Ordinatio

To the question [n.218], therefore, I say that, because of the words of Augustine, one must concede that infallible truths are seen in eternal rules, where the ‘in’ is taken objectively, and this in four ways: either as in the proximate object, or as in what contains the proximate object, or as in that by virtue of which the proximate object moves [the intellect], or as in the remote object.

For understanding of the first [n.261], I say that all intelligibles have intelligible being by act of the divine intellect, and in them do all truths about them shine forth, such that the intellect understanding them, and understanding by virtue of them the necessary truths about them, sees these necessary truths in them as in their objects. And they, insofar as they are secondary objects of the divine intellect, are truths because in conformity with their exemplar, namely the divine intellect; and they are light because manifest; and they are unchangeable there and necessary. But they are eternal in a certain respect, because eternity is a condition of what exists, and they do not have existence save in a certain respect. So then, first, we can be said to see in eternal light, that is, in a secondary object of the divine intellect, which object is truth and eternal light in the way explained.

The second way [n.261] is likewise plain, because the divine intellect contains these truths as a book, just as the authority of Augustine says, On the Trinity 14.15, that ‘these rules are written in the book of eternal light’ [n.205], that is, in the divine intellect insofar as it contains these truths. And though the book not be seen, yet the truths are seen that are written in that first book. And to that extent could our intellect be said to see truths in the eternal light, that is, in the book as in what contains the object.¹ And the other [n.262] of these two ways seems to be of the meaning of Augustine in On the Trinity 12.14 n.23, that “the idea of a square body remains incorruptible and unchangeable etc.” But it does not remain such save as it is a secondary object of the divine intellect.

But against the first way [n.262] there is a doubt. For if we do not see these truths as they are in the divine intellect (because we do not see the divine intellect), how will we be said to see in the uncreated light from the fact we see in such eternal light in a certain respect, which light has being in the uncreated light as in the knowing intellect?

To this the third way [n.261] responds, which is as follows: they, as they are the secondary object of the divine intellect, only have being in a certain respect; but any true, real operation does not belong to anything that is precisely a being in a certain respect by virtue of itself; but if in some way it does belong to it, this must be by virtue of something to which being simply belongs. Therefore, it does not belong to these secondary objects to move the intellect precisely save by virtue of the being of the divine intellect, which is being simply and by which these [secondary objects] have being in a certain respect. So, therefore, we see in eternal light in a certain respect, as in the proximate object [n.262]; but in the uncreated eternal light we see in the third way, as in the proximate cause by whose virtue the proximate object moves [the intellect].

Following on from this too it can be said that, as to the third way [n.265], we see in eternal light as in the cause of the object in itself; for the divine intellect produces them, by its own act, in intelligible being, and by its own act it gives being of this sort to this object and of that sort to that object, and consequently it gives them such an idea of object, by which ideas they afterwards move the intellect to certain knowledge. And, that it could properly be said that our intellect sees in the light because the light is the cause of the object, is apparent through a likeness; for we are properly said to understand in the light of the agent intellect, although however that light is only the active cause or what makes the object in its own act, or by virtue of which the object moves, or both.

This double causality, therefore, of the divine intellect (that it is the true uncreated light, namely which produces secondary objects in intelligible being, and that it is that by virtue of which do also the produced secondary objects actually move the intellect) can as it were integrate one third member [nn.261265], because of which we are said truly to see in eternal light.

And if it be objected against these two ways that integrate the third member about the cause [n.267], that then it seems rather that we would be said to see in God so willing, or in God as he is will, than in God as he is light, because the divine will is the immediate principle of any extrinsic act – I reply: the divine intellect, insofar as it is in some way prior to act of the divine will, produces these objects in intelligible being and so seems, with respect to them, to be a merely natural cause; for God is a not free cause with respect to anything save that which, in some way prior to itself, presupposes the will according as it is an act of will. And just as the intellect, as prior to an act of will, produces objects in intelligible being, so it seems as prior cause to cooperate with the intelligibles for their natural effect, namely so that the intelligibles, as apprehended and combined, may cause the apprehension’s conformity with them. It seems therefore that it includes a contradiction for some intellect to form such composition and for the composition not to be in conformity with the terms (though it is possible for it not to compose the terms); for although God voluntarily co-act so that the intellect compose or not compose the terms, yet when the intellect has composed them, so that the composition be in conformity with the terms, this seems necessarily to follow the idea of the terms that the terms have from the intellect of God that causes those terms naturally in intelligible being.

And from this appears how no special illumining is necessary for seeing things in eternal rules, because Augustine does not posit that truths are seen in them save those that are necessary by force of the terms. And in such truths there is the greatest naturalness of both the remote and the proximate cause as regards the effect, namely of both the divine intellect for the objects moving [the intellect] and of the objects for the truth of the complex [the proposition] about them. And also, though there not be as much naturalness for perception of the truth that ‘the opposite includes a contradiction’, yet there is naturalness on the part of the proximate cause when the remote cause is co-assisting with it, because the terms when apprehended and composed are of a nature to cause the evidence of the conformity of the composition with the terms naturally. And if it be posited that God act along with the terms with a general influence for this effect not, however, with natural necessity; still, whether there is a general influence or, what is more, a natural necessity of influencing for the terms toward this effect, it is plain that a special illumining is not required.

The assumption about what Augustine means is plain from what he says in On the Trinity 4.35 n.20 (he is speaking about the philosophers), “Some of them were able to raise their mind’s gaze beyond all creatures and to attain, in however little part, the light of unchangeable truth, and they mock the fact that many Christians, living by faith alone, are not yet able to do it.” Therefore, he maintains that Christians do not see the things of faith in the eternal rules, but that the philosophers do see many necessary things in them.

Also ibid. 9.6 n.9, “Not just any man’s sort of mind etc.” [cf. n.202], as if he were to say: contingent things are not seen there but necessary ones.

And ibid. 4.16 n.21 he argues against these philosophers: “Is it because they contend most truly that all things come to be by eternal ideas that they were therefore able to espy in those very ideas how many kinds of animals, how many seeds of individuals, there are in the origin?” etc. “Surely it was not by unchangeable science that they searched all these things out, but through the history of places and times, and they believed what was experienced and written down by others?” Therefore, he means that it is not through eternal rules that they know the contingent facts that are known only through the senses or believed through histories; and yet a special illumining is more required in things believed than in necessities known; indeed in the latter most of all is a special illumining taken away, and a general illumining alone suffices.

On the contrary: what then is Augustine saying in ibid. 12.14 n.23, that “it belongs to few to reach the intelligible reasons by the mind’s gaze” [cf. n.204], and in 83 Questions q.46 n.2, “only pure souls attain to them”?

I reply: this purity must not be understood as purity from vices, because in On the Trinity 14.15 n.21 he maintains that the unjust sees in eternal rules what the just thing to be done is; and in chapter 15 from ibid. 4 already cited [n.270] he maintains that philosophers see the truth in eternal rules without faith; and in the same question [83 Questions q.46 n.1] he maintains that no one can be wise without knowledge of the ideas (in the way they would perhaps concede that Plato was wise). But this purity must be understood to be by raising the intellect to considering truths as they shine forth in themselves, not only as they shine forth in a phantasm.

One needs to consider here that the external sensible thing causes in the imaginative power a phantasm that is confused and one per accidens, namely representing a thing in quantity, in figure and color and other sensible accidents. And just as a phantasm represents only confusedly and per accidens, so do many perceive only a being per accidens. Now the first truths are precisely such from the proper idea of their terms, insofar as the terms are abstracted from everything conjoined to them per accidens. For this proposition, ‘the whole is greater than its part’, is not first true as ‘whole’ is in stone or wood, but as ‘whole’ is abstracted from everything to which it is per accidens conjoined. And an intellect, therefore, that never understands a totality save in a per accidens concept, as in a totality of stone or wood, never understands the genuine truth of the above principle, because it never understands the precise idea of the term by which the principle is true.

It therefore belongs to few to reach eternal ideas, because it belongs to few to have understandings per se, and to many to have such per accidens concepts. But these few are not said to be distinguished from others on account of a special illumining, but either on account of better natural endowments (because they have an intellect that abstracts more and is more perspicacious), or on account of a greater investigation whereby someone equally endowed reaches a knowledge of the quiddities that another, who does not investigate, does not know. And in this way is understood Augustine’s comment, On the Trinity 9.6. n.11, about someone seeing on a mountain, and seeing the cloudy air below and clear air above. For he who only ever understands per accidens concepts in the way a phantasm represents such objects as per accidens beings, he is, as it were, in the valley, surrounded by cloudy air. But he who separates out quiddities, understanding them precisely in a per se concept, which quiddities, however, shine forth in the phantasm with many other accidents adjoined – he has the phantasm beneath him, like the cloudy air, and is himself on the mountain top, to the extent he knows the truth and sees the true up above, as the higher truth, in virtue of the uncreated intellect that is the eternal light.

In the last way [sc. the fourth, n.261] it can be conceded that pure truths are known in the eternal light as in a remote known object, because the uncreated light is the first principle of speculative things and the ultimate end of practical things; and therefore are from it the first principles taken, both the speculative and the practical. And for this reason is the knowledge of all things (both speculative and practical), taken through principles from the eternal light as known, more perfect and purer than the knowledge taken through principles in their proper genus. And in this way does knowledge of all things pertain to the theologian, as was said in the question about the subject of theology [Ord. Prol. n.206]; and it is more eminent than any other knowledge whatever. In this way is the pure truth said to be known, because through it is known what is truth only, not having anything of non-truth intermixed; for it is through the first being, from which as known the principles of knowing in this way are taken. But anything else whatever, from which the principles of knowing in general are taken, is defective truth. In this way does only God know all things in their purity alone, because, as was said in the question about the subject of theology [Ord. Prol. nn.200-201], only he knows all things precisely through his essence; every other intellect can be moved by another object to know a truth by virtue it [Ord. Prol. nn.202, 206]. For to know that a triangle has three angles [equal to two right angles] as this is a certain participation in God and possesses such order in the universe that it expresses more perfectly, as it were, the perfection of God – this is to know that a triangle has three angles etc. in a nobler way than to know it through the idea of a triangle [sc. a plane figure bound by three straight lines, Ord. I d.2 n.27]. And to know in this way that one should live temperately for attaining ultimate beatitude, which is by reaching God’s essence in itself, is to know this practical knowable more perfectly than to know it through some principle in the genus of morals, as for example through this, that one should live honorably.

And in this way does Augustine speak of the uncreated light as known, On the Trinity 15.27 n.50 where, speaking to himself, he says, “Many truths have you seen, and truths that you discerned by this light which, as shining on you, you saw by. Raise up your eyes to the light itself, and fix them on it if you can; for thus will you see how distant the nativity of the Word of God is from the procession of a gift of God.” And a little later, “These and other things has this light shown to your interior eyes. What then is the cause why, with gaze fixed, you will not be able to see it, save surely your infirmity?” etc. [cf. n.187].

From what has been said [nn.262-278] the answer is plain to all the authorities of Augustine for the opposite [nn.202-206]; and according to one or other of the stated ways of seeing ‘in’ [n.261] can the authorities of Augustine that occur on this matter be expounded.