Ordinatio

From the second member¹ [n.351], namely from the presence of the object, the first consequence is proved [n.349]. First as follows: Either the intellect can have an object present to it in idea of intelligible object, without the fact it is present to any inferior power, or it cannot. If it cannot, then, it cannot have any operation without the inferior powers (because it cannot have an object present without them), and if it cannot have an operation without them, then it cannot be without them, according to the Philosopher in his preface to On the Soul [1.1.403a3-10]. But if it can have an object present without the object’s presence to an inferior power, then it has [sc. an operation without the inferior powers]. The consequence is proved because the agents of such presence of the object, namely the phantasm and the agent intellect, are close enough to the possible intellect, and they act by way of nature, and so they necessarily cause in it that of which it is itself receptive.²

Second as follows: the other cognitive powers have an object present to them, not merely secondarily (namely because the [objects] are present to other inferior powers), but in its proper presentiality, just as the common sense has color present to it, not only insofar as color is present to sight, but because it has the species of color present in the organ of the common sense. Therefore, since this is a mark of perfection in the cognitive power (to be able to have an object present to it under the idea in which it is an object of this sort of power), it follows that not only can it have an object present to it because it is present to the imaginative power, but can have it in its proper presentiality, insofar, namely, as it shines forth for the intellect through something that is in the intellect.

Again third; if a power not able to have an act save about an object present to it cannot have that object present save through another power with which it is contingently conjoined, it depends in its operation on such power contingently conjoined with it, and so it is imperfect. But the intellect cannot have an act save about an object present to it and, for you, it cannot have an object present save in the power of imagination [n.340]. But the power of imagination is contingently conjoined to the intellect insofar as it is a power; therefore, the intellect in its operation depends on another power to which it is contingently conjoined, and so this puts an imperfection in it of cognitive power [cf. Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 4 q.7]; but no imperfection is to be posited in any nature unless a necessity appear in such nature; therefore such imperfection is not to be posited in the intellect.

If you object that plurality is only to be posited where there is necessity, here there is no necessity, therefore etc. – I reply: there is necessity when the perfection of nature requires it. Now although this supposit which is man could have an object present in a phantasm, because he is a man, yet the intellectual nature of man, as it is intellectual, does not have an object sufficiently present if it has it only in a presence begged from the imaginative power. This therefore much cheapens intellective nature as it is intellective, because removed from it is that which belongs to perfection in a cognitive power, and that it is found in the sensitive power as in the imaginative power. Therefore, plurality is being posited here on account of necessity, because on account of saving the greater or at least equal perfection of a more perfect nature, greater than belongs to a more imperfect nature.