Ordinatio

But there remains a doubt why, if being according to its most common idea be the first object of the intellect, whatever is contained under being cannot naturally move the intellect, as was argued in the first argument for the first question [n.25]; and then it seems that God, and all immaterial substances, could be naturally known by us, which has been denied [nn.56-57]. Indeed, it has been denied about all substances and all essential parts of substances, because it has been said [n.137] that they are not conceived in any quidditative concept save in the concept of being.

I reply. That is assigned to be the first object of a power which is adequate to the power by reason of the power, but not that which is adequate to the power in any state, just as the first object of sight is not posited to be what is adequate to sight existing in a medium illuminated by a candle precisely, but what is of a nature to be adequate to sight of itself as far as it is of the nature of sight. But now, as was proved before [nn.113-119] (against the first opinion about the first object of the intellect, that is, adequate object, which opinion posits the quiddity of a material thing to be the first object), nothing in idea of first object can be made adequate to our intellect from the nature of the power save the most common object [cf. nn.113-119]; however, what is adequate to the intellect for this present state in idea of what moves is the quiddity of a material thing, and therefore the intellect for this present state will not understand other things that are not contained under this first mover of it.

But what is the idea of this state? I reply: a ‘state’ seems to be nothing but a ‘stable permanence’ secured by laws of wisdom. Now it has been secured by those laws that our intellect for this present state understand only the things whose species shine forth in a phantasm – and this either because of penalty for original sin, or because of the natural concord of the powers of the soul in operating, according to which we see that a superior power operates on the same thing that an inferior power operates on, if each is going to have perfect operation. And so in fact it is in our case, that, whatever universal we understand, we have a phantasm actually of a singular instance of it. However, this concordance, which is de facto for this present state, is not of the nature of the intellect as it is intellect; nor even as it is in a body, because then it would have a like concordance in a glorious body, which is false. Wherever this present state comes from, then, whether from the pure will of God, or from punitive justice (which cause Augustine points to in On the Trinity 15 n.50, “What is the cause,” he says, “why you cannot see the light with a fixed gaze unless, surely, it is infirmity? And who made it for you save, surely, iniquity?”) – whether, I say, this is the total cause, or there is some other, at any rate there is, from the fact the intellect is a power and a nature, no first object of it save something common to all intelligibles, even though the first object, adequate to it in moving it, be for this present state the quiddity of a sensible thing.

And if you say, granted that being in common would be the adequate common object for this present state, yet separate substances would not move it save in a greater light than is the natural light of the agent intellect – this reason seems no reason. First, because if such light is required, there is no reason on the part of the intellect, from the fact it is such a power, why it could not now have such light; for it is of itself receptive of such light, otherwise it could, while remaining the same, never receive it. Second, because when some two agents concur for some effect, the more that one of them can supply the place of the other, the more is a lesser perfection required in the other – and sometimes no perfection at all if it supply the whole place of the other; but the object and light concur for affecting the possible intellect; therefore, the more the object is more perfect and more able to supply the place of light, the more does a lesser light suffice, or at any rate a greater light is not required. But the first intelligible is maximally light and maximally able to supply the place of intellectual light; therefore if, as far as concerns its own part, it be conceived under the first object adequate to our intellect for this present state, there would be no defect on the part of the light but that it could move our intellect.