Ordinatio

To the question, then, I reply by first distinguishing how something may be said to be supernatural.¹ For a receptive power is compared to the act that it receives or to the agent it receives it from. In the first way it is a natural power, or a violent one, or neither. It is said to be a natural if it is naturally inclined, violent if [the act] is against the natural inclination of what undergoes it, neither if it is naturally inclined neither to the form that it receives nor to the opposite. Now in this comparison there is no supernaturality. But when comparing the receiver to the agent from which it receives the form, then there is naturality when the receiver is compared to such an agent as has the nature of naturally impressing such a form on such a receiver, but there is supernaturality when it is compared to an agent that does not naturally impress the form on that receiver.

Before this distinction be applied to the proposed case, there is a multiple argument against it; both that the distinction of ‘natural’ and ‘violent’ may be taken from the comparison of the receiver to the agent and not only from the comparison of it to the form, and that the distinction of ‘natural’ and ‘supernatural’ may be taken from the comparison of the receiver to the form and not only from its respect to the agent. But these arguments are not set down here [they are set down in 4 d.43 q.4 nn.4-5].

But a reasonable solution is apparent, because that is per se cause of something on which when posited, with everything else being removed or varied, the effect follows. But now, although the form against which the receiver is inclined is not introduced save by an agent acting violently on the receiver, and although a supernatural agent does not act supernaturally save by introducing a form, yet the per se idea of ‘violent’ is taken from the relation of the receiver to the form [Ord. 4 d.43 q.4 n.4], and the per se idea of ‘supernatural’ is taken from the relation of the receiver to the agent [ibid. n.5]. The proof is because when receiver and form remain in their own nature (for example, that the form can be received but against the inclination of the receiver), then, however the agent is varied, the receiver receives it violently [ibid. n.4]; likewise, when the receiver and the agent are so disposed that only an agent not naturally active changes the receiver (‘only’ I say in the sense that a natural agent does not dispose it), then whatever form the agent introduces will be supernatural with respect to the receiver [ibid. n.5].This is proved secondly in this way because [the form is supernatural] not only in ‘being introduced’ but also in ‘persisting’; some form persists violently in a receiver without extrinsic action, although not for a long time, some form persists naturally and for a long time; some form remains natural, some supernatural, because of the agent only, so that, by exclusion of the agent by which the thing is done, it could not be said to be supernatural; and it could be said to be natural because, by comparing the form to the receiver only, it perfects naturally [Ord. IV d.43 q.4 n.4]. This is proved secondly in this way because [the form is supernatural] not only in ‘being introduced’ but also in ‘persisting’; some form persists violently in a receiver without extrinsic action, although not for a long time, some form persists naturally and for a long time; some form remains natural, some supernatural, because of the agent only, so that, by exclusion of the agent by which the thing is done, it could not be said to be supernatural; and it could be said to be natural because, by comparing the form to the receiver only, it perfects naturally [Ord. IV d.43 q.4 n.4].

Applying this then to the proposed case, I say that, when comparing the possible intellect to actual knowledge in itself, no knowledge is supernatural for it, because the possible intellect is naturally perfected by any knowledge whatever and to any knowledge whatever does it naturally incline. But speaking in the second way [n.57], in this way is that supernatural which is generated by an agent that is not of a nature to move the possible intellect to such knowledge naturally.

Now for this present state, according to the Philosopher [On the Soul 3.4.429a13-18, 5.430a14-17, 7.431a14-17, 8.432a8-10], the possible intellect is of a nature to be moved to knowledge by the agent intellect and by a phantasm, therefore only that knowledge is natural for it which is impressed by these agents. Now by virtue of these agents can all knowledge of a concept be had that is had by a wayfarer according to common law, as is plain in the instance [n.42] against the third principal reason. And therefore, although God could, by a special revelation, cause knowledge of some concept, as in the case of rapture, yet such supernatural knowledge is not of common law necessary.

But about propositional truths it is otherwise because, as was shown by the three first reasons adduced against the first opinion [nn.13-18, 40-41], once the whole action of the agent intellect and phantasms is posited, many propositions will remain unknown to us and neutral to us the knowledge of which is necessary for us. Therefore, knowledge of these things must be handed on to us supernaturally, because no one has been able naturally to discover the knowledge of them and to hand it on to others by teaching, because as they were by natural powers neutral for one, so also for everyone. But whether, after the first handing on of teaching about such things, someone else could, by natural powers, assent to doctrine handed down, Ord. III. Suppl. d.23 q.un. nn.4-5. Now this first handing on of such doctrine is called revelation, which is for this reason supernatural, because it is from an agent that, for this present state, is not naturally a mover of the intellect.

In another way too could action or knowledge be said to be supernatural, because it is from an agent supplying the place of the supernatural object. For an object of a nature to cause knowledge of this proposition ‘God is triune’ and of like ones is the divine essence known under its proper idea; as knowable under this idea it is a supernatural object [Ord. I d.3 q.2 n.16]. Whatever agent, then, causes some knowledge of the truths that are of a nature to be evident through such an object so known, that agent is in this respect supplying the place of that object. But if the agent were to cause of those truths a perfect knowledge of the sort that the object known in itself would cause, then the agent would perfectly supply the place of the object; to the extent the knowledge it causes is imperfect, it is virtually contained in the perfect knowledge of which the object known in itself would cause.

So it is in the case at hand. For he who reveals this truth ‘God is triune’, causes in the mind some knowledge, though obscure, of this truth, because it is about an object not known under its proper idea, which object, if it were thus known, would be of a nature to cause a perfect and clear knowledge of that truth. To the extent, then, that this knowledge is obscure and is included eminently in that clear knowledge, as the imperfect in the perfect, to that extent the revealer or causer of this obscure truth supplies the place of the object that is causative of the clear knowledge, especially since it cannot cause knowledge of any truth except by supplying the place of some object; nor could it cause knowledge of such truths about this object the way it supplies the place of some lower object that is naturally mover of our intellect, because no such object virtually includes any knowledge of those truths, neither clear even nor obscure; therefore it must be the case that, in causing even that obscure knowledge, it supply in some way the place of the supernatural object.

The difference between these two ways of positing the supernaturality of revealed knowledge is plain by separating one from the other. For example, if a supernatural agent were to cause knowledge of a natural object, so that if it were to infuse geometry into someone, this geometry would be supernatural in the first way [n.60], not in the second [n.63] (that is,² in both ways, because the second implies the first, though not conversely). But where only the first is, there it is not necessary that it be supernatural such that it could not be had naturally; where the second way is, there is a necessity for it be had supernaturally, because it cannot be had naturally.