Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

S. Th. II-II, q. 1, a. 1 ; q. 2, a. 2 ; De Verit., q. 14, a. 1 ; III Sent. d. 23, q. 2, a. 2, qc. 2.

693. Thesis. The elicitive principle of faith is the intellect. — The ultimate act required for faith, which is essentially and properly the act of faith by which assent is given to revealed truth, is an act of the intellect ; hence the intellect is the proximate elicitive principle of faith. — It is certain from the Vat. Counc., sess. 3, c. 3, establishing faith « whereby we believe things to be true », and from the Creed of Pius X ; against many Protestants who hold faith as a trust which is more in the heart or will than in the intellect, and against the Rationalists, Semi-rationalists, and Modernists who place it principally in a tendency or inclination, or reduce it to a religious sense.

It is clear from Scripture in which

1. faith is called the argument, i.e. the conviction of things not seen (Heb. XI, 1) ;

2. which we admit something as true and indeed on account of testimony (Heb. XI, 3, 6, 8 ; Mk. XVI, 16 ; John VI, 70 ; XX, 31 ; Rom. X, 9 ; 1 John V, 1-10) ;

3. whence it is called the captivity of the intellect in obedience to Christ (2 Cor. X, 5).

Hence the profession of faith in which the Creed was explained was always required of catechumens (cf. Cyr. Hier. Cat. V, 7 ; Chrys. in Hebr., Aug. De Praed. SS. n. 5).

694. The analysis of the act of faith is simply this : we admit some truth, e.g. the Incarnation, i.e. we judge it to be true, because God has authority in revealing it (which is presupposed as already known beforehand) ; but we do not believe nor in any way affirm in this act the authority of God revealing itself. For just as in human faith the authority of Peter as a witness is in no way believed or affirmed, but is only the motive, or that on account of which I believe what he says, so in divine faith the authority of God revealing is only the motive on account of which it is believed, but is in no way what is believed or affirmed ; otherwise it would be to confuse the material and formal object. In other words : the knowledge of God's authority is presupposed beforehand as a condition, but is not the cause or motive of the assent ; this is not knowledge about God's authority but the sole authority known from elsewhere¹].

Hence 1) Suarez does not correctly teach²] that the motive, i.e. the authority of God revealing, is believed in the very act of faith, saying that the analysis of this act is : I believe the Incarnation, because I believe the authority of God revealing it, and I believe the authority of God revealing it, because I believe the authority of God revealing Himself, since it is impossible that God reveal something and not by that very fact say His own authority in revealing, or that He reveal Himself with authority. — For again one may ask : and why do you believe God saying that He reveals with authority, or revealing His authority ? Either you will answer, because I believe a new revelation of the authority of God, and then you believe this because you believe another, and then there will be a process to infinity ; or you will answer : I believe the authority of God revealing because I believe it, which is a blind affirmation without a given reason.

Nor should you say : the authority of God revealing is also revealed, therefore it too ought to be believed. — It is replied :

a) it is not therefore believed in every act of faith : for the intellect can abstract from the fact that God, by revealing, also revealed His authority, and consider only that He has revealed some truth, e.g. the Incarnation ; indeed ordinarily we act in this way ;

b) when we believe the authority of God revealing, it is at once what is believed and the motive on account of which it is believed, but it is not believed as it is the formal object or motive ; in other words : the authority of God is believed on its own account as a motive, but not on its own account as believed, otherwise we would arrive at this absurd analysis : I believe the authority of God revealing because I believe it !

Likewise 2) we do not admit what Lugo teaches³], that in the act of faith the authority of God and the very fact of revelation are affirmed by reason, saying that the act of faith is a reasoning or is equivalent to one : God is infallible in revealing, but God revealed the Incarnation, therefore the Incarnation took place. — For :

a) the conclusion of this syllogism is not : therefore the Incarnation took place, but : therefore God, by revealing the Incarnation, is infallible. This conclusion is not the act of faith, because it is not the adherence given to the Incarnation ; from it indeed follows the obligation of believing the Incarnation, but not necessarily that it is already believed⁴ ; b) that conclusion, since it is admitted on account of the nexus with the premises, is not an act of faith in the authority and testimony of another, but an act of science ; especially

c) that it is not admitted by trusting the dignity or authority of God revealing ; whence such reasoning could also be made by an infidel, who with a perverse will would not wish to believe.

Nor should you say : it is irrational, indeed impossible, for us to believe unless we know God to be infallible in revealing and that He has spoken. — For it is replied that the assertion is true, but it does not therefore follow that those truths are affirmed in the very act of faith : it suffices and is required that they be known before that act, as will be said in art. 3. Just as in human faith, it is required beforehand that I know the authority and testimony of Peter in order to believe him, but not that, while I believe him, I affirm his authority and testimony.

695. Corollaries. — From the foregoing doctrine it follows, and experience confirms,

1. the act of faith is simple, because it indivisibly attains the revealed truth as believed and the authority of the revealer as the reason for believing ; therefore

2. it is not complex and multiple, so that it is equivalent to two other acts (as Suarez says) or three (as Lugo says) ; therefore

3. nor is it formally or virtually discursive. Moreover, an assent which rests on a discourse has as its motive the goodness of the consequence, for it assents to the conclusion because it logically coheres and follows well from the antecedent ; but the assent of faith in no way rests on the goodness of the consequence, but the adequate motive of faith is the sole first truth of God revealing something.