Ordinatio

Against this position one can argue in three ways. Note: nothing supernatural can be shown by natural reason to exist in the wayfarer, or to be necessarily required for his perfection; nor even can one who has [something supernatural] know that it is in him. Therefore, it is impossible here to use natural reason against Aristotle: if it be argued from matters of belief, it is not a reason against the philosopher, because he will not concede the believed premise. Hence these reasons here made against him have the other premise as something believed or as proved from something believed; therefore, they are only theological persuasions, from things believed to something believed.

[First principal reason] – First as follows: everything that acts through knowledge has need of distinct knowledge of its end.¹ I prove this because everything that acts for an end acts from desire of the end;² everything that per se acts, acts for an end;³ therefore everything that per se acts in its own way desires the end. Therefore, just as for a natural agent there needs to be desire of the end for which it must act, so for what acts by knowledge (because it too is a per se agent, from Physics 2.5.196b17-22) there needs to be desire of the end for which it must act.⁴ The major then is plain. But man cannot from his natural powers distinctly know his end; therefore some supernatural knowledge of it is necessary for him.⁵

The minor is plain: first, because the Philosopher, following natural reason, either sets down that happiness is perfect in the acquired knowledge of separate substances, as he seems to mean in Ethics (1.6.1097b22-98a20, 10.7.1177a12-b1, 10.8.1178b7-32, 10.9.1179a22-32), or if he does not determinately assert that it is the supreme perfection possible for us, he does not conclude anything else by natural reason, such that, by relying on natural reason alone, he will either err about the end in particular or remain in doubt about it;⁶ hence in Ethics 1.10.1099b11-13 he doubtfully says “if there is any gift from the gods, it is reasonable that happiness is.”⁷

Secondly the same minor is proved through reason, because of no substance is the proper end known by us save from the acts of it manifest to us from which is shown that such end is fitting for such nature;⁸ no acts do we experience or know to be present in our nature for this present state from which we may know that the vision of separate substances is fitting for us; therefore we cannot naturally know distinctly that that end is fitting for our nature.⁹

This at least is certain, that certain conditions of the end, on account of which it is more desirable and more fervently to be inquired about, cannot be determinately known by natural reason. For even if it were granted that reason was sufficient to prove that the naked vision and enjoyment of God is the end of man, yet the conclusion will not follow that these belong in perpetuity to the man perfect in soul and body, as will be said in 4 d.43 q.2 n.32. And yet the perpetuity of a good of this sort is a condition that renders the end more desirable than if it were transitory. For to obtain this good in a perfect nature is more desirable than to obtain it in a separated soul, as is plain from Augustine The Literal Meaning of Genesis bk. 12. ch. 35 n.68. These and the like conditions of the end, therefore, must be known for efficaciously inquiring into the end, and yet natural reason is not sufficient for them; therefore, a doctrine delivered supernaturally is required.

[Second Principal Reason] – Secondly as follows:¹⁰ every knower acting for an end must have knowledge how and in what way such an end may be acquired; and he must also have knowledge of all the things that are necessary for the end; and third he must have knowledge that all those things are sufficient for such an end. The first is plain, because if he not know how and in what way the end may be acquired, he will not know how to dispose himself for obtaining it. The second is proved because if he not know everything necessary for the end, he could, because of ignorance of some act necessary for it, fail of the end. If too, as to the third, the necessary things are not known to be sufficient, he will, from doubt that he may be ignorant of something necessary, not pursue what is necessary in an effective way.

But the wayfarer cannot know these three conditions by natural reason. The proof of the first is because beatitude is conferred as a reward for the merits that God accepts as worthy of such a reward, and consequently it does not follow by natural necessity on acts of ours of any sort, but is given contingently by God when he accepts some acts in their ordering to him as meritorious.¹¹ This fact is not naturally knowable, as it seems, because here too the philosophers erred, laying down that everything that is from God immediately is from him necessarily [cf. Henry of Ghent, Summa a.29 q.5, q.30q4 ad 1]. The other two members [n.17], at any rate, are manifest: for the acceptation of the divine will, namely as contingently accepting such and such things worthy of eternal life and also that they are sufficient, cannot be known by natural reason; it depends merely on the divine will about things it is contingently related to; therefore, etc.

[Instances against the two Principal Reasons] – Against these two reasons objection is made. Against the first [nn.13-16] as follows: every created nature essentially depends on any of its per se causes, and because of such dependence the cause can be known from knowing the caused thing by a demonstration ‘that’,¹² and any per se cause of it can be known; therefore, since the nature of man is naturally knowable to man, because it is not disproportionate with his cognitive power, the conclusion follows that from knowledge of that nature could the end of that nature be naturally known.¹³

Confirmation of the reason: for if from knowledge of a lower nature the end of it is known, no less is this possible in the matter at hand, because there is no lesser dependence in the proposed case of a finite thing on its end than in the case of other things.¹⁴

From this reason too it seems that the proposition is false: ‘the end of a substance is not known save from its acts’,¹⁵ which was assumed in the proof of the minor, because from the knowledge of a nature in itself the end of it can be known by a ‘demonstration-that’.

But if it be said that the reason concludes that man can naturally know his natural end but not his supernatural end, on the contrary Augustine says, On Predestination of the Saints ch.5 n.10: “Being able to have faith, like being able to have charity, belongs to the nature of men, although having faith, like having charity, belongs to the grace of the faithful.” If, therefore, the nature of man is naturally knowable to man, then that ability as it belongs to such a nature is also naturally knowable and consequently such a nature’s orderability to the end for which faith and charity dispose it.

Again, man naturally desires the end which you say is supernatural; therefore, he is naturally ordered to that end;¹⁶ therefore from such ordering can that end can be concluded as from knowledge of the nature ordered to it.

Again, it is naturally knowable that the first object of the intellect is being, according to Avicenna, Metaphysics 1.6 (72rb), and it is naturally knowable that the idea of being is most perfectly saved in God; but the end of every power is the best of the things that are contained under its first object, because in that alone is there perfect rest and delight, from Ethics 10.4.1174b14-23; therefore it is naturally knowable that man, according to his intellect, is ordered to God as to his end.

The reason is confirmed, because to him to whom some power is naturally knowable, what is its first object is naturally knowable; and, further, he can know what the nature of that first object is saved in, and that the most perfect such thing is the end of the power; now the mind is known to itself, according to Augustine On the Trinity bk.11 chs.11-12, nn.16, 18; therefore what is its first object is known to it. And it knows that God is not exceeded by the idea of the first object, because then God would in no way be intelligible by the mind; therefore it knows that God is the best thing in which the idea of its object is realized, and so it knows him to be the end of the power.

Against the second reason [nn.17-18] the argument runs as follows: if through one extreme the other extreme is known, then the means in between are known; but necessary for obtaining the end are the means between the nature and the obtaining of its end; therefore, since, according to what was proved above [n.19], the end can be known from knowledge of the nature, it seems that similarly the means necessary for the end can be known.

The reason is confirmed: for it thus seems that the connection of beings to the end is as necessary in the matter at hand as it is in other cases; but, on account of this sort of connection in other cases, other things are known from the end, as that from the idea of health is deduced that such and such things are required for health; therefore etc.

[Response to the Instances] – To the first of these instances [nn.19-21] I say that, although it proceeds from the end which is the final cause and not from the end that must be attained by operation – the distinction between these ends will be stated below (1 d.1 p.1 q.1 n.5) – yet with a single response it can be said to it, and to the next one from Augustine, and to the third one from the power and the first object, that all of them accept that our nature or intellective power is naturally knowable to us; but this is false under the proper and special idea under which our nature or intellective power is ordered to this sort of end, and under which it is capable of consummate grace, and under which it has God for most perfect object. For our soul and our nature are only known by us in this present state under some general idea that is capable of being abstracted from sensible things, as will appear below in 1 d.3 p.1 q.1 n.24. And according to such a general idea it does not fittingly belong to them to be ordered to that end, or to be capable of receiving grace, or to have God for most perfect object.

Next to the form. When it is said [n.19] that, from a being that is for an end, the end can be demonstrated by a ‘demonstration-that’, I say that it is not true unless the being that is for an end is known under the proper idea under which it has that end. In this way is the minor is. – And when proof is given by proportion [n.19], I say that the mind, although it is the same as itself, is yet not for this present state proportional to itself as object save according to the general ideas that can be abstracted from sensible things.

To the confirmation [n.20] I say that the proper ends of other substances are not known either, namely the ends that belong to them according to their proper ideas, unless some acts be manifest from which the order of those substances to such end may be deduced.

And from this the answer is plain to what is added [n.21] against the proof of the minor, that the proposition ‘the proper end of a substance is not known to us save by a manifest act of it’ [n.15] is not false; for the proposition does not take it that the end could not be known in another way. For it is very true that, if a substance were known under its proper nature, from it as thus known could the per se cause of it be known. But no substance is thus known to us now, and therefore we can deduce now no end proper to a substance save from an evident act of that substance as it is known universally and confusedly. Both these ways are lacking in the proposed case; but the proof of the minor [n.15] touches on one of them, about ignorance of the act, by supposing the other, namely about ignorance of the nature in itself.

To the second instance from Augustine [n.22] I say that the power to have charity, as it is a disposition with respect to God in himself under the proper idea of loving, belongs to man’s nature according to a special idea, not one common to himself and sensible things; therefore that potentiality is not naturally knowable in man’s present state, just as neither is man known under the idea under which this power is his. Thus do I reply to the instance insofar as it can be adduced for the principal conclusion [nn.19-20], namely the one opposed to the minor of the first reason [nn.14-15]. But insofar as it is adduced against the response about supernatural and natural end [n.22] my reply is: I concede that God is the natural end of man, but as not to be attained naturally but supernaturally. And this is proved by the subsequent reason about natural desire [n.23], which I concede.

To the other argument [n.24], that must be denied which it assumes, namely that being is naturally known to be the first object of our intellect, and this according to the whole indifference of being to sensible and non-sensible things, and that this does Avicenna say, that it is naturally known. For he has intermingled his sect – which was the sect of Mohammed – with philosophical matters, and some things he said as philosophical and proved by reason, others as consonant with his sect; hence he expressly posits in his Metaphysics 9.7 (107ra)¹⁷ that the separated soul knows immaterial substance in itself, and therefore under the first object of the intellect he had to posit that immaterial substance was included. Not so Aristotle [On the Soul 3.6.430b27-29; 7.431a14-17, b2; 8.432a8-9], but according to him the first object of our intellect is or seems to be sensible quiddity, and this either sensible in itself or in its inferior; and this is the quiddity that is abstractable from sensible things.¹⁸

But as to what is said in confirmation of the reason from Augustine [n.25] my reply is: I say that the statement of Augustine must be understood of first act, which act is altogether sufficient of itself as to second act but is now however impeded; and because of this impediment the second act is not now elicited from the first act. But of this more below [1 d.3 p.1 q.3 nn.24-25].

If it be objected to this that man in the state of nature when it was instituted could know his nature, therefore also the end of his nature, from the first reason’s deduction [n.19]; therefore, that knowledge is not supernatural.

Again, against the response to the final reason [n.33]: if then it is not known what is the first object of the intellect (because the intellect is not known under every proper idea under which it regards such object), then it cannot be known of everything whatever that it is intelligible, because the power is not known under every proper idea under which it has regard to everything whatever as intelligible object.

I reply: to the first objection [n.35] it would need to be said what sort man’s knowledge was when he was instituted, which may be deferred to another place [Ord. 4 d.1 p.2 q.2 n.7]. However at least in respect of the wayfarer in this present state the said knowledge is supernatural, because exceeding his natural faculty; natural, I say, in the sense of according to the state of fallen nature.

To the second [n.36] I concede that knowledge of the soul, or of any power of it, is not now had so distinctly that from it could be known that some intelligible object correspond to it; but we deduce from the act itself which we experience that the power and nature of which it is the act regard that for object which we perceive to be attained by the act, such that we do not deduce the object of the power from knowledge of the power in itself but from knowledge of the act we experience. But we can have neither knowledge of a supernatural object; and so both ways of knowing the proper end of that nature are there lacking.

To the argument [n.26] against the second reason, it is plain that it supposes something [n.19] already denied [nn.28-29]. – To the confirmation [n.27] of the reason I say that when the end naturally follows the things that are for the end, and naturally requires them in advance, then the things that are for the end can be deduced from the end; here, however, there is no natural attainment but only acceptation by the divine will rewarding these merits as worthy of such end.

[Third Principal Reason] – Again,¹⁹ thirdly argument is made against the opinion principally of the philosophers. Metaphysics 6.1.1026a21-23: the knowledge of separate substances is noblest because it is about the noblest genus; therefore knowledge of the things that are proper to them is most noble and necessary, for the things proper to them are more perfect knowables than the things in which they agree with sensibles. But we cannot know those properties from pure natural powers alone. First, because if such properties were handed on in some science capable now of being found, it would be in the science of metaphysics; but metaphysics about the proper features of those separate substances cannot naturally be had by us, as is plain.²⁰ And this is what the Philosopher says in Metaphysics 1.2.982a8-10, that the wise man must know all things in some way and not in particular; and he subjoins: “For he who knows the universals knows in some way all the things under them.” He there calls the metaphysician ‘the wise man’, just as he there calls metaphysics ‘wisdom’.

Second, I prove the same because those properties are not known by knowledge ‘because of what’ unless the proper subjects are known, which alone include such ‘because of whats’; but their proper subjects are not naturally knowable to us; therefore etc. Nor do we know their properties by a ‘demonstration-why’ and from the effects. The proof of this: for the effects either leave the intellect in doubt as to these properties, or lead it away into error. And this is clear from the properties of the first immaterial substance in itself; for a property of it is that it is communicable to three [persons]; but the effects do not show this property, because they do not come from it insofar as it is three. And if an argument from effects to cause is made, the effects lead rather to the opposite and to error, because in no effect is there found one nature save in one supposit. Also a property of this nature as to what is outside it is to cause contingently; and the effects lead rather to the opposite of this, to error, as is plain from the opinion of the philosophers positing that the first thing necessarily causes whatever it causes.²¹ About the properties too of other substances the same is plain, because the effects, according to the philosophers, lead rather to the eternity and necessity of these properties than to their contingency and newness. Likewise, the philosophers seem also to conclude from the celestial motions that the number of those separate substances is in accord with the number of the celestial motions. Likewise, that these substances are naturally blessed and incapable of sin. All which things are absurd.²²

[Instance against the Third Principal Reason] – Against this reason I argue that all the necessary properties of separate substances known now to us by faith or common revelation, could be known by natural knowledge. And this as follows:²³ the necessary things of which we naturally know the terms we can also naturally comprehend; but of all revealed necessary things we naturally know the terms; therefore etc.

Proof of the major: those necessary things are either mediate or immediate; if they are immediate, then they are known when the terms are known, Posterior Analytics 1.3.72b23-25; if they are mediate, therefore when we are able to know the extremes we are able to conceive the mean between them. And by conjoining the mean with each extreme, we get either mediate or immediate premises; if immediate, the same as before; if mediate, the process continues by knowing the mean between the extremes and by conjoining it with the extremes, until we come to immediates. So at length we will come down to immediate necessaries that we understand from the terms, from which all the mediate necessaries follow; therefore we will be able naturally to know the mediates through the immediates.

Proof of the principal minor, because having and not having faith, being contradictories to each other, are not contradictory in words only but in concepts, as is plain when a philosopher and a theologian contradict each other over this proposition, ‘God is triune,’ where not only the same name but the same concept one denies and the other affirms; therefore every simple concept that the former has the latter has.

[Response to the Instance] – To this I reply: About separate substances there are some immediate truths. I take then some such first and immediate truth, and let it be a. In it are included many mediate truths, as for instance all those that particularly assert things common to the predicate of things common to the subject; let them be called b, c. The true mediate assertions do not have evidence save from something immediate. Therefore, they are not of a nature to be known save from this understood immediate. If therefore some intellect could understand the terms in b and combine them with each other, but could not understand the terms in a nor consequently a itself, b will be for his intellect a neutral proposition, because it will not be known either from itself or from an immediate proposition because that, by supposition, is not known. Such is how it is with us, because we have certain common concepts about material and immaterial substances, and we can combine them with each other; but these complexes are not evident save from the true immediate propositions that are about the quiddities under their proper and special idea, under which idea we do not conceive those quiddities, and so neither do we know those general truths of general concepts.

An example: if it were impossible for someone to conceive a triangle in its proper idea, yet he could abstract from a quadrilateral the idea of a figure and conceive it, still it would be impossible for him to conceive primacy as it is a proper quality of triangle, because it is not in this way conceived save as it is abstracted from triangle; however he could abstract primacy from other primacies, as for instance in numbers. Although this intellect could form this composite ‘some figure is first’, because it can apprehend its terms, yet the composite when formed will be neutral for it, because this is a mediate one, included in this immediate one ‘the triangle is thus first’; and because he cannot understand this immediate one, because neither can he understand its terms, therefore he cannot know the mediate proposition, which only has its evidence from this immediate one.

Hereby to the argument [n.42]: I deny the major; to the proof [n.43] I say that those necessary things are mediate. – And when you say ‘therefore we can conceive the mean between the extremes’, I deny the consequence, because the mean between the extremes is sometimes essentially ordered, as for example the ‘what it is’ of one extreme or a prior property in respect of a later property; and such a thing is the middle for universally proving the extreme of the extreme. I concede therefore that whoever can understand the extremes can understand such a mean between the extremes, because the understanding of it is included in one of the extremes, or is the same as one of the extremes. But if the mean be a particular, contained under one of the extremes and not essentially between the extremes, then it is not necessary that he who can understand the general extremes can conceive the mean particular to the extremes. So it is here. For a whatness under its proper and particular idea having some property immediately inhering in it is a mean inferior to the common concept of which is asserted the property in its common concept; and so it is not a mean for universally proving the property of the common term, but only particularly. This is plain in the example [n.46], because it is not necessary that he who is able to conceive figure in general and primacy in general could conceive triangle in particular, because triangle is the mean, contained under ‘figure’; a mean, I say, for proving primacy of the figure in particular.

This third reason [n.40] is especially conclusive about the first immaterial substance, because knowledge of it as beatific object is above all necessary. And then the response to the objection [n.42] against it: namely it supposes that we naturally do not now conceive God save in a concept common to him and to sensibles, which point will be expounded below, in 1 d.3 p.1 q.1 nn.5-10. If also this supposition be denied, one must still say that the concept that can be made about God by virtue of the creature is imperfect; but the concept that would be made by virtue of the very essence in itself would be perfect. Just as it was said then of general and special concept [n.47], so let it be said in another way of perfect and imperfect concept.

[Fourth Principal Reason]. Fourth it is argued thus: what is ordered to some end for which it is not disposed must be moved little by little toward the disposition for that end; man is ordered to a supernatural end for which he is of himself indisposed; therefore, he needs to be disposed little by little to the having of that end. This is done through some supernatural imperfect knowledge of the sort that is posited as necessary; therefore etc.

But if it be objected that a perfect agent can at once remove the imperfection and at once act, I reply that if it were possible by absolute power, yet it is more perfect to communicate an activity to the creature as regard obtaining its own perfection than not to communicate it; now man can have some activity with respect to his own final perfection; therefore it is more perfect that this be communicated to him, which is not possible without some imperfect knowledge that precedes the perfect knowledge toward which he is finally ordered.

[Fifth Principal Reason]. Fifth, it is argued thus: every agent using an instrument in its acting has, through that instrument, no power for any action that exceeds the nature of that instrument; but the light of the agent intellect is the instrument which the soul uses now in understanding naturally; therefore, it has no power through that light for any action that exceeds that light. But that light is of itself limited to having knowledge by the sensing way and the way of the senses; therefore, the soul has no power for any knowledge that cannot be had by way of sense. But the knowledge of many other things is necessary for this present state; therefore etc.

This reason seems to conclude against him who made it. For, according to this deduction, the uncreated light will not be able to use the agent intellect as an instrument for knowledge of any pure truth, because, according to him, such truth cannot be had by means of the senses without a special illumination. And so it follows that in the knowledge of pure truth the light of the agent intellect in no way has any action; but this seems unacceptable, because this action is more perfect than every intellection, and consequently what is more perfect in the soul insofar as the soul is intellective ought to come together in some way for that action.

[To the Fourth and Fifth Reason]. These two final reasons [nn.49, 51] do not seem particularly efficacious. For the first would be efficacious if it were proved that man is ordered finally to supernatural knowledge (the proof of which is pertinent to the question about beatitude, Ord. 4 Suppl. d.49 q.7 nn.2-7), and if along with this it were shown that natural knowledge does not in this present state dispose sufficiently for attaining supernatural knowledge. The second reason begs two questions, namely that there is need for knowledge of certain things that cannot be known by way of the senses, and that the light of the agent intellect is limited to such knowables.

The first three reasons [nn. 13, 17, 40] appear more probable. However, that no such knowledge is necessary for salvation I prove:²⁴ Posit, someone is not baptized: although he is an adult, does not have any teacher, he does have the sort of good motions that he can have conform to right reason, and guards against the things that natural reason shows him to be bad. Although God by common law would visit such a person, teaching him through a man or an angel (in the way he visited Cornelius, Acts 10.1-48), yet posit that he is not taught by anyone: he will be saved. Likewise, although he be taught afterwards, yet he was just before and so worthy of eternal life, because by willing good things preceding teaching he merits the grace by which he is just;²⁵ and yet he does not have theology, even as to the first objects of faith, but only natural knowledge. Therefore, nothing of theology is simply necessary for salvation.

One could say that by willing thing good in genus he merits by congruity to be justified from original sin, and God does not deny the favor of his liberality;²⁶ therefore he gives the first grace without a sacrament, because he is not bound by the sacraments; grace is not given without the habit of faith;²⁷ therefore that person has the habit of theology, although he is not able to activate it, just as neither is he baptized unless he is instructed. And although there is no contradiction in grace being given without faith, since the habits are distinct and exist in different powers, yet just as in baptism a simultaneity in infusion is posited, so for the same reason simultaneity can be posited in this case. For God is not less gracious to the one whom, because of his merit by congruity, he justifies without a sacrament, than to him whom, without any merit of his own, he justifies in the reception of the sacrament. Therefore it is possible for God of his absolute power to save anyone at all, and also to bring it about that he merit glory without infused faith, if, in the absence of it, God give the grace which the possessor uses well as far as to willing what he is able to have according to natural reason and acquired faith, or without any acquired faith if a teacher is lacking, although of his ordained power God not give it without the preceding habit of faith (because grace is supposed not to be infused without it)²⁸ – not because of need, as if grace without it would not be sufficient, but because of divine liberality, which reforms the whole; also a man would be less perfectly disposed as regard assent to certain truths without infused faith.

And as in this case so I say proportionally about the habit of theology, which when it is perfect includes infused and acquired faith of the articles and other things revealed by God in Scripture; so that it is not infused faith alone nor acquired faith alone but both together. Theology is therefore necessary, but it is so when speaking of ordained power and when speaking of the more principal or prior habit that pertains to theology, namely the one which is infused faith, and this generally as to everyone; it is not so as to the second habit that it includes, which is acquired faith, although perhaps it is necessary by ordained necessity in an adult able to have a teacher and to understand him, and this as to acquired faith of certain general things.