Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

S. Th. II-II, q. 1, a. 4, ad 2 ; q. 2, a. 1, ad 1 ; a. 9, ad 3 ; a. 10.

699. Thesis. For the act of faith a judgment of credibility is required beforehand. — The first act required for faith, which precedes the others, is the previous judgment of credibility (Ps. XCI, 5 according to the Greek and Latin [texts] ; John X, 25, 37-38). This is altogether required as a condition before the act of faith. The reason is that the will cannot move the intellect to believe something and command faith in something, unless this is proposed to it by the intellect as credible, and the intellect sees that it is to be believed. And indeed :

a) This judgment must be evident, because the will cannot prudently command an assent altogether certain and firm, unless some evidence, at least of credibility, is given, on account of which the intellect judges that it ought to be believed.

b) This judgment is the conclusion of a reasoning similar to that which Lugo said was the very act of faith : What God, infallible in speaking, says is credible and to be believed. But God, infallible in speaking, revealed the Incarnation. Therefore the Incarnation is credible and to be believed. — Or more reflectively : What, all things considered, after diligent examination, appears to me sufficiently as infallibly attested by God, is to be believed. But, all things considered, it sufficiently appears to me that God has revealed the Incarnation. Therefore it is to be believed.

c) Hence the premises of this reasoning, namely, that God is infallible in speaking and is to be believed, and that in fact He has spoken, must be known with at least practical certainty, not absolute, but relative, i.e. which, in respect to the capacity of each one's intellect, excludes all prudent doubt ; otherwise a certain judgment of credibility could not be founded on them¹].

Hence the 21st proposition was condemned by Innocent XI : « The assent of supernatural faith useful for salvation stands with only a probable knowledge of revelation, indeed with the fear lest God has not spoken » ; and prop. 25 of the Modernists by Pius X : « The assent of faith ultimately rests on a heap of probabilities ».

700. The judgment of credibility rests on the preambles of faith and on the motives of credibility. — Those things whose knowledge is required beforehand for faith, and on which the judgment of credibility rests, are called preambles of faith. The divine authority or infallibility in speaking is known by reason : for, supposing that God exists, it is easily deduced from the fact that He is a most perfect being. The fact of revelation, however, is known by different people through different arguments, as they are suited to their intellect ; these arguments are called motives of credibility.

The motives of credibility and the formal object or motive of faith therefore differ :

a) the former proximately demonstrate the motive of faith, namely, that God has revealed something, and so only remotely dispose, induce, impel, and lead one to faith ; the latter, on the contrary, formally moves the intellect to give the assent of faith ;

b) the former precede the act of faith, and are an extrinsic condition to it ; the latter enters into the act of faith as an essential element and intrinsic motive ;

c) the former show that faith is reasonable ; and they are not the formal motive why we believe something, but only why we judge that something is to be believed ; on the other hand, the formal motive of faith is why we actually believe, namely, the divine authority of God revealing.

701. The external motives of credibility are altogether certain. — There are most certain signs and external arguments, suited to the intelligence of all (Vat. Counc.), even of the men of this time (Creed against the Modernists), even for the wiser altogether apodictic, by which the existence of revelation is proved, as the Vat. Counc. defined, sess. 3, c. 3, can. 3 and 4, namely, certain facts which cannot be naturally explained, and which appear as supernatural and divine. They are, as the same Council teaches, c. 3, chiefly : 1) miracles and 2) prophecies ; — likewise 3) the Church which, by herself, on account of her admirable propagation, her exalted sanctity and her inexhaustible fruitfulness in good (confirmed by the testimony of innumerable martyrs), her Catholic unity and her unconquered stability, appears as a divine work and institution, and is an irrefragable witness of her divine legation ; and 4) the same Church which, marked with the signs and characters of her legation by Christ, evidently and easily appears to all as God's legate, and so as the guardian and mistress of revelation, proposing faith in the name of God.

Nor should you say : the Church is known by faith and revelation ; therefore she cannot be the means of knowing the revelation itself, and the motive of credibility ; otherwise we would fall into a vicious circle. — For the Church, inasmuch as she is the means of knowing revelation and the motive why we judge it is to be believed, is known not by revelation and faith but by reason and history, inasmuch as we can inspect her, e.g. as she is described in the Gospels and in the testimonies of ecclesiastical writers, not inasmuch as they are the word of God or the testimony of divine tradition, but inasmuch as they are historical books having human authority. Afterwards, however, the Church, as supernatural and divine, is known and believed by revelation and faith.

702. The internal motives of credibility are less certain. — The motives intrinsic to the Christian religion, such as the sanctity of Christ and the sublimity of Christian doctrine, even if considered by themselves also as divine external facts inexplicable naturally, do not seem to prove the existence of divine revelation with strictly demonstrative certitude, but only with the highest probability and practical certainty ; moreover they are arguments requiring much study and subject to great difficulties, and not suited to all intelligences. Hence they are not efficacious for convincing all, nor do they deserve to occupy the principal part in apologetics.

Still more grievously are deceived those who, having rejected or at least put aside the external motives of credibility, appeal solely or principally to merely internal motives for founding supernatural faith, such as internal experience, the need of the religious soul, the religious sense ; or even hold faith as something instinctive. For these motives :

a) are not evident, nor are they able to found practical certainty in all, indeed they are subjective in such a way that some in one way, some in another, believe or do not believe from them ;

b) are repugnant to the supernatural character of faith, if taken in the very word of what they say : that faith is a pleasing of nature, or that it alone satisfies the aspirations of nature or the necessities of society, since even natural religion satisfies sufficiently ;

c) are repugnant to the motive of faith, which would no longer be the testimony of God but a conformity with nature or society : for that God has spoken cannot be proved by any of the foregoing or by other internal criteria, but only by external divine facts. Hence those motives can prepare for faith by removing the obstacles of faith, dispose the will to receive revelation, and confirm it ; but they cannot demonstrate it.

703. The motives of credibility are sufficiently certain broadly speaking ; some, however, can found absolute certitude. — The motives of credibility, although for many they are not certain except by a practical and improperly so-called certitude, can nevertheless be absolutely certain. Hence it is false, that Lugo is forced to say the act of faith — which he thinks the conclusion of a reasoning — is obscure and free, because the premises, namely, God's authority and at least the fact of revelation, are obscure and are not known with evidence or certain demonstration, but only with great probability and practical certainty. For 1) the infallibility or authority of God revealing in speaking can be clearly perceived, as is done by philosophers ; — 2) about the fact of revelation, we seem able to acquire true historical certitude a) from the prophecies, or from the miracles of Christ, about whose life and deeds we have historical certitude, and physical certitude about the supernatural character of his acts, — and especially b) if all the motives of credibility are considered together, because if so many and all the indications concur in showing the truth of our religion, Providence itself would be deceived if this religion were not true : it is not only improbable, but impossible to explain the Catholic Church and the miracles of Christ and the Apostles, if the religion of Christ is not true ; — indeed 3) that God has spoken can be evident ; as it was for the Angels, the Apostles, and others who are immediately instructed by God in faith ; which does not impede faith, because the more evident the authority of God and the fact of revelation appear, the more evident the obligation to believe appears.

Hence the act of faith is only obscure and free because revelation does not make the revealed things appear, and chiefly because they are not believed except by trusting divine authority.

704. How can children and the unlearned form for themselves a judgment of credibility ? — By children and the unlearned, the fact of revelation is often known only through the human authority of parents, the wise, the pastor, etc., whom they trust : for right and prudent reason dictates to them that in things necessary which they cannot see by themselves, they should subject themselves to the authority of those who can and ought naturally to instruct them. They believe, therefore, by human faith those things which they have received from their parents or parish priest about the history of the revelation made by God, e.g. that God has taught such and such ; which being posited, they believe those things by divine faith on account of the sole authority of God revealing.

In general they have a judgment of credibility. This is formed fairly easily by the following or an equivalent reasoning, at least implicit : In necessary things which I cannot investigate, it is prudent or obligatory to admit the testimony of those who are naturally the guides or instructors. But by myself I cannot be certain that God has spoken these things. Therefore it is prudent and obligatory to admit this because it is said by those who are naturally the guides and instructors ; and therefore to believe on account of God's testimony.

Parents and priests, whose duty it is to instruct such persons, should therefore attend : 1) that the doctrine be proposed to them at least as the word or revelation of God, for otherwise they would believe by human faith alone, on account of the authority of those same persons, and not by divine faith on account of the authority of God revealing. Although 2) if they are instructed a little more, they easily recognize that the parents teach the same as their priests, and that these are united with the bishops, and the bishops are united with the Roman Pontiff, e.g. because all teach a similar catechism ; whence they will know that the doctrine proposed is not of private persons, but of the universal religious society, which is possessed of the greatest authority, and is taught by the pastors not in their own name but as ministers of the Church, sent by her and by Christ to preach ; — indeed 3) they easily recognize that this doctrine is the word of God, because of the miracles by which the revelation was confirmed, and because of the Church which, by her marks (great authority and truth, Catholic unity of doctrine, sanctity and fruitfulness in good, unconquered stability), easily appears to all as God's legate and guardian of the revealed word.

705. Observations. — 1st From the part of the judgment of credibility, faith is called reasonable, and a special property belongs to it, namely, that even from outside the Church no one is believed to be a believer unless he has first judged the things of faith to be credible, and therefore judges them to be true.

2nd Although the Holy Spirit can teach directly and immediately, and sometimes does teach even the unlearned, the Protestants are nevertheless wrong, who say that revelation is credible on account of the immediate and internal testimony of the Holy Spirit, which is given to all (cf. treatise on the Theological Loci).

3rd Lugo and those who hold the act of faith to be the conclusion of a reasoning which is admitted on account of the premises, to explain in their opinion how the proximate, immediate, and ultimate motive of faith is the authority and revelation of God, are forced to say that the premises, and notably the fact of revelation which is asserted in the minor, are known immediately by all and without a new reasoning, because the miracles, the fulfillments of prophecies, the proposition of the Church, etc., by which revelation is proved or shown and on account of which revelation is affirmed in the minor, are the complex part of the divine speech. — But

a) at the most all these are only the external speech of God, which is not the motive of faith, as was said above, n. 669 ;

b) probably they are not even the external speech of God itself except improperly ; properly they are only signs of the divine speech, just as a seal is a sign of the king's letter ;

c) we have known divine revelation for the first time not immediately, but only through several arguments.