Ordinatio

Name: Ordinatio
Author: John Duns Scotus

John Duns Scotus's Ordinatio (also called the Opus Oxoniense) is his revised, authorially prepared commentary on Peter Lombard's Sentences. Scotus began arranging it for publication around 1300 after lecturing at Oxford and continued revising material associated with Paris until his death in 1308; the work therefore remains unfinished and textually layered. Its disputations on God, creation, individuation, freedom, grace, and the Incarnation helped establish Scotism as a major alternative within late-medieval scholastic theology. Schola uses the Vatican critical-edition tradition for the Latin and a separately sourced English translation.

This work is being completed — add a section.

Section I: A. About the Image of the Trinity in Us

Here one needs first to understand what is the idea of image in corporeal things, whence the word has been transferred to the issue at hand; second, with respect to what in the Trinity there is an image; third, in what in us the idea of the image consists.
[Article 1]. As to the first point I say, as was said in the question about the vestige [nn.289, 293], that an image is representative of a whole, and in this it differs from a vestige, which is representative of a part. For if the whole body were impressed in the dust, the way a foot is impressed, it would be an image of the whole, just as the latter is an image of a part and a vestige of the whole. But the conformity expressive of a whole does not suffice, but imitation is required, because according to Augustine 83 Questions q.74, “however much two eggs are alike, one is not an image of the other,” because it is not of a nature to imitate it; and so it is required that an image be of a nature to imitate that of which it is the image, and to express it.
[Article 2]. About the second article,¹ although in our intellect the concept of one Person is partial with respect to the concept of the whole Trinity, the creature that may lead us to knowledge of the Trinity by way of image will represent the Trinity as to the total concept that our intellect can have of it; therefore it will represent the distinction of three Persons and the unity of essence and the order of origin, because the real distinction in divine reality is by origin; it will also have an imitation essential to the Trinity that it represents.
[Article 3] About the third article [n.574] one must first look at the things that are manifest in being in the mind; second in what things the image does not consist; third in what things it may consist.
As to the first, we experience in ourselves that there is an act of intellection and an act of volition, and that these acts are in some way in our power when an object is present; therefore, it is necessary to posit in some way in ourselves principles active for these second acts, so that by them we may have a capacity with respect to those acts. Now the same thing under the same formal idea cannot be the principle of these two second acts, because these second acts require in their principles an opposite idea of being principle; therefore it is necessary to have some distinction of first acts, and this a distinction corresponding proportionally to the distinction of second acts.²
About the second point in this article [n.577] I say that neither in first acts only nor in second acts only is there an image. This appears in two ways: first because the latter are two only and the former two only, so there would only be an image of a duality, not of a trinity; second, because in the first acts, although there is consubstantiality there, yet there is not a real distinction there between thing and thing, nor an order of origin; in second acts, although there is a distinction and an origin in some way, yet not consubstantiality.
From these points it follows, third, that the image consists in first and second acts together – and I understand this as follows: The soul has in itself some perfection according to which there is a first act with respect to generated knowledge, and it has in itself some perfection according to which it formally receives generated knowledge, and it has in itself some perfection according to which it formally receives volition. These three perfections are memory, intelligence, and will – or the soul insofar as the soul has them. Therefore, the soul, insofar as it has total first act with respect to intellection (namely something of the soul and the object present to it in idea of ‘intelligible’), is called memory, and this [is called] perfect memory by including both intellect and that by which the object is present to it. The same soul insofar as it receives generated knowledge is called intelligence, and [called] perfect intelligence as it is under that generated knowledge; the will too is called perfect, insofar as it is under the perfect act of willing. Accepting, therefore, these three on the part of the soul as they are under their three acts, I say that in these three terms there is consubstantiality, by reason of these three realities that are on the part of the soul. But there is distinction and origin by reason of the actualities received in the soul according to these realities in the soul.³

↑ Top of work

Prologus I: Prologus Totius Operis

Pars I: Pars 1 - On the Necessity of Revealed Doctrine

Quaestio I: Single Question: On the Necessity of Revealed Doctrine - Whether it be necessary for man in this present state for some doctrine to be supernaturally inspired

Articulus I: 1. Controversy between Philosophers and Theologians

Section I: A. Opinion of the Philosophers

Section II: B. Rejection of the Opinion of the Philosophers

Articulus II: II. Solution of the Question

Articulus III: III. About the Three Principal Reasons against the Philosophers

Articulus IV: IV. To the Arguments of the Philosophers

Articulus V: V. To the Principal Arguments

Pars II: Pars 2 - On the Sufficiency of Revealed Doctrine

Quaestio I: Single Question: On the Sufficiency of Revealed Doctrine Whether the supernatural knowledge necessary for the wayfarer is sufficiently handed on in Sacred Scripture.

Articulus I: I. On the Truth of Sacred Scripture

Articulus II: II. Principal Response to the Question

Articulus III: III. To the Principal Arguments

Pars III: Pars 3 - On the Object of Theology

Quaestio I: Question 1: Whether theology is about God as about its first object.

Quaestio II: Question 2: Whether Theology is about God under some Special Idea

Quaestio III: Question 3: Whether Theology is about All Things from the Attribution of them to its First Subject

Articulus I: I. Preliminary Remarks

Articulus II: II. About Necessary Theology

Section I: A. To the First Question, speaking of Theology in itself

Section II: B. To the Second Question, speaking of Theology in itself

Section III: C. To the First Question, speaking of Our Theology

Articulus III: III. On Contingent Theology

Articulus IV: IV. On Christ as First Object

Articulus V: V. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question

Articulus VI: VI. To the principal Arguments of the Second Question

Articulus VII: VI. To the Third Question

Section I: A. Opinion of Others

Section II: B. Scotus’ own Response

Articulus VIII: VII. To the principal Arguments of the Third Question

Pars IV: Pars 4 - On Theology as a Science

Quaestio I: Questions 1 and 2 - Whether theology in itself is a science, and whether it is subalterning or subalternate

Articulus I: I. To the First Question

Articulus II: II. To the Second Question

Pars V: Pars 5 - On Theology insofar as it is a Practical Science

Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether theology is a practical or a speculative science

Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether a science is called practical per se from order to action as to its end

Articulus I: I. What Action [Praxis] is

Articulus II: II. How Practical Knowledge is Extended to Action

Articulus III: III. From what Source Knowledge has Extension to Action

Articulus IV: IV. To the Second Question

Articulus V: V. To the First Question

Section I: A. The Opinion of Others

Section II: B. Scotus’ own Opinion

Articulus VI: VI. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question.

Articulus VII: VII. To the Principal Arguments of the Second Question

Book 1

Distinctio I: First Distinction

Pars I: First Part - On the Object of Enjoyment

Quaestio I: Question 1: Whether the object of enjoyment per se is the ultimate end

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Tractatus I: II. To the Principal Arguments

Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether the ultimate end has only the one idea of enjoyability

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Section I: A. On the Enjoyment of the Wayfarer as to its Possibility

Section II: B. On the Enjoyment of the Comprehender when Speaking of the Absolute Power of God

Section III: C. On the Enjoyment of the Comprehender when Speaking of the Power of the Creature

Section IV: D. On the Enjoyment of the Comprehender and of the Wayfarer when Speaking of the Fact

Articulus II: II. To the Arguments

Section I: A. To the Principal Arguments

Section II: B. To the Reasons for the Opposite

Pars II: Second Part - On Enjoying in Itself

Quaestio I: Question 1 - Whether enjoying is an act elicited by the will or a passion received in the will

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Articulus II: II. To the Principal Arguments

Quaestio II: Question 2 - Whether when the end has been apprehended by the intellect the will must necessarily enjoy it

Articulus I: I. To the Question

Section I: A. The Opinion of Others

Section II: B. Attack on the Opinion of Others

Section III: C. Scotus’ Own Opinion

Section IV: D. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Others

Articulus II: II. To the Principal Arguments

Pars III: On the Enjoyer

Quaestio I: Whether Enjoying Belongs to God

Quaestio II: Whether the Wayfarer Enjoys

Quaestio III: Whether the Sinner Enjoys

Quaestio IV: Whether the Brutes Enjoy

Quaestio V: Whether All Things Enjoy