Ordinatio

The three reasons on which this solution rests are confirmed by authorities. The first [nn.13-16] by the authority of Augustine City of God XVII ch.41 n.3: “The philosophers, not knowing to what end those things were to be referred, were able, among the false things they said, to see something true” etc.

The second reason [nn.17-18] is confirmed by Augustine City of God XI ch.2: “What advantage is it to know whither one should go if the way by which one should go is not known?” On this point the philosophers were in error who, although they handed on some truths about the virtues, yet mixed in falsehoods, according to the preceding authority of Augustine [n.66], and it is plain from their books. For Aristotle blames the polities arranged by many others, Politics 2. But neither is the polity itself of Aristotle free of blame: in the Politics, 7.9.1329a29-32, he teaches that the gods are to be honored (“For it is fitting,” he says, “to give honor to the gods”), and in the same place, 7.16.1335b19-25, he hands on a law “to nourish nothing abandoned.”

The third reason [nn.40-41] is confirmed by Augustine City of God XI ch.3: “As to things that are remote from our senses, since we cannot know them by our own testimony, we require the testimony of others.” And this confirms the whole of the principal solution [nn.57-65]. For because the propositions about which the argument is [nn.40-41, 62] are in themselves neutral for us, no one can have confidence about them on his own testimony, but it is necessary to look for the supernatural testimony of someone superior to the whole human species.

Now in what way the first handing down or revelation of such doctrine was able to be done and was done is doubtful – namely whether by interior or exterior locution, with some signs applied sufficient to cause assent – it is enough for the purpose that such doctrine could have been supernaturally revealed in either way, but in neither way could it without error have been handed down by man first.

Against these three reasons it is at the same time objected that they destroy themselves, because that which is shown to be necessarily in need of being known is shown to be true, because nothing is known except what is true; therefore whatever these reasons show as necessary to be known (namely, that the enjoyment of God in himself is the end of man, as to the first reason [nn.13-16], – the way to reach it is through the merits that God accepts as worthy of such reward, as to the second reason [nn.17-18], – that God is triune and causes contingently, and the like, as to the third reason [nn.40-41]), all this is shown to be true. Either, then, these reasons are only from faith, or from them the opposite of what they prove is concluded.

I reply: by natural reason it is shown that there is need to know determinately one part of this contradiction, ‘enjoyment is the end, enjoyment is not the end’, that is, that the intellect is not merely doubtful or neutral about this problem, ‘whether enjoyment is the end’, because such doubt or ignorance would impede search for the end; but it is not shown by natural reason that this part [of the contradiction] is something that needs necessarily to be known. And in this way the aforesaid reasons, insofar as they are natural, conclude to one part of the contradiction, this one or that, not determinately to this one save only from things believed [cf. n.12].