Ordinatio

About the vestige I ask¹ whether in every creature there is a vestige of the Trinity. That there is not: Because through a vestige can that of which it is the vestige be investigated; therefore the Trinity could naturally be investigated through a creature, which is false, because this surpasses natural reason.

Again, in intellectual nature there is an image of the Trinity, so there is no vestige. The consequence is plain, because these have opposite ideas of representing; therefore, they do not agree in the same thing.

Again, intellectual nature, because it is nobler, has a different idea of representing than lower natures have, as the idea of an image; but below intellectual nature there are many other natures that have an order in perfection, as living things above non-living things and mixed things² above simple things; so there will be in them a different idea of representing, such that the idea of the vestige will not be common to all of them.³

To the contrary is Augustine On the Trinity 6.10 n.12,⁴ “It is necessary that when we look at the creator through the things that are made we understand the Trinity, a vestige of whom appears in the creature in a way that is worthy.”

As to the first point [n.285] it is said [Giles of Rome, Thomas Aquinas] that a footprint is an impression left behind from the passage of something over a vacuum or a plenum, imperfectly representing it. And it represents ‘imperfectly’ for this reason, because a footprint represents something confusedly and under the idea of a species; an image does so perfectly because under the idea of the individual; just as, by its footprint a horse is distinguished from an ox, or that what is passing is a horse, not an ox, and there is no distinction of this horse from that; but an image does make distinction, because an image of Jove does not represent Caesar.

As to the second [n.285], it is said [cf. Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 9.1] that the creature has a triple relation to God as to a triple cause, and this according to the three modes of relatives that the Philosopher posits, Metaphysics 5.15.1020b26-32. As to the first mode, the creature is referred to God by a relation founded on ‘one’, namely by a relation of likeness, and this insofar as the creature is patterned after and referred to God insofar as God is the exemplar cause. As to the second mode, namely of power, the creature is referred to God as produced to producer. As to the third mode, namely in the mode of measure, the creature is referred to God as being ordered to him as to final cause [Henry of Ghent, ibid., Summa a.63 q.1]. These three relations, then, complete the idea of footprint, because one is not enough without the others, as is gathered from Augustine 83 Questions q.74, the remark “about two sheep etc.” [n.575 infra].

There is had, then, what the vestige in creatures consists of. But what is it in respect of on the part of God [n.285]? Response: in respect of what is appropriated to the three persons; for by the first respect (namely of likeness) the creature represents the exemplar art, which is appropriated to the Son; by the second the creature represents the power of the producer, which is appropriated to the Father; by the third the creature represents the goodness of the finisher, which is appropriated to the Holy Spirit [Henry of Ghent, Giles of Rome].

Against what is said in the first member [n.286]. If there were only one animal such that another in the universe would not be possible, still the vestige of it would not be the image of it (because a vestige would still not be a likeness of the whole but of a part, and an image is a likeness of the whole), and yet it would then not represent it confusedly, that is, according to an idea common to itself and others.

It will be said that it does [represent confusedly], just as now the sun is a universal, even though it were impossible for there to be many suns [cf. Algazel, Logic ch.3]. And the science that is about the sun is about it under the idea of a universal, and not about this sun; and so the intelligible species does represent the universal and not this particular, even though the universal can only exist in this particular.

Against this [n.290]: If it is respect of something insofar as it is a ‘this’ that the vestige is not an image, the proposed conclusion is obtained [n.289], and this when supposing, by whatever supposition, that nothing could be abstracted from ‘this’. But still, on this supposition, something could represent this whole as ‘this’, and something a part of this as ‘of this’.

Again, if the parts of animals diverse in species, which parts make an impression on what yields in a soft thing, were alike in quantity and figure, the vestige too would not lead to knowledge of them under the idea of species but only of genus. If in the same species there were parts of this sort unlike in quantity and figure, the vestige would lead to knowledge of the individual as ‘this’, though not of the whole as represented wholly. Therefore, species or not species is an accidental difference.

Concerning this point then [n.285], I say that a footprint is the likeness of a part of an animal, by which part a footprint is impressed on something yielding to it. But an expressed likeness of a part is not an expressed likeness of the whole, because not in accord with the idea of the whole in itself, nor even with that by which it is immediately known but only by argument, and herefrom because the thing represented is known to be some part of it. And therefore, if this supposition is false – for example, because the impressing thing were separate from the whole (as if a foot amputated from the body were impressing the footprint) – the soul would be in error about the whole to which the sort of part that impresses a vestige naturally belongs. It is plain too that, if the whole body were as impressed on the dust as the foot was impressed, this left-behind impression would truly be the image and likeness of the whole, just as now the vestige is the likeness of a part.

Applying this also to the issue at hand [n.281], it does not seem that the first distinction set down between vestige and image [n.286] is true, because no creature represents God save according to common concepts, and not according to special concepts, namely, concepts of the most specific species. So there is no difference between creature and creature in representing God in a common and non-common idea.

What is said too in the second member, that the vestige consists in the three relations [n.287], does not seem true. For although the idea of vestige states a respect, in the way in which a likeness is really a respect, yet, just as a likeness is not said to exist in a respect precisely but in something absolute in which the idea of likeness is founded, so too the idea of vestige seems not to exist in a respect precisely but in something on which the respect is founded. And the proof of this is as follows, because the vestige is a likeness of the thing of which it is the vestige, from which vestige, when known, the thing is known. Therefore, the vestige can be known naturally before that of which it is the vestige; but a relation cannot be known naturally before the term; therefore etc.

Again, as to what is said that the three respects belong to the three modes of relatives [n.287], this seems false. For the Philosopher, Metaphysics 5.15.1021a26-30, when setting down the difference of the two modes relative to the third, maintains that in the first two modes the relation is mutual, in the third not, but one thing is said relative to another only because the other is of it; and every relation of creature to God is non-mutual, but God is said relative to the creature only because the creature is relative to him; therefore every respect of a creature to God is according to the third mode.

Also, what he brings forward about the first mode of likeness [n.287] is not valid, because the likeness (which is of the thing exemplified to what exemplifies it) does not belong to the first mode, because it is not a likeness of univocity; rather it belongs to the third mode, as appears manifestly from the Philosopher [Metaphysics 5.15.1020b30-32], who puts the relation of knowledge to knowable in the third mode and, universally, the relation of measured to measure; and the exemplar has the idea of measure with respect to what it is the exemplar of; therefore etc.

As concerns the second article, then [n.285], I concede that every respect of a creature to God belongs to the third mode of relatives [n.296]. And not in relations alone does the vestige consist, but in some absolutes [n.295], and perhaps in some respect as in the third part of itself, according to what Augustine assigns as part of the vestige in On the Trinity 6.10 n.12, where he says of creatures, “All these things that are made by divine art also display a certain unity in themselves and species and order.” Now unity is an absolute perfection, as is plain from his examples there, “one thing is something, as the natures of bodies etc.” Species too, or form, is something absolute, as is plain from his examples in the same place, “just as of bodies there are qualities, so also of souls there are teachings.” Now order states a respect, but not to the ultimate end but to operation; hence he says, “it holds an ordering, as are weights, arrangements of bodies, and loves or delights of souls.” These three [sc. unity, species, order], thus taken, represent, under the idea of likeness, three things corresponding to them in God, because unity represents the supreme unity of the first principle, whence is the origin; and as to this Augustine says there, “In the Trinity is the supreme origin of all things.” Species in the creature represents supreme beauty, hence he adds it is “the supreme beauty.” Order or operation in the creature represents the most perfect operation in God, and as to this he adds, “and most blessed delight.”

Many other things too can be assigned in creatures which, as being alike, represent something in divine reality appropriated to the persons, as one, true, and good. One in creatures represents the unity appropriated to the Father; true the truth appropriated to the Son; good the goodness appropriated to the Holy Spirit. And all these perfections are disposed in an absolute way, and represent absolute perfections of God appropriated to the Persons.

In another way is the vestige multiply assigned, either in things that represent through the idea of likeness what is appropriated to the Persons, or that do so through the idea of what is proportional. Now I say that they ‘represent proportionally’ when the idea of the representing thing is not formally in God but something proportional to that idea is, as in the case of the assignment ‘mode and species and order’, which the assignment in Wisdom 11.21, “in number, weight, and measure,”¹ seems to be the same as. For mode is taken for limitation, and for the same thing is measure taken in Wisdom 11.21, and weight is there taken for order and number for species. Number or species, and weight or order, are expounded as they were in the first exposition or assignment [nn.298-299]. But measure (which here is the same as mode) does not represent anything under the idea of the like but of the proportional, because the limitation of what has been produced represents the un-limitation of the producer. And thus is plain in what the vestige in creatures consists, and in respect of what in divine reality, because in respect of things appropriated to the Divine Persons [nn.293-300].

But how then is the idea of vestige, which is a likeness of a part [n.293], now taken in divine reality, since in divine reality there are no parts? Response. The Trinity is, as it were, a certain numerical whole, at least in concept of the intellect, and a Person there is, as it were, a part of this whole; thus too what is appropriated to a Person, insofar as it is appropriated, is there as it were a part of the same, because it is taken for that to which it is appropriated. And not only this, but what can be appropriated, though it is not taken as appropriated, is still there a part, as it were, of the same; for the idea of it, as it is and as it is taken, is completely preserved in one Person, and consequently its idea does not posit the Trinity but does posit concomitantly the unity of any Person in whom it is. Although, therefore, the creature commonly represents neither a Person as a Person (who in our intellect is as it were a part of the Trinity), nor what is appropriated as appropriated (for thus it is not known unless what it is appropriated to be known), yet it does represent what can be appropriated, in which the idea of a part is as it were preserved (in the way already stated [here supra]) with respect to the Trinity.

As to the third article [n.285], it is said [cf. Henry of Ghent infra], according to Boethius On the Hebdomads, that “what a thing is by and what it is are diverse,” because that which a thing is ‘by’ is called its ‘ratification’, and that by which it is ‘what it is’ is called its ‘somesort-ness’ [Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 11 q.3]. On this understanding it is said that the respect of vestige in a creature is not founded on the ratification of the thing, but only on its somesort-ness, and it is formally the ratification of it [ibid., 5 q.6, 11 q.3].¹

The way posited is this: according to Avicenna Metaphysics 5 ch.1, “humanity is only humanity;” therefore the idea of humanity is not the ratified thing; therefore, it must be a ratified thing by something else outside the formal idea of humanity.

The argument is also made that which its ratification is formally by is the vestigial relation, and this first as follows: whatever is included in the per se understanding of something insofar as it is such is that by which it is such, or the same formally as it insofar as it is such; but the vestigial respect is included in the idea of any ratified being; therefore etc. Proof of the minor: some being is what its ‘to be’ is, as God; some being is what ‘to be’ belongs to, as is every being other than God, which is not a ‘to be’ of itself but only a being to which ‘to be’ belongs [cf. Henry, Quodlibet 5 a.2, Summa a.2 q.6]. From this the argument is as follows: any being that is not of itself ‘to be’ but to which ‘to be’ belongs is not a ratified being save by participating ‘to be’ itself, or insofar as it does participate ‘to be’ itself [cf. n.109]; everything other than God is what ‘to be’ belongs to and is not ‘to be’ itself; therefore it is not ratified save to the extent it participates ‘to be’; therefore by that participation is it formally ratified.

Secondly [cf. n.304] as follows: nothing other than God can be perfectly known without knowledge of all the intrinsic and extrinsic causes, Physics 1.1.184.14-17, “Then each thing etc.” [Henry, Summa a.1 q.5]; but if the essence of something such were absolute and were not to include a respect essentially to an extrinsic cause, it could be perfectly known without knowledge of the extrinsic cause; therefore it is necessary that it include such a respect [ibid., a.27 q.1].

Augustine On the Trinity 8.3 n.4 is brought in here [“you will see God, not good with another good, but the good of every good.” Cf. Henry, ibid. a.24 q.8].

Again, Boethius On Hebdomads, “If little by little you take away, through the intellect, the good itself, then, though there may be good things, yet they will not be good by the fact that they are.” Therefore, the idea of good is taken away from them when the first good is, through the intellect, taken away; and consequently goodness in them states a relation to, or participation in, the supreme good.

If argument is made against the opinion [n.302] from Averroes Metaphysics 12 com.19, that relation has the weakest being, so there is not and cannot be formally ratification of ratified being [Henry, Quodlibet 9 q.3 etc.] – it is said that relation is double: one accidental, one substantial. And this distinction of relation is taken from Simplicius On the Categories (‘When’), where he maintains that some cases of ‘in’ do not constitute categories as others do, because of the fact that some respects are essential or substantial, some are not but accidental [Henry, ibid.²]. They say, therefore, that the statement of the commentator [Averroes] is true of accidental relation, not of substantial relation.

But if it is objected that every relation presupposes a foundation in ratified being, therefore it is not itself the ratification of the foundation [nn.295, 323] – it is said that this is true of a relation coming to a foundation, but not of a relation constituting a foundation.

Against these points [nn.302-309]. So that these words may be understood, I distinguish three things according to the opinion of the doctor [Henry of Ghent] on whose statements this opinion seems to be based. For, according to him ‘thing’, res, is in one way said from reor, reris, which means to ‘think’; in a second way ‘thing’ is said to be from ratification. In place of these words I take plainer words: for ‘thing’ as said from ‘think’ I take ‘thinkable reality’, which is common, according to him, to figments and non-figments; for ‘thing’ as said from ‘ratification’ I take, according to his intention, quidditative reality, because he posits that a quidditative thing is ratified by the fact it is exemplified, which does not belong to figments. Beyond these there only remains the reality of actual existence. We have, therefore, three things in order: thinkable reality, quidditative reality, and reality of existence.

I ask, then, what he means by ‘somesort-ness’? [n.302]. For if he means thinkable reality, since that is common to something and to nothing, it is of itself nothing. Therefore. if ratification be founded on somesort-ness taken in this way [n.302], it is founded on nothing; therefore it is nothing, because what is nothing relative to itself is nothing relative to another thing, On the Trinity 7.1 n.2 [“Wherefore if the Father is not something in relation to himself, he is altogether not who may be said in relation to anything”]; therefore ratification is nothing; therefore, the total thing, composed of ratification and somesort-ness, is two nothings.

If somesort-ness be called quidditative reality, I ask what he means by ratification, either quidditative reality or reality of existence. If quidditative reality, then to say that ratification is founded on somesort-ness [n.302] is to say that quidditative reality is founded on quidditative reality, which is to say nothing, because then the same thing would be founded on itself according to the same being. If he means reality of existence – on the contrary: then ratification is presupposed to it, because a thing, according to this opinion, has truly ratified being before being of existence, and so its first ratification cannot be the being of existence.¹

If you say that the somesort-ness that is thinkable reality is a ‘what’ common to something and nothing, but there is another somesort-ness that is proper to a thing able to be and that does not belong to figments (of which a thing having somesort-ness is composed, and from being as from its own ratification,) – on the contrary: this is to say that there is a double somesort-ness, one of something and nothing, and another of something only, just as if it were said there is a double whiteness, one of white and black, another of white only. And in addition to this, as to the somesort-ness proper to possible being, I ask: either it is a respect only and is founded on the somesort-ness that is common (because that alone precedes it), and then it will be founded on nothing, as was said [n.311], and then it will be nothing; or the somesort-ness that is proper is an absolute, and thereby, for you, the thing that has it is distinguished from fictions; so this is the first ratification of a thing and is an absolute, and thus a respect will not be the first ratification of a thing.

Further, second [n.313], as follows: humanity has of itself a concept to which it is not repugnant that something falls under it in fact, or to which it is repugnant of itself that something falls under it in fact, or to which of itself something does fall under it in fact. Not in the third way, according to every opinion, for the reason that this is proper to God alone. If it be granted that it is repugnant of itself to the concept that something falls under it, then by no respect that comes to it from without can belong to it that something could fall under it; for what is repugnant to something by some part of it cannot not be repugnant to it while its nature remains, and so cannot become non-repugnant to it by any respect that comes to it from without. Therefore, the concept of humanity is such that to it of itself is not repugnant that something in fact falls under it; but such concept is a concept of ratified thing, according to the opinion of this master [Henry of Ghent], because to be in fact is repugnant to the concept of a figment [cf. n.310].

Besides, third: the Philosopher, Metaphysics 4.6.1011a19-20, infers from the opinion of those who say that all appearances are true this impossibility, that everything will be relative to something. And he does not mean this only by way of denomination, because in thus is it true that everything is relative to something, at least everything other than God; therefore he means to infer it as something maximally unacceptable that everything is essentially relative to something. But this opinion posits that everything is essentially relative to something; therefore, this conclusion, namely that all things are relative to something, is more unacceptable than that all appearances are true.

If you say that the Philosopher is saying that all things will be relative to another, namely “relative to opinion and sense” – on the contrary: in an argument, a conclusion leading to something impossible must be equally or more impossible than the premises; the inferred conclusion here, insofar as it is inferred, does not differ from the premise that posits all things to be true on account of their appearing to sense or to opinion – save in this that it infers ‘everything is relative to something’ [cf. n.307]; therefore if in something it has a greater impossibility than the premises, it is this impossibility, that all things are relative to something simply.

Fourth as follows: humanity, insofar as it is humanity, either has only the ‘what’ of the name or it has the ‘what’ of a thing repugnant to figments [cf. Henry, Summa a.24 q.3]. If in the first way, then of humanity, as it is humanity, there is no more a science than there is of a chimaera, and consequently metaphysics, which is about quiddities, will no more be a science than if it were about figments unintelligible because of the contradiction included in them. But if humanity, as it is humanity, has the ‘what’ of a thing that is repugnant to figments, then humanity, whence it is humanity, is a ratified thing [cf. n.303].

The reply is made that humanity, whence it is humanity, has some definition, but the definition does not indicate a ratified being because figments can have genus and difference; but, in order to get the complete idea of a ratified being, one must add a respect to unparticipating being [cf. n.304].

This [n.318] does not make reply to the argument [n.317] without making metaphysics no science. Likewise too, what it says about figments (that they have genus and difference) is false, because all such things have an idea that is in itself false, because including a contradiction, because one part contradicts the other; but such parts are never genus and difference, for a difference is per se determinative of a genus and is, consequently, not repugnant to it.

Second, argument is made against the opinion [n.302] from his own statements [n.310]. First as follows: each thing is active formally by its ratification,¹ the proof of which is because by ratification is it formally in act; but nothing is in itself formally active by a relation, because a relation is not a principle of acting [Henry of Ghent, Summa a.39 qq.3,4]; therefore ratification is not a relation.

Again, according to him no creature, insofar as ratified, differs in species from the being that is God [Henry, Quodlibet 7 qq.1-2]; but the very being that is God, according to every opinion, is absolute; how then does that which is formally a relation not differ in species from that which is absolute?

Again, according to him, a being of reason participates ratified being or first being, but is not formally a ratified being [ibid., 5 q.2]. Therefore, this sort of participation is not formally ratification itself [n.304].