Ordinatio

As to the third article [n.218], a response must be made from the preceding [nn.230-245] to the three reasons [of Henry, nn.211-213].¹ To the first argument [n.211], as to the point about the change of the object, the antecedent is false;² nor is it the opinion of Augustine but the error of Heraclitus, and of his disciple Cratylus who did not want to speak but to move his finger, as is said in Metaphysics 4.5.1010a7-15. And the consequence, given the antecedent were true, is not valid, because still, according to Aristotle, could certain knowledge be had of the fact that all things were continually moving. Also, it does not follow that, if the object is changeable, then what is produced by it is not representative of anything under the idea of the unchangeable [n.211]; for the changeability in the object is not the reason for generating [knowledge], but the nature of the object itself that is changeable. The thing generated by it, therefore, represents the nature per se. If, therefore, the nature, whereby it is nature, have some unchangeable relationship to something else, that something else through its exemplar, and the nature itself through its exemplar, are represented as unchangeably united; and thus, through two exemplars, generated by two changeable things – not insofar as they changeable but insofar as they are natures – knowledge of the unchangeability of their union can be had.

Although it not generate insofar as it is changeable, yet, if it is changeable, how is there an unchangeable relation of it to something else? I reply: the relation is unchangeable in this way, because there cannot be an opposite relation between the extremes, neither can this relation not exist once the extremes are posited, but it is destroyed by the destruction of the extreme or the extremes.

On the contrary: how is a necessary proposition affirmed if the identity of the extremes can be destroyed? I reply: when the thing does not exist, there is no real identity of it. But then, if it is in the intellect, there is identity as it is an understood object, and it is necessary in a certain respect, because in such existence the extremes cannot be without such identity. However, that [identity] is able not to be, just as the extreme is able to be non-understood. Therefore, it is a necessary proposition in our intellect in a certain respect, because it cannot be changed to the false; but it is not simply necessary save in the divine intellect, just as neither do the extremes have an identity simply necessarily in any being save in that being understood.

It is plain too that something representative that is in itself changeable can represent something under the idea of the unchangeable, because the essence of God under the idea of the unchangeable will be represented to the intellect through something altogether changeable, whether it be a species or an act; this is plain through a likeness, because through the finite can something under the idea of the infinite be represented.

To the second argument [of Henry, n.212] I say that in the soul a twofold changeability can be understood, one from affirmation to negation and conversely, as from ignorance to knowledge or from non-intellection to intellection;³ another from, as it were, contrary to contrary, as from rectitude to deception or conversely. Now as to any object the soul is changeable in the first way, and by nothing formally existing in it is such changeability taken away from it. But it is not changeable with the second changeableness save as to the complexes [propositions] that do not have evidence from the terms. But about those that are evident from the terms the soul cannot be changed with the second changeableness, because, once the terms themselves are understood, they are a necessary and evident cause of conformity with the terms of the composition that has been made [n.230]. Therefore, if the soul is changeable from rectitude to error, absolutely, it does not follow that by nothing other than itself can it be set right; at least it can be set right as regard the objects about which the intellect, once the terms have been apprehended, cannot err.

To the third argument [of Henry, n.213] I say that if it had any appearance [of truth], it would conclude more against the opinion that denies the intelligible species,⁴ because the species that can represent something sensible as an object in dreams would be a phantasm, not an intelligible species. Therefore, if the intellect use a phantasm alone whereby the object is present to it, and not any intelligible species, it does not seem it could discriminate the true from the likely true through anything in which the object is lucid for it. But if one posits a species in the intellect, [Henry’s] reasoning is not valid, for the intellect cannot use the species [sc. as opposed to a phantasm] for itself as object, because it cannot use it when sleeping.

If you object that, if the phantasm can represent itself as the object, then the intellect, through that error of the imaginative power, can err, or at any rate it can be bound so as not to be able to operate, as is plain in dreams and the mad [n.213] – it can be said that, though the intellect be bound when there is such error in the imaginative power, yet it does not err, because it does not then have any act.

But how will the intellect know, or how then will it be certain, when the imaginative power is erring, whose not erring is, however, required for the intellect not to be in error? I reply. This truth rests in the intellect, that a power does not err about an object proportioned to it unless it is indisposed. And it is known to the intellect that the power of imagination is not, when awake, indisposed with such an indisposition as makes a phantasm represent itself as an object; for it is per se known to the intellect that, when thinking, it is awake, so that the power of imagination is not bound during wakefulness the way it is in dreams.

But an objection against the stated certitude about acts is still made in this way: ‘it seems to me that I am seeing or hearing, when however I am not seeing or hearing; so there is no certitude about this’.

I reply. It is one thing to show against someone who denies a proposition that the proposition is true; it is another thing to show to someone who admits it how it is true. An example from Metaphysics 4.3.1005a29-6a18: the Philosopher does not introduce, against someone who denies the first principle [sc. the principle of non-contradiction], the unacceptable result that contrary opinions would simultaneously exist in the soul [n.231] (the deniers would concede this themselves as presupposed); rather he brings in for them other unacceptable results, more manifest to them though not in themselves. But to those who receive the first principle he shows how it is known, because it is such that its opposite could not come into the mind; which he proves because then contrary opinions could stand together. Such a conclusion is there more unacceptable than the hypothesis [sc. ‘its opposite could not come into the mind’].

So here. If you allow that no proposition is known per se, I refuse to dispute with you, because it is clear that you are impudent and are not convinced, as is plain in your actions, the way the Philosopher objects, Metaphysics 4.3.100535-6a18: for, when dreaming about getting something that is as it were close by and waking up afterwards, you do not pursue it as you would pursue it if, being awake, you were close to obtaining it. But if you allow that some proposition is known per se, and that an indisposed power can err about anything (as is plain in dreams), then, so that some proposition may be recognized to be known per se, there must be a possibility of it being known when the power is disposed and when not, and consequently a possibility for knowledge to be had about our acts that the power is thus disposed, that that is known per se which appears known per se to it.

I say then to the form of this caviling [n.254] that, just as it appears to a dreamer that he sees, so could the opposite appear to him of a principle of speculation that is known per se; and yet it does not follow that that principle is not known per se, and so it does not follow that it is not per se known to a hearer that he is hearing, for an indisposed power can err about both, but not a disposed power. And when it is disposed and when not is per se known – otherwise it could not be known that anything else was per se known, because it could not be known what will be per se known, whether what the intellect assents to when disposed in this way, or what it assents to when disposed in that way.