Ordinatio

To the arguments for the second opinion [n.422]. Although it could there be touched on whether the causality that is attributed to the intellective part belongs properly to the agent intellect or the possible intellect, yet I dismiss the difficulty to another place [Scotus, Quodlibet 15 nn.13-20, 24; cf. n.554 infra.].

When it is proved [n.422] that the possible [intellect] cannot have any causality, because nothing the same acts on itself, I reply that that proposition is only true of a univocal agent, and that the proof of it, that then the same thing would be in act and in potency, is only conclusive when the agent acts univocally, that is, when it induces in the passive subject a form of the same idea as that by which it acts. For if it were thus to act on itself, then it would have at the same time a form of the same idea as that to which it is moved and would, while it is being moved to it, lack it; so it would have it and not have it at the same time – at least this follows about two forms of the same species or about the same form. But in equivocal agents, that is, in those agents that do not act through forms of the same idea as that toward which they act, the proposition that nothing moves itself does not have necessity. Nor does the proof of it, that something would be in potency and act with respect to the same thing, conclude anything, for there the agent is not such formally in act as the passive subject is formally in potency [cf. n.422]; and that the same thing is virtually such in act and formally such in potency is no contradiction.

This gloss [n.513] about univocal and equivocal agents is necessary because the Philosopher posited that what is moved is not only in the genus of quality but of quantity and ‘where’. And in quantity and ‘where’ no agent is univocal, because in the genus of quantity and ‘where’ there is no form that is the principle of inducing a similar form. Rather, to speak generally, any motion that is not to an active form is not from a univocal agent, because, from the fact that a terminating form is not active, no form of the same idea is a principle of acting. There are with the Philosopher, therefore, many motions from an agent not univocal but equivocal; and there an agent is virtually such in act as the patient is formally in potency.

If you argue that therefore in all cases the same thing could be in virtual act and in potency to a formal act, and so anything can move itself [n.513] – I reply that in this inference a non-cause is put as the cause, for from the general idea of virtual act and of potency for formal act there is no repugnancy, because if from this idea there were repugnancy there would also be repugnancy in anything at all. However in something with virtual act there concurs something else because of which it is repugnant to it to be sometimes in potency or actually such formally. An example: to be hot virtually in act and in potency formally do not of themselves include contradiction or repugnancy, and therefore in no subject do they include repugnancy, that because of this they could not exist together or one not exist there because the other does. However, the sun, which is hot virtually, cannot be hot formally, but this is not because of a repugnance between these things first. For Saturn is cold virtually and yet cannot be hot formally, so the virtual act was not in it cause of repugnance, but something else was that is common to the sun and Saturn, as that these are incorruptible bodies and heat is a corruptible quality.¹

But if you object that such metaphysical principles [as ‘nothing acts on itself’, nn.422, 513] should not, because of the fact they are general, be denied on account of some special difficulties, I reply: no principles are metaphysical that have many false singulars. But by understanding that nothing is in virtual act and in potency to a formal act, and that this repugnance is taken from the idea of act and potency, there are many singulars that are sufficiently plainly false, and from this it sufficiently follows that this is not a metaphysical principle. But that nothing is in formal act and in potency in respect of the same formal act is true, namely that nothing is thus at the same time in act and in potency.

And if you altogether contend that, even when speaking of virtual act and potency to formal act, it is a metaphysical principle – how were others so blind, and he [sc. Godfrey of Fontaines, n.422] alone seeing, that they could not conceive the idea of common metaphysical terms and from them apprehend the truth of such a proposition as he posits to be a metaphysical principle, which is not only not posited a principle by others, but is in many cases false, and never necessary by reason of the terms?

When, second, it is argued [n.422] about material and efficient cause that they do not coincide – this is true of matter that is in pure potency but not of matter in a certain respect, of which sort is a subject in respect of an accident. For it is necessary that something the same is sometimes matter and efficient cause with respect to the same thing – which is apparent because otherwise a property would not be predicated of a subject per se in the second mode. Proof: because if it [a property] is predicated of it [a subject] per se in the second mode, it [the subject] is the material cause of it [the property] as matter is in the case of accidents, because it [the subject] is put in the definition of it [a property] as an addition. If too it is a predication per se, then it is also necessary; but what is only a material cause with respect to something does not have necessity with respect to it; therefore, to save necessity, one must posit in the subject, besides a causality of matter, a causality of efficiency.

As to what is argued afterwards about opposite real relations [n.422], I say that some opposite relations are incompossible in the same nature, some not in the same nature but in the same supposit, some neither in the same nature nor in the same supposit. Hence a repugnance of them in the same thing cannot be proved by reason of real relations in general. Examples of the aforesaid: cause and caused in the same nature or in the same supposit are repugnant because if not, then the same thing would depend on itself. Producer and produced are not repugnant in the same nature if the nature can be communicated without division, of which sort is the divine nature; yet they are repugnant in the same supposit. Mover and moved are repugnant neither in the same nature nor in the same supposit, because here there is not posited an essential dependence of the sort they posit relations of cause and caused to be; nor there is it posited that the same thing is before it is, which the idea of producer and produced seems to posit; but there is only posited here that the same thing depends on itself as to accidental act, as the moved depends on the mover as to the accidental act that it receives from it. The incompossibility, therefore, of some real relations must be reduced to some prior incompossibility, and where that prior incompossibility is not found, there the incompossibility of opposite real relations will not be concluded.

This is also made more clear, because just as these relations of producer and produced, which are repugnant in the same supposit, can be founded on the same unlimited nature, as in the divine essence, so these relations of mover and moved, which have a much lesser repugnance, can be founded on the same somehow unlimited nature. And whatever is in potency to some act formally, and yet along with this has the same actuality virtually (as when the same thing moves itself), it is in some way unlimited; for it is posited to be not only capable of that perfection but as causing it. So there those opposite relations, because of a sort of unlimitedness, are very well compatible.

To their ‘Achilles’ [their key point, n.422], that ‘anything would move itself’, I say, as was argued against the first opinion when excluding a cause ‘sine qua non’ [n.415], that nothing is a total and perfect and natural effective cause of anything it but that, when it is proximate to the whole receptive subject and not impeded, it cause it. Now wood is always proximate to itself, and sufficiently so, and a perpetual impediment cannot be posited when fire is not present; because if this impediment be posited, let this [wood] be removed and it [fire] will not be; if that [wood] be posited, let it [fire] be removed; and so, by running through them singly, wood will be got present to itself and in no way impeded. Therefore, if it [fire] were the total active cause with respect to heat, and it [wood] is the total receptive cause, then it would always be hot, as a brute is always able to sense. Therefore, since could not be posited a non total causality because of an impediment, nor because of non-proximity, nor because of receptive subject, the conclusion will be that in wood there is not a total active causality, which is the point intended. So, therefore, not everything will move itself as total cause, because no cause, which does not always have its act, is a total natural cause of the act.

If you say, ‘at least I may say the wood is a partial cause, so that, when fire is present, it [wood] acts along with it [fire] for heating of itself in idea of partial effective and active cause’ – nor is this cavil of any value, because two partial causes are not posited with respect to the same effect when one of them precisely has the total effect in its own power, univocally or equivocally. Proof: for if one of them has the whole effect in its own power, it can produce all of it; therefore the other partial cause can produce nothing, or the same thing will be produced twice; but fire, which from the preceding argument [n.521] was proved to have activity with respect to heat in the wood, has in itself virtually the whole heat of the wood; therefore the wood here has no partial causality.

To the issue at hand then: because the soul is not always in act with respect to any intellection whatever (although, however, it is receptive of any intellection whatever, and is itself proximate to itself and not always impeded), the conclusion is that it is not the total active cause but there is something else; that something else is concluded to be the object, because when it is present the effect follows, when it is not present the effect cannot be had. Therefore some sort of causality first is concluded to be in the object; and not total causality, because the object, on account of its imperfection, cannot have intellection, on account of its perfection, totally in its power, and so it is concluded that, along with the object, is required some other partial active cause – and not some cause other than the intellective power because, when it concurs with the object, there is intellection. So therefore is it here proved that there are two partial active causes, and in many other cases that nothing the same moves itself, either totally or partially. This argument too, which is held for the Achilles [n.522], does not seem very efficacious; for this seems to be a certain defensive move, by diverting [attention] from the side of the opponent to the side of the respondent; for, because of their lack of arguments, they assume the sort of form that respondents do, so that those who respond [to them] make an argument to prove something necessary, namely that wood does not heat itself.

An objection to the response [n.521] of the Achilles is because wood will not heat itself unless something else be present ‘sine quo non’ [sc. fire], just as for you the will does not make itself to will save when an object is present through cognition. If you also argue that one of them [sc. fire] will always heat something else, because it has the power of heating, the response is that it will heat itself before something else, and this first only if the ‘sine qua non’ cause is present. Or perhaps it will never heat something else, just as neither does the will make another will to will. For, having conceded that some action of the genus of action is immanent, will it be said that any is, or why not?

The Achilles is removed in another way: when diverse pieces of wood similarly disposed are present to fire, they all become hot; when the same object is present to diverse wills, they are not all similarly made to will (City of God 12.6); therefore here the fire acts, and not there the object, because then it would act equally on every will.

An objection against this [n.525] is because if wills are not similarly affected when a sine qua non cause is present, this is because for you they act freely. Pieces of wood when a sine qua non cause is present act naturally; therefore, prove that fire here is a cause other than a sine qua non cause. But all that is said [in reply] is that wood is natural, the will not.

Argument in a third way [nn.521, 525] against the Achilles [sc. ‘anything would move itself’]. Whatever is acted on, it is acted on by something; when therefore it cannot be acted on by itself, it is necessary to posit that it is acted on by something else. The will cannot be acted on by something else (not speaking of God), both because then volition would not be in its power and because then some other moving thing, disposed in the same way and with respect to the same passive subject, would have power indifferently for both opposites; for the will can will and not will the same thing presented to it in the same way. Therefore, it is necessary to attribute to the will principally the motion of itself to act of willing, because it alone has the indifference in acting proportioned to such passive subject. But wood does not have an indifference in acting proportioned to itself in idea of passive subject; for it is receptive of disparate qualities, and also contrary ones, any of which when made intense corrupts it. Nor does it have so many univocal principles, as is plain, because too nothing univocally moves itself; nor does it have a single univocal principle, because how would it be so unlimited, unless by saying that anything at all has power for all the qualities it is susceptible of, even those corruptive of it? In the will whatever it is capable of is an operation of it and some sort of perfection.