Ordinatio

As to the solution of this question [nn.124-140] I proceed thus: first I make a distinction about theology in itself and theology in us; second I will assign the idea of the first subject; third I will distinguish theology as to its parts. [About theology in itself and in us] – On the first point I say that any science in itself is that which is naturally had of the object of the science according as the object is of a nature to manifest itself to a proportioned intellect; doctrine however for us is what is of a nature to be had in our intellect about that object. Therefore, theology in itself is such knowledge as the theological object is of a nature to produce in an intellect proportioned to it; but theology for us is such knowledge as our intellect is of a nature to have of that object. – An example: if some intellect could not understand geometrical matters yet could believe someone else about geometrical matters, geometry for it would be faith, not science; however, geometry in itself would be a science, because the object of geometry is of a nature to produce science about itself in a proportioned intellect.

[On the Idea of the First Object] – On the second point I say that the idea of a first object is to contain in itself first virtually all the truths of the habit. Which I prove thus: first, because the first object contains the immediate propositions, because the subject of those propositions contains the predicate and so the evidence for the whole proposition; now immediate propositions contain the conclusions; therefore the subject of the immediate propositions contains all the truths of the habit.

I make the same clear in a second way thus, that here ‘firstness’ is taken from Posterior Analytics 1.4.73b32-33, from the definition of ‘universal’ according as it states adequacy: the object¹ would not be adequate to the habit unless it virtually contained everything to the considering of which such habit inclines, because, if it did not, the habit would exceed the object.²

I explain the ‘first…virtually’ that I said [n.142], because it is the first thing that does not depend on another but other things depend on it; so therefore, ‘to contain first’ is not to depend on other things in containing but other things depend on it, that is, that when per impossibile everything else in the idea of the object is removed while the understanding of it remains, it would still objectively contain it. But it does not contain anything else save in the idea of it.

That the essence of the object, when habitually known, contains ‘first virtually’ the knowledge of all the truths of the habit: The habit that is called science is an intelligible species [likeness] of the first object; it regards immediate and mediate truths, not formally, but by implication, and its adequate object is formally the quiddity of which it is the species. What wonder, then, if the first object as known contains the knowledge of the things which its intelligible species moves one, although mediately, to consider? Nay rather, it is the same thing for the intelligible species of a to contain virtually knowledge of b and for the a itself, as known habitually, to contain it, which is that the intelligible species of the a itself in memory is able to generate knowledge of b in the intelligence. In this way, then, the first object of the intellect and of the science are the same; and then the first object does not distinguish them but what is proximate, which is immediate and mediate truth, and the first object of each is related in a certain order to the proximate objects and the habits of them. Accordingly it is impossible to use the habit of the science save by using first in nature and in time together the habit of the intellect, because I never contemplate something in scientific knowing save by considering it as true, evident to me because of some other truth. Either, then, they are the same habit, and I first use the habit about the object to which it first inclines (nay rather, according to Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 9 q.4, both are the same as the habit which is the quiddity of the first simple object, which habit you say is called science by Aristotle in his distinction of sciences);³ or they are many habits – nay rather, any truth at all has its proper habit, and, besides this, there is the habit of the quiddity of the first object, which you say is the intelligible species, and it virtually includes all of them – and then he who uses the later habit must at the same time use all the prior ones. Can it be, then, that a habit, when comparing it with many acts or with one act, has a proper act about each one that is compared? And, besides this, an act of comparing it as well with the act especially of discursive reasoning? – A proper habit is set down as that whereby I am inclined to perform a demonstration, that is, to infer this from that; for which extremes I have two habits; look for the passage with the triangular mark below,⁴ against Henry of Ghent and Richard of St. Victor here [1 d.2 p.2 q1.4 nn.35, 36] – If a plurality of habits may be made sense of, a fewness of them should be preferred.

On the contrary, namely, to the designation of the above posited idea of the first object [nn.142-145],⁵ there are two arguments. First thus: as the first object is to the power, so is the first object to the habit; but the first object of the power is something common to all the per se objects of that power; therefore the first object of the habit is something common to all its objects, and not something that virtually contains other things.

Again second: because what is commonly designated for first object in the sciences is something that is common to all the things that are considered in that science, as line in geometry, number in arithmetic, being in metaphysics.⁶

To the first argument [n.146] I reply and say that the proportion of the object to the proportion of the mover is to the movable or of the active to the passive; the proportion of the object to the habit is as the proportion of the cause to the effect.⁷ Now whenever some agent acts on some patient, any agent also of the same idea can act on any patient of the same idea. Therefore, the first extremes of the active proportion to the passive are common to all the per se extremes of this proportion; for there is adequacy between these most common things, because whatever the idea of one is in has respect to whatever the idea of the other is in. But the first extremes of the proportion of cause to effect are not the most common, because there is no adequacy between them; for not anything contained under what is common has respect to the habit as to its effect, but only some first object or content does, which virtually respects or contains everything that the habit extends itself to.

To the second argument [n.147] I reply that, in the case of many habits differing in species there can be some common object, just as from their objects can a common object be extracted; and so in the sciences a common object is assigned from which there is not one habit in species but only in genus.

[On the Parts of Theology] – On the third [n.141] I say that theology not only contains things necessary but also things contingent. The matter is plain, because all the truths about God, whether as triune or about any of the divine persons, in which he is compared to what is extrinsic, are contingent, as that God creates, that the Son is incarnate, and the like; but all the truths about God as triune or as a determinate person are theological, because they have regard to no natural science; therefore the first integral parts of theology are two, namely truths necessary and contingent.