Ordinatio

In this question there is an opinion which says that the first object of our intellect is the quiddity of a material thing, because a power is proportioned to its object [Thomas Aquinas, ST Ia q.84 a.7, q.85 a.1].

Now there is a triple cognitive power: one is altogether separate from matter both in being and in operating, as the separate intellect; another is conjoined to matter both in being and in operating, as an organic power which perfects matter in being and only operates through the medium of an organ, from which it is not separated in operating as neither in being; another is conjoined to matter in being only, but it does not use a material organ in operating, like our intellect.

And to these powers correspond proportionate absolute objects. For to an altogether separate power, namely the first power, a quiddity altogether separate from matter ought to correspond; to the second an altogether material singular; therefore to the third corresponds the quiddity of a material thing that, although it be in matter, is yet not knowable as it exists in singular matter.

On the contrary: this cannot be sustained by a theologian, for the intellect, while existing as the same power in its nature, will know per se the quiddity of an immaterial substance, as is plain according to the faith about a blessed soul. But a power cannot, while remaining the same, have an act about anything that is not contained under its first object.

But if you say [Aquinas, ST Ia q.12 a.5] it will be raised by the light of glory to the fact of knowing the immaterial substances – on the contrary: the first object of a habit is contained under the first object of the power, or at any does not go beyond it, because if a habit has regard to some object that is not contained under the first object of the power but goes beyond it, then the habit would not be the habit of that power, but would make it to be not that power but another one. There is a confirmation of the reason, because since a power, in the first moment of nature in which it is a power, has such sort of object as first, then by nothing posterior in nature that presupposes the idea of the power can another object become the first object of it. But every habit naturally presupposes the power.

Also, if this opinion [n.110] were posited by the Philosopher [On the Soul III.7.431a16-17, 8.432a7-9, Scotus, Ord. Prol. n.33], namely if he were to posit that our intellect, because of its infirmity among other intellects (namely the divine and the angelic), and because of its conjunction with the imaginative power in its knowing, has an immediate ordering to the phantasm [Aquinas, ST. Ia 1.89 a.1] just as phantasms have an immediate ordering to the common sense, and that therefore just qw imagination is not moved by anything save by what is an object of the common sense (although it know the same object in a different way) – thus would he be saying that our intellect, not only because of some state but from the nature of the power, could not understand anything save what can be abstracted from a phantasm [Aquinas, ST. Ia 1.88 a.1].

Against this there is a threefold argument. First because there is a natural desire in an intellect knowing the effect to know the cause, and in knowing the cause universally there is a natural desire to know it in particular and distinctly; but a natural desire is not for what, from the nature of the desired, is impossible, because then it would be in vain; therefore it is not impossible for the intellect, on the part of the intellect, to know immaterial substance in particular from the fact it knows the material thing that is the effect of it [cf. Aquinas, ibid. q.88 a.2], and so that immaterial thing does not exceed the first object of the intellect.¹

Besides, no power can know any object under an idea more common than is the idea of its first object, – which is plain first by reason, because then the idea of the first object would not be adequate. And it is plain from an example, for sight does not know anything through an idea more common than is the idea of color or light, which is its first object; but the intellect does know something under an idea more common than is the idea of the imaginable [cf. n.115], because it knows something under the idea of being in general, otherwise metaphysics would be no science for our intellect; therefore etc.

Besides, third [n.116] (and it returns as it were to the same as the second [n.117]): whatever is per se known by a cognitive power is either its first object or is contained under its first object; being as being is more common than what is sensible; it is per se understood by us, otherwise metaphysics would not be more a science transcendent than physics; therefore it cannot be that something is the first object of our intellect which is more particular than being, because then being in itself would in no way be understood by us.

Therefore, it seems that something false is supposed in the stated opinion [n.110] about the first object, and this when speaking of the power from the nature of the power. And this is apparent because, if the first question [n.1] be solved by way of this opinion, saying that the sensible quiddity is the first object of the intellect, not God or being [nn.125, 137; Aquinas, ibid. q.88 a.3], the solution is resting on a false foundation.

The congruity too that is adduced for the opinion [nn.110, 112] is no congruity. For potency and object should not be assimilated in mode of being, for they are related as mover and movable and these are related as dissimilar, because related as act and potency. They are, however, proportionate, because this proportion requires unlikeness in the things proportioned, as is commonly the case in a proportion – as is plain of matter and form, part and whole, cause and caused, and the other proportions. So, from the mode of being for such potency cannot be concluded a similar mode of being in the object.

An objection is made against this [n.120; Aquinas ST Ia q.85 a.2], because although a making agent can be dissimilar from its object (which is there passive), yet an operating agent should, in its knowing operation, be assimilated to the object it operates about, which is not there passive but is rather active and assimilating. For everyone was agreed on this point, that knowledge comes to be through assimilation, nor did Aristotle contradict them on this [On the Soul 1.2.404b7-5b17, 3.8.431b29-2a1]. Therefore, here is not only proportion required but also likeness.

Response. It is one thing to speak of the mode of being of the power itself in itself, and it is another thing to speak of it insofar as it is under second act, or in proximate disposition to second act, which is other than the nature of the power. But now it is the case that the knowing power is assimilated to the known object. This is true through its act of knowing, which is a certain likeness of the object, or through the species that disposes it proximately for knowing. But to conclude from this that the very intellect in itself naturally has a mode of being similar to the mode of being of the object, or conversely, is to commit the fallacy of the accident and of figure of speech – just as this inference does not hold: ‘a copper coin is likened to Caesar because it is likened to him through the impressed image, therefore a copper coin has in itself a like mode of being to the mode of being of Caesar’. Or more to the purpose, ‘an eye seeing through the species of the object is likened to the object, therefore sight has a like mode of being to the mode of being of the object’. And so further, just as ‘certain visible things have matter (which is cause of corruption and in potency of contradiction, as are mixed bodies²), certain lack such matter, as the heavenly bodies, therefore a certain sort of vision will exist in such matter, another without such matter’, or ‘a certain sort of organ is such, and another not such’. Or still more to the purpose, ‘an idea in the divine mind, which is a likeness of the object, is immaterial, therefore the stone too of which it is the idea, is immaterial’. Because of that congruity, then, it does not seem congruous to restrict the intellect, from the nature of its power, to the sensible object, so that it not exceed the senses save only in mode of knowing.

In agreement here are Aristotle [n.115] and the article [nn.186-187] that the quiddity of a sensible thing is now [sc. in this present life] the adequate object, understanding ‘sensible’∴ properly, or included essentially or virtually in the sensible thing;∴³ in another way, understanding quiddity as specific quiddity (either remote or included virtually, they each return to the same). Not now, therefore, is the adequate object of it [sc. the intellect] what belongs to the highest sense, because it understands everything included essentially in the sensible thing, up to being (under which difference in no way do the senses know it), and also up to what is included virtually, as relations (which the senses do not know). Nor is it necessary here to make the distinction that only the sensible thing is the object moving; the terminating entity, because included in the sensible thing in some way or other, is not only the term but also mover, at least it moves the intelligence through the proper species in the memory, whether generated by itself or something else.

In disagreement: the object that is adequate, from the nature of the power, to the intellect [nn.186-187] is nothing under being. This, the article [nn.186-187], is against Aristotle. And the first reason here well opposes Thomas [n.113]. But does natural reason really show this? If so, it is much more in contradiction with Aristotle [n.115]; if not I reply to the ‘Against this there is a threefold argument’ [n.116]. To the first [n.116]: every antecedent about ‘a natural desire for a’is more obscure than is a plurality [of natural desires; Metaphysics 10.3.1054a28-29, “multitude is prior in idea to what is indivisible, on account of the senses”], unless it be proved a posteriori. And if it be proved in us (from promptness toward the act of desire), it is not valid unless it be shown that true apprehension precedes the act. The act immediately follows a true apprehension. To the second [n.117]: being, as it is a certain single intelligible, is contained under the sensible quiddity above expounded.∴⁴ The other argument [n.118], about metaphysics, proves that being as ‘this intelligible’ is understood by us; but if it were the first object, this would be according to its whole indifference to everything in which it is saved, not as some single intelligible in itself – and anything at all of that indifference could be understood [cf. Ord. Prol. n.33]. Therefore, it is not the adequate object now [for this present life]. There still remains the major of the second argument and the major of the third [nn.117, 118, first lines, that only the first object, or what falls under it, is known]. They seem evident at this sort of sign⊙.⁵ For being, insofar as it is being, is more common than any other concept of first intention (a second intention is not the first object), and it is understood thus with altogether no contraction being understood along with it, neither a relation to sensibles nor any relation at all.

There is another opinion [Henry of Ghent, Summa a.24, q.8], which posits that God is the first object of the intellect, for which the fundamental reasons are those that were adduced for the first part of the question [nn.108-109], arguing to the main point. And for the same reasons it posits that God is the first object of the will, because God is the reason for willing everything else – just as it has adduced the authority from Augustine On The Trinity VIII ch.6 n9, “Why then do we love another whom we believe to be just, and not the form [of justice] itself, when we see what a just mind is, so that we too can be just? Or is it that, unless we loved this form, we would in no way love him whom we believe to be just, whom we love by this form? But while we are not just, we do not love it enough to have the strength to be just.”

Against this opinion I argue as follows: the natural first object of any power has a natural order to that power; God does not have a natural order to our intellect under the idea of moving it, save perhaps under the idea of some general attribute, as that opinion supposes; therefore God is only the first object under the idea of that attribute, and so that general attribute will be the first object – or, according to the opinion that I held before [n.19] (that God is only understood under the idea of being [nn.56-60]), he will not have a natural order save under such universal concept. But a particular that is only understood in something common is not the first object of the intellect, but rather that common thing is. Therefore etc.

Further, it is certain that God does not have a primacy of adequacy because of being common, so as to be asserted of any object per se intelligible to us. Therefore, if he has some primacy of adequacy this will be because of virtuality, namely because he contains virtually in himself everything per se intelligible. But not for this reason will he be an object adequate to our intellect, because other beings move our intellect by their own virtue, so that the divine essence is not moving our intellect to knowing itself and all other knowables. And as was said before in the question about the subject of theology [Ord. Prol. nn.152, 200-201], the essence of God is for this reason the first object of the divine intellect, because it alone moves the divine intellect to knowing itself and all the other things knowable by that intellect.

For the same reasons [nn.126-127] it is proved that substance, on the ground that all accidents are attributed to it, could not be posited to be the first object of our intellect, for accidents have their own power to move the intellect. Therefore, substance does not move it to itself and to all other things.