Ordinatio

To the arguments [n.6-11] for the opinion of Aristotle. To the first [n.6] I say that knowledge depends on the soul that knows and the object that is known [nn.6-11], because according to Augustine On the Trinity IX ch.12 n.18 “knowledge is born from knower and known.” Although, therefore, the soul may have within a sufficient active and passive element to the extent an action with respect to knowledge agrees with the soul, yet it does not have within itself a sufficient active element to the extent the action agrees with the object, because it is thus like a blank tablet, as is said in On the Soul 3.4.429b30-30a2. The agent intellect then is that by which it makes everything, but it is so insofar as ‘making’ with respect to knowledge agrees with the soul, not insofar as the object is active.

To the confirmation for the reason [n.7]. To the major I say that nature is sometimes taken for the intrinsic principle of motion or rest – as it is described in Physics 2.1.192b20-23 – sometimes for the naturally active principle, insofar as nature is distinguished from art or from purpose on account of opposite modes of being a principle, whether it is intrinsic or not, provided it be natural. In the first way the major is not true, because there does not naturally correspond to every passive element an active intrinsic principle that is nature, because many things are naturally receptive of some act for which they do not have an active intrinsic principle. In the second way too the major proposition is false in certain cases, namely when a nature, because of its excellence, is naturally ordered to receiving a perfection so eminent that it cannot fall under the causality of a natural agent in the second way. So it is in the proposed case.

When proof is given of the major [n.7], I say that the passive power is not in vain in nature, because although it cannot through a natural agent be principally reduced to act, yet the disposition for it can be introduced by such an agent, and can by some agent in nature – that is, in the whole system of being or beings – to wit, by the first or supernatural agent, be completely reduced to act.

And if it is objected that this cheapens nature because it cannot attain its perfection from natural sources, although nature fails less in nobler things, from On the Heavens 2.8.290a29-35, I reply: if our happiness were to consist in the highest contemplation to which we can now naturally attain, the Philosopher would not say [On the Soul 3.9.432b21-22] that nature fails in necessary things. But now I concede that that speculation can be had naturally, and further I say that another more eminent one can be received naturally. Therefore, nature is in this respect made more dignified than if the supreme one possible for it were posited to be that natural one; nor is it to be wondered at that there is a passive capacity in some nature for a greater perfection than its active causality can extend itself to.

What is adduced from the On the Heavens is not to the purpose, because the Philosopher is speaking there of instruments corresponding to motive power, were it present, in the stars. And I concede that universally to that to which a power is given which is of a nature to be organic, an organ is by nature given – I mean in the case of non-deprived things. But in the case at hand a power is given but not one with an organ; however not all other things have been naturally given that, besides the power, come together for the act. From the Philosopher, then, can be had there that a nature orderable to some act or object naturally has the power for it, and an organ if the power is organic; but of things later required for the act it is not so.

In another way it could be said to the major [n.7] that it is true speaking of a natural passive power as it is a passive power in comparison to an active one, but not as it is a passive power in comparison to the received act. The difference between these members is plain at the beginning of the solution to this question [n.57].

Now he minor [n.7] is true in the second way, not the first [n.57]. It could also easily be in a third way said to the minor by the denial of it, because although absolutely the possible intellect is naturally receptive of such intellection, yet not for this present state. But the cause of this will be spoken about below, 1 d.3 p.1 q.2 n.16; q.3 n.2.

As to the third reason [n.8], look for the response of Thomas in ST Ia q.1 a.1 ad 2, where he responds thus, that “a diverse idea of the knowable introduces a diversity of sciences. For the same conclusion is demonstrated by the astrologer through a mathematical middle term, that is, a term abstracted from matter (to wit, that the earth is round), and by the natural philosopher through a middle term considered in matter. Hence nothing prevents the same things which the philosophical sciences treat of according to how they are knowable by the light of natural reason, from being treated of by another science according to how they are known by the light of divine revelation.” On the contrary: if knowledge of things knowable in theology is handed on or can be handed on in other sciences, although in another light, then theological knowledge about the same things is not necessary. The consequence is plain in his example, because he who knows that the earth is round by a physical middle term does not need the knowledge by a mathematical middle term as if this knowledge were simply necessary.

His stated response, however, to the third argument [n.8] is thus expounded [ST IaIIae q.54 a.2 and ad 2], namely that a habit is both a habit and a form; insofar as it is a habit it gets its distinction from the object, but insofar as it is a form it can be distinguished by the active principle. Now with respect to a scientific habit the principles are efficient causes. Although, therefore, where there is the same knowable (for example, that the earth is round) there is no distinction through the objects, yet there is a distinction through the principles by which the mathematician and the natural philosopher show this; and so there will be a distinction of habits insofar as they are forms and not insofar as they are habits.

On the contrary: the form is common to the habit; but it is impossible for things to be distinct in the idea of the superior and indistinct in the idea of the inferior; therefore it is impossible for anything to be distinct through the idea of the form whereby it is a form and yet indistinct through the idea of the habits (for this would be as if some things were distinct from other things in idea of ‘animal’ and indistinct from them in idea of ‘man’). Besides, it supposes too that principles distinguish habits in some other genus of cause than as efficient principles, which is false, because if they do have some idea of a distinctive cause as to habits they have only the idea of efficient cause. Besides, the reason is still in place that however much distinct cognitive habits could be posited, yet the necessity of one of them, as though otherwise knowledge would be impossible, would not be preserved by positing the possibility of a second habit whencesoever distinct.

Therefore to the argument I reply that in those speculative sciences, although it treat of all objects of speculation, yet not as to everything that is knowable about them, because not as to what is proper to them, as was made plain before in the third reason [nn.40-47] against the first opinion (look under g [n.9]).

To the fourth [n.9] the response is thus, that the first principles cannot be applied to any conclusions save those of sense; both because their terms are abstracted from sensibles and so reflect the nature of them, and because the agent intellect, by which the application must be made, is limited to sensibles.

On the contrary: it is certain to the intellect that those first principles are true not only in sensibles but also in non-sensibles; for the intellect has no more doubt as to something immaterial that contradictories are not both true than as to something material. And as to the remark that the term of the first principle is being that is divided into the ten categories, and this does not extend itself to the object of theology, it is of no force; for we are not more in doubt about God that contradictories are not both true (as that God is blessed and not blessed and the like) than about something white.

Another response is given, that conclusions do not follow from major premises alone but with the minor premises adjoined; but the minors that should be adjoined to them are not now naturally manifest. On the contrary: the minors to be assumed under the first principles make predication of things assumed ‘under’ the subject terms of the first principles; but it is known that the terms of the first principles are said of anything whatever, because they are most common; therefore etc.

For this reason I respond that the second part of the minor is false, namely this, that in the first principles ‘all knowable conclusions are virtually included’ [n.10]. In proof I say that just as the subject terms are common, so also are the predicate terms. When, therefore, the subject terms, because they are distributed, are taken to cover everything, they are not taken to cover everything except in respect of the predicate terms that are most common, and consequently, by virtue of such principles, only the most common predicates are known about lower things.

This is plain by reason, because a middle term cannot be the ‘why’ in respect of any property save a property that is virtually included in the idea of the middle term; but in the idea of the subject of the most common principle is not included why any particular property is, but only why the most common is; therefore the subject cannot be the middle term or reason for knowing certain things, save under the most common idea. But there are in addition to the most common properties many other knowable properties, for which properties the properties of the first principles cannot be the middle terms, because they do not include them. Therefore, there are many knowable truths that are not included in the first principles. This is plain in an example, because this statement ‘every whole is greater than its part’, although it includes the statement ‘four is greater than two’, and other like statements about the same predicate, yet it does not include the following: ‘four is double in respect of two’, ‘three is in the relation of one and a half to two’, for there would be need that these predicates have special middle terms which include them.

The third proof [the first proof is n.86, the second n.87], a logical one, is that although it may be possible to descend under the subject of a universal affirmative yet not under the predicate; but many predicates contained under the predicates of the first principles are knowable of things inferior to the subjects of them; therefore, the predicates are not known of the subjects through the first principles.

An objection against this: ‘about anything at all there is affirmation or negation, and about the same thing negated there is both’; the consequence follows, ‘therefore about this white or non-white’, in such a way that it is licit to descend there under the predicate and under the subject. I reply: this principle ‘about anything there is affirmation or negation’ etc. is equivalent to this proposition ‘one part of any contradiction about anything is true and the other false’, where there are two distributed terms, and it is licit to descend under each distributed term, ‘therefore about this term of this contradiction’ etc.; but under the predicate, which stands confusedly only, it is not licit to descend, because this does not follow, ‘one part of any contradiction about anything, therefore this part’. So it is in other principles; always the predicate of a universal affirmative stands confusedly only, whether there are two distributions there in the subject or one. And in the example at hand still the matter is plain. Because about man it is knowable that he is able to laugh, never can more be inferred from the principle ‘one part of any contradiction’ etc. than that ‘therefore about man, able to laugh or not able to laugh’. One part, then, of the disjunctive predicate will never be known of the subject through this principle, but there is required other special principle, as the definition of the subject or the property, which is indeed the middle term and the reason for knowing ‘able to laugh’ determinately of man.