Ordinatio

As to the second article [n.130] I say that from these four reasons [nn.132-135,with n.136 as a fifth complementing the first] it follows – since nothing can be more common than being and being cannot be a common univocal term said in the ‘what’ of all per se intelligibles (because not so said of ultimate differences, nor of their properties) – it follows that nothing is the first object of our intellect because of its commonness in the ‘what’ as to every per se intelligible. And yet, this notwithstanding, I say that the first object of our intellect is being, because in it there comes together a double primacy, namely of commonness and virtuality; for every per se intelligible either essentially includes the idea of being, or is contained virtually or essentially in what essentially includes the idea of being. For all genera and species and individuals, and all the essential parts of genera, and uncreated being, include being quidditatively; but all ultimate differences are included in some of these essentially, and all the properties of being are included in being and in its inferiors virtually. Therefore, the things for which being is not a univocal term asserted in the ‘what’ are included in those for which being is thus univocal. And thus is it plain that being has a primacy of commonness as to the first intelligibles, that is, to the quidditative concepts of genera and species and individuals, and of the essential parts of all of these, and of uncreated being. And being has a primacy of virtuality as to all intelligibles included in the first intelligibles, that is, as to the qualitative concepts of ultimate differences and of proper properties.

But as to the supposition I made [n.137], that there is a commonness of being said in the ‘what’ to all the aforesaid quidditative predicates [n.137] – this is proved about all of them by the two reasons set down in the first question of this distinction [nn.27, 35] to prove being’s commonness to created and uncreated being. So that this may be clear, I go through them in some way: The first as follows: for as to any of the aforesaid quidditative concepts [n.137], it is possible for the intellect to be certain that it is a being while in doubt as to the differences that contract being to such concept;¹ and so the concept of being as it belongs to that concept is other than the lower level concepts that the intellect is doubtful of, and other such as to be included in each of the concepts under it, for the differences that contract them presuppose the same common concept of being that they are contracting.²

The second reason I treat of as follows: just as it was argued [n.35] too that God is not knowable by us naturally unless being is univocal to the created and the uncreated, so can it be argued about substance and accident. For if substance does not immediately move our intellect to an intellection of itself but only the sensible accident does, it follows that we will be able to have no quidditative concept of substance unless some such concept can be abstracted from the concept of an accident; but no such quidditative concept is abstractable from the concept of an accident save the concept of being.

And as to the supposition made about substance [n.139], that it does not move our intellect immediately to an act about itself, the proof of this is because whatever, when present, affects the intellect,³ the absence of it can naturally be known by the intellect when it is not being affected – as appears from On the Soul 2.2.425b21, that sight is perceptive of darkness, namely when light is not present and when therefore sight is not then being affected. Therefore, if the intellect is naturally moved by substance immediately to an act about that substance, the consequence would be that when substance were not present it could be naturally known not to be present, and so it could naturally be known that the substance of bread is not in the consecrated host on the altar, which is manifestly false.

Response: the proof [n.140] rejects intuitive knowledge of substance, because about that is the major true, but not about abstractive knowledge, which does not fail because of a real absence of the object (so neither is absence perceived).

Again, what is assumed about the senses [n.140] is dubious; since the senses do not retain the species in the absence of the object, nor receive the species of darkness, how will they be able to know darkness?

Against the first [n.141]: abstractive cognition necessarily presupposes that, sometimes, the real presence is had of the thing that abstractive cognition, or the species (which is the principle of abstractive cognition), remains over from. He who has only seen the eucharist never had the real presence of the object that is, mediately, the cause of abstractive intellection. Someone else who saw other bread did have it. Therefore, the first will not have cognition abstractive from bread, the second will – which is immediately against experience, because each can experience in himself a like act of understanding bread. If it be said, in shameless denial, ‘suppose the first one afterwards saw other bread, then he will afterwards be capable of the abstractive knowledge of bread that he was not capable of before’ – he experiences the opposite in himself, for he is disposed now in like way as before. Again, he who can know an absent object abstractively can intuitively know it when it is present in existence; and if you know the substance of something known abstractively, then you know it intuitively when it is present; and then the absence etc. [“of it [substance] can naturally be known by the intellect when it is not being affected,” n.140].

To the objection about the senses [n.142]. Darkness is known by argument – not by sight but by the power arguing thus, ‘the eye is looking, and it is not blind, and it is not seeing; so there is darkness’. The fact is plain. When one of the three premises is omitted the conclusion does not follow. None of the three propositions is grasped by sight as knowing it or the conjunction [‘is’] or division [‘is not’] of the extreme terms (because neither is the third one [‘it is not seeing’], which it more seems true of). Because sight does not know its own act when it is present;⁴ therefore it does not know the privation when the act is not present. There is an explanation for Aristotle’s remark that there is sight of darkness [n.140]; because it is privation of sight’s object; therefore it is cause of its not being affected, and so darkness is perceived, not by sight but by another power using the privation of act in the sight for presence.

So no quidditative concept of substance caused by substance immediately is naturally had, but only one that is first caused by or abstracted from accident; and it is only a concept of being.

By the same fact is proved also the proposed thesis [n.139] about the essential parts of substance. For if matter does not move the intellect to an act about matter, and if the substantial form does not either, I ask what simple concept of matter or form will be had in the intellect. If you say that it is some relative concept (as of a part), or a concept per accidens (as of some property of matter or form), I ask what the quidditative concept is to which this per accidens or relative concept is attributed. And if no quidditative concept is had, there will be nothing to which this concept per accidens may be attributed. – But no quidditative concept can be had save one impressed by or abstracted from what moves the intellect, namely by or from an accident; and it will be a concept of being. And so nothing will be known of the essential parts of substance unless being is something common univocal to them and to accidents.

These arguments [nn.27-44, 138-139] do not include the univocity of being said in the ‘what’ as to ultimate differences and properties [nn.132-136]. This is shown about the first argument [nn.27, 138], because: either the intellect is, as to some such [ultimate difference or property], certain that it is a being (doubting whether it is this one or that one), yet not certain that it is a being quidditatively but is as it were by predication per accidens. Or in another way, and better, any such concept is simply simple [n.71], and so cannot be conceived in some respect and be unknown in another respect, as is plain from the Philosopher, Metaphysics 10.10.1051b25-28, about concepts simply simple, that there is no deception about them, as there is about the quiddity of complex ones. This is not to be understood as if simple understanding may be formally deceived about intellection of a quiddity, because there is no true or false in simple intellection. But about a composite quiddity it is possible for simple understanding to be deceived virtually: for if the idea is in itself false, then it includes a false proposition virtually. But what is simply simple does not include virtually, proximately, or formally a false proposition, and so there is no deception about it; for either it is attained totally, or it is not attained, and then it is altogether unknown.⁵ About no simply simple concept then can there be certitude as to something of it and doubt as to something else of it.

Through this too is plain [the response] to the second argument set down above [n.35], because such a simply simple is altogether unknown unless the whole of it in itself be conceived.

In a third way too can response be made to the first argument [sc. in addition to what is said in n.147, about the argument in n.27], that the concept about which there is certitude is different from those about which there is doubt. And if that certain same concept is preserved with either of the doubtful ones, it is truly univocal as it is taken with either of them. But it is not necessary that it be present to both of them in the ‘what’. But either it is so, or it is univocal to them as a determinable to what determine it [sc. as ‘being’ is determinable by the ‘in itself’ or ‘in another’ that determine it to substance or accident] or as a denominable to what denominate it [sc. as ‘being’ is denominable by the ‘undivided’ or ‘divided’ that denominate it as ‘one’ or ‘many’; cf. n.133].

Hence in brief: being is univocal in everything. But in non-simply simple concepts it is univocal when said of them in the ‘what’. In simply simple concepts it is univocal but as determinable or denominable, but not as said of them in the ‘what’, because this includes a contradiction [nn.132-136].

From these points [nn.129-150] is apparent how a double primacy comes together in being, namely the primacy of commonness in the ‘what’ as to all non-simply simple concepts, and the primacy of virtuality (in itself or in what is under it) as to all simply simple concepts. And that this double concurrent primacy suffice for being to be the first object of the intellect (though it have neither of the primacies precisely as to all per se intelligibles) – I make this clear through an example: because if sight were per se cognitive of all properties and differences of color in general and of all species and individuals, and yet color were not included quidditatively in the differences and properties of colors, sight would still have the same first object that it now has, because, by running through them all, nothing else would be adequate to it. So the first object would not then be included in all its per se objects, but every per se object would either include it essentially or would be included in something essentially or virtually including it. And thus would a double primacy come together in it, namely primacy of commonness on its own part and primacy of virtuality in itself or in its inferiors [sc. what fall under it]. And this double primacy would suffice for the idea of the first object of such power.⁶