Ordinatio

1. The question¹ is whether it is necessary for man in this present state for some special doctrine, namely one which he could not reach by the natural light of the intellect, to be supernaturally inspired.² And that it is not, I argue thus: Every³ power having something common for first object naturally has power for whatever is contained under that object as for the per se natural object. This is proved by an example about the first object of sight and about the other things contained under it, and thus by induction in the case of other first objects and powers. It is also proved by reason, because the first object is said to be that which is equal to the power; but if the idea of it, namely of the first object, were in something about which the power could not act, the power would not be equal to it but the object would exceed the power. The major premise, then, is plain. But the first natural object of our intellect is being insofar as it is being; therefore our intellect is naturally able to act about any being whatever, and thus about any intelligible non-being, because the negation is known through the affirmation [Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 1.25.86b34-35, On Interpretation 2.2.24b3, Metaphysics 4.4.1008a17-18]. Therefore, etc. The proof of the minor is in Avicenna Metaphysics 1.6, 72rb: “Being and thing are imprinted in the soul on first impression, and these cannot be made manifest by other things;” but if something other than them were the first object, they could be made manifest by the idea of that something other; but this is impossible.⁴

2. Further,⁵ sense does not need, for this present state, any supernatural cognition; therefore, neither does the intellect. The antecedent is plain. The proof of the consequence: “Nature does not fail in necessary things,” On the Soul, 3.9.432b21-22; but if it does not fail in things that are imperfect, much more does it not fail in those that are perfect; therefore if it does not fail in the inferior powers as to what is necessary for them to accomplish their acts and attain their end, much more does it not fail in what is necessary for the higher power to attain its act and end. Therefore etc.

3. Further, if some such doctrine be necessary, this is because the power in its pure natural state is not proportionate to the knowable object as such; therefore, it is necessary that by something other than itself it be made proportionate to it. That something other is either natural or supernatural; if natural then the whole thing is disproportionate to the prime object; if supernatural, then the power is disproportionate to it, and thus it must be made proportionate by something else, and so on ad infinitum. Therefore, since it is impossible to proceed to infinity, Metaphysics 2.2.994a1-b31, one must stop at the first by saying that the intellective power is proportionate to everything knowable according to every way of being knowable. Therefore, etc.

4. To the opposite: 2 Timothy 3.16: “All doctrine divinely inspired is useful for reproof…” In addition, in Baruch 3.31-32 it is said of wisdom: “There is none who could know her ways, but he who knows all things knows her;” therefore no one else can have wisdom except from him who knows all things. This, then, as to the necessity for it. But about the fact he subjoins, v.37: “He handed her on to Jacob his son and to Israel his beloved,” as to the Old Testament; and then follows, v.38: “After this he is seen on earth and conversed with men,” as to the New Testament.

5. On this question there seems to be a controversy between philosophers and theologians. And the philosophers maintain the perfection of nature and deny a supernatural perfection; but the theologians acknowledge a defect of nature and a necessity of grace and a supernatural perfection.⁶

The philosopher, then, would say, that there is no supernatural knowledge necessary for man in this present state, but that he could acquire all knowledge necessary for himself from the action of natural causes. Adduced for this are the authority and reasoning together of the Philosopher from diverse places.

6. First, On the Soul 3.5.430a14-15, where he says that “the agent intellect is that whereby it exists for making all things and the possible intellect that whereby it exists for becoming all things.” From this I argue as follows:¹ when that which is naturally active and that which is naturally passive come together and are not impeded, action necessarily follows [Averroes, Metaphysics II com.1, On the Soul III com.36], because it does not essentially depend save on these as on prior causes; but the active element with respect to all intelligibles is the agent intellect, and the passive element is the possible intellect, and these are naturally in the soul and are not impeded. The thing is plain. Therefore, by the natural virtue of these can the act of understanding ensue with respect to any intelligible whatever.

7. There is a confirmation by reason: to every natural passive power there corresponds something naturally active, otherwise the passive power would be vain in nature if by nothing in nature could it be reduced to act; but the possible intellect is the passive power with respect to any intelligible whatever; so to it there corresponds some natural active power [Aristotle, On the Soul 3.5.430a1014, Metaphysics 5.12.1019a15-b15, On the Heaven 1.4.271a32-33; Averroes, Metaphysics II com.1]. The proposed conclusion then follows. The minor is plain, because the possible intellect naturally desires knowledge of any knowable thing whatever; it is also naturally perfected by any knowledge whatever; therefore, it is naturally receptive of any intellection whatever.

8. In addition,² in Metaphysics 6.1.1026a18-19, there is a distinction of the speculative habit into the mathematical, the physical, and the metaphysical; and from the proof of this in the same place [ibid. 1025b3-26a19] it does not seem possible for there to be more habits that are speculative, because in these habits the whole of being, both in itself and in its parts, is considered. But just as there could not be any speculative science other than these, so neither could there be any other practical science than the acquired active and productive ones. Therefore, the acquired practical sciences are sufficient for perfecting the practical intellect, and the acquired theoretical sciences sufficient for perfecting the speculative intellect.

9. In addition,³ a thing naturally able to understand a principle is naturally able to know the conclusions contained in the principle. I prove this conclusion from the fact that knowledge of conclusions depends only on understanding of the principle and on deduction of the conclusions from the principle, as is plain from the definition of ‘know’ in Posterior Analytics 1.2.71b9-12; but a deduction is manifest of itself, as is plain from the definition of a perfect syllogism, Prior Analytics 1.1.24b22-24, because “it is in need of nothing so as to be or appear clearly necessary;” therefore if the principles are understood, everything is had that is necessary for knowledge of the conclusion. And thus is the major plain.

10. But we naturally understand first principles, in which all the conclusions are virtually contained; therefore, we can naturally know all knowable conclusions. Proof of the first part of the minor: because the terms of first principles are the most common terms, therefore we can naturally understand them, because from Physics 1.1.184a21-22 the most common things are understood first;⁴ “but we know and understand the principles insofar as we know the terms,” Posterior Analytics 1.3.72b23-25; therefore, we can naturally know the first principles.

11. Proof of the second part of the minor: because the terms of first principles are the most common, therefore, when they are distributed, they are distributed for all the concepts under them; now such terms are taken universally in the first principles and thus they extend themselves to all the particular concepts, and consequently to the extreme terms of all special conclusions.⁵

12. Against this position one can argue in three ways. Note: nothing supernatural can be shown by natural reason to exist in the wayfarer, or to be necessarily required for his perfection; nor even can one who has [something supernatural] know that it is in him. Therefore, it is impossible here to use natural reason against Aristotle: if it be argued from matters of belief, it is not a reason against the philosopher, because he will not concede the believed premise. Hence these reasons here made against him have the other premise as something believed or as proved from something believed; therefore, they are only theological persuasions, from things believed to something believed.

13. [First principal reason] – First as follows: everything that acts through knowledge has need of distinct knowledge of its end.¹ I prove this because everything that acts for an end acts from desire of the end;² everything that per se acts, acts for an end;³ therefore everything that per se acts in its own way desires the end. Therefore, just as for a natural agent there needs to be desire of the end for which it must act, so for what acts by knowledge (because it too is a per se agent, from Physics 2.5.196b17-22) there needs to be desire of the end for which it must act.⁴ The major then is plain. But man cannot from his natural powers distinctly know his end; therefore some supernatural knowledge of it is necessary for him.⁵

14. The minor is plain: first, because the Philosopher, following natural reason, either sets down that happiness is perfect in the acquired knowledge of separate substances, as he seems to mean in Ethics (1.6.1097b22-98a20, 10.7.1177a12-b1, 10.8.1178b7-32, 10.9.1179a22-32), or if he does not determinately assert that it is the supreme perfection possible for us, he does not conclude anything else by natural reason, such that, by relying on natural reason alone, he will either err about the end in particular or remain in doubt about it;⁶ hence in Ethics 1.10.1099b11-13 he doubtfully says “if there is any gift from the gods, it is reasonable that happiness is.”⁷

15. Secondly the same minor is proved through reason, because of no substance is the proper end known by us save from the acts of it manifest to us from which is shown that such end is fitting for such nature;⁸ no acts do we experience or know to be present in our nature for this present state from which we may know that the vision of separate substances is fitting for us; therefore we cannot naturally know distinctly that that end is fitting for our nature.⁹

16. This at least is certain, that certain conditions of the end, on account of which it is more desirable and more fervently to be inquired about, cannot be determinately known by natural reason. For even if it were granted that reason was sufficient to prove that the naked vision and enjoyment of God is the end of man, yet the conclusion will not follow that these belong in perpetuity to the man perfect in soul and body, as will be said in 4 d.43 q.2 n.32. And yet the perpetuity of a good of this sort is a condition that renders the end more desirable than if it were transitory. For to obtain this good in a perfect nature is more desirable than to obtain it in a separated soul, as is plain from Augustine The Literal Meaning of Genesis bk. 12. ch. 35 n.68. These and the like conditions of the end, therefore, must be known for efficaciously inquiring into the end, and yet natural reason is not sufficient for them; therefore, a doctrine delivered supernaturally is required.

17. [Second Principal Reason] – Secondly as follows:¹⁰ every knower acting for an end must have knowledge how and in what way such an end may be acquired; and he must also have knowledge of all the things that are necessary for the end; and third he must have knowledge that all those things are sufficient for such an end. The first is plain, because if he not know how and in what way the end may be acquired, he will not know how to dispose himself for obtaining it. The second is proved because if he not know everything necessary for the end, he could, because of ignorance of some act necessary for it, fail of the end. If too, as to the third, the necessary things are not known to be sufficient, he will, from doubt that he may be ignorant of something necessary, not pursue what is necessary in an effective way.

18. But the wayfarer cannot know these three conditions by natural reason. The proof of the first is because beatitude is conferred as a reward for the merits that God accepts as worthy of such a reward, and consequently it does not follow by natural necessity on acts of ours of any sort, but is given contingently by God when he accepts some acts in their ordering to him as meritorious.¹¹ This fact is not naturally knowable, as it seems, because here too the philosophers erred, laying down that everything that is from God immediately is from him necessarily [cf. Henry of Ghent, Summa a.29 q.5, q.30q4 ad 1]. The other two members [n.17], at any rate, are manifest: for the acceptation of the divine will, namely as contingently accepting such and such things worthy of eternal life and also that they are sufficient, cannot be known by natural reason; it depends merely on the divine will about things it is contingently related to; therefore, etc.

19. [Instances against the two Principal Reasons] – Against these two reasons objection is made. Against the first [nn.13-16] as follows: every created nature essentially depends on any of its per se causes, and because of such dependence the cause can be known from knowing the caused thing by a demonstration ‘that’,¹² and any per se cause of it can be known; therefore, since the nature of man is naturally knowable to man, because it is not disproportionate with his cognitive power, the conclusion follows that from knowledge of that nature could the end of that nature be naturally known.¹³

20. Confirmation of the reason: for if from knowledge of a lower nature the end of it is known, no less is this possible in the matter at hand, because there is no lesser dependence in the proposed case of a finite thing on its end than in the case of other things.¹⁴

21. From this reason too it seems that the proposition is false: ‘the end of a substance is not known save from its acts’,¹⁵ which was assumed in the proof of the minor, because from the knowledge of a nature in itself the end of it can be known by a ‘demonstration-that’.

22. But if it be said that the reason concludes that man can naturally know his natural end but not his supernatural end, on the contrary Augustine says, On Predestination of the Saints ch.5 n.10: “Being able to have faith, like being able to have charity, belongs to the nature of men, although having faith, like having charity, belongs to the grace of the faithful.” If, therefore, the nature of man is naturally knowable to man, then that ability as it belongs to such a nature is also naturally knowable and consequently such a nature’s orderability to the end for which faith and charity dispose it.

23. Again, man naturally desires the end which you say is supernatural; therefore, he is naturally ordered to that end;¹⁶ therefore from such ordering can that end can be concluded as from knowledge of the nature ordered to it.

24. Again, it is naturally knowable that the first object of the intellect is being, according to Avicenna, Metaphysics 1.6 (72rb), and it is naturally knowable that the idea of being is most perfectly saved in God; but the end of every power is the best of the things that are contained under its first object, because in that alone is there perfect rest and delight, from Ethics 10.4.1174b14-23; therefore it is naturally knowable that man, according to his intellect, is ordered to God as to his end.

25. The reason is confirmed, because to him to whom some power is naturally knowable, what is its first object is naturally knowable; and, further, he can know what the nature of that first object is saved in, and that the most perfect such thing is the end of the power; now the mind is known to itself, according to Augustine On the Trinity bk.11 chs.11-12, nn.16, 18; therefore what is its first object is known to it. And it knows that God is not exceeded by the idea of the first object, because then God would in no way be intelligible by the mind; therefore it knows that God is the best thing in which the idea of its object is realized, and so it knows him to be the end of the power.

26. Against the second reason [nn.17-18] the argument runs as follows: if through one extreme the other extreme is known, then the means in between are known; but necessary for obtaining the end are the means between the nature and the obtaining of its end; therefore, since, according to what was proved above [n.19], the end can be known from knowledge of the nature, it seems that similarly the means necessary for the end can be known.

27. The reason is confirmed: for it thus seems that the connection of beings to the end is as necessary in the matter at hand as it is in other cases; but, on account of this sort of connection in other cases, other things are known from the end, as that from the idea of health is deduced that such and such things are required for health; therefore etc.

28. [Response to the Instances] – To the first of these instances [nn.19-21] I say that, although it proceeds from the end which is the final cause and not from the end that must be attained by operation – the distinction between these ends will be stated below (1 d.1 p.1 q.1 n.5) – yet with a single response it can be said to it, and to the next one from Augustine, and to the third one from the power and the first object, that all of them accept that our nature or intellective power is naturally knowable to us; but this is false under the proper and special idea under which our nature or intellective power is ordered to this sort of end, and under which it is capable of consummate grace, and under which it has God for most perfect object. For our soul and our nature are only known by us in this present state under some general idea that is capable of being abstracted from sensible things, as will appear below in 1 d.3 p.1 q.1 n.24. And according to such a general idea it does not fittingly belong to them to be ordered to that end, or to be capable of receiving grace, or to have God for most perfect object.

29. Next to the form. When it is said [n.19] that, from a being that is for an end, the end can be demonstrated by a ‘demonstration-that’, I say that it is not true unless the being that is for an end is known under the proper idea under which it has that end. In this way is the minor is. – And when proof is given by proportion [n.19], I say that the mind, although it is the same as itself, is yet not for this present state proportional to itself as object save according to the general ideas that can be abstracted from sensible things.

30. To the confirmation [n.20] I say that the proper ends of other substances are not known either, namely the ends that belong to them according to their proper ideas, unless some acts be manifest from which the order of those substances to such end may be deduced.

31. And from this the answer is plain to what is added [n.21] against the proof of the minor, that the proposition ‘the proper end of a substance is not known to us save by a manifest act of it’ [n.15] is not false; for the proposition does not take it that the end could not be known in another way. For it is very true that, if a substance were known under its proper nature, from it as thus known could the per se cause of it be known. But no substance is thus known to us now, and therefore we can deduce now no end proper to a substance save from an evident act of that substance as it is known universally and confusedly. Both these ways are lacking in the proposed case; but the proof of the minor [n.15] touches on one of them, about ignorance of the act, by supposing the other, namely about ignorance of the nature in itself.

32. To the second instance from Augustine [n.22] I say that the power to have charity, as it is a disposition with respect to God in himself under the proper idea of loving, belongs to man’s nature according to a special idea, not one common to himself and sensible things; therefore that potentiality is not naturally knowable in man’s present state, just as neither is man known under the idea under which this power is his. Thus do I reply to the instance insofar as it can be adduced for the principal conclusion [nn.19-20], namely the one opposed to the minor of the first reason [nn.14-15]. But insofar as it is adduced against the response about supernatural and natural end [n.22] my reply is: I concede that God is the natural end of man, but as not to be attained naturally but supernaturally. And this is proved by the subsequent reason about natural desire [n.23], which I concede.

33. To the other argument [n.24], that must be denied which it assumes, namely that being is naturally known to be the first object of our intellect, and this according to the whole indifference of being to sensible and non-sensible things, and that this does Avicenna say, that it is naturally known. For he has intermingled his sect – which was the sect of Mohammed – with philosophical matters, and some things he said as philosophical and proved by reason, others as consonant with his sect; hence he expressly posits in his Metaphysics 9.7 (107ra)¹⁷ that the separated soul knows immaterial substance in itself, and therefore under the first object of the intellect he had to posit that immaterial substance was included. Not so Aristotle [On the Soul 3.6.430b27-29; 7.431a14-17, b2; 8.432a8-9], but according to him the first object of our intellect is or seems to be sensible quiddity, and this either sensible in itself or in its inferior; and this is the quiddity that is abstractable from sensible things.¹⁸

34. But as to what is said in confirmation of the reason from Augustine [n.25] my reply is: I say that the statement of Augustine must be understood of first act, which act is altogether sufficient of itself as to second act but is now however impeded; and because of this impediment the second act is not now elicited from the first act. But of this more below [1 d.3 p.1 q.3 nn.24-25].

35. If it be objected to this that man in the state of nature when it was instituted could know his nature, therefore also the end of his nature, from the first reason’s deduction [n.19]; therefore, that knowledge is not supernatural.

36. Again, against the response to the final reason [n.33]: if then it is not known what is the first object of the intellect (because the intellect is not known under every proper idea under which it regards such object), then it cannot be known of everything whatever that it is intelligible, because the power is not known under every proper idea under which it has regard to everything whatever as intelligible object.

37. I reply: to the first objection [n.35] it would need to be said what sort man’s knowledge was when he was instituted, which may be deferred to another place [Ord. 4 d.1 p.2 q.2 n.7]. However at least in respect of the wayfarer in this present state the said knowledge is supernatural, because exceeding his natural faculty; natural, I say, in the sense of according to the state of fallen nature.

38. To the second [n.36] I concede that knowledge of the soul, or of any power of it, is not now had so distinctly that from it could be known that some intelligible object correspond to it; but we deduce from the act itself which we experience that the power and nature of which it is the act regard that for object which we perceive to be attained by the act, such that we do not deduce the object of the power from knowledge of the power in itself but from knowledge of the act we experience. But we can have neither knowledge of a supernatural object; and so both ways of knowing the proper end of that nature are there lacking.

39. To the argument [n.26] against the second reason, it is plain that it supposes something [n.19] already denied [nn.28-29]. – To the confirmation [n.27] of the reason I say that when the end naturally follows the things that are for the end, and naturally requires them in advance, then the things that are for the end can be deduced from the end; here, however, there is no natural attainment but only acceptation by the divine will rewarding these merits as worthy of such end.

40. [Third Principal Reason] – Again,¹⁹ thirdly argument is made against the opinion principally of the philosophers. Metaphysics 6.1.1026a21-23: the knowledge of separate substances is noblest because it is about the noblest genus; therefore knowledge of the things that are proper to them is most noble and necessary, for the things proper to them are more perfect knowables than the things in which they agree with sensibles. But we cannot know those properties from pure natural powers alone. First, because if such properties were handed on in some science capable now of being found, it would be in the science of metaphysics; but metaphysics about the proper features of those separate substances cannot naturally be had by us, as is plain.²⁰ And this is what the Philosopher says in Metaphysics 1.2.982a8-10, that the wise man must know all things in some way and not in particular; and he subjoins: “For he who knows the universals knows in some way all the things under them.” He there calls the metaphysician ‘the wise man’, just as he there calls metaphysics ‘wisdom’.

41. Second, I prove the same because those properties are not known by knowledge ‘because of what’ unless the proper subjects are known, which alone include such ‘because of whats’; but their proper subjects are not naturally knowable to us; therefore etc. Nor do we know their properties by a ‘demonstration-why’ and from the effects. The proof of this: for the effects either leave the intellect in doubt as to these properties, or lead it away into error. And this is clear from the properties of the first immaterial substance in itself; for a property of it is that it is communicable to three [persons]; but the effects do not show this property, because they do not come from it insofar as it is three. And if an argument from effects to cause is made, the effects lead rather to the opposite and to error, because in no effect is there found one nature save in one supposit. Also a property of this nature as to what is outside it is to cause contingently; and the effects lead rather to the opposite of this, to error, as is plain from the opinion of the philosophers positing that the first thing necessarily causes whatever it causes.²¹ About the properties too of other substances the same is plain, because the effects, according to the philosophers, lead rather to the eternity and necessity of these properties than to their contingency and newness. Likewise, the philosophers seem also to conclude from the celestial motions that the number of those separate substances is in accord with the number of the celestial motions. Likewise, that these substances are naturally blessed and incapable of sin. All which things are absurd.²²

42. [Instance against the Third Principal Reason] – Against this reason I argue that all the necessary properties of separate substances known now to us by faith or common revelation, could be known by natural knowledge. And this as follows:²³ the necessary things of which we naturally know the terms we can also naturally comprehend; but of all revealed necessary things we naturally know the terms; therefore etc.

43. Proof of the major: those necessary things are either mediate or immediate; if they are immediate, then they are known when the terms are known, Posterior Analytics 1.3.72b23-25; if they are mediate, therefore when we are able to know the extremes we are able to conceive the mean between them. And by conjoining the mean with each extreme, we get either mediate or immediate premises; if immediate, the same as before; if mediate, the process continues by knowing the mean between the extremes and by conjoining it with the extremes, until we come to immediates. So at length we will come down to immediate necessaries that we understand from the terms, from which all the mediate necessaries follow; therefore we will be able naturally to know the mediates through the immediates.

44. Proof of the principal minor, because having and not having faith, being contradictories to each other, are not contradictory in words only but in concepts, as is plain when a philosopher and a theologian contradict each other over this proposition, ‘God is triune,’ where not only the same name but the same concept one denies and the other affirms; therefore every simple concept that the former has the latter has.

45. [Response to the Instance] – To this I reply: About separate substances there are some immediate truths. I take then some such first and immediate truth, and let it be a. In it are included many mediate truths, as for instance all those that particularly assert things common to the predicate of things common to the subject; let them be called b, c. The true mediate assertions do not have evidence save from something immediate. Therefore, they are not of a nature to be known save from this understood immediate. If therefore some intellect could understand the terms in b and combine them with each other, but could not understand the terms in a nor consequently a itself, b will be for his intellect a neutral proposition, because it will not be known either from itself or from an immediate proposition because that, by supposition, is not known. Such is how it is with us, because we have certain common concepts about material and immaterial substances, and we can combine them with each other; but these complexes are not evident save from the true immediate propositions that are about the quiddities under their proper and special idea, under which idea we do not conceive those quiddities, and so neither do we know those general truths of general concepts.

46. An example: if it were impossible for someone to conceive a triangle in its proper idea, yet he could abstract from a quadrilateral the idea of a figure and conceive it, still it would be impossible for him to conceive primacy as it is a proper quality of triangle, because it is not in this way conceived save as it is abstracted from triangle; however he could abstract primacy from other primacies, as for instance in numbers. Although this intellect could form this composite ‘some figure is first’, because it can apprehend its terms, yet the composite when formed will be neutral for it, because this is a mediate one, included in this immediate one ‘the triangle is thus first’; and because he cannot understand this immediate one, because neither can he understand its terms, therefore he cannot know the mediate proposition, which only has its evidence from this immediate one.

47. Hereby to the argument [n.42]: I deny the major; to the proof [n.43] I say that those necessary things are mediate. – And when you say ‘therefore we can conceive the mean between the extremes’, I deny the consequence, because the mean between the extremes is sometimes essentially ordered, as for example the ‘what it is’ of one extreme or a prior property in respect of a later property; and such a thing is the middle for universally proving the extreme of the extreme. I concede therefore that whoever can understand the extremes can understand such a mean between the extremes, because the understanding of it is included in one of the extremes, or is the same as one of the extremes. But if the mean be a particular, contained under one of the extremes and not essentially between the extremes, then it is not necessary that he who can understand the general extremes can conceive the mean particular to the extremes. So it is here. For a whatness under its proper and particular idea having some property immediately inhering in it is a mean inferior to the common concept of which is asserted the property in its common concept; and so it is not a mean for universally proving the property of the common term, but only particularly. This is plain in the example [n.46], because it is not necessary that he who is able to conceive figure in general and primacy in general could conceive triangle in particular, because triangle is the mean, contained under ‘figure’; a mean, I say, for proving primacy of the figure in particular.

48. This third reason [n.40] is especially conclusive about the first immaterial substance, because knowledge of it as beatific object is above all necessary. And then the response to the objection [n.42] against it: namely it supposes that we naturally do not now conceive God save in a concept common to him and to sensibles, which point will be expounded below, in 1 d.3 p.1 q.1 nn.5-10. If also this supposition be denied, one must still say that the concept that can be made about God by virtue of the creature is imperfect; but the concept that would be made by virtue of the very essence in itself would be perfect. Just as it was said then of general and special concept [n.47], so let it be said in another way of perfect and imperfect concept.

49. [Fourth Principal Reason]. Fourth it is argued thus: what is ordered to some end for which it is not disposed must be moved little by little toward the disposition for that end; man is ordered to a supernatural end for which he is of himself indisposed; therefore, he needs to be disposed little by little to the having of that end. This is done through some supernatural imperfect knowledge of the sort that is posited as necessary; therefore etc.

50. But if it be objected that a perfect agent can at once remove the imperfection and at once act, I reply that if it were possible by absolute power, yet it is more perfect to communicate an activity to the creature as regard obtaining its own perfection than not to communicate it; now man can have some activity with respect to his own final perfection; therefore it is more perfect that this be communicated to him, which is not possible without some imperfect knowledge that precedes the perfect knowledge toward which he is finally ordered.

51. [Fifth Principal Reason]. Fifth, it is argued thus: every agent using an instrument in its acting has, through that instrument, no power for any action that exceeds the nature of that instrument; but the light of the agent intellect is the instrument which the soul uses now in understanding naturally; therefore, it has no power through that light for any action that exceeds that light. But that light is of itself limited to having knowledge by the sensing way and the way of the senses; therefore, the soul has no power for any knowledge that cannot be had by way of sense. But the knowledge of many other things is necessary for this present state; therefore etc.

52. This reason seems to conclude against him who made it. For, according to this deduction, the uncreated light will not be able to use the agent intellect as an instrument for knowledge of any pure truth, because, according to him, such truth cannot be had by means of the senses without a special illumination. And so it follows that in the knowledge of pure truth the light of the agent intellect in no way has any action; but this seems unacceptable, because this action is more perfect than every intellection, and consequently what is more perfect in the soul insofar as the soul is intellective ought to come together in some way for that action.

53. [To the Fourth and Fifth Reason]. These two final reasons [nn.49, 51] do not seem particularly efficacious. For the first would be efficacious if it were proved that man is ordered finally to supernatural knowledge (the proof of which is pertinent to the question about beatitude, Ord. 4 Suppl. d.49 q.7 nn.2-7), and if along with this it were shown that natural knowledge does not in this present state dispose sufficiently for attaining supernatural knowledge. The second reason begs two questions, namely that there is need for knowledge of certain things that cannot be known by way of the senses, and that the light of the agent intellect is limited to such knowables.

54. The first three reasons [nn. 13, 17, 40] appear more probable. However, that no such knowledge is necessary for salvation I prove:²⁴ Posit, someone is not baptized: although he is an adult, does not have any teacher, he does have the sort of good motions that he can have conform to right reason, and guards against the things that natural reason shows him to be bad. Although God by common law would visit such a person, teaching him through a man or an angel (in the way he visited Cornelius, Acts 10.1-48), yet posit that he is not taught by anyone: he will be saved. Likewise, although he be taught afterwards, yet he was just before and so worthy of eternal life, because by willing good things preceding teaching he merits the grace by which he is just;²⁵ and yet he does not have theology, even as to the first objects of faith, but only natural knowledge. Therefore, nothing of theology is simply necessary for salvation.

55. One could say that by willing thing good in genus he merits by congruity to be justified from original sin, and God does not deny the favor of his liberality;²⁶ therefore he gives the first grace without a sacrament, because he is not bound by the sacraments; grace is not given without the habit of faith;²⁷ therefore that person has the habit of theology, although he is not able to activate it, just as neither is he baptized unless he is instructed. And although there is no contradiction in grace being given without faith, since the habits are distinct and exist in different powers, yet just as in baptism a simultaneity in infusion is posited, so for the same reason simultaneity can be posited in this case. For God is not less gracious to the one whom, because of his merit by congruity, he justifies without a sacrament, than to him whom, without any merit of his own, he justifies in the reception of the sacrament. Therefore it is possible for God of his absolute power to save anyone at all, and also to bring it about that he merit glory without infused faith, if, in the absence of it, God give the grace which the possessor uses well as far as to willing what he is able to have according to natural reason and acquired faith, or without any acquired faith if a teacher is lacking, although of his ordained power God not give it without the preceding habit of faith (because grace is supposed not to be infused without it)²⁸ – not because of need, as if grace without it would not be sufficient, but because of divine liberality, which reforms the whole; also a man would be less perfectly disposed as regard assent to certain truths without infused faith.

56. And as in this case so I say proportionally about the habit of theology, which when it is perfect includes infused and acquired faith of the articles and other things revealed by God in Scripture; so that it is not infused faith alone nor acquired faith alone but both together. Theology is therefore necessary, but it is so when speaking of ordained power and when speaking of the more principal or prior habit that pertains to theology, namely the one which is infused faith, and this generally as to everyone; it is not so as to the second habit that it includes, which is acquired faith, although perhaps it is necessary by ordained necessity in an adult able to have a teacher and to understand him, and this as to acquired faith of certain general things.

57. To the question, then, I reply by first distinguishing how something may be said to be supernatural.¹ For a receptive power is compared to the act that it receives or to the agent it receives it from. In the first way it is a natural power, or a violent one, or neither. It is said to be a natural if it is naturally inclined, violent if [the act] is against the natural inclination of what undergoes it, neither if it is naturally inclined neither to the form that it receives nor to the opposite. Now in this comparison there is no supernaturality. But when comparing the receiver to the agent from which it receives the form, then there is naturality when the receiver is compared to such an agent as has the nature of naturally impressing such a form on such a receiver, but there is supernaturality when it is compared to an agent that does not naturally impress the form on that receiver.

58. Before this distinction be applied to the proposed case, there is a multiple argument against it; both that the distinction of ‘natural’ and ‘violent’ may be taken from the comparison of the receiver to the agent and not only from the comparison of it to the form, and that the distinction of ‘natural’ and ‘supernatural’ may be taken from the comparison of the receiver to the form and not only from its respect to the agent. But these arguments are not set down here [they are set down in 4 d.43 q.4 nn.4-5].

59. But a reasonable solution is apparent, because that is per se cause of something on which when posited, with everything else being removed or varied, the effect follows. But now, although the form against which the receiver is inclined is not introduced save by an agent acting violently on the receiver, and although a supernatural agent does not act supernaturally save by introducing a form, yet the per se idea of ‘violent’ is taken from the relation of the receiver to the form [Ord. 4 d.43 q.4 n.4], and the per se idea of ‘supernatural’ is taken from the relation of the receiver to the agent [ibid. n.5]. The proof is because when receiver and form remain in their own nature (for example, that the form can be received but against the inclination of the receiver), then, however the agent is varied, the receiver receives it violently [ibid. n.4]; likewise, when the receiver and the agent are so disposed that only an agent not naturally active changes the receiver (‘only’ I say in the sense that a natural agent does not dispose it), then whatever form the agent introduces will be supernatural with respect to the receiver [ibid. n.5].This is proved secondly in this way because [the form is supernatural] not only in ‘being introduced’ but also in ‘persisting’; some form persists violently in a receiver without extrinsic action, although not for a long time, some form persists naturally and for a long time; some form remains natural, some supernatural, because of the agent only, so that, by exclusion of the agent by which the thing is done, it could not be said to be supernatural; and it could be said to be natural because, by comparing the form to the receiver only, it perfects naturally [Ord. IV d.43 q.4 n.4]. This is proved secondly in this way because [the form is supernatural] not only in ‘being introduced’ but also in ‘persisting’; some form persists violently in a receiver without extrinsic action, although not for a long time, some form persists naturally and for a long time; some form remains natural, some supernatural, because of the agent only, so that, by exclusion of the agent by which the thing is done, it could not be said to be supernatural; and it could be said to be natural because, by comparing the form to the receiver only, it perfects naturally [Ord. IV d.43 q.4 n.4].

60. Applying this then to the proposed case, I say that, when comparing the possible intellect to actual knowledge in itself, no knowledge is supernatural for it, because the possible intellect is naturally perfected by any knowledge whatever and to any knowledge whatever does it naturally incline. But speaking in the second way [n.57], in this way is that supernatural which is generated by an agent that is not of a nature to move the possible intellect to such knowledge naturally.

61. Now for this present state, according to the Philosopher [On the Soul 3.4.429a13-18, 5.430a14-17, 7.431a14-17, 8.432a8-10], the possible intellect is of a nature to be moved to knowledge by the agent intellect and by a phantasm, therefore only that knowledge is natural for it which is impressed by these agents. Now by virtue of these agents can all knowledge of a concept be had that is had by a wayfarer according to common law, as is plain in the instance [n.42] against the third principal reason. And therefore, although God could, by a special revelation, cause knowledge of some concept, as in the case of rapture, yet such supernatural knowledge is not of common law necessary.

62. But about propositional truths it is otherwise because, as was shown by the three first reasons adduced against the first opinion [nn.13-18, 40-41], once the whole action of the agent intellect and phantasms is posited, many propositions will remain unknown to us and neutral to us the knowledge of which is necessary for us. Therefore, knowledge of these things must be handed on to us supernaturally, because no one has been able naturally to discover the knowledge of them and to hand it on to others by teaching, because as they were by natural powers neutral for one, so also for everyone. But whether, after the first handing on of teaching about such things, someone else could, by natural powers, assent to doctrine handed down, Ord. III. Suppl. d.23 q.un. nn.4-5. Now this first handing on of such doctrine is called revelation, which is for this reason supernatural, because it is from an agent that, for this present state, is not naturally a mover of the intellect.

63. In another way too could action or knowledge be said to be supernatural, because it is from an agent supplying the place of the supernatural object. For an object of a nature to cause knowledge of this proposition ‘God is triune’ and of like ones is the divine essence known under its proper idea; as knowable under this idea it is a supernatural object [Ord. I d.3 q.2 n.16]. Whatever agent, then, causes some knowledge of the truths that are of a nature to be evident through such an object so known, that agent is in this respect supplying the place of that object. But if the agent were to cause of those truths a perfect knowledge of the sort that the object known in itself would cause, then the agent would perfectly supply the place of the object; to the extent the knowledge it causes is imperfect, it is virtually contained in the perfect knowledge of which the object known in itself would cause.

64. So it is in the case at hand. For he who reveals this truth ‘God is triune’, causes in the mind some knowledge, though obscure, of this truth, because it is about an object not known under its proper idea, which object, if it were thus known, would be of a nature to cause a perfect and clear knowledge of that truth. To the extent, then, that this knowledge is obscure and is included eminently in that clear knowledge, as the imperfect in the perfect, to that extent the revealer or causer of this obscure truth supplies the place of the object that is causative of the clear knowledge, especially since it cannot cause knowledge of any truth except by supplying the place of some object; nor could it cause knowledge of such truths about this object the way it supplies the place of some lower object that is naturally mover of our intellect, because no such object virtually includes any knowledge of those truths, neither clear even nor obscure; therefore it must be the case that, in causing even that obscure knowledge, it supply in some way the place of the supernatural object.

65. The difference between these two ways of positing the supernaturality of revealed knowledge is plain by separating one from the other. For example, if a supernatural agent were to cause knowledge of a natural object, so that if it were to infuse geometry into someone, this geometry would be supernatural in the first way [n.60], not in the second [n.63] (that is,² in both ways, because the second implies the first, though not conversely). But where only the first is, there it is not necessary that it be supernatural such that it could not be had naturally; where the second way is, there is a necessity for it be had supernaturally, because it cannot be had naturally.

66. The three reasons on which this solution rests are confirmed by authorities. The first [nn.13-16] by the authority of Augustine City of God XVII ch.41 n.3: “The philosophers, not knowing to what end those things were to be referred, were able, among the false things they said, to see something true” etc.

67. The second reason [nn.17-18] is confirmed by Augustine City of God XI ch.2: “What advantage is it to know whither one should go if the way by which one should go is not known?” On this point the philosophers were in error who, although they handed on some truths about the virtues, yet mixed in falsehoods, according to the preceding authority of Augustine [n.66], and it is plain from their books. For Aristotle blames the polities arranged by many others, Politics 2. But neither is the polity itself of Aristotle free of blame: in the Politics, 7.9.1329a29-32, he teaches that the gods are to be honored (“For it is fitting,” he says, “to give honor to the gods”), and in the same place, 7.16.1335b19-25, he hands on a law “to nourish nothing abandoned.”

68. The third reason [nn.40-41] is confirmed by Augustine City of God XI ch.3: “As to things that are remote from our senses, since we cannot know them by our own testimony, we require the testimony of others.” And this confirms the whole of the principal solution [nn.57-65]. For because the propositions about which the argument is [nn.40-41, 62] are in themselves neutral for us, no one can have confidence about them on his own testimony, but it is necessary to look for the supernatural testimony of someone superior to the whole human species.

69. Now in what way the first handing down or revelation of such doctrine was able to be done and was done is doubtful – namely whether by interior or exterior locution, with some signs applied sufficient to cause assent – it is enough for the purpose that such doctrine could have been supernaturally revealed in either way, but in neither way could it without error have been handed down by man first.

70. Against these three reasons it is at the same time objected that they destroy themselves, because that which is shown to be necessarily in need of being known is shown to be true, because nothing is known except what is true; therefore whatever these reasons show as necessary to be known (namely, that the enjoyment of God in himself is the end of man, as to the first reason [nn.13-16], – the way to reach it is through the merits that God accepts as worthy of such reward, as to the second reason [nn.17-18], – that God is triune and causes contingently, and the like, as to the third reason [nn.40-41]), all this is shown to be true. Either, then, these reasons are only from faith, or from them the opposite of what they prove is concluded.

71. I reply: by natural reason it is shown that there is need to know determinately one part of this contradiction, ‘enjoyment is the end, enjoyment is not the end’, that is, that the intellect is not merely doubtful or neutral about this problem, ‘whether enjoyment is the end’, because such doubt or ignorance would impede search for the end; but it is not shown by natural reason that this part [of the contradiction] is something that needs necessarily to be known. And in this way the aforesaid reasons, insofar as they are natural, conclude to one part of the contradiction, this one or that, not determinately to this one save only from things believed [cf. n.12].

72. To the arguments [n.6-11] for the opinion of Aristotle. To the first [n.6] I say that knowledge depends on the soul that knows and the object that is known [nn.6-11], because according to Augustine On the Trinity IX ch.12 n.18 “knowledge is born from knower and known.” Although, therefore, the soul may have within a sufficient active and passive element to the extent an action with respect to knowledge agrees with the soul, yet it does not have within itself a sufficient active element to the extent the action agrees with the object, because it is thus like a blank tablet, as is said in On the Soul 3.4.429b30-30a2. The agent intellect then is that by which it makes everything, but it is so insofar as ‘making’ with respect to knowledge agrees with the soul, not insofar as the object is active.

73. To the confirmation for the reason [n.7]. To the major I say that nature is sometimes taken for the intrinsic principle of motion or rest – as it is described in Physics 2.1.192b20-23 – sometimes for the naturally active principle, insofar as nature is distinguished from art or from purpose on account of opposite modes of being a principle, whether it is intrinsic or not, provided it be natural. In the first way the major is not true, because there does not naturally correspond to every passive element an active intrinsic principle that is nature, because many things are naturally receptive of some act for which they do not have an active intrinsic principle. In the second way too the major proposition is false in certain cases, namely when a nature, because of its excellence, is naturally ordered to receiving a perfection so eminent that it cannot fall under the causality of a natural agent in the second way. So it is in the proposed case.

74. When proof is given of the major [n.7], I say that the passive power is not in vain in nature, because although it cannot through a natural agent be principally reduced to act, yet the disposition for it can be introduced by such an agent, and can by some agent in nature – that is, in the whole system of being or beings – to wit, by the first or supernatural agent, be completely reduced to act.

75. And if it is objected that this cheapens nature because it cannot attain its perfection from natural sources, although nature fails less in nobler things, from On the Heavens 2.8.290a29-35, I reply: if our happiness were to consist in the highest contemplation to which we can now naturally attain, the Philosopher would not say [On the Soul 3.9.432b21-22] that nature fails in necessary things. But now I concede that that speculation can be had naturally, and further I say that another more eminent one can be received naturally. Therefore, nature is in this respect made more dignified than if the supreme one possible for it were posited to be that natural one; nor is it to be wondered at that there is a passive capacity in some nature for a greater perfection than its active causality can extend itself to.

76. What is adduced from the On the Heavens is not to the purpose, because the Philosopher is speaking there of instruments corresponding to motive power, were it present, in the stars. And I concede that universally to that to which a power is given which is of a nature to be organic, an organ is by nature given – I mean in the case of non-deprived things. But in the case at hand a power is given but not one with an organ; however not all other things have been naturally given that, besides the power, come together for the act. From the Philosopher, then, can be had there that a nature orderable to some act or object naturally has the power for it, and an organ if the power is organic; but of things later required for the act it is not so.

77. In another way it could be said to the major [n.7] that it is true speaking of a natural passive power as it is a passive power in comparison to an active one, but not as it is a passive power in comparison to the received act. The difference between these members is plain at the beginning of the solution to this question [n.57].

78. Now he minor [n.7] is true in the second way, not the first [n.57]. It could also easily be in a third way said to the minor by the denial of it, because although absolutely the possible intellect is naturally receptive of such intellection, yet not for this present state. But the cause of this will be spoken about below, 1 d.3 p.1 q.2 n.16; q.3 n.2.

79. As to the third reason [n.8], look for the response of Thomas in ST Ia q.1 a.1 ad 2, where he responds thus, that “a diverse idea of the knowable introduces a diversity of sciences. For the same conclusion is demonstrated by the astrologer through a mathematical middle term, that is, a term abstracted from matter (to wit, that the earth is round), and by the natural philosopher through a middle term considered in matter. Hence nothing prevents the same things which the philosophical sciences treat of according to how they are knowable by the light of natural reason, from being treated of by another science according to how they are known by the light of divine revelation.” On the contrary: if knowledge of things knowable in theology is handed on or can be handed on in other sciences, although in another light, then theological knowledge about the same things is not necessary. The consequence is plain in his example, because he who knows that the earth is round by a physical middle term does not need the knowledge by a mathematical middle term as if this knowledge were simply necessary.

80. His stated response, however, to the third argument [n.8] is thus expounded [ST IaIIae q.54 a.2 and ad 2], namely that a habit is both a habit and a form; insofar as it is a habit it gets its distinction from the object, but insofar as it is a form it can be distinguished by the active principle. Now with respect to a scientific habit the principles are efficient causes. Although, therefore, where there is the same knowable (for example, that the earth is round) there is no distinction through the objects, yet there is a distinction through the principles by which the mathematician and the natural philosopher show this; and so there will be a distinction of habits insofar as they are forms and not insofar as they are habits.

81. On the contrary: the form is common to the habit; but it is impossible for things to be distinct in the idea of the superior and indistinct in the idea of the inferior; therefore it is impossible for anything to be distinct through the idea of the form whereby it is a form and yet indistinct through the idea of the habits (for this would be as if some things were distinct from other things in idea of ‘animal’ and indistinct from them in idea of ‘man’). Besides, it supposes too that principles distinguish habits in some other genus of cause than as efficient principles, which is false, because if they do have some idea of a distinctive cause as to habits they have only the idea of efficient cause. Besides, the reason is still in place that however much distinct cognitive habits could be posited, yet the necessity of one of them, as though otherwise knowledge would be impossible, would not be preserved by positing the possibility of a second habit whencesoever distinct.

82. Therefore to the argument I reply that in those speculative sciences, although it treat of all objects of speculation, yet not as to everything that is knowable about them, because not as to what is proper to them, as was made plain before in the third reason [nn.40-47] against the first opinion (look under g [n.9]).

83. To the fourth [n.9] the response is thus, that the first principles cannot be applied to any conclusions save those of sense; both because their terms are abstracted from sensibles and so reflect the nature of them, and because the agent intellect, by which the application must be made, is limited to sensibles.

84. On the contrary: it is certain to the intellect that those first principles are true not only in sensibles but also in non-sensibles; for the intellect has no more doubt as to something immaterial that contradictories are not both true than as to something material. And as to the remark that the term of the first principle is being that is divided into the ten categories, and this does not extend itself to the object of theology, it is of no force; for we are not more in doubt about God that contradictories are not both true (as that God is blessed and not blessed and the like) than about something white.

85. Another response is given, that conclusions do not follow from major premises alone but with the minor premises adjoined; but the minors that should be adjoined to them are not now naturally manifest. On the contrary: the minors to be assumed under the first principles make predication of things assumed ‘under’ the subject terms of the first principles; but it is known that the terms of the first principles are said of anything whatever, because they are most common; therefore etc.

86. For this reason I respond that the second part of the minor is false, namely this, that in the first principles ‘all knowable conclusions are virtually included’ [n.10]. In proof I say that just as the subject terms are common, so also are the predicate terms. When, therefore, the subject terms, because they are distributed, are taken to cover everything, they are not taken to cover everything except in respect of the predicate terms that are most common, and consequently, by virtue of such principles, only the most common predicates are known about lower things.

87. This is plain by reason, because a middle term cannot be the ‘why’ in respect of any property save a property that is virtually included in the idea of the middle term; but in the idea of the subject of the most common principle is not included why any particular property is, but only why the most common is; therefore the subject cannot be the middle term or reason for knowing certain things, save under the most common idea. But there are in addition to the most common properties many other knowable properties, for which properties the properties of the first principles cannot be the middle terms, because they do not include them. Therefore, there are many knowable truths that are not included in the first principles. This is plain in an example, because this statement ‘every whole is greater than its part’, although it includes the statement ‘four is greater than two’, and other like statements about the same predicate, yet it does not include the following: ‘four is double in respect of two’, ‘three is in the relation of one and a half to two’, for there would be need that these predicates have special middle terms which include them.

88. The third proof [the first proof is n.86, the second n.87], a logical one, is that although it may be possible to descend under the subject of a universal affirmative yet not under the predicate; but many predicates contained under the predicates of the first principles are knowable of things inferior to the subjects of them; therefore, the predicates are not known of the subjects through the first principles.

89. An objection against this: ‘about anything at all there is affirmation or negation, and about the same thing negated there is both’; the consequence follows, ‘therefore about this white or non-white’, in such a way that it is licit to descend there under the predicate and under the subject. I reply: this principle ‘about anything there is affirmation or negation’ etc. is equivalent to this proposition ‘one part of any contradiction about anything is true and the other false’, where there are two distributed terms, and it is licit to descend under each distributed term, ‘therefore about this term of this contradiction’ etc.; but under the predicate, which stands confusedly only, it is not licit to descend, because this does not follow, ‘one part of any contradiction about anything, therefore this part’. So it is in other principles; always the predicate of a universal affirmative stands confusedly only, whether there are two distributions there in the subject or one. And in the example at hand still the matter is plain. Because about man it is knowable that he is able to laugh, never can more be inferred from the principle ‘one part of any contradiction’ etc. than that ‘therefore about man, able to laugh or not able to laugh’. One part, then, of the disjunctive predicate will never be known of the subject through this principle, but there is required other special principle, as the definition of the subject or the property, which is indeed the middle term and the reason for knowing ‘able to laugh’ determinately of man.

90. To the principal arguments. – To the first [n.1] I draw a distinction about natural object. For ‘natural object’ can be taken either for that which the power can attain naturally or by the action of naturally active causes, or for that to which the power is naturally inclined whether it can naturally attain the object or not. The major, then, could be denied by understanding ‘natural’ in the first way, because the first object is adequate to the power and is therefore abstracted from all those things that the power can operate on; but it is not necessary that if the intellect could naturally understand such common thing, that it could naturally understand whatever is contained under it, because the intellection of something contained is much more excellent than a confused intellection of such common thing; thus, when the minor has been conceded in each sense, the intended conclusion is not gained, namely about what is naturally attainable, because in this way was the major false.

91. Against this response I argue that it destroys itself. For the first object is adequate by itself to the power and is true object, that is, that the power regards nothing as object save what the idea of the first object is in, and whatever the idea of the first object is in the power regards as object; therefore, it is impossible for something to be naturally first without whatever is thus contained being naturally the per se object. For grant the opposite, and then it is not naturally adequate but exceeds, and something inferior to it is adequate and so is first. Now the reason that is adduced for the response [n.90] is a fallacy of figure of speech. For although being as it is something intelligible in a single act (as man is intelligible in a single intellection) is naturally intelligible (for the single intellection of being as of a single object is natural), yet being cannot be posited to be the first object naturally attainable because it is the first object as it is included in all per se objects, and as such it is not naturally attainable unless any of them at all is naturally attainable. Therefore it changes here ‘this something’ to ‘some sort of thing’ when it argues ‘being is naturally intelligible, therefore being as it is the first object of the intellect, that is, adequate object, is naturally attainable’, for the antecedent is true of being as it is one intelligible, like white, but the consequent draws a conclusion about being as it is included in every intelligible, not as it is understood apart from them.

92. To the argument [n.1], then, there is another response, a real one, namely that the minor is false about natural object, that is, naturally attainable object, – it is true in another way, namely what the power is naturally inclined or ordained to [n.90]. And in this way should the authority of Avicenna be understood. But as to what is to be set down as the first object naturally attainable, about this below in 1 d.3 p.1 q.3 nn.8-12. The response is confirmed by Anselm On Free Choice of the Will ch.3, “No ability, as I think,” he says, “do we have that is by itself sufficient for act.” He calls ability what we commonly call power; it is clear from his example about sight. It is not therefore inappropriate for a power to be naturally ordered to an object which it cannot naturally attain from natural causes, like whatever is ordered of itself alone [to something] and yet cannot attain it alone.

93. To the second argument [n.2] I deny the consequence. – To the proof [n.2] the thing is clear from what was said [nn.73-78] in the response given to the second argument for the opinion of the Philosopher, because higher things are ordered to passively receiving a greater perfection than they themselves can actively produce, and consequently the perfection of them cannot be produced except by some supernatural agent. It is not so with the perfection of inferior things, whose ultimate perfection can be subject to the action of inferior agents.

94. To the third argument [n.3] I say that the possible intellect is not proportionate to firm possession of some propositional truth, that is, it is not a movable proportional to the sort of agents that cannot be known from phantasms and the natural light of the agent intellect. When you argue ‘therefore it is made proportional by something else’ I concede the point – both as to ‘by something else’ in the sense of ‘by a mover’, because the possible intellect assents to the truth through a mover that reveals supernaturally, and as to ‘by something else’ in the sense of a ‘form’, because it assents by the assent that is made in the possible intellect, which assent is a sort of inclination in the intellect toward that object, making it proportionate to the object. When about that ‘something else’ you ask further ‘whether it is natural or supernatural’, I say that it is supernatural, whether you understand the question of the agent or of the form. When you infer ‘therefore the intellect is not proportionate with it, and is by something else made proportionate with it ’, I say that it is of itself in obediential potency to the agent [cf. 3 d.1 q.2 n.7, q.4 n.2], and thus it is proportional with it sufficiently for the purpose of being moved by it. Likewise, it is of itself capable of the assent caused by such an agent, even naturally capable; it is not necessary, therefore, that it be by something else made proportional for receiving the assent. A stand, then, is made at the second stage, not the first [n.3], because the revealed truth does not sufficiently incline the intellect to assent to it, and thus the agent is not proportional and the recipient is not proportional to it; but a supernatural agent does sufficiently incline the intellect to the truth, by causing in it an assent whereby it is proportioned to this truth, such that there is no need for the intellect to be by something else made proportionate to such an agent or to the form impressed by it, just as there is need that it be made proportionate to such an object through something else in the aforesaid double way [n.94]

95. The question is asked whether the supernatural knowledge necessary for the wayfarer is sufficiently handed on in Sacred Scripture. That it is not: Because necessary knowledge was never lacking to the human race; Sacred Scripture was not in the law of nature, because Moses first wrote the Pentateuch, nor was the whole of Sacred Scripture in the Mosaic law, but only the Old Testament; therefore etc.

96. Again, the more acute in intellect any author of human sciences is, the more he avoids superfluity in handing them on; but in Sacred Scripture there seem to be many superfluous things contained, as the many ceremonies and histories, knowledge of which does not seem necessary for salvation; therefore etc.

97. Again, there are many things about which it is not known with certitude from Scripture whether they are sins or not; however knowledge of these things is necessary for salvation, because he who does not know that something is a mortal sin will not avoid it sufficiently; therefore etc.

98. To the contrary: Augustine in City of God XI ch.3 says, speaking of canonical Scripture: “We have faith in it for things that it is not expedient to be ignorant of and that we are not suited to know by ourselves.”