Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis
Benedictus Henricus Merkelbach (1871–1942)
Summa Theologiae Moralis ad mentem D. Thomae et ad normam iuris novi
First published 1935
Volume I (De principiis) of Benedictus Henricus Merkelbach's Summa theologiae moralis sets out the foundations of Catholic moral theology within a Thomistic framework. It treats human acts, conscience, law, sin, and merit in relation to the canon law of its period. The present edition follows the Paris text published by Desclée de Brouwer in 1935 and includes the Latin text with an English translation. It comprises the first volume of the three-volume Summa.
Prologus
Introductio I: Theologia Moralis Generalis: Introductio
Tractatus I: Tractatus de ultimo actu humanorum fine seu de beatitudine
Introductio
Quaestio I: DE FINE ULTIMO IN COMMUNI
Quaestio II: DE BEATITUDINE OBIECTIVA
Quaestio III: DE BEATITUDINE FORMALI
Quaestio IV: DE QUALITATIBUS BEATITUDINIS
Quaestio V: DE MODO OBTINENDI BEATITUDINEM
Tractatus II: De actibus humanis in se
Introductio
Pars I: De actibus humanis secundum esse materiale et psychologicum
§ I: De conditione actuum humanorum
Caput I: De elemento subiectivo actus humani
Quaestio I: De voluntario
Articulus I: De voluntario in se
Articulus II: De voluntario tum positivo et directo, tum negativo et indirecto
Articulus III: De voluntario in se et in causa
Quaestio II: De impedimentis voluntarii seu de involuntario
Articulus I: De violentia
Articulus II: De metu
Articulus III: De concupiscentia
Articulus IV: De ignorantia
Quaestio III: De libero
Quaestio IV: De impedimentis liberi
Articulus I: De passionibus
Articulus II: De habitu et consuetudine
Articulus III: De impedimentis liberi remotioribus
Caput II: De elemento obiectivo actus humani
Quaestio I: De elemento essentiali seu obiecto
Quaestio II: De elemento accidentali seu de circumstantiis
§ II: De distinctione actuum humanorum
Quaestio I: De actibus elicitis
Quaestio II: De actibus imperatis
Pars II: De actibus humanis secundum esse morale
§ I: De moralitate actus humani in genere
Quaestio I: De essentia et speciebus moralitatis
Quaestio II: De fundamentis moralitatis
Articulus I: De intrinseca differentia boni inter et mali
Articulus II: De norma moralitatis
Articulus III: De fundamento obiectivo moralitatis
Articulus IV: De falsis systematibus circa fundamenta moralitatis
Articulus V: De facultate apprehensiva moralitatis
Quaestio III: De principiis seu fontibus moralitatis
Quaestio IV: De distinctione specifica inter actum bonum et malum
Quaestio V: De distinctione specifica inter varios actus bonos vel malos
Articulus I: De obiecto
Articulus II: De circumstantiis
Articulus III: De fine
§ II: De moralitate actuum humanorum in specie
Quaestio I: De bonitate et malitia actus interioris
Quaestio II: De bonitate et malitia actus exterioris
Quaestio III: De bonitate et malitia effectus externi
Quaestio IV: De bonitate et malitia passionum
Quaestio V: De bonitate et malitia circumstantiarum
Pars III: De actibus humanis secundum esse supernaturale et meritorium
Quaestio I: De merito praesertim supernaturali
Quaestio II: De conditionibus meriti supernaturalis
Tractatus III: De conscientia in generali
Introductio
Quaestio I: De conscientia morali secundum se in esse psychologico
Quaestio II: De conscientia prout est regula actuum moralium
Articulus I: De rectitudine conscientiae
Articulus II: De conscientiae certitudine
Quaestio III: De conscientia christiana prout est regula actuum supernaturalium
Tractatus IV: De legibus in genere
Introductio
§ I: De lege secundum esse psychologicum
Pars I: De lege in genere
Quaestio I: De ipsa lege in se
Articulus I: De essentia legis
Articulus II: De promulgatione legis
Quaestio II: De distinctione legum
Quaestio III: De effectibus legis
Articulus I: De vi directivâ seu obligatione legis
Articulus II: De vi coactivâ seu sanctione legis
Pars II: De lege aeterna quae est fundamentum omnis legis
Quaestio I: De essentia legis aeternae
Quaestio II: De potestate legis aeternae
Quaestio III: De mutabilitate legis aeternae
§ I: De legibus quae regunt actus morales
Pars III: De lege naturali
Quaestio I: De essentia legis naturalis
Quaestio II: De potestate legis naturalis
Articulus I: De vi directivâ seu obligatione legis naturalis
Articulus II: De vi coactivâ seu sanctione legis naturalis
Quaestio III: De mutabilitate legis naturalis
Quaestio IV: De Lege Humana in Se
Articulus I: De Auctore legis civilis
Articulus II: De Qualitate legis humanae
Articulus III: De Efformatione legis humanae
Articulus IV: De Divisione legis humanae
Quaestio V: De Potestate Legis Humanae
Articulus I: De Materia legis humanae
Articulus II: De Obligatione legis humanae
Articulus III: De Subditis legis civilis
Articulus IV: De Impletione et Interpretatione legis humanae
Quaestio VI: De Mutabilitate Legis Humanae
Caput I: De Lege Vetere
Quaestio I: De Lege Vetere Secundum Se
Quaestio II: De Potestate Legis Veteris
Quaestio III: De Mutabilitate Veteris Legis
Caput II: De Lege Nova
Quaestio I: De Essentia Legis Novae
Quaestio II: De Potestate Legis Novae
Quaestio III: De Lege Ecclesiastica Secundum Se
Articulus I: De Auctore legis ecclesiasticae
Articulus II: De Materia et Qualitate legis ecclesiasticae
Articulus III: De Efformatione legis ecclesiasticae
Articulus IV: De Divisione legis ecclesiasticae
Quaestio IV: De Potestate seu Obligatione Legis Ecclesiasticae
Articulus I: De Quantitate seu Gravitate Obligationis
Articulus II: De Qualitate et Extensione Obligationis legis praeceptivae
Articulus III: De Qualitate et Extensione Obligationis legis poenalis
Articulus IV: De Qualitate et Extensione Obligationis legis irritantis
Articulus V: De Subditis legis ecclesiasticae
Articulus VI: De Impletione legis ecclesiasticae
Articulus VII: De Interpretatione legis ecclesiasticae
Quaestio V: De Mutabilitate Legis Ecclesiasticae
Articulus I: De Ignorantia
Articulus II: De Impotentia
Articulus III: De Dispensatione
Articulus IV: De privilegio
Articulus V: De cessatione finis
Articulus VI: De abrogatione et derogatione
Articulus VII: De consuetudine
Tractatus V: De peccatis in genere
Introductio I: De Peccatis in Genere
Quaestio I: De essentia peccati
Articulus I: De notione et conditionibus peccati
Articulus II: De peccato omissionis negative voluntario
Articulus III: De peccato commissionis externo, indirecte aut in causa voluntario
Articulus IV: De elementis constitutivis peccati
Articulus V: De definitione peccati
Quaestio II: De distinctione peccatorum
Articulus I: De distinctione specifica
Articulus II: De distinctione numerica
Quaestio III: De comparatione et gravitate peccatorum
Quaestio IV: De subiecto peccati
Articulus I: De motibus seu peccatis sensualitatis
Articulus II: De consensu in delectationem seu de delectatione morosa
Articulus III: De consensu in actum seu de desiderio et gaudio
Pars I: De causis peccatorum
Quaestio I: De causis peccati interioribus
Articulus I: De ignorantia causa peccati ex parte rationis
Articulus II: De passione causa peccati ex parte appetitus sensitivi
Articulus III: De malitia causa peccati ex parte voluntatis
Quaestio II: De causis peccatorum exterioribus
Articulus I: De deo permittente
Articulus II: De diabolo tentante
Articulus III: De homine cooperante
Quaestio III: De peccato quod est causa alterius peccati
Articulus I: De modo quo unum peccatum alterum causat
Articulus II: De superbia et inani gloria
Articulus III: De avaritia
Articulus IV: De luxuria et gula
Articulus V: De invidia et ira
Articulus VI: De acedia
Pars II: De effectibus peccatorum
Quaestio I: De diminutione boni naturae
Quaestio II: De reatu culpae seu macula peccati
Quaestio III: De reatu poenae
Quaestio IV: De peccato mortali et veniali
Articulus I: De differentia inter peccatum mortale et veniale
Articulus II: De gravitate peccati mortalis
Articulus III: De conditionibus ad peccatum mortale requisitis
Articulus IV: De divisione peccati mortalis et venialis
Articulus V: De conversione peccati mortalis et venialis
Articulus VI: De peccato veniali secundum se
Tractatus VI: De habitibus et virtutibus in genere
Introductio I: De Habitibus et Virtutibus in Genere
Pars I: De habitibus in genere secundum esse psychologicum
Quaestio I: De essentia habitus
Quaestio II: De subiecto habitus
Quaestio III: De causa habituum
Quaestio IV: De distinctione habituum
Pars II: De habitibus secundum esse morale seu de virtutibus acquisitis
Quaestio I: De essentia virtutis
Quaestio II: De subiecto virtutis
Quaestio III: De distinctione virtutum
Articulus I: De virtutibus intellectualibus
Articulus II: De virtutibus moralibus
Articulus III: De virtutibus cardinalibus
Quaestio IV: De proprietatibus virtutum
Articulus I: De medio virtutis
Articulus II: De connexione virtutum
Articulus III: De aequalitate virtutum
Articulus IV: De duratione virtutum
Pars III: De habitibus secundum esse supernaturale seu de virtutibus infusis
Quaestio I: De existentia et essentia infusorum habituum ac virtutum
Quaestio II: De distinctione infusorum habituum et virtutum
Articulus I: De virtutibus theologicis
Articulus II: De virtutibus moralibus
Articulus III: De donis spiritus sancti
Quaestio III: De causa infusorum habituum et virtutum
Quaestio IV: De proprietatibus infusorum habituum et virtutum
Articulus I: De medio virtutum infusarum
Articulus II: De connexione habituum infusorum
Articulus III: De aequalitate habituum infusorum
Articulus IV: De duratione habituum infusorum
Tractatus VII: De fide divina
Introductio
Quaestio I: De Obiecto Formali Fidei
Quaestio II: De Obiecto Materiali Fidei
Articulus I: De obiecto materiali in se
Articulus II: De conditionibus ad obiectum materiale requisitis
Articulus III: De evolutione obiecti materialis
Articulus IV: De ecclesia proponente obiectum fidei
Pars I: De Actu Fidei
Caput I: De Actu Fidei Interiore
Quaestio I: De Essentia Actus Fidei
Quaestio II: De Analysi Actus Fidei
Articulus I: De ipso actu fidei
Articulus II: De ipso credulitatis affectu
Articulus III: De iudicio credibilitatis seu de praeambulis fidei
Quaestio III: De Necessitate Fidei
Caput II: De Actu Fidei Exteriore seu de Eius Confessione
Pars II: De Habitu Fidei
Quaestio I: De Ipsa Fide
Articulus I: De fide in ordine ad subiectum spectata
Articulus II: De fide spectata relative ad virtutes supernaturales
Articulus III: De fide spectata relative ad habitus intellectuales
Quaestio II: De habentibus fidem
Quaestio III: De causa et effectibus fidei
Quaestio IV: De donis fidei correspondentibus
Pars III: De vitiis et peccatis fidei oppositis
Quaestio I: De peccatis directe oppositis fidei
Articulus I: De infidelitate
Articulus II: De haeresi et apostasia
Quaestio II: De peccatis indirecte oppositis fidei
Articulus I: De communicatione cum infidelibus et haereticis
Articulus II: De cooperatione ad infidelitatem et haeresim
Articulus III: De lectione et evulgatione scriptorum prohibitorum
Articulus IV: De admissione vel professione doctrinae quae pro fide est periculosa
Quaestio III: De blasphemia quae opponitur confessioni fidei
S. Th. II-II, q. 13.
781. Blasphemy (βλάπτω, I harm, φήμη, fame) etymologically signifies a curse and insult against someone (I Cor. IV, 13), and is therefore employed to signify a detraction from someone's excellent goodness; but in the sense of the holy Fathers and Theologians it is so called only the contumelious speech against God. It is called:
1° Speech or signification, and so it is distinguished from infidelity which is a judgment, and from sacrilege (and simony) which is an unworthy handling of a sacred thing. Furthermore, speech is done in various ways, and therefore on the part of the act, blasphemy is internal of the heart (by nod, as among the demons) and external, which is either of the mouth, when it is done by words spoken or written, or of deed, when it is done by sign, fact or gesture, as if one gnash one's teeth at God, spit at heaven, Christ, sacred images, trample crucifixes, throw blood into heaven, etc. Hence sacrilege is also blasphemy, if at the same time in the violation of a sacred thing there is a signification or some real speech against God.
2° Against God, and so it is distinguished from insult and curse against the neighbor and against other creatures: blasphemy namely is an act against faith, religion and God, whether in himself, or through the mediation of creatures, inasmuch as they have an order to God: "for just as God is praised in his saints, inasmuch as the works which God works in the saints are praised, so also blasphemy which is committed against the saints consequently redounds against God" (a. 1, ad 2). Hence on the part of object or terminus, blasphemy is immediate or mediate.
3° Contumelious, because namely something is taken away from the excellent or honor of the divine majesty, and so it is distinguished from perjury which is speech invoking divine testimony. Since however God is everywhere present, every speech against him is an insult; whence also blasphemy can be of various kinds according to the different way in which the insult is inflicted, as we are now about to explain.
782. Different modes of blaspheming. — On the part therefore of the mode by which the insult is inflicted, blasphemy can be enuntiativa, dehonestativa, or imprecativa.
1° Enuntiativa (declarative) is done:
a) by affirming of God what does not befit him, e.g. that he is unjust, the author of evils, cruel, that he punishes unjustly, that he has forgotten me, a tyrant, etc.;
b) by denying God what befits him, such as omnipotence, providence, justice, knowledge, e.g. by saying that not all things are well ordered but could have been better done in creation, that God does not wish or cannot help us, does not care for our affairs, that he will do something in spite of God (whether God wills or not, I will do this), denying God or the sacraments, etc.;
c) by attributing to creatures what is proper to God alone: since indeed whatever is proper to God God is, by this very fact God is said to be a creature and what is proper to him is denied, e.g. by saying: I can do this as well as God; seriously calling one's mistress a goddess, every and unique good, one's beatitude; swearing by false gods; calling the devil holy, almighty, more faithful, more powerful (a. 1, ad 3).
But if something contrary to faith is affirmed or something pertaining to faith is denied, the blasphemy is haereticalis.
2° Dehonestativa (dishonoring) is done:
a) by affirming or denying of God with truth, but in a contumelious way through contempt or mockery, e.g. by reproaching Christ that he suffered and died, naming his members dishonorably, "you have conquered, Galilean", "Hail, King of the Jews", "Ah, you who destroy the temple of God"; or by cursing through all those things, e.g. may your blood, wounds, death, head, passion, sacraments, chrism of Christ destroy you; or by applying Scripture to base things: for all these things were instituted not for destruction but for salvation;
b) not by affirming, but by approbatively and with contempt naming holy things, i.e. out of anger, not indeed against creatures, but against God or religion, in the manner of being indignant or contemptuous toward them, e.g. God!; the name of God, the members, the blood of Christ; the sacraments, the saints; "ah!
the power of God"; to swear mockingly by the members of Christ; "I despise God with my whole heart", etc.
3° Imprecativa (imprecatory) is when evil is wished or imprecated upon God, or even commanded, e.g. may he perish, may he not exist, may he die, may he be damned, may he not punish sins, may he not be almighty; "in contempt of God!"; "may it displease God!" Such, if done from the heart, proceeds from hatred of God and is the blasphemy of the damned and of the worst men.
All the aforesaid modes are reduced to the first two: to affirm or deny something false of God. For the dehonestativa implicitly says there is in God something blameworthy which is not blameworthy, or denies that to be worthy which is worthy. The imprecativa implicitly affirms of God that to be possible which cannot be, or that to be fitting which is not fitting.
783. Different intention of the blasphemer. — On the part of intention, blasphemy is direct or perfect, which is done with an affect of detestation or an expressed intention of dishonoring God, and proceeds from hatred of God, from anger and indignation against God (and religion), from contempt, etc.; and indirect, which is done without an expressed but with an implicit intention of dishonoring God, when one voluntarily utters words which according to the opinion of his intellect he knows, either from their proper signification, or from the manner of uttering, or from other circumstances, to import dishonor of God (a. 1). Hence if one from habit, from anger against creatures, from jest, in the manner of an interjection utters words of blasphemy, one commits the sin of blasphemy; except if it is done in jest so that the words are not taken by others as blasphemy, or if they are merely uttered narratively.
784. Blasphemy is a sin at the same time against faith and against religion. — For:
a) It is opposed to the confession of faith: for either it is heretical and explicitly says something against faith; or at least implicitly that God or a sacred thing is blameworthy, or that there is something in God worthy of insult; one can namely sin against the confession of faith even without uttering anything against faith, namely by signifying by one's manner of speaking that one does not believe, or by speaking as if one did not believe1.
b) It is also directly opposed to the honor and praise which are due to God, and so contains dishonor and irreverence against the virtue of religion.
Hence all blasphemies, even heretical ones, do not differ specifically under the notion of blasphemy; but sometimes other species are added, such as heresy, hatred of God, despair, which then are to be declared in confession.
But if the speech is contumelious against creatures, if they are looked at formally with relation to God, inasmuch as they are his creatures, as easily happens with wind, rain, thunder, heaven, the whole world (e.g. cursed be the rain of God...), and almost always with those which of themselves have a relation to God, such as the Christian faith, the sacraments, the saints, our soul, etc.: the insult necessarily redounds upon God, their author. Indeed since blasphemers generally do not intend to injure those things for their own excellence, but only mediately inasmuch as they are referred to God, there is no sin against dulia, but against religion and faith alone. — If however the saints were looked at, not as saints, but in themselves, formally abstracting from their relation to God, inasmuch as they are men, it would be a sin against the dulia alone due to the saints, venial if done in jest (e.g. by calling S. Crispin a shoemaker, S. Peter bald, SS. John and Paul eunuchs), grave if it proceeded from anger, indignation, contempt or hatred against them.
To curse other creatures considered in themselves, if they are rational, is injurious to them; if irrational, it is vain and idle. To curse the demon is not evil, unless sometimes accidentally by reason of scandal.
785. Blasphemy is a mortal sin of its whole genus: for no insult against God can be small (Lev. XXIV, 15-16; Is. XXXVI; IV Reg. XVIII, XIX; Tob. I, 21; II Mach. XV; I Tim. I, 20; Col. III, 8).
Indeed it is called the gravest, in the absolute sense, i.e. very grave; taken abstractly inasmuch as it is opposed to religion alone and imports only dishonor of God, it is less grave than hatred of God, infidelity, despair and idolatry; but graver than perjury (which affirms nothing false against God but only makes him a witness of falsehood) and than homicide (which is only against the neighbor). But if it be considered in the concrete, it supposes and includes the malice of infidelity or hatred of God and adds something to them, and so is graver than they, so that the greatest blasphemy is graver than the greatest infidelity or the greatest hatred of God.
On the part of the object therefore only idolatry, which otherwise contains a great blasphemy, surpasses it.
On the part of the sinner, however, it is often graver than idolatry.
On the part of the effect, it is less than homicide: for homicide harms man more than blasphemy harms God.
786. A voluntary custom or habit of blaspheming is bad because it proximately inclines to sin; whence there is an obligation to remove it, and he gravely sins who voluntarily acquires such a habit or neglects to eliminate it. He sins internally and as to the affection as many times as, advert to the obligation of breaking the habit, he does not break it; externally and as to the effect as many times as, from the habit of blasphemy sufficiently foreseen, he utters acts morally distinct.
He who blasphemes from habit
a) either utters words of blasphemy advertently, and then the blasphemy is voluntary and culpable in itself;
b) or does not attend to the words uttered, and then the speech which externally sounds as blasphemy is voluntary and culpable in its cause, namely the habit, as has been said;
c) but if he has efficaciously retracted the habit, neither is it voluntary in its cause, nor is there sin.
The habit is retracted by the will by which one is sorry for it and proposes to use means to remove it (which on account of the usefulness should be renewed several times); but if after proposing the means he has not used them, the habit again becomes indirectly voluntary for him, because he shows that he does not wish to remove it.
787. Practical rules. — 1° Not blasphemous are formulas which by their proper signification can be contumelious against God, but either are much changed or corrupted, or are halved or maimed, or at least are not taken by men as blasphemies. Such are the expressions: merdïè, mordïè, lardïè, jarnidïè, sernidïè, ventredië, sacredien, non de domme, verdomd, podverdomme, sacré nom, sakristi, sapristi, sangbleu, morbleu, non di hu, non de djowo, godvernondedomme, godvernondedju, saterment.
2° On the contrary, blasphemous are formulas which of themselves, by their proper signification, do not contain an insult against God, but either from the manner of uttering the name of God ironically or with contempt or in anger against God; or also from common acceptance are taken as such. Such was formerly the Flemish expression: G. v. D. which signifies according to some: God damn, according to others: God damn me (which is a mortal imprecation if said seriously, venial if said with levity as ordinarily happens), the true signification of which, that it is not blasphemous, the people must be taught by mandate of the Bishop of Belgium (Oct. 1903).
3° Equivocal formulas which can have a blasphemous and non-blasphemous meaning, are blasphemous or not, according to the intention of the speaker or at least of the hearers, e.g. mort-Dieu, ventre-Dieu, this is destined by fate, c'est fatalité, het is alzoo dat het moest zijn. Hence they are not blasphemous if they are not generally taken as such by men, e.g. in Belgium: tausend sakrament, tausend Herr Gott, mille Dieu, mille nom de Dieu, milliard de nom de Dieu, sacré mille Dieu.
4° In doubt whether a formula is blasphemous, attention must be paid to the intention and conscience of the speaker, and to the circumstances.
5° The French formula: S. N. de D. (S. D.) of itself is equivocal, because the word sacrum has a twofold meaning: in the primary and obvious sense it means blessed; but in a secondary sense it can signify by antiphrasis: accursed or execrable, as happens in interjections and formulas: sacrée bête, sacré coquin, menteur, bougre, mâtin, sacré curé, sacré fils, sacré pluie. Hence the formula: S. N. de D. can have a pious meaning, and a blasphemous meaning, which meaning it in fact has if it is pronounced out of anger or indignation, not indeed against creatures, but against God. Its origin seems to have been juratory: I swear by the sacred name of God. But this meaning is no longer perceived by all; indeed by some the formula is taken in a blasphemous sense, whether they have it as meaning: accursed be the name of God, or whether they do not assign it a definite meaning but in a confused way conceive a great blasphemy; which also often happens with the formula: S.D., although for this the persuasion is less firm. Which estimate however rightly does not exist and is not correct, since these formulas can have a good meaning.
Wherefore in practice preachers and confessors teach a) the blasphemous meaning not to be the single and only necessary meaning, and especially not to be: God is accursed; b) the formula not to be blasphemous, if it is not uttered from evil intention or from anger and indignation against God, but only by way of a simple interjection or out of anger against creatures; c) nevertheless one must abstain from it, both because it includes a venial irreverence toward God, and lest it be a scandal to others.
788. Practical remarks. — 1° Let confessors instruct penitents who from an erroneous conscience believe certain formulas to be true blasphemies and mortal sins, e.g. nom de Dieu, begod, par Dieu, etc.; — let them nevertheless inquire about the scandal given, which easily follows; — let those who utter true blasphemies (which in our country is rare) set forth the greatness of blasphemy and its dreadful malice and rashness and its uselessness, — let them impose on those to be corrected a renewal of firm purpose to be often repeated, and for each blasphemy a little prayer to be made immediately or a penance to be performed; and let them suggest other expressions which sound well but are not sinful.
2° Penitents are to be interrogated a) what words they have uttered: they sometimes confuse curses, imprecations, oaths, blasphemies; and with what intention: whether from infidelity, despair, hatred of God or the Saints, anger, etc.; — b) how often and on what occasion: in play, in the tavern, for how long, etc.; — c) whether in the presence of others, of children, of the family, etc., to know whether scandal was given.