Ordinatio

In the first question [n.1] the distinction should not be drawn that God can be known negatively or affirmatively [Alexander of Hales, ST I q.2 n.1 ch.2], because negation cannot be known save through affirmation, On Interpretation 14.24b3-4, Metaphysics 4.4.1008a17-18. Plain too is that we do not know any negations about God save through the affirmations by which we remove other incompossible things from those affirmations,. Also, we do not supremely love negations. Likewise too, a negation is conceived either precisely or as said of something. If a negation is conceived precisely, as ‘non-stone’, this belongs as equally to nothing as to God, because a pure negation is said of being and of non-being; therefore, God is no more understood in this than nothing is or a chimaera. If it is understood as a negation said of something, then, about the underlying concept that this negation is understood to be true of, I ask the question: will it be an affirmative concept or a negative one? If it is affirmative then the conclusion is gained. If negative I ask the question as before: is the negation conceived either precisely or as said of something? If in the first way this belongs as equally to nothing as to God; if said of something, I ask as before. And however far the process in negations goes, either God would not be understood more than nothing is, or a stand will be made at some affirmative concept that is first.

Nor, second, should a distinction be made about knowledge what a thing is and knowledge whether it is [Henry of Ghent, Summa a.24 q.3], because in the matter at hand I am looking for a simple concept, the ‘being’ of which may be known by an act of the intellect combining and dividing. For I never know of something whether it is if I have no concept of the term about which I know the ‘is’; and the question being asked here is about that concept.

Nor third should a distinction about ‘whether it is’ be drawn as it is a question about the truth of a proposition or as it is a question about the being of God [Henry of Ghent, ibid.]; because if there can be a question about the truth of a proposition in which the ‘is’ serves as predicate of a subject, one must, in order to conceive the truth of the proposition or question, first conceive the terms of the question; and about the simple concept of that subject, whether it is possible, is the question now being asked.

Nor, fourth, is it valid to draw a distinction between a natural concept and a supernatural concept [Henry of Ghent, ibid. and q.2], because the question is about the natural concept.

Nor, fifth, is it valid to draw a distinction about ‘naturally’ by speaking of nature absolutely or of nature for this present state [Bonaventure, Sent. I d.3 p.1 a.1 q.1; Henry of Ghent, ibid., q.6], because the question is precisely about knowledge for this present state.

Nor, sixth, is it of value to draw a distinction about knowledge of God in creatures or in himself [Alexander of Hales, ST I tr. Intro. q.2 m.2 ch.2], because if knowledge be obtained through a creature such that discursive knowledge begin from the creature, I ask in what term does the knowledge come to rest? If in God in himself, I have the intended conclusion, because I am asking for that concept of God in himself. If it does not come to rest in God in himself but in a creature, then the same thing will be the end and the beginning of the discursive reasoning, and so no knowledge will be had of God – at any rate the intellect is not in the final term of discursive reasoning as long as it rests in some object that is the beginning of the discourse.

About the knowledge of God ‘whether he is’ and ‘what he is’ (Godfrey of Fontaines in Quodlibet 7.11 rejects Henry of Ghent [ibid., a.22 q.4] on the distinction between ‘whether he is’, and that knowledge ‘what he is’ be possible), note: the ‘what’ which is spoken of in the name is the ‘what’ which is of the thing, and it is inclusive of ‘whether it is’, because, Metaphysics 4.7.1012a23-24, “the idea of which the name is the sign is the definition.” However, the ‘what is’ of the name is more common than the ‘is’ and the ‘what’ of the thing, because being signified by the name belongs to more things than ‘is’ does; but when they are conjoined they are the same, just as not every color is whiteness yet the color that is whiteness is the same as whiteness. The example, however, is not altogether similar, because color is taken from some partial perfection. Not so here, but the whole ‘what’ has a relation to the name as to a sign, which whole has a relation to the thing as quiddity to supposit. But about the same ‘what’ I know the first relation before the second.¹ Nor only in this is there an order to these knowings (knowing of the same simple concept one relation before another), but also in this, that a simple concept is somehow different in many cases, as in definitions, because the first is confused, the second distinct. For the first either does not explain the parts of the concept, or if it does, not distinctly under compossibility or non-compossibility; the second does explain the compossiblity, and thereby that the idea is true and is from this ‘what’ that expresses the ‘what it is’ of a possible thing.²

Second [sc. second to n.16], note that the subject of the first science is at the same time already known. What is said by the name is both ‘if it is’ and ‘what it is’, because no science asks about its first subject ‘if it is’ or ‘what it is’ [Metaphysics 7.1.1028a36-b2].³ Therefore either this is not a question at all, or only in a prior science; no science is prior to the first science; therefore about its first subject there is in no way a question ‘if it is’ or ‘what it is’. Therefore the concept is simply simple, so being is.⁴ Because a ‘being per se’ can be doubted as to the compossibility of the parts of the concept⁵ (to this extent too, because it is what is not God, because no idea simply simple is had of God that distinguishes him from other things), therefore about any such idea there is a question ‘if it is’ and a demonstration that the idea of it is not in itself false; therefore according to no concept possible for a wayfarer is God the first subject of metaphysics. Again, whatever is proved of God is contained virtually in the idea of being, because just as a convertible simple property is included first in the subject, so too is a disjunct property; therefore in the subject there is included first that some part of a disjunct property belongs to some being.⁶ Therefore being first includes virtually this proposition ‘some being is first’, therefore both the ‘if it is’ and the ‘what it is’ of this idea. The first being⁷ is included first in being, therefore also whatever is concluded about the first being through the idea of this totality, or through the idea of being. Therefore metaphysics is theology finally and principally, because just as it is more principally about substance than about accident, Metaphysics 7.1.1028a18-19, so (by a further analogy) is it more principally about God; because always what is first in the order of perfection is included in the idea of the first subject – particularly the part of a disjunctive property that is simply more perfect.⁸

On the contrary: no knowledge simply more perfect is included virtually in less perfect knowledge, but conversely; therefore, no knowledge naturally possible for the wayfarer about God is more perfect than the concept of being, therefore than the speculation wherein is happiness [cf. n.5]. If this reasoning is probative, then [it proves] that which the arguments for the first side [nn.1-4] suppose about a non-simple concept. It is denied according to Henry; rather a proper and simple concept of God [is asserted], through motion of the effect. But then being is not common but analogous, and so the first science of being will be about the first being to which everything is attributed.

The sense, then, of the question [n.1] is this, whether the intellect of the wayfarer could naturally have some simple concept, in which simple concept God is conceived.