Ordinatio

The question is whether this science is about all things from the attribution of them to its first subject. That it is: Metaphysics 4.1.1003a21-22: the science about a thing and about what is attributed to it is the same, as he exemplifies there about health; but all other things are attributed essentially to the first subject of this science; therefore etc. On the Contrary:

[Augustine] On the Trinity 14 ch.1 n.3: “Neither must it be attributed to this science etc.”¹

As to the solution of this question [nn.124-140] I proceed thus: first I make a distinction about theology in itself and theology in us; second I will assign the idea of the first subject; third I will distinguish theology as to its parts. [About theology in itself and in us] – On the first point I say that any science in itself is that which is naturally had of the object of the science according as the object is of a nature to manifest itself to a proportioned intellect; doctrine however for us is what is of a nature to be had in our intellect about that object. Therefore, theology in itself is such knowledge as the theological object is of a nature to produce in an intellect proportioned to it; but theology for us is such knowledge as our intellect is of a nature to have of that object. – An example: if some intellect could not understand geometrical matters yet could believe someone else about geometrical matters, geometry for it would be faith, not science; however, geometry in itself would be a science, because the object of geometry is of a nature to produce science about itself in a proportioned intellect.

[On the Idea of the First Object] – On the second point I say that the idea of a first object is to contain in itself first virtually all the truths of the habit. Which I prove thus: first, because the first object contains the immediate propositions, because the subject of those propositions contains the predicate and so the evidence for the whole proposition; now immediate propositions contain the conclusions; therefore the subject of the immediate propositions contains all the truths of the habit.

I make the same clear in a second way thus, that here ‘firstness’ is taken from Posterior Analytics 1.4.73b32-33, from the definition of ‘universal’ according as it states adequacy: the object¹ would not be adequate to the habit unless it virtually contained everything to the considering of which such habit inclines, because, if it did not, the habit would exceed the object.²

I explain the ‘first…virtually’ that I said [n.142], because it is the first thing that does not depend on another but other things depend on it; so therefore, ‘to contain first’ is not to depend on other things in containing but other things depend on it, that is, that when per impossibile everything else in the idea of the object is removed while the understanding of it remains, it would still objectively contain it. But it does not contain anything else save in the idea of it.

That the essence of the object, when habitually known, contains ‘first virtually’ the knowledge of all the truths of the habit: The habit that is called science is an intelligible species [likeness] of the first object; it regards immediate and mediate truths, not formally, but by implication, and its adequate object is formally the quiddity of which it is the species. What wonder, then, if the first object as known contains the knowledge of the things which its intelligible species moves one, although mediately, to consider? Nay rather, it is the same thing for the intelligible species of a to contain virtually knowledge of b and for the a itself, as known habitually, to contain it, which is that the intelligible species of the a itself in memory is able to generate knowledge of b in the intelligence. In this way, then, the first object of the intellect and of the science are the same; and then the first object does not distinguish them but what is proximate, which is immediate and mediate truth, and the first object of each is related in a certain order to the proximate objects and the habits of them. Accordingly it is impossible to use the habit of the science save by using first in nature and in time together the habit of the intellect, because I never contemplate something in scientific knowing save by considering it as true, evident to me because of some other truth. Either, then, they are the same habit, and I first use the habit about the object to which it first inclines (nay rather, according to Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 9 q.4, both are the same as the habit which is the quiddity of the first simple object, which habit you say is called science by Aristotle in his distinction of sciences);³ or they are many habits – nay rather, any truth at all has its proper habit, and, besides this, there is the habit of the quiddity of the first object, which you say is the intelligible species, and it virtually includes all of them – and then he who uses the later habit must at the same time use all the prior ones. Can it be, then, that a habit, when comparing it with many acts or with one act, has a proper act about each one that is compared? And, besides this, an act of comparing it as well with the act especially of discursive reasoning? – A proper habit is set down as that whereby I am inclined to perform a demonstration, that is, to infer this from that; for which extremes I have two habits; look for the passage with the triangular mark below,⁴ against Henry of Ghent and Richard of St. Victor here [1 d.2 p.2 q1.4 nn.35, 36] – If a plurality of habits may be made sense of, a fewness of them should be preferred.

On the contrary, namely, to the designation of the above posited idea of the first object [nn.142-145],⁵ there are two arguments. First thus: as the first object is to the power, so is the first object to the habit; but the first object of the power is something common to all the per se objects of that power; therefore the first object of the habit is something common to all its objects, and not something that virtually contains other things.

Again second: because what is commonly designated for first object in the sciences is something that is common to all the things that are considered in that science, as line in geometry, number in arithmetic, being in metaphysics.⁶

To the first argument [n.146] I reply and say that the proportion of the object to the proportion of the mover is to the movable or of the active to the passive; the proportion of the object to the habit is as the proportion of the cause to the effect.⁷ Now whenever some agent acts on some patient, any agent also of the same idea can act on any patient of the same idea. Therefore, the first extremes of the active proportion to the passive are common to all the per se extremes of this proportion; for there is adequacy between these most common things, because whatever the idea of one is in has respect to whatever the idea of the other is in. But the first extremes of the proportion of cause to effect are not the most common, because there is no adequacy between them; for not anything contained under what is common has respect to the habit as to its effect, but only some first object or content does, which virtually respects or contains everything that the habit extends itself to.

To the second argument [n.147] I reply that, in the case of many habits differing in species there can be some common object, just as from their objects can a common object be extracted; and so in the sciences a common object is assigned from which there is not one habit in species but only in genus.

[On the Parts of Theology] – On the third [n.141] I say that theology not only contains things necessary but also things contingent. The matter is plain, because all the truths about God, whether as triune or about any of the divine persons, in which he is compared to what is extrinsic, are contingent, as that God creates, that the Son is incarnate, and the like; but all the truths about God as triune or as a determinate person are theological, because they have regard to no natural science; therefore the first integral parts of theology are two, namely truths necessary and contingent.

On the basis of what has been said I reply to the first question [nn.124, 141]. And first, speaking of theology in itself as to its necessary truths, I say that the first object of theology in itself cannot be anything but God; which I prove through three reasons. The first is taken from the idea of first object, and I argue thus: the first object contains virtually all the truths of the habit of which it is the first object; nothing contains virtually all the theological truths except God; therefore etc. – Proof of the minor: nothing else contains them as cause, or as that to which they have attribution, except God, because God is attributed to no other thing; nor does anything contain those truths as an effect by a ‘demonstration that’, for no effect demonstrates that God is triune [n.41] (which is most of all a theological truth) and the like; therefore etc.¹

Secondly thus: theology is of things that are naturally known to the divine intellect alone, therefore it is of an object naturally known to God alone; but God alone is naturally known to himself alone; therefore etc. – Proof of the first proposition: if this science is of certain things naturally known to another intellect, then there are, in addition to those things, some other things naturally knowable to the divine intellect alone, because it is infinite and therefore has cognition of more things than a finite intellect; therefore, there will still be another science superior to the one that is about things naturally known to a created intellect. – Proof of the minor: every created essence can be naturally known to some created intellect; therefore, the uncreated essence can alone be known to an uncreated intellect alone.

Third thus: in no science is as distinct a knowledge or cognition handed on about any other thing that is not its first object as would be handed on in the science that would be about that other thing as about its first object, because in no science is as distinct a cognition handed on about its non-per se subject as about its per se subject; for then there would be no reason why that subject would be more its subject than another one. Therefore, if God be not here the subject, there is not handed on here as distinct a cognition of him as would be handed on in some other science in which he could be the subject; but he can be the subject in some other science; therefore, that one would be prior to this one.²

Besides these three reasons there are other persuasive considerations. The first is as follows: theology according to Augustine On the Trinity 13 ch.1 n.2; 14 ch.1 n.3 [and cf. 14 ch.19 n.24] is in some part of itself wisdom, and in another part of itself it is science; but if it were about something non-eternal formally, it would be a science formally about it, and in no way wisdom, because eternal things are not attributed to temporal things.

The second one is that the superior part of reason has some perfection corresponding to itself. But if this perfection is about a non-eternal subject as its first subject, since the eternal is not attributed to the non-eternal, it follows that in no way is it about eternal things, and thus neither does it perfect the superior part of reason.³ Therefore there would be some intellectual habit nobler than it perfecting that part, which is inappropriate.

The third is that, according to Augustine On the Trinity 13 ch.9 n.12 or 14 ch.1 n.3, this science is about things whereby faith is “generated, defended, and strengthened” [cf. n.140], therefore it is about the same object that is the first object of faith; but faith is about the first truth; therefore etc.

The fourth is that “the noblest science is about the noblest genus” [Metaphysics 6.1.1026a21-23, On the Soul 1.1.402a1-4]; but this science is admitted to be noblest; therefore, it must be that it is about God as about its object [cf. nn.40, 135].

From these statements I make reply to the second question [nn.133, 141]. For the understanding of it I posit an example: man is understood as rational animal, as substance, as tame, as noblest of animals. In the first he is understood according to his proper quidditative idea, in the second in common, in the third per accidens in a property, in the fourth in relation to something else. But the most perfect knowledge of man cannot be in relation to something else, because a relation presupposes knowledge of an absolute; nor can it be of man under the idea of a property, because knowledge of a property presupposes knowledge of the subject; nor can it be about man in common or universally, because that is confused knowledge. Therefore, the noblest cognition of man is according to his quidditative idea. – So some science could be posited of God under the idea of relation to something outside him, as some posit knowledge of him under the idea of repairer [cf. n.133], or glorifier, or head of the Church [cf. n. 134]; or some science could be posited of God under the idea of something attributal to him, which is a sort of property, as some posit this science to be of God under the idea of good [cf. n.137]; or it could be posited of him under a general or universal idea [cf. n.146-147], as of being, or infinite being, or necessary existence, or some such thing.

Argument against all these positions. First against the one about common idea, for no common concept said of God contains virtually all the properly theological truths pertaining to the plurality of persons; for if so, since those common concepts are naturally conceived by us, then immediate propositions about those concepts can be naturally known and understood by us, and through those immediate propositions we could know the conclusions, and so acquire the whole of theology naturally.

Second, because from the fact common concepts are not to God alone naturally known, therefore neither are the truths included in those common concepts; therefore theology, if it were of God under such a common concept, would not be naturally known to God alone, the opposite of which was shown in the first question [n.152].

Against the other position about the attributal idea [n.158] argument could be made through the same reasons, but I argue nevertheless through other special ones. First, because cognition of him according to what he is is the most perfect cognition, according to what the Philosopher says, Metaphysics 7.1.1028a36-b2; therefore knowledge of this essence is a more perfect cognition of God than is knowledge of any attributal property that is disposed as a feature of this nature, according to Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith 1 ch.4.

Second, because if those properties differ in reality from God’s essence,¹ his essence would be really cause of them; therefore, just as they differ in idea, so the essence in its idea has the idea of what is uncaused, and the others, although they be uncaused because of their identity with the essence, yet do not according to their formal idea first include their own being uncaused.

Third, because that seems, according to its own proper idea, to be more actual in itself to which communicability to several things extrinsic to it is repugnant; but to essence in itself is communicability to many things extrinsic to it repugnant, and not to any attributable property, except insofar as the property is of the essence, or is the same as this essence insofar as it is infinite. If it be said that any property is infinite and therefore incommunicable, on the contrary: the infinity is because of infinity and identity with the essence as from the root and foundation of every intrinsic perfection.²

Against the way too about relations to what is extrinsic [n.158] it can be argued as it was against the other two ways, but I give special reasons. First, because relation to what is extrinsic is a relation of reason;³ but a science that does not consider its subject under a real idea is not a science about reality, just as neither is logic about reality although it consider real things as second intentions are attributed to them; therefore theology would not be a science about reality, which is false.

Second, because what is absolute and what is relational do not form any concept per se one; therefore, a concept that gathers these two into itself is a concept per accidens one. But no first science is about a concept per accidens one, because such presupposes the sciences of each part; and therefore, if a subalternate science be about anything per accidens one, it presupposes the two sciences that treat the parts of the whole separately. Therefore, if theology were of such a per accidens one, there could be another science prior to it, which would be of a concept per se one.

Third, no relation to what is extrinsic is shown to belong necessarily to God;⁴ therefore nothing theological will belong necessarily to him as he is the subject of theology, which is false. – Proof of the consequence: what belongs to something under the idea of not being necessarily inherent does not belong to it necessarily; but every relation to what is extrinsic is of this sort; therefore etc. And so no theological truth is necessary. And this conclusion is proved by the first and second reasons set down for the first question [nn.151-152], namely about the idea of the first subject and about what is naturally known only to God.

I concede, therefore, the fourth member [n.158], namely that theology is about God under the idea by which namely he is this essence, just as the most perfect science of man would be of man if it were of him according as he is man, and not under some universal or accidental idea.

But now we must see as to contingent theological truths [n.150, Quodl. q.7 n.10] what the prime subject is there. And as to these truths I say that no subject contains only necessary truths about itself, because it is of itself equally disposed to contingent truths about itself and to their opposites. There is, however, an order in contingent truths, and some contingent truth is true first;¹ and so that can be posited the first subject of many contingent truths about which first, that is immediately, is stated the predicate of the first contingent truth (which is as it were the principle in the order of contingent truths), or the predicates of several first contingent truths, if several be first. But the first subject of the first contingent truth is said to be that which, when seen as such, is of a nature to be seen first to be conjoined with the predicate of that truth, because nothing is a first known in contingent truths save through intuition of the extremes; therefore the first intuitable thing in which is the predicate of the first contingent truth is the first subject of all ordered contingent truths.

From these statements I say to the issue in question that the divine essence is the first subject of contingent theology, and this when taken in the same way in which it was previously said that it is the first subject of necessary theology [n.167]; – and this holds of that contingent theology in itself as it holds of it as it is in the divine intellect and also of it as it is in the intellect of the blessed. Therefore, of the whole of theology in itself, both of God and of the blessed, the first subject is his essence as this essence, the vision of which by the blessed is like what the cognition of being is in metaphysics; and for that reason blessed vision is not theological [science] but a sort of perfect simple apprehension of the subject naturally preceding science.

Of our contingent theology there seems to be the same first subject as also of necessary theology, and in the way expounded above [n.168], because it is not the subject as containing – even if it is seen in intuition – but as knowable by us, proximate to that which, known intuitively, the predicate of the first evident contingent truth is of a nature to be in [n.169]. On the contrary: it seems that the Word is the adequate object of contingent theology, both of that theology as it is in itself and as it is in the divine intellect, because it is the first subject of all the articles of our reparation. I reply: something contingent can be first said of the Word, and something of the Holy Spirit, and something of the triune God, as ‘to create’; therefore, the persons will be as it were parts of the subject, just as also some necessary things are first true of the diverse persons.

[The Opinion of Bonaventure] From what has been said the rejection of the opinion that posits Christ as first subject¹ is plain, because then the necessary truths about the Father and the Holy Spirit – to wit, ‘the Father generates’, ‘the Holy Spirit proceeds’ – would not be theological truths, nor would the contingent truths about them, to wit ‘the Father creates through the Son’, ‘the Holy Spirit is sent in time visibly and invisibly’; nor the necessary truths about the triune God, as that he is omnipotent, boundless, nor the contingent truths, as that God creates, God governs the world, remits sins, punishes, rewards, and the like. – All these consequences are proved because to no science does any truth belong per se unless it be about the first subject of it, or about a subjective or integral or essential part of it, or about something essentially attributed to the subject. It is plain that the Father or the Trinity is not Christ, nor part of him in any of the stated ways, nor anything essentially attributed to Christ; both because since Christ states two natures – and this insofar as he is subject, according to those who posit that – it follows that, as having a created nature, he will be essentially prior to the Father or the Trinity, because an essential attribution is not made save to what is essentially prior, which is false; and because Christ even according to divinity does not have any such priority according to which the Father or the Trinity could be attributed to him.

Against this opinion too are the reasons placed last above in the solution of the second question against the position about relation to what is extrinsic [nn.164-166]. – Against the same is the first reason set down for the solution of the first question [n.151], because the necessary truths about the Father, about the Holy Spirit, and about the Trinity cannot be contained first in Christ virtually, because if the Word had not been incarnate, those truths would not have been necessary, which is false. The third reason too in the same place [n.153] is valid here, because no knowledge would have had to be handed down about God save as included in Christ; this knowledge is about the Word only and thus is not the most distinct knowledge that could be handed down; therefore another prior knowledge would need to be required.

Making for this point are some of the persuasive considerations there set down [nn.154-156], because the unity which belongs to Christ² as he is one supposit in two natures is not an eternal unity; but it would be necessary to posit the formal unity of the first subject; therefore the first subject as first is not something eternal only. The persuasive consideration too about faith³ seems to be conclusive; for it is not a theological belief or truth that this man was crucified, as it does not implicate the Word in the subject term, because the Jews could naturally see this man on the cross. But it is a theological belief and truth that the Word was a man born of a Virgin, that the Word was a man crucified, that the Word was a man rising from the dead, and so on about the articles pertaining to humanity; but as for those pertaining to divinity, it is plain that they do not belong first to Christ as he is Christ, but some to the other persons, some to the Trinity. Therefore, the adequate object of theology is not Christ but something that is as it were common to the Word, about whom are primarily believed the articles pertaining to reparation, and to the Father and to the Holy Spirit, about whom are some other theological truths.

It seems then that it must be said that just as if in medicine the human body be the subject, about which is considered health and infirmity there as property: if the kinds of human body were body mixed thus and so, to wit blooded body, phlegmatic body, etc., this whole, healthy blooded body, would not there be the first subject, both because it is too particular and also because it includes the property that needs to be considered about the subject, and a property cannot be the idea of the subject, because a subject, as it is subject, is naturally prior to its property, and thus a property would be prior to itself. And in brief, whatever might be said about any medicine handed down, that it was about such sort of thing, although a particular and a per accidens being, at least it would at any rate be impossible for the first science of man’s body to be about a healthy blooded body. Rather, if in any way it were about this, another science could be prior: either about man’s body in general, because it has in its generality certain properties knowable about it through a common idea, as is a prior to its inferiors; or about blooded body, whose idea is naturally prior to healthy blooded body, and this prior idea virtually contains the other properties; or about man’s healthy body, because its nature precedes healthy blooded body. So it is in the proposed case. Christ states the Word-man, according to Damascene [De Fide Orthodoxa 3 ch.4]; therefore before the knowledge that would be about Christ as about first subject, there would by nature be another prior one about the Word, if any things are present in him through the idea by which he is the Word, and prior to that one another one about God as to things that are present in him through the idea of God as God is common to the three persons.

Therefore, if we hold theology to be in itself the first knowledge, it will not be first about Christ; and if it is equally about truths common and proper to the three persons, it would not be about any person as about some adequate subject, but about God as God is common to the three persons. And then the thesis will be saved that either every theological truth is about the first subject, to wit a truth that is in God by reason of God, or about a subjective part, as it were, of the first subject, to wit a truth that is properly in some person, or about what is attributed to the first subject or to a part, as it were, of the subject, to wit about the creature as to the respect that it has to God as God and about the nature assumed as to the respect it has to the Word sustaining it [n.172].

[The Opinion of Lincoln]⁴ – In another way, however, it is posited that Christ is the prime subject, according to Lincoln in his The Work of Six Days, and this according as Christ is one by a triple unity, of which the first is with the Father and the Holy Spirit, the second of the Word with the assumed nature, the third of Christ the head with his members. And on behalf of this opinion about Christ seems to be the first reason set down for the first question and the penultimate one [nn.151, 156], because the seven articles of the faith pertaining to the humanity [of Christ]⁵ God does not contain as subject, because they do not belong to him by nature of his divinity. But the subject does contain the property by whose form the property is in it. Now Christ contains those articles, because they are present in him according to his humanity, and this really; he also contains the others pertaining to his divinity,⁶ because they seem to be present in him according to his divinity.

A confirmation is that the subjects of the parts of the doctrine should be contained under the subject of the whole, either as subjective parts or as quasi-integral parts; not so contained under God are the subjects of the parts of Scripture. The thing is proved by many glosses at the beginnings of books, assigning as material causes certain things that are not anything of God, to wit, a gloss on Hosea says that the matter of Hosea is ‘the ten tribes’.

Again, third: nothing proper to God is narrated in some place of Scripture, because no fact is there narrated where anything was required on the part of God save only his general influence; therefore such a book is not about God.

To the first argument [n.177] I say that the contingent truths asserted of Christ are not contained virtually in any subject in the way a subject is said to contain a property, because then those truths would be necessary; yet they do have a subject of which they are immediately and first asserted, and that is the Word, for the theological truths about the incarnation, nativity, passion, etc. are these: ‘The Word became man’, ‘the Word was born man’, ‘the Word suffered as man’ etc. hen you say that ‘the property is present according to the human nature’, I reply: humanity is not the subject’s first idea at which the resolution stands, but is as it were a prior property mediating between the first subject of these truths, which is the Word, and the other later properties, as ‘born’ etc. It is plain that humanity cannot be the idea of the subject with respect to the first property, which is ‘was incarnate’, because that is said of the Word without humanity being pre-understood as present in the Word as subject; this is the first reason.

To the second [n.178] I say that the attribution of the parts of science to the first subject would be enough, and this sort of attribution to God can be saved as to any matter assigned by the adduced glosses. In another way: the matter of any book whatever is God of whom is therein narrated how he governed the human race; but the tribe or person governed is the remote matter. Thus are such glosses to be understood.

Hereby is clear the response to the third [n.179], that although there were some book containing no miracle of God, yet any book contains God’s providence and governance about man in general or about a determinate tribe or person, so much so that if the same history about Pharaoh be written in Exodus by Moses and by some Egyptian in the chronicles of the Egyptians, the subject of Moses’ history is God, about whom is transmitted there that he governs man, by mercifully freeing the oppressed Hebrews, by justly punishing the Egyptian oppressors, by wisely ordering a fitting form of liberation and by powerfully doing, for the purpose that the freed people might accept the law with joy, so many signs proper to himself; but the subject of the history of a historiographer would be the kingdom, or the king, or the Egyptian people, whose deeds and fortunes that befell them he intended to write, such that it is incidental to him what God did, but principal what his people did or suffered. Principal for Moses is what God did or permitted, but incidental as it were what the matter happened to be about. And granted that in some places no miracle were narrated, yet what God permitted, by giving assistance according to his ordinary influence, not preventing, this is principally intended in that book insofar as it is part of Scripture; and how that was fittingly ordered to some good, if it was so orderable, or how justly punished if it was bad, this is frequently added in the same or another book, or if it was permitted and not here punished, Scripture is elsewhere not silent about it in general, that it will be punished elsewhere.

[To the Arguments from the First Way] – To the first argument of the first question [n.125] I say that the authority states that the matter of this science, not the first and formal subject of this science, is things and signs and the like.

To the second [n.126] I say that whatever sense is not literal in one part of Scripture, is literal in another part of Scripture; therefore, although some part of Scripture have diverse senses, yet the whole Scripture has all those senses on behalf of the literal sense.

To the third [n.127] I say that the argument is to the opposite, in two ways. First, because man is posited to be the subject of moral science or medicine as that which contains virtually all the truths of the science. For the human body contains the idea of health virtually; for that is why the health of man is the sort it is, because the human body is complexioned as it is. Likewise, the soul of man contains the idea of natural felicity virtually, as is plain in Ethics 1.9.1097b22-98a20, where the idea of the natural felicity of man is concluded from the soul, or from the idea of the soul. Not so does man contain the idea of the end of this science (of theology), because supernatural felicity or the object of it is not included in the idea of man; and, therefore, man cannot be the first object of this science; therefore etc.

Second thus: man is the ultimate end of these sciences, and to this end both health and natural felicity are ordered. My proof is that all love of concupiscence presupposes love of friendship [2 d.6 q.2 n.3]; but health or felicity is loved with love of concupiscence; therefore, what is loved with love of friendship by him who has love of concupiscence is a further end beyond any of these. Such a further end is the body, on one side, and the soul, on the other. Therefore, if man in his body or soul is the subject of this science, it follows that his end is the subject of this science.

To the fourth [n.128] I say that the first proposition is false, because the end of a science is nothing other than to attain by its act the proper object of the science -- not to induce by its act some form in an object, because science is not a manufacturing quality.

[To the Arguments from the Second Way] – To Boethius [n.129] I say that he is speaking of a subject of an accident, not of a subject of study. To the text from the Physics [n.130] I say that it means ‘matter from which’, because this matter and the efficient cause do not coincide, and not that it means ‘matter of which’ or ‘about which’. Or better, one should say that the subject of a science as to truth does not belong to the genus of material cause but to the genus of efficient cause; however the subject of a science is said to be its matter by a certain likeness to the act of making, where the idea of object ‘about which’ and the idea of susceptive matter run together, because the act of it is a making that passes beyond to what is outside it. Not so in the case of the proper act of a science; however, a science is understood to pass beyond, because it does not terminate in itself but in that about which it is, although it is not received into the ‘about-which’ but remains in the knower. And on account of this one property of matter, namely ‘to be that about which’, the object is said to be matter in relation to the science and its act.¹

To the text from the Posterior Analytics [n.131] I say that the object of any science naturally discovered is something universal; therefore, the subject of such a science should have subjective parts. But of this science [of theology] the object is this essence [sc. God] as a singular, because it is a mark of imperfection in universal created nature that it is divided among many singulars; once this imperfection has been removed, the result is that this essence is knowable without divisibility of it into subjective parts. Yet it could be said that the divine persons are quasi subjective parts of the divine essence itself; but the essence itself is not numerically multiplied in them as it is in other imperfect things, where the subject is divisible into many.

As to what is added about properties [n.131], some say the attributes are quasi properties of the essence itself. But this is not valid, because any attribute as a ‘this’ can properly be known theologically of God, though anything as known confusedly is known metaphysically of him. For just as God in this way and that, that is, as a ‘this’ and as confusedly known, pertains to the theologian and to the metaphysician, so too does any attribute taken in this way and in that.² Now as to the added point that a property is outside the essence of the subject [n.131], this is true when the property is really caused by the object; but in divine reality that which has the idea of a property is not caused, because it passes into essence by way of identity; however, as to its knowability, it is known through the idea of the essence as if it were really distinct from the essence.

As to what, third, is said about the principle of the subject [n.131], I say that it is not necessary that the principles of what is knowable be principles of the subject as it is in itself, because in the case of being qua being, which is set down as the subject of metaphysics, there are no principles, because then they would be principles of any being whatever; but it is necessary that of any subject whatever there be principles by which its properties are demonstrated of it, and from these principles, as from the middle terms of demonstration, propositional principles are formed, just as self-evident principles are. In this way, of any subject at all, however much it is not a principle with respect to its properties, there can be principles.³

To the first argument of the second question, when argument is made by Hugh of St. Victor and Cassiodorus [nn.133-134], it is said that they are not speaking here of the formal object but of the proximate matter (which is more diffusively dealt with in Scripture), because of the more immediate order they have to the end.

To the second [n.135] I say that metaphysics is not about God as about its first subject. The proof is that, in addition to the special sciences, there needs to be some common science in which are proved all the things that are common to the special ones; therefore, in addition to the special sciences, there needs to be some common science about being, in which the knowledge of the properties of being may be dealt with, which knowledge is presupposed in the special sciences; if then there is some science about God, there is in addition to it some naturally known science about being insofar as it is being. But when it is proved by the Philosopher in the Metaphysics [n.135] that the science of metaphysics is about God, I say that his reasoning concludes as follows: ‘the noblest science is about the noblest genus’, either as first subject, or as considered in that science in the most perfect way in which it can be considered in any naturally acquired science. But although God is not the first subject in metaphysics, he is yet considered in that science in the noblest way that he can be considered in any science naturally acquired.¹

To the Commentator on the Physics [n.136] I say that Avicenna – whom the Commentator contradicts – spoke well and the Commentator badly. The proof is: first, because if the existence of any separate substances were a supposition in the science of metaphysics and a conclusion in natural science, then physics would be simply prior to the whole of metaphysics, because physics would show the ‘whether it exists’ about the subject of metaphysics, which is presupposed to the whole knowledge of the science of metaphysics. – Second, because by every condition of an effect can it be proved of the cause that it exist, which condition cannot be in the effect unless the cause exist; but many properties are considered in metaphysics that cannot be present save from some first cause of such beings; therefore, on the basis of such properties, metaphysics can demonstrate that there is some first cause of those beings. The proof of the minor is that the multitude of beings, their dependence, composition, and the like – which are the properties of metaphysics – show that there is actually something simple, altogether independent, and necessarily existent. Also, the existence of a first cause is much more perfectly shown from the properties of caused things considered in metaphysics than from natural properties when a first mover is shown to exist; also there is a more perfect and more immediate knowledge of the first being to know it as first being, or as necessarily existent, than to know it as first mover.

To the other [n.137] I say that the relation of end is not the noblest idea of knowledge, but that which is the end (as the idea of the foundation of this relation) is the noblest idea; but the deity is the founding idea of the relation of end to creatures; therefore, the deity will be the first object, which I concede. And so the argument is for the opposite. But when proof from Metaphysics II about the good is given [n.137], I say that if through some appropriation goodness is the foundation of the end, still the deity is the root and first foundation of it. But the consequence is good: ‘if there is no final end, then there is no good’, because if there is no perfect good there is no good; but no good is perfect which is ordered to some further good, because a good of this sort has a diminished goodness. However, it is not necessary that goodness is the proper idea of the end, but essence is more proper and fundamental. Hereby is it clear, as to the remark of Avicenna on Metaphysics VI [n.137], that it must not be understood of the end, but of the fundamental idea in respect of the end.

To the third question [n.139] it seems it can probably be said that theology is not about all knowables,¹ because quiddities distinct from the divine essence as it is this singular essence contain first virtually many truths about themselves. The proof is because if, after everything else per impossible has been removed, these quiddities were uncreated, they would still contain such truths, as is plain of line and number with respect to the immediate propositions about them. And, accordingly, it could be posited that in the divine intellect there were habits distinct in idea, I mean habits of science,² as: there would be a theology that the divine essence as this essence would cause in the divine intellect, and there would be a geometry in his intellect that was in his intellect by virtue of line, and arithmetic in this way by reason of number, and so on about others.

Against this in three ways: First, because the divine intellect would be cheapened by reason of the fact that it would be opened up by an object other than its essence; for in the instant of nature in which it understood line, it would still be as it were in potency to knowing the truths that exist in line – and it recognizes those truths by virtue of the quiddity of line – , therefore line would as it were be the efficient cause imprinting knowledge of these truths on the divine intellect, and so line will be a mover of the divine intellect.

Second as follows: the first object of every power made actual by diverse objects per se by their proper virtue is something common to them; but if line, by virtue of itself, were to cause truth in the divine intellect, by parity of reasoning will other things too cause truth in God’s intellect, and so the first object of the divine intellect will be being in common, not his own singular essence. Nor is it an objection here that other objects are attributed to his essence; for thus are other beings attributed to substance, and yet the first object of our intellect is being.

Third, because if his essence is the first object, it is clear that it is not first by commonness of predication; therefore, it will be first by virtualness. But it would not be the first object virtually if anything else were, in accord with its own virtue, to effect a change in his intellect.