternal formally, it would be a science formally about it, and in no way wisdom, because eternal things are not attributed to temporal things.
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The second one is that the superior part of reason has some perfection corresponding to itself. But if this perfection is about a non-eternal subject as its first subject, since the eternal is not attributed to the non-eternal, it follows that in no way is it about eternal things, and thus neither does it perfect the superior part of reason.3 Therefore there would be some intellectual habit nobler than it perfecting that part, which is inappropriate.
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The third is that, according to Augustine On the Trinity 13 ch.9 n.12 or 14 ch.1 n.3, this science is about things whereby faith is “generated, defended, and strengthened” [cf. n.140], therefore it is about the same object that is the first object of faith; but faith is about the first truth; therefore etc.
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The fourth is that “the noblest science is about the noblest genus” [Metaphysics 6.1.1026a21-23, On the Soul 1.1.402a1-4]; but this science is admitted to be noblest; therefore, it must be that it is about God as about its object [cf. nn.40, 135].
Section II: B. To the Second Question, speaking of Theology in itself
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From these statements I make reply to the second question [nn.133, 141]. For the understanding of it I posit an example: man is understood as rational animal, as substance, as tame, as noblest of animals. In the first he is understood according to his proper quidditative idea, in the second in common, in the third per accidens in a property, in the fourth in relation to something else. But the most perfect knowledge of man cannot be in relation to something else, because a relation presupposes knowledge of an absolute; nor can it be of man under the idea of a property, because knowledge of a property presupposes knowledge of the subject; nor can it be about man in common or universally, because that is confused knowledge. Therefore, the noblest cognition of man is according to his quidditative idea. – So some science could be posited of God under the idea of relation to something outside him, as some posit knowledge of him under the idea of repairer [cf. n.133], or glorifier, or head of the Church [cf. n. 134]; or some science could be posited of God under the idea of something attributal to him, which is a sort of property, as some posit this science to be of God under the idea of good [cf. n.137]; or it could be posited of him under a general or universal idea [cf. n.146-147], as of being, or infinite being, or necessary existence, or some such thing.
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Argument against all these positions. First against the one about common idea, for no common concept said of God contains virtually all the properly theological truths pertaining to the plurality of persons; for if so, since those common concepts are naturally conceived by us, then immediate propositions about those concepts can be naturally known and understood by us, and through those immediate propositions we could know the conclusions, and so acquire the whole of theology naturally.
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Second, because from the fact common concepts are not to God alone naturally known, therefore neither are the truths included in those common concepts; therefore theology, if it were of God under such a common concept, would not be naturally known to God alone, the opposite of which was shown in the first question [n.152].
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Against the other position about the attributal idea [n.158] argument could be made through the same reasons, but I argue nevertheless through other special ones. First, because cognition of him according to what he is is the most perfect cognition, according to what the Philosopher says, Metaphysics 7.1.1028a36-b2; therefore knowledge of this essence is a more perfect cognition of God than is knowledge of any attributal property that is disposed as a feature of this nature, according to Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith 1 ch.4.
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Second, because if those properties differ in reality from God’s essence,1 his essence would be really cause of them; therefore, just as they differ in idea, so the essence in its idea has the idea of what is uncaused, and the others, although they be uncaused because of their identity with the essence, yet do not according to their formal idea first include their own being uncaused.
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Third, because that seems, according to its own proper idea, to be more actual in itself to which communicability to several things extrinsic to it is repugnant; but to essence in itself is communicability to many things extrinsic to it repugnant, and not to any attributable property, except insofar as the property is of the essence, or is the same as this essence insofar as it is infinite. If it be said that any property is infinite and therefore incommunicable, on the contrary: the infinity is because of infinity and identity with the essence as from the root and foundation of every intrinsic perfection.2
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Against the way too about relations to what is extrinsic [n.158] it can be argued as it was against the other two ways, but I give special reasons. First, because relation to what is extrinsic is a relation of reason;3 but a science that does not consider its subject under a real idea is not a science about reality, just as neither is logic about reality although it consider real things as second intentions are attributed to them; therefore theology would not be a science about reality, which is false.
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Second, because what is absolute and what is relational do not form any concept per se one; therefore, a concept that gathers these two into itself is a concept per accidens one. But no first science is about a concept per accidens one, because such presupposes the sciences of each part; and therefore, if a subalternate science be about anything per accidens one, it presupposes the two sciences that treat the parts of the whole separately. Therefore, if theology were of such a per accidens one, there could be another science prior to it, which would be of a concept per se one.
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Third, no relation to what is extrinsic is shown to belong necessarily to God;4 therefore nothing theological will belong necessarily to him as he is the subject of theology, which is false. – Proof of the consequence: what belongs to something under the idea of not being necessarily inherent does not belong to it necessarily; but every relation to what is extrinsic is of this sort; therefore etc. And so no theological truth is necessary. And this conclusion is proved by the first and second reasons set down for the first question [nn.151-152], namely about the idea of the first subject and about what is naturally known only to God.
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I concede, therefore, the fourth member [n.158], namely that theology is about God under the idea by which namely he is this essence, just as the most perfect science of man would be of man if it were of him according as he is man, and not under some universal or accidental idea.
Section III: C. To the First Question, speaking of Our Theology
- To the first question about our theology [nn.124, 141] I say that when a habit exists in some intellect having evidence from the object, then the first object of that habit, as it belongs to the habit, does not only contain the habit virtually but as known to the intellect itself it contains the habit in such a way that the knowledge of the object in this intellect contains the evidence of the habit as it is in this intellect.1 But in a habit not having evidence from the object but caused from elsewhere, one must not grant that its first object has its two stated conditions; rather one should not grant either condition, because it is just like a habit, as it is in this respect, as if it were about things contingent that in neither way have the first object. To such a habit, then, not evident from the object, there is given a first subject about some first known thing, that is, some most perfect first thing, that is, in which the first truths of the habit immediately inhere. – Our theology is a habit not having evidence from the object; and also the theology that is in us about necessary theological matters does not, as it exists in us, more have evidence from the known object than the theology that is about contingents things does;2 therefore to our theology, as it is ours, one should only give a first known object about which the first truths are immediately known. That first object is infinite being, because this is the most perfect concept that we can have about what is in itself the first subject,3 which subject, however, has neither foresaid condition, because it does not virtually contain our habit in itself, and much less does it, as known to us, contain the habit itself. Yet because our theology about necessary things is about the same that theology in itself is about, therefore a first object is assigned to it to this extent, which is to contain the truths in themselves, and this is the same as the first subject of theology in itself; but because it is not evident to us, therefore it does not, as known to us, contain those truths, indeed rather it is not known to us. When you argue, then, that “therefore it is not the first object of our habit” [n.146], I reply: it is true that it is not the first object giving evidence to us, but it is the first subject containing all the truths in itself, and of a nature or able to provide evidence sufficiently provided it were known. These things are said to the question, or to the two questions, about the theology of necessary things [nn.124, 133, 141, 151-168].