Ordinatio

As to the first point [n.285] it is said [Giles of Rome, Thomas Aquinas] that a footprint is an impression left behind from the passage of something over a vacuum or a plenum, imperfectly representing it. And it represents ‘imperfectly’ for this reason, because a footprint represents something confusedly and under the idea of a species; an image does so perfectly because under the idea of the individual; just as, by its footprint a horse is distinguished from an ox, or that what is passing is a horse, not an ox, and there is no distinction of this horse from that; but an image does make distinction, because an image of Jove does not represent Caesar.

As to the second [n.285], it is said [cf. Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 9.1] that the creature has a triple relation to God as to a triple cause, and this according to the three modes of relatives that the Philosopher posits, Metaphysics 5.15.1020b26-32. As to the first mode, the creature is referred to God by a relation founded on ‘one’, namely by a relation of likeness, and this insofar as the creature is patterned after and referred to God insofar as God is the exemplar cause. As to the second mode, namely of power, the creature is referred to God as produced to producer. As to the third mode, namely in the mode of measure, the creature is referred to God as being ordered to him as to final cause [Henry of Ghent, ibid., Summa a.63 q.1]. These three relations, then, complete the idea of footprint, because one is not enough without the others, as is gathered from Augustine 83 Questions q.74, the remark “about two sheep etc.” [n.575 infra].

There is had, then, what the vestige in creatures consists of. But what is it in respect of on the part of God [n.285]? Response: in respect of what is appropriated to the three persons; for by the first respect (namely of likeness) the creature represents the exemplar art, which is appropriated to the Son; by the second the creature represents the power of the producer, which is appropriated to the Father; by the third the creature represents the goodness of the finisher, which is appropriated to the Holy Spirit [Henry of Ghent, Giles of Rome].

Against what is said in the first member [n.286]. If there were only one animal such that another in the universe would not be possible, still the vestige of it would not be the image of it (because a vestige would still not be a likeness of the whole but of a part, and an image is a likeness of the whole), and yet it would then not represent it confusedly, that is, according to an idea common to itself and others.

It will be said that it does [represent confusedly], just as now the sun is a universal, even though it were impossible for there to be many suns [cf. Algazel, Logic ch.3]. And the science that is about the sun is about it under the idea of a universal, and not about this sun; and so the intelligible species does represent the universal and not this particular, even though the universal can only exist in this particular.

Against this [n.290]: If it is respect of something insofar as it is a ‘this’ that the vestige is not an image, the proposed conclusion is obtained [n.289], and this when supposing, by whatever supposition, that nothing could be abstracted from ‘this’. But still, on this supposition, something could represent this whole as ‘this’, and something a part of this as ‘of this’.

Again, if the parts of animals diverse in species, which parts make an impression on what yields in a soft thing, were alike in quantity and figure, the vestige too would not lead to knowledge of them under the idea of species but only of genus. If in the same species there were parts of this sort unlike in quantity and figure, the vestige would lead to knowledge of the individual as ‘this’, though not of the whole as represented wholly. Therefore, species or not species is an accidental difference.

Concerning this point then [n.285], I say that a footprint is the likeness of a part of an animal, by which part a footprint is impressed on something yielding to it. But an expressed likeness of a part is not an expressed likeness of the whole, because not in accord with the idea of the whole in itself, nor even with that by which it is immediately known but only by argument, and herefrom because the thing represented is known to be some part of it. And therefore, if this supposition is false – for example, because the impressing thing were separate from the whole (as if a foot amputated from the body were impressing the footprint) – the soul would be in error about the whole to which the sort of part that impresses a vestige naturally belongs. It is plain too that, if the whole body were as impressed on the dust as the foot was impressed, this left-behind impression would truly be the image and likeness of the whole, just as now the vestige is the likeness of a part.

Applying this also to the issue at hand [n.281], it does not seem that the first distinction set down between vestige and image [n.286] is true, because no creature represents God save according to common concepts, and not according to special concepts, namely, concepts of the most specific species. So there is no difference between creature and creature in representing God in a common and non-common idea.

What is said too in the second member, that the vestige consists in the three relations [n.287], does not seem true. For although the idea of vestige states a respect, in the way in which a likeness is really a respect, yet, just as a likeness is not said to exist in a respect precisely but in something absolute in which the idea of likeness is founded, so too the idea of vestige seems not to exist in a respect precisely but in something on which the respect is founded. And the proof of this is as follows, because the vestige is a likeness of the thing of which it is the vestige, from which vestige, when known, the thing is known. Therefore, the vestige can be known naturally before that of which it is the vestige; but a relation cannot be known naturally before the term; therefore etc.

Again, as to what is said that the three respects belong to the three modes of relatives [n.287], this seems false. For the Philosopher, Metaphysics 5.15.1021a26-30, when setting down the difference of the two modes relative to the third, maintains that in the first two modes the relation is mutual, in the third not, but one thing is said relative to another only because the other is of it; and every relation of creature to God is non-mutual, but God is said relative to the creature only because the creature is relative to him; therefore every respect of a creature to God is according to the third mode.

Also, what he brings forward about the first mode of likeness [n.287] is not valid, because the likeness (which is of the thing exemplified to what exemplifies it) does not belong to the first mode, because it is not a likeness of univocity; rather it belongs to the third mode, as appears manifestly from the Philosopher [Metaphysics 5.15.1020b30-32], who puts the relation of knowledge to knowable in the third mode and, universally, the relation of measured to measure; and the exemplar has the idea of measure with respect to what it is the exemplar of; therefore etc.

As concerns the second article, then [n.285], I concede that every respect of a creature to God belongs to the third mode of relatives [n.296]. And not in relations alone does the vestige consist, but in some absolutes [n.295], and perhaps in some respect as in the third part of itself, according to what Augustine assigns as part of the vestige in On the Trinity 6.10 n.12, where he says of creatures, “All these things that are made by divine art also display a certain unity in themselves and species and order.” Now unity is an absolute perfection, as is plain from his examples there, “one thing is something, as the natures of bodies etc.” Species too, or form, is something absolute, as is plain from his examples in the same place, “just as of bodies there are qualities, so also of souls there are teachings.” Now order states a respect, but not to the ultimate end but to operation; hence he says, “it holds an ordering, as are weights, arrangements of bodies, and loves or delights of souls.” These three [sc. unity, species, order], thus taken, represent, under the idea of likeness, three things corresponding to them in God, because unity represents the supreme unity of the first principle, whence is the origin; and as to this Augustine says there, “In the Trinity is the supreme origin of all things.” Species in the creature represents supreme beauty, hence he adds it is “the supreme beauty.” Order or operation in the creature represents the most perfect operation in God, and as to this he adds, “and most blessed delight.”

Many other things too can be assigned in creatures which, as being alike, represent something in divine reality appropriated to the persons, as one, true, and good. One in creatures represents the unity appropriated to the Father; true the truth appropriated to the Son; good the goodness appropriated to the Holy Spirit. And all these perfections are disposed in an absolute way, and represent absolute perfections of God appropriated to the Persons.

In another way is the vestige multiply assigned, either in things that represent through the idea of likeness what is appropriated to the Persons, or that do so through the idea of what is proportional. Now I say that they ‘represent proportionally’ when the idea of the representing thing is not formally in God but something proportional to that idea is, as in the case of the assignment ‘mode and species and order’, which the assignment in Wisdom 11.21, “in number, weight, and measure,”¹ seems to be the same as. For mode is taken for limitation, and for the same thing is measure taken in Wisdom 11.21, and weight is there taken for order and number for species. Number or species, and weight or order, are expounded as they were in the first exposition or assignment [nn.298-299]. But measure (which here is the same as mode) does not represent anything under the idea of the like but of the proportional, because the limitation of what has been produced represents the un-limitation of the producer. And thus is plain in what the vestige in creatures consists, and in respect of what in divine reality, because in respect of things appropriated to the Divine Persons [nn.293-300].

But how then is the idea of vestige, which is a likeness of a part [n.293], now taken in divine reality, since in divine reality there are no parts? Response. The Trinity is, as it were, a certain numerical whole, at least in concept of the intellect, and a Person there is, as it were, a part of this whole; thus too what is appropriated to a Person, insofar as it is appropriated, is there as it were a part of the same, because it is taken for that to which it is appropriated. And not only this, but what can be appropriated, though it is not taken as appropriated, is still there a part, as it were, of the same; for the idea of it, as it is and as it is taken, is completely preserved in one Person, and consequently its idea does not posit the Trinity but does posit concomitantly the unity of any Person in whom it is. Although, therefore, the creature commonly represents neither a Person as a Person (who in our intellect is as it were a part of the Trinity), nor what is appropriated as appropriated (for thus it is not known unless what it is appropriated to be known), yet it does represent what can be appropriated, in which the idea of a part is as it were preserved (in the way already stated [here supra]) with respect to the Trinity.