Ordinatio

To the arguments for the opinions, in order. First, to the authorities of Augustine [nn.407-408], I say that the image which is posited by him to be in the spirit needs to be understood to be in the soul or in something of the soul as in a subject, and not precisely in a thus mixed body¹ – otherwise the conclusion would not follow that the image is nobler than every body, which however he himself says in Literal Commentary on Genesis 12.16 nn.32-33. Now what is in the soul or in something of the soul as in a subject is not the species which is commonly called ‘species’; that, rather, is received in an organ’s part which is a thus mixed body [n.471].² But what is received in the soul or a power of the soul is the act of knowing; therefore by image Augustine himself means such sort of act.

This gloss [n.504] is proved from his remark On the Trinity 11.2 n.3, where he maintains that the informing of the sense, which is done by the body alone, is called vision. And the informing is the species proper which is received in a part of the organ, namely in a thus mixed body; this is plain from what he says [ibid.] that “it is generated by the body alone that is seen” [n.461]. Just as therefore what is properly the image is called vision, so conversely can vision be called an image, and much more truly, because vision, in truth, is a certain quality, and the sort of quality that is a certain likeness of the object, and is perhaps more perfect than the prior likeness which is usually called a species.

On this understanding, the response to his authorities [nn.407-408] is easily made plain. For I concede that the body does not, as total cause, cause in the spirit the image that is sensation, but the soul causes it in itself with marvelous speed – not however as total cause, but it and the object. Hence he says there that “as soon as it is seen etc.”, indicating that the presence of the object is required in idea of being visible so that the soul cause vision in itself; and it is required only as in some way partial cause, as he himself expresses it in On the Trinity 11 ch.2 n.3 [n.413] that “vision is generated by the seer and the visible.”

This conclusion [n.506], thus understood, is proved by his first cited reason [n.407], because this conclusion, that “the agent is more outstanding than the effect,” is not an immediate one but depends on these three statements: ‘the agent is more outstanding than the effect’ and ‘the effect of the agent is the form and act of what undergoes it’ and ‘act is nobler than potency’. Where these propositions are true, there the proposition that Augustine takes is true [n.407]; but the proposition that the agent is more outstanding than the effect is only true of an equivocal and total cause. And some cause can be partially an agent for an effect more noble than itself, as an element in virtue of the heavenly bodies can act for the generation of a mixed body, which is nobler than the element acting as partial cause [cf. Scotus, Ord. I d.2 nn.333, 331].

From this [n.506] is clear the response to the second authority of Augustine On the Trinity 10.5 [n.408]. For the soul forms an image in itself, that is, a sensation – and from itself, that is, it itself is in natural potency to sensation and not in neutral potency, as a surface is in neutral and not natural potency to whiteness; and what he says, ‘from itself’, points to this naturality. And he is speaking there only of sensations, as is apparent, because he says there that “the parts of the soul that are informed by likenesses of bodies we have common with the beasts.” This is true of those parts that are informed by images, that is, sensations, extending the name of ‘image’ to sensation.

As to the first argument for the [first] opinion [n.409]: it concludes in my favor, because thinking, since it is a living operation, is not from a non-living thing as from a total cause; but a non-living thing can be partial cause of something living or of a living effect, just as the non-living sun is partial cause, along with the father, for generating a living son; and much more is this possible in the issue at hand, because here the more principal cause is life, as will be clear in the following question [nn.559-562].

When argument is made afterwards about perfect form [n.410], this argument concludes that it [the soul] has some activity with respect to its proper operation. But as to its seeming to prove total causality in it [the soul] with respect to its own operation – I reply that that form, by its own perfection, is ordered to having an operation about the whole of being, as is said in the third question of this distinction [nn.185-187]. But because it is not simply perfect, because it is not infinite, therefore does it not have the whole of being in itself. From its perfection, therefore, along with its imperfection, is concluded that it have some activity, and yet not a sufficient activity, for it could not have total causality of knowledge with respect to the whole of being unless it had the whole of being in itself. And therefore I say that more imperfect forms can well be total causes with respect to their own operations, because their operations are limited as to certain things, and having total activity with respect to these things does not prove any active perfection save a limited one. But in that perfect form, which is ordered to the whole of being, there cannot be posited such a causality with respect to knowledge of the whole of being (for then an unlimited active virtue would be posited in it). But a partial causality can be posited in it, and a partial causality in the object, so that it itself could thus cooperate with its own perfection as to any object whatever, and also any object whatever could cooperate with it – a great object for a great perfection of it, and a little object for a little perfection of it.

The other two arguments, namely about action as it is distinguished from making, and that action denominates the agent [nn.411-412], I concede. For I posit that the act of understanding truly remains in the agent which is its partial cause – not only in the agent supposit (such that it not go outside the supposit), but that it does not go outside the intellective part into the sensitive part, nor outside the intellective part into the appetitive part, nor outside its active principle into another power, but remains in the intellective part, which is its partial cause. And it is not necessary that action properly speaking remain in its total cause, but it is enough that it remain in its partial cause.