Ordinatio

In this question there is an opinion of the following sort [Henry of Ghent, Summa a.1 q.2], that general intentions [sc. concepts] have a natural ordering among themselves. Let us speak about the two intentions that relate to the issue at hand, namely the intention of being and of true. The first intention is that of being, as is proved by what is said in the fourth proposition of On Causes, “The first of created things is ‘to be’,” and in the commentary on the first proposition, “‘To be’ is of greater inherence [sc. than truth];” and the reason is because entity is absolute, truth states relation to an exemplar. From this follows that being can be known under the idea of entity, though not under the idea of truth.¹ This conclusion is proved also on the part of the intellect: because being can be conceived in a simple intelligence and then is that which is true conceived; but the idea of truth can only be conceived by an intelligence that combines and divides [sc. terms in a proposition]; simple intelligence precedes composition and division.

And if a question be asked about the knowledge of being, or of that which is true, it is said [sc. by Henry] that the intellect can, of its pure natural powers, thus understand the true, of which the proof is because it is unacceptable for “nature to be without its proper operation,” according to Damascene Orthodox Faith III ch.15 n.234. And this is more unacceptable in a more perfect nature, according to the Philosopher, On the Heavens 2.8.290a29-35, about the stars [Henry, Summa a.24 q.1, Scotus Ord. Prol. n.76].² Therefore, since the proper operation of the intellect is to understand the true, it seems unacceptable that nature would not have granted the intellect the things that are sufficient for this operation.

But if we speak about knowledge of truth, the response is made that, just as there is a double exemplar, created and uncreated, according to Plato in the Timaeus 28-29 (namely the made and non-made, or the created and non-created; the created exemplar is the universal species caused by the thing, the uncreated exemplar is the idea in the divine mind), so there is a double conformity to an exemplar and a double truth. One is conformity to the created exemplar, and in this way did Aristotle [Metaphysics 1.1.981a5-7, Posterior Analytics 2.18.100a3-8; also Henry, ibid., a.1 q.1 ad 4] posit that the truths of things are known through their conformity to the intelligible species. And so does Augustine seem to posit in On the Trinity 8.4 n.7, where he maintains that we get the knowledge, general and special, of things collected from sensibles, according to which we judge the truth about each thing that confronts us, that it is of such and such sort.

But that through such exemplar, acquired in us, an altogether certain and infallible knowledge of truth may be had about a thing – this seems altogether impossible. And it is proved by a threefold reason, according to them [Henry, ibid., a.1 q.2]. The first is taken on the part of the thing from which the exemplar is abstracted; the second on the part of the subject in which it is; the third on the part of the exemplar in itself. The first reason is of this sort: the object from which the exemplar is abstracted is changeable; therefore, it cannot be the cause of anything unchangeable; but someone’s certain knowledge of something under the idea of truth is held in him through unchangeable reason; therefore it is not held through such an exemplar. This reason is said to be Augustine’s in 83 Questions q.9, where he says that “truth is not to be expected from sensibles,” because “sensibles ceaselessly change.”

The second reason is of this sort: the soul is of itself changeable and suffers error; therefore by nothing more changeable than it can it be set right or ruled over so as not to err; but such an exemplar in it is more changeable than the soul itself is; therefore the exemplar does not perfectly rule over the soul so that it not err.³ This reason is said to be Augustine’s in On True Religion ch.30 n.56, “The law of all arts etc.”

The third reason: no one has a certain and infallible knowledge of truth unless he have whereby he could discriminate the true from the likely true; because if he cannot discriminate the true from the false or from the likely true he can be in doubt that he is being deceived; but through the aforesaid created exemplar the true cannot be discriminated from the likely true; therefore etc. Proof of the minor: such a species can represent itself as itself, or in another way as the object, such as in dreams. If it represent itself as the object, there is falsity; if it represent itself as itself, there is truth. Therefore, through such species there is not had anything that sufficiently distinguishes when it represents itself as itself or as the object, and so neither anything that sufficiently distinguishes the true from the false.

From these is the conclusion drawn that, if it do happen that man knows certain science and infallible truth, this does not happen to him by looking at an exemplar taken from the thing by the senses, however much it be purified and made universal; but it is required that he look back to the uncreated exemplar. And then the mode of positing it is as follows: God does not as known have the idea of the exemplar by looking at which genuine truth is known, for he is known in a general attribute; but he is the reason for knowing as bare exemplar and proper idea of created essence.

But as to how he can be the reason for knowing and not be something known, an example is posited, because just as a ray of the sun is sometimes deflected at an oblique angle, as it were, from its source and sometimes is in direct line – what is seen in a ray deflected in the first way, although the sun be the reason for seeing it yet not as seen in itself, and of that which is seen in a ray in the second way the sun is so the reason for knowing that it is also known. When therefore this uncreated light illumines the intellect in, as it were, a direct line, then it is, as seen, the idea of seeing other things in itself. But the uncreated light illumines our intellect for this wayfaring state in an oblique line, as it were, and therefore it is for our intellect an unseen reason for seeing.

And a way is posited how [the uncreated light] may possess a threefold idea in respect of the act of seeing, namely of the light that stimulates, of the species that affects, of the character or exemplar that configures. And from this the conclusion is further drawn that a special influence is required, because just as that essence is not seen naturally by us in itself so, as that essence is exemplar with respect to some creature, it is naturally not seen (according to Augustine On Seeing God [Epistle 147 to Paulina ch.6 n.18]), for that it is seen is in God’s power: “if he wants, it is seen; if he does not, it is not seen.”

Finally is added that perfect knowledge of the truth is when two exemplar species run together in the mind: one inherent in it, namely the created one, the other flowing into it, namely the uncreated one; and thus do we touch on⁴ the word of perfect truth.