Ordinatio

[To the principal arguments] To the arguments of this question [nn.6-8]. As to the first [n.6], I say that the consequence ‘it is the first being, therefore it is the first known’ is not valid, although it does follow that therefore it is the first knowable as far as concerns it in itself. And in this way must the truth be understood that the Philosopher speaks of in Metaphysics 2 [n.6], that [truth] stands for the evidence of the thing in itself, or for its intelligibility on the part of itself. And it is not necessary that as a thing is disposed to entity, so is it disposed to being known, save as to its being known by the intellect that has regard to all intelligibles according to the proper degree of their knowability, of which sort our intellect is not but knows sensibles most of all.

To the second [n.7] I say that the consequence is not valid, save in precise causes. The point is plain in an example: if an eclipse is knowable from a double cause through two powers, namely by the senses and by the intellect possessing a demonstration, it is never most perfectly known unless the principle of demonstration is most perfectly known. But it does not follow that therefore it is never known unless the principle of demonstration is known, for an eclipse has another cause by which it can be known, because it is not the precise cause; however, it cannot be known by the other cause as perfectly as by this cause, because this cause, namely the demonstration whereby it is known by the intellect, is a more perfect cause of knowledge of it than the other cause by which it can be known, namely by the senses.¹

So it is in the issue at hand. Any creature has, besides the cause of the knowledge of it which is the divine essence, another cause of that knowledge, namely its own essence, which is of a nature to generate knowledge of itself. But never is a thing through its own motion [on the intellect] as perfectly known as it is through the divine essence. Therefore, when arguing from effect to cause, this does not follow: ‘if most perfectly then most perfectly, therefore if simply then simply’. For the ‘most perfectly’ that is taken can be the precise cause, which is ‘most perfectly’ in genus; but the ‘simply’ that is taken is not the precise cause of the effect in genus.

To the third [n.8] I say that the major is true when speaking of the primacy of perfection but not of the primacy of adequacy. An example: vision of something is never under the idea of color precisely such that it is not under the idea of this or that color, as of white or black, save in the case of what is seen from a remote distance, or imperfectly. Now vision of something under the idea of color is precisely not the most perfect vision but the most imperfect. The fact therefore that the most perfect operation of a power is about its first object is true – not first in adequacy but first in perfection, namely because it is the most perfect of the things contained under the first adequate object. And therefore does the Philosopher say, Ethics 10.7.1178a5-6, that perfect delight is in an operation about the best of the objects that fall under the power, that is, about the best object contained under the object adequate to the power. This reason, therefore, proves that God is the first object, that is, the most perfect object (which I concede), but not the first adequate object – about which in the next question [nn.108-121].

[To the other arguments] As to what the opinion [n.22] says in the first member in response to the first question (about the indeterminate negatively and privatively), if the understanding is about the primacy of origin, I contradicted it in the first member of the second question [nn.73-78].

And when it is argued that the indeterminate negatively is more indeterminate than the indeterminate privatively [nn.80-81] I deny it, when speaking of indeterminacy as to the issue at hand (namely the issue of what sort it is in first understanding), because the ‘indeterminate negatively’ is the singular, and such is not more indeterminate than the ‘indeterminate privatively’. Now negative indetermination, namely repugnance to being determined, although it is in some way greater than privative indetermination, yet such indeterminate does not occur first to the intellect, because such is not a confused but a most distinct knowable, as was said before [n.80].

Also, what [Henry] argues in the second member [n.22], that God is the last thing known by rational knowledge, because first is known that from which the abstraction is made – this is not true save by positing that abstraction is a sort of discursive reasoning from one known thing to another, such that that from which the abstraction is made is known and the other is known through it. And if Henry do so understand abstraction, such knowledge by abstraction is not the first knowledge of the abstracted thing. For if God is thus known through a creature, it is necessary first to have some concept of God to which the discourse proceeds, because discursive reasoning presupposes some concept of the term to which it goes. Either then the proposition that Henry takes is false, or, if it is true, it proves that God is pre-known before he is known through reason, which perhaps he would concede [Henry, Summa a.21 q.2].

Now as to what he adds, that God as he the first thing naturally known is not distinct from other things, because he is not conceived in anything in which he is discriminated from a creature [n.23] – in this he seems to contradict himself. For he first said that God is the first thing known naturally by the intellect as he is the indeterminate negatively [n.22], and he says that in this concept he is distinct from the creature, because this does not belong to the creature [n.21].