ON THE HABIT OF FAITH.

ON FAITH ITSELF.

S. Th. II-II, q. 4, a. 1-5 ; q. 6, a. 2 ; De Verit., q. 14, a. 4-7.

716. The habit of faith 1) is in the intellect as in its subject, because its act, which is to believe, or to adhere to revealed truths, is an act of the intellect, whose object is the true (n. 693).

2. But this act is commanded by the will (n. 692 and 696) : since, however, several powers concur to produce the act, the act will not be perfect unless all those powers are perfectly disposed by some habit. Hence faith will not be perfect unless the will also is well disposed by some habit for commanding faith (a. 2).

3. Nevertheless, from this principle it cannot be concluded that there exists in the will some special habit which disposes us for nothing else than to command faith.

4. But it is to be said, in conformity with the principles of S. Thomas, that the habit by which man is perfectly disposed for commanding faith, and indeed on account of the ultimate end, is charity, which orders man to the ultimate end and is therefore born to command the acts of all the virtues.

717. Corollaries on formed and unformed faith. — From the foregoing doctrine the following conclusions are easily deduced :

1. Charity gives faith its ultimate perfection, namely the tending toward the ultimate end.

2. Hence charity is called the form (extrinsic, directive, and accidental) of faith (a. 3), and faith which is united to charity is faith formed or perfect and living, while that which is without charity is called unformed and imperfect or dead.

3. Unformed faith does not differ in essence from formed faith, but remaining the same in number, with the accession of charity it becomes formed ; hence they do not differ in species, but as perfect and imperfect in the same species (a. 5, ad 3).

4. Faith, although it is not a merely intellectual virtue but is seated in the intellect inasmuch as it is moved by the will, and therefore also inclines to upright living ; nevertheless in the supernatural order, it is not a virtue in the absolute sense and according to the perfect notion, or in the perfect state, which can produce an altogether perfect act, unless it is united to charity by which the will is perfectly disposed to tend toward the good. Because thus it comes about, as S. Thomas says, q. 4, a. 5, « that the intellect always tends toward the true, ... and that infallibly the will is ordered to the good end ». For when two powers concur to one operation, this will not be perfect unless each power is perfectly disposed.

5. Unformed faith, because it is a supernatural habit, is caused by God according to its essence, whence it is rightly called the gift of God (Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 7 and 15, can. 28 ; Vat., sess. 3, c. 3, can. 5) ; nevertheless God is not the cause that it is unformed, or that it is without charity (q. 6, a. 2).

718. Faith is in the speculative intellect, because it directly deals with the true and not with things to be done. Since, however, the object of faith, the first truth, is also the ultimate end for the sake of which we act, hence faith also extends itself to operations inasmuch as we are directed in them by revealed truths or by eternal and divine reasons. Hence faith is secondarily practical (a. 2, ad 3).

S. Th. II-II, q. 4, a. 5-7 ; De Verit., q. 14, a. 3 and 7.

719. Faith is a virtue because it is a good habit, not implying imperfection : it is good because it always tends toward the true ; — it does not imply imperfection, because for man in the state of way it is not an imperfection but a perfection to admit, on account of God's authority, those things which he cannot know by his own reason (a. 5).

It is one virtue because it has one formal object, for by the same divine authority we admit all revealed things (a. 6).

It is the first supernatural virtue : for the theological virtues, which order us to the supernatural end, precede the infused moral virtues which order us about the means ; moreover, in relation to the end, the knowing itself comes before willing it ; now we know the supernatural end through faith, and therefore faith is the first virtue. Nevertheless, accidentally, the act of some virtue can precede the act of faith, inasmuch as it removes the impediments to believing, such as humility removes pride, and fortitude removes worldly fear (a. 7).

S. Th. II-II, q. 4, a. 8 ; De Verit., q. 10, a. 12, ad 6 ; q. 14, a. 1, ad 7.

720. Notions on certitude. — Faith is compared with intellectual habits under the respect of certitude. To understand this, it must be recalled that properly so-called or speculative certitude is the determination of the intellect to one thing, or the firm adherence of the mind to an object without fear of erring. Hence it includes a twofold element : one negative, namely the exclusion of actual doubt, the other positive, namely the firm adherence of the mind, and so certitude can be considered under a twofold respect : 1) negatively, inasmuch as it excludes all doubt or fear, and so it does not admit of degrees but consists in the indivisible ; 2) positively, inasmuch as it firmly adheres to something, and so it admits of degrees and is greater or lesser. This takes place in two ways :

a) Simply and in itself, on the part of the cause and motive, i.e. that is more certain which has a more certain cause or motive, to which error is more repugnant. And so, in this way, faith is more certain than the other intellectual habits.

Summa Theologiae Moralis I. — 36 According to the diverse motive, natural certitude is metaphysical, physical, or moral. The first rests on the essential or metaphysical necessity of things known from their very essences. The second, on their natural necessity known by induction, by which, being posited, the same cause (antecedent), even in various circumstances, always or almost always and in many cases produces the same effect (consequent), which could not be unless there were a natural property and law according to which that cause constantly tends to this effect and also, unless hindered from elsewhere, would certainly have produced it, e.g. the sun rises in the morning, from hydrogen and oxygen water is made, mothers love their children. The third rests on the testimony of other men, which is shown to be true by a kind of moral induction, because so many and so great testimonies, diverse from one another and independent, in such varied circumstances, have been given in concord, that the concord cannot be explained except by the truth of the thing asserted, e.g. the existence of Julius Caesar, Napoleon, William II, Rome.

Moreover, metaphysical certitude is greater than physical, and this greater than moral, because error about the essence of things is more repugnant than about their natural inclination, and this more than error about the testimony of others.

b) Also in a certain respect and in relation to us, i.e. on the part of the subject, that is more certain which the intellect more fully attains because it is more clearly manifested to it, and consequently that which more satisfies the intellect, in which it rests quietly and to which it adheres more intensively firmly without any possibility of doubting. In this way evident or intrinsic certitude, which necessitates the intellect, is greater than non-evident and extrinsic, which does not necessitate but is sought from the authority of others.

Moreover, there is improperly so-called, prudential or practical certitude, which excludes not every speculative doubt, but every reasonable and prudent fear of erring. This is not strict certitude because it does not exclude every fear, but it is the greatest probability which is equivalent to certitude, because it suffices for acting rightly and prudently ; whence it renders us rather morally, i.e. nearly and equally certain, than is true moral certitude. Such is, for many, the knowledge of metaphysical and essential moral truths which they admit without full evidence of them ; likewise, often, experimental certitude ; especially human faith, which does not seem easily to be able to rise to strict certitude.

721. Faith is truly certain, as is evident from the fact that it rests on the infallible truth of God revealing (Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 9, can. 16, and Vat., sess. 3, c. 3); it is also most certain, as is held by the unanimous opinion of the Holy Fathers and Theologians.

a) But it is more certain simply and in itself, i.e. on the part of the cause and motive : for in this way faith is even more certain than metaphysical certitude, because it is more repugnant to admit the false on account of the truth of God in the light of divine grace than on account of any other motive, even on account of the full evidence of the natural light of our reason. Wherefore we adhere more and more firmly to the truths of faith than to others, because in faith the will moves the intellect to an estimatively firmer adherence, before every other natural cognition ; whence a man is ready to deny, as much as is possible for him, all those things which would contradict the revealed truths (1 John V, 9 ; Pius IX, enc. 9 Nov. 1846 : nothing more certain).

b) Nevertheless it is not more certain in a certain respect, namely, in relation to us, i.e. on the part of the subject, the believing man : for in this way faith, because it does not exclude involuntary doubt, is less certain than a fully evident assent which excludes all possible doubt. This however is accidental as to the motive of faith, which in itself has sufficient power to strengthen the intellect altogether, and it arises from our imperfect manner of concluding from it, and therefore faith is simply more certain.

Certitude on the part of the motive is called by theologians infallibility ; certitude on our part, indubitability.

The certitude of faith is preached in Scripture : a) a firm adherence is required (Acts II, 36 ; VIII, 37 ; Rom. IV, 3-10 ; Heb. X, 22 ; Gal. I, 8) ;

b) all doubt is reproved (Mk. XVI, 14 ; Lk. XXIV, 25) ;

c) the reason is indicated why the adherence must be firm (Acts I, 16 ff. ; Heb. X, 19 to the end of the chapter ; Gal. I, 8, 11 ; 1 John V, 9) ;

d) whence those things to which human reason seems to repugn are to be humbly admitted (Heb. XI, 1 ; 2 Tim. I, 12), and in the Athanasian Creed it is read : This is the Catholic faith, unless one believes it firmly...

722. Observations. — 1st The certitude of faith is greater on the part of the motive than the certitude of the judgment and the motives of credibility ; in this sense prop. 19 was condemned by Innocent XI : « The will cannot make the assent of faith in itself more firm than the weight of the reasons impelling to the assent of faith deserves », i.e. of the preambles because of which we judge that it is to be believed, or of the motives so remotely disposing to faith.

2° Since the conclusion is not more certain than the premises, it follows that in the opinion of Lugo, who says the act of faith is a reasoning, it cannot be explained how faith is more certain than rational cognition ; indeed, since he says (in the minor of the syllogism) that revelation is only practically certain, it would follow that faith has only a practical and improperly so-called certitude.

3° Some theologians falsely contend that divine grace partially supplies the defect of certitude on the part of the motive, and causes a firmer adherence than the proximate motive of adherence demands, on account of which we adhere and believe : for the will cannot reasonably command an adherence firmer than the motive of adherence deserves. Grace can, however, illuminate the intellect so that it may more clearly and better perceive the motives of faith and of credibility, even those which otherwise it would not perceive ; indeed it can exceptionally manifest internally a new and special motive of credibility to someone¹.

S. Th. II-II, q. 5.

723. The angels and the first man were created in faith. — The reason is that on the one hand they did not enjoy the vision of God in Himself, and on the other hand they were destined for this vision ; hence they ought to know it by faith, in order to be able to tend toward it as to a supernatural end (n. 707).

724. In the next life faith does not remain. — In the blessed faith does not remain, because they see (1 Cor. XIII, 9-10) ; it remains, however, in the souls of purgatory. — In the damned, on the other hand, it is brought to nothing, because no ability or tendency toward the supernatural end remains in them : for they are definitively turned away from the ultimate end and hardened in evil.

Nor should you say according to James II, 19 : « The demons believe and tremble ». For they do not properly believe, or adhere to revealed truths, by supernatural grace from a pious affection of credulity, on account of the sole authority of God revealing, because God is worthy of faith and because they wish to trust Him speaking ; — but they admit them only by rational cognition and a kind of historical certitude, because from the sharpness of their intellect they have such manifest indications that they are revealed by God who does not lie, and therefore that His testimony about them is in fact true, so that they are convinced of them and cannot doubt, because of the evidence, namely, of the testimony (cf. n. 689, 2°). They do not doubt, namely, but they adhere, yet on account of signs and inducing reasons, not on account of the very authority of God revealing.

725. Faith is lost not by any mortal sin whatsoever, as the Council of Trent defined, sess. 6, can. 28 and is presupposed in Scripture, 1 Cor. XIII, 2 ; James II, 14 ; but only by sin directly contrary to it (1 Tim. I, 19), namely by infidelity (Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 15), even if it concerns only one point. For he who denies the authority of God revealing in one thing cannot receive it in another, because it is always and in all things of equal weight and value. Hence if a heretic adheres to other articles, this is already done not by divine faith on account of God's authority, but either by human faith or by his own opinion.

S. Th. II-II, q. 6 and 7 ; De Verit., q. 8 and q. 18, a. 3.

726. God is the cause of faith : a) because He externally proposes both the things to be believed which we cannot know without divine revelation, and the manifest signs by which we know that this revelation is divine. But b) this is not enough, for many knowing these things do not believe ; hence an interior cause is also required which moves man interiorly to assent to those things which are of faith : but not only the free will alone, which is insufficient for a supernatural act ; therefore God also interiorly through grace (habitual or actual alone) moves us to assent to revealed truths. « Since man, by assenting to those things which are of faith, is elevated above his nature, this must be in him from a higher principle moving him interiorly, which is God. And therefore faith, as to the assent which is the principal act of faith, is from God moving interiorly through grace » (q. 6, a. 1). Faith, therefore, since it is by grace, is of itself infused.

727. Faith is supernatural, not only objectively because it has as its object the very truth of God revealing supernatural things ; but also subjectively because it is produced by a supernatural principle, the grace of God, not only medicinal or healing but also elevating. For it is impossible that by the powers of nature we attain any object which is in itself supernatural as such¹] ; since faith, namely, is the beginning of salvation and the root of justification, it is the means by which we tend to an end in itself supernatural, but the means must be proportioned to the end. So the Council of Orange II defined, can. 5, 6, 7 ; and Trent, sess. 6, c. 6, can. 3 ; and Vat., sess. 3, c. 3, can. 5 against Hermes. — Cf. John VI, 44, 45, 64 ; Eph. II, 5, 8 ; 1 Cor. III, 7 ; 2 Cor. III, 5 ; Phil. I, 29.

Moreover, not only the act of faith itself, but also the very affection of credulity or motion of the will, as being the beginning of faith, is elicited by the powers of grace, as the Council of Orange II defined, can. 5 and 7, against the Semipelagians. For to tend toward a supernatural object, namely toward the act of faith, requires the powers of grace.

The judgment of credibility itself can perhaps be made by the powers of nature, because it has as its object the reasonableness of faith ; but when that judgment is immediately and ultimately practical (here and now it is to be believed by me, here and now you believe), so that it is made in order to supernatural faith and is the cause that we wish to believe and do believe, or that the will of believing follows it, then it deals with the supernatural object as such, namely the act of faith to be exercised, and pertains to the beginning of faith, and therefore cannot be made except by the powers of grace, as is certainly gathered from the same Council (can. 5) and from the Council of Milevis (can. 4). Cf. S. Augustine, l. 2, c. 2, ep. Pel., c. 8.

The act of faith and the judgment of credibility are elicited by the habit of theological faith in him who possesses it²] ; otherwise it is done only by the powers of actual grace. The pious affection of credulity itself, according to S. Thomas, is elicited by charity in the just man ; but in the sinner it is done only by the help of actual grace.

728. Observations. — 1° The powers of grace which are granted to our intellect, whether under the form of a habit or under the form of actual grace, so that it can believe, are called by the holy Fathers and theologians the light of faith : for just as by the light of reason we can know natural things, so by these powers, which elevate our intellect, we can supernaturally know supernatural things.

2° Faith elevates us to the supernatural and divine order ; hence the act of faith is supernatural not only in mode but in itself and as to substance : for it is divine, because as material and formal object it has God in Himself, such as can naturally be known only by Himself. Hence we believe the same truths which we shall see in heaven as mysteries, and indeed for the same motive : the first truth revealing them. The only difference is on the part of the condition of the object, which in heaven is clear, here remains obscure. Hence, as the beatific vision is an act of divine life, so also is faith.

3° The habit of faith not only causes the act of faith itself, but, as in other habits, its causality extends itself to other principal subordinate acts (I-II, q. 54, a. 4), whether they are preparatory acts of the principal act, or conservative of it. Hence, by the habit of faith are also produced both the acts pertaining to the previous judgment of credibility as was said in the preceding n°³]., and the acts by which (on account of the authority of the Church) are admitted truths not indeed in themselves revealed but connected with these, which are defined by the Church for the safe preservation of faith, or at least are proposed with authority.

4° From what has been said the various properties of faith are already known : on the part of the material object, infallibility and obscurity ; on the part of the will, freedom ; on the part of the judgment of credibility : reasonableness (and rational credibility of the object) ; on the part of the intellect adhering to the formal object, the highest certitude ; on the part of the external cause, God moving through grace : supernaturality ; on the part, finally, of the subject of faith there belongs irrevocability, as will be said below, n. 736, 3°.

729. Effects of faith. — Faith has as effects : 1° fear : inasmuch as by unformed faith we apprehend evils to be inflicted by divine judgment, it is the cause of servile fear, by which one fears to be punished by God ; inasmuch as by formed faith we esteem God as the Supreme Good, from which to be separated is the worst, and to be unwilling to be equal to which is evil, it is the cause of filial fear, by which one is subject to God and fears to be separated from God ; — 2° it has as effect the purification of the heart : for that is said to be impure which is mixed with baser things ; and that is purified which is mixed with nobler things. From which it is clear that a man becomes impure if he subjects himself with love to temporal things which are baser than himself ; but by faith he tends to things superior to himself, namely supernatural and divine things, and therefore faith is the principle of purification of the heart : unformed faith indeed purifies from error, which arises from the intellect's inordinate adherence to lower things ; formed faith also from the impurity of affection. Hence Acts XV, 9 : Faith purifying their hearts.

S. Th. II-II, qq. 8 and 9.

730. The gift of understanding, under the interior instinct of the Holy Spirit, serves to penetrate with supernatural light those things which we cannot penetrate by natural light, and which stand in faith as principles from which other things are deduced (q. 8, a. 1).

Moreover, during the state of the way we are not able to penetrate these things in themselves; but we penetrate that other evident truths are not opposed to them (a. 2).

This happens according to a triple grade.

"The first grade of the gift of understanding is that by it man knows that he must hold to the truths of faith according to what is necessary for salvation, considering some reason of the Christian faith on account of which he knows that he must believe. For the Holy Spirit shows to everyone who has grace at least some reason of faith, on account of which he sees that what is proposed to him by faith comes from God..."

The second grade of the gift of understanding is to speculate subtly all or at least the chief truths of faith: and thus to be established all the more firmly in the truths of faith, the more diligently one considers the foundations of faith, so that one may abundantly marvel that God has deigned to reveal the faith so copiously and evidently... For the more profoundly the things which God has revealed are examined, the more they shine forth as the most certain and the most worthy of contemplation.

The third grade belongs to being able to consider with the purest gaze the proper reasons and foundations of each article of faith, and so to be able to speculate each truth of faith separately with the most subtle and most certain eye of mind, contemplating, namely, that it is reasonable to be believed, and considering the basis on which it rests... — both on account of the evangelical testimonies and apostolic documents, and on account of the most beautiful persuasions drawn from the natures of things. Moreover, contemplating the reasons of faith regarding the incarnation of the Son of God, the oracles of the prophets, the testimonies of the apostles, the reasonable considerations by which it is proved that this was fitting, and thus considering about each article or part of faith its proper foundations, and how they assert almost nothing about Christ which is not shown to have been predicted by the holy prophets...¹ "

To this gift corresponds the sixth beatitude: Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God. For the gift of understanding purifies the mind from the phantasms and errors by which we would ill-receive or ill-understand those things which are proposed about God; but the more we are purified from these, the better we see God, insofar as in this life it is possible to see Him in a mirror and in an enigma.

"For there is a twofold purity: one preliminary and dispositive for the vision of God, which is the purification of the affections from disordered affections; and this purity of heart is produced through the virtues and gifts which belong to the appetitive power. The other purity of heart is, as it were, completive with respect to the vision of God; and it consists in the mind being purified from the phantasms and errors by which it is impeded from the contemplation of those things which are seen in God, even as regards the intellective cognition by which the mind is borne to those things which are seen in God. And the first purity corresponds to the virtue of temperance; but the second corresponds to the gift of understanding."

To the gift of understanding correspond the fruits of the Holy Spirit, faith — that is, the certitude of faith which produces delight in the mind; in the will, however, the fruit joy corresponds (a. 8).

731. The gift of knowledge, under the interior instinct of the Holy Spirit, serves to judge rightly and certainly according to the truth of faith about human and created things, discerning which of these are to be believed and which are not to be believed (q. 9, a. 1 and 2).

"The gift of knowledge has three grades.

The first consists in this, that man looks upon all created things, knows that they are fallible and vain according to their divine nature, understands that they are not to be loved for their own sake, nor to be sought as the ultimate end, and clings to them less than to God; and this grade of the gift of knowledge is required for salvation, and is held to be common to all having charity..."

To the second grade of this knowledge we ought to progress, namely, that about each created thing, singly and through its proper reasons, we may know that affection is not to be fixed in it, nor is one to be tied to it as to a final good, but in them one neither intends nor uses them more nor less than is required for the intermission of the soul from those things which are directed to the ultimate end... [S. Th. II-II, q. 9, a. 4].

The third grade, finally, of the gift of knowledge, is to be so practiced, experienced, and perfect in those things which concern the active life, that in every doubtful event and perplexing case one may know most truly, most promptly, and most wholesomely how to judge, to elicit the causes of sins, to set forth the reasons for a negligent and sluggish life, and to know how to correct these and apply the appropriate remedy, to induce contempt for temporal things, and to attend to the most serious and tireless pursuit of spiritual progress².

To the gift of knowledge corresponds the third beatitude: Blessed are those who mourn, for they shall be comforted. For he who judges rightly about creatures does not find in them a perfect good, but rather mourns over them, and orders them to the divine good; from which consolation follows (a. 4).

732. Observations. — 1. To revealed truths we simply adhere by faith; by the gift of understanding we penetrate them.

2. The gift of knowledge differs from the gift of understanding: this proceeds by way of simple apprehension, "so that the things which are of faith may be penetrated or grasped by the intellect"; that proceeds by way of judgment, "so that man may have a right judgment about them and may esteem that he must hold to them and recede from their opposites" [S. Th. II-II, q. 9, a. 3].

3. These gifts, like faith, are primarily speculative in themselves, but secondarily practical (a. 3). Thus S. Thomas, in the present, retracts what he had written to the contrary in I-II, q. 68, a. 4 (a. 6).

4. Two vices are opposed to the gift of understanding: blindness of mind, and dullness of sense. The latter "imports a certain debility (or obtusion) of mind about the consideration of spiritual goods; but blindness of mind imports the complete privation of the knowledge of them" (q. 15, a. 1). Dullness arises from gluttony; blindness, from lust.

To the gift of knowledge, ignorance is directly opposed.