ON THE ANALYSIS OF THE ACT OF FAITH.

S. Th., in III Sent., d. 23, q. 2, a. 2, qc. 2.

692. Analysis or resolution of the act is its reduction to principles, both objective and subjective, i.e. to the motive and efficient causes which concur in its production. Now divine faith, as human faith, comprises several acts, for the act of faith itself presupposes two others : for it is the assent of the intellect commanded by the will, and so presupposes the motion and command of the will ; but the will cannot move the intellect to assent and command the assent of the intellect, unless the intellect itself previously judges that such an assent is to be given, whence it presupposes a judgment of credibility on the part of the intellect. Hence

1. three acts are required for believing : a) a judgment of credibility, by which we judge that such or such a truth, e.g. the Incarnation, is to be believed ; b) a pious affection of credulity, by which we will to believe that truth ; c) the act of faith itself, by which we properly believe, i.e. adhere to that truth and judge it to be true ;

2. consequently the question why we believe can be understood in a threefold sense, namely, a) dispositively : why do we judge that some truth is to be believed ? — b) affectively : why do we command the assent to that truth ? — c) formally : why do we adhere to it ? Therefore the analysis of this threefold act is to be undertaken.

S. Th. II-II, q. 1, a. 1 ; q. 2, a. 2 ; De Verit., q. 14, a. 1 ; III Sent. d. 23, q. 2, a. 2, qc. 2.

693. Thesis. The elicitive principle of faith is the intellect. — The ultimate act required for faith, which is essentially and properly the act of faith by which assent is given to revealed truth, is an act of the intellect ; hence the intellect is the proximate elicitive principle of faith. — It is certain from the Vat. Counc., sess. 3, c. 3, establishing faith « whereby we believe things to be true », and from the Creed of Pius X ; against many Protestants who hold faith as a trust which is more in the heart or will than in the intellect, and against the Rationalists, Semi-rationalists, and Modernists who place it principally in a tendency or inclination, or reduce it to a religious sense.

It is clear from Scripture in which

1. faith is called the argument, i.e. the conviction of things not seen (Heb. XI, 1) ;

2. which we admit something as true and indeed on account of testimony (Heb. XI, 3, 6, 8 ; Mk. XVI, 16 ; John VI, 70 ; XX, 31 ; Rom. X, 9 ; 1 John V, 1-10) ;

3. whence it is called the captivity of the intellect in obedience to Christ (2 Cor. X, 5).

Hence the profession of faith in which the Creed was explained was always required of catechumens (cf. Cyr. Hier. Cat. V, 7 ; Chrys. in Hebr., Aug. De Praed. SS. n. 5).

694. The analysis of the act of faith is simply this : we admit some truth, e.g. the Incarnation, i.e. we judge it to be true, because God has authority in revealing it (which is presupposed as already known beforehand) ; but we do not believe nor in any way affirm in this act the authority of God revealing itself. For just as in human faith the authority of Peter as a witness is in no way believed or affirmed, but is only the motive, or that on account of which I believe what he says, so in divine faith the authority of God revealing is only the motive on account of which it is believed, but is in no way what is believed or affirmed ; otherwise it would be to confuse the material and formal object. In other words : the knowledge of God's authority is presupposed beforehand as a condition, but is not the cause or motive of the assent ; this is not knowledge about God's authority but the sole authority known from elsewhere¹].

Hence 1) Suarez does not correctly teach²] that the motive, i.e. the authority of God revealing, is believed in the very act of faith, saying that the analysis of this act is : I believe the Incarnation, because I believe the authority of God revealing it, and I believe the authority of God revealing it, because I believe the authority of God revealing Himself, since it is impossible that God reveal something and not by that very fact say His own authority in revealing, or that He reveal Himself with authority. — For again one may ask : and why do you believe God saying that He reveals with authority, or revealing His authority ? Either you will answer, because I believe a new revelation of the authority of God, and then you believe this because you believe another, and then there will be a process to infinity ; or you will answer : I believe the authority of God revealing because I believe it, which is a blind affirmation without a given reason.

Nor should you say : the authority of God revealing is also revealed, therefore it too ought to be believed. — It is replied :

a) it is not therefore believed in every act of faith : for the intellect can abstract from the fact that God, by revealing, also revealed His authority, and consider only that He has revealed some truth, e.g. the Incarnation ; indeed ordinarily we act in this way ;

b) when we believe the authority of God revealing, it is at once what is believed and the motive on account of which it is believed, but it is not believed as it is the formal object or motive ; in other words : the authority of God is believed on its own account as a motive, but not on its own account as believed, otherwise we would arrive at this absurd analysis : I believe the authority of God revealing because I believe it !

Likewise 2) we do not admit what Lugo teaches³], that in the act of faith the authority of God and the very fact of revelation are affirmed by reason, saying that the act of faith is a reasoning or is equivalent to one : God is infallible in revealing, but God revealed the Incarnation, therefore the Incarnation took place. — For :

a) the conclusion of this syllogism is not : therefore the Incarnation took place, but : therefore God, by revealing the Incarnation, is infallible. This conclusion is not the act of faith, because it is not the adherence given to the Incarnation ; from it indeed follows the obligation of believing the Incarnation, but not necessarily that it is already believed⁴ ; b) that conclusion, since it is admitted on account of the nexus with the premises, is not an act of faith in the authority and testimony of another, but an act of science ; especially

c) that it is not admitted by trusting the dignity or authority of God revealing ; whence such reasoning could also be made by an infidel, who with a perverse will would not wish to believe.

Nor should you say : it is irrational, indeed impossible, for us to believe unless we know God to be infallible in revealing and that He has spoken. — For it is replied that the assertion is true, but it does not therefore follow that those truths are affirmed in the very act of faith : it suffices and is required that they be known before that act, as will be said in art. 3. Just as in human faith, it is required beforehand that I know the authority and testimony of Peter in order to believe him, but not that, while I believe him, I affirm his authority and testimony.

695. Corollaries. — From the foregoing doctrine it follows, and experience confirms,

1. the act of faith is simple, because it indivisibly attains the revealed truth as believed and the authority of the revealer as the reason for believing ; therefore

2. it is not complex and multiple, so that it is equivalent to two other acts (as Suarez says) or three (as Lugo says) ; therefore

3. nor is it formally or virtually discursive. Moreover, an assent which rests on a discourse has as its motive the goodness of the consequence, for it assents to the conclusion because it logically coheres and follows well from the antecedent ; but the assent of faith in no way rests on the goodness of the consequence, but the adequate motive of faith is the sole first truth of God revealing something.

S. Th. II-II, q. 2, a. 2 and 9 ; q. 1, a. 1 ; De Verit., q. 14, a. 2, ad 10 and 13 ; a. 3, ad 10 ; a. 7, ad 3 ; III Sent., d. 23, q.

696. Thesis. For the act of faith the command of the will is also required. — The second act required for faith, namely, is the motion of the will ; this is certain because it is explicitly taught by the Vat. Counc., sess. 3, c. 3, calling faith « the obedience of the will », and indeed it follows immediately from what it defined about the freedom of faith (can. 5).

The analysis of this is as follows : the will moves to assent to revealed things and commands it on account of its own proper motive ; but the proper motive of the will is the good ; hence it moves the intellect to believe, e.g. because it is good to believe, because to believe is useful, because it is good to tend to the ultimate end by faith, because it is good not to act irrationally. « That will, says S. Thomas, De Verit., q. 14, a. 2, ad 10, which determines the intellect to believe, is not an act of charity, nor an act of hope, but a certain appetite (or simple volition) of the good promised », e.g. John VI, 69. This act of the will moving the intellect to believe is called by theologians after the Council of Orange II the pious affection of credulity, i.e. a pious inclination to believe.

697. Corollary : What it is to believe God, to believe God, and to believe in God. — From the foregoing we understand, following S. Augustine in John, tr. 29, that S. Thomas teaches (a. 2) that by the act of faith we believe God, God, and in God. For to believe is an act of the intellect commanded by the will. On the part of the intellect, God is the primary material object, and this we signify by saying : I believe God ; He is also the formal object, and this we signify by saying : I believe God, namely, with authority speaking. On the part of the will, however, this commands the act of faith by tending to God as to an end, and this we signify by saying : I believe in God. We do not do this last perfectly except through charity, and so without this faith is called imperfect or unformed.

On the contrary, by divine faith we do not believe the Church, because the Church is not the formal object of this faith, although we may believe her by human faith, or indeed by divine faith insofar as she is proposed by God Himself as the organ of faith.

698. The freedom of faith. — From the part of the motion of the will the act of faith has a property, namely, freedom, as the Council of Orange II (can. 5) and Trent (sess. 6, c. 6) already taught, and the Vatican Council defined (sess. 3, c. 3, can. 5), against the Rationalists and Hermes, who confuse faith with science.

It is a free act 1) not indeed radically, remotely, and accidentally, because we can fail to consider the motives of credibility, — or because the motives of credibility do not make us altogether certain of the revelation, as Lugo falsely teaches (as will be said in the next art., n. 703), which would explain freedom in the preambles but not in the act of faith itself ; — but

2. formally, proximately, and of itself, because, although the fact of revelation and the obligation to believe can be altogether certain and evident, nevertheless the truths to be believed are not in themselves evident for us ; hence the intellect does not necessarily assent to them, but for this the motion of the free will is required, especially

3. because we admit those truths by trusting the divine authority. From which it follows

a) the act of faith is free not only as to exercise, i.e. as to the use (like science), because we can fail to consider the motive or turn attention away from the object of belief, but also as to specification, or as to the assent, because while we consider the object, there remains the possibility of doubting, of not assenting, indeed of denying ; whence S. Thomas, a. 10 : « the act of faith... is subject to the will not only as to use, but also as to assent » ;

b) the act of faith can be meritorious, with charity, however, being present (a. 9 and 10).

The freedom of faith is given in Holy Scripture : a) once the preaching of the Gospel has been put forth, some believe, some do not believe, which is a sign of freedom (Acts XVII, 32-34 ; Rom. X, 16 ; Is. LXV) ; they do not believe because they do not seek the light but love the darkness (John III, 18-21) ;

b) believers are praised, unbelievers are reproved (Rom. IV, 3 ; Mk. XVI, 14 ; Apoc. II, 19 ; Lk. XXIV, 25 ; Acts VII, 39) ;

c) faith falls under a precept and a reward is ascribed to it, whereas infidelity is held as a grave sin worthy of eternal punishment (1 John III, 23 ; John III, 15 ; Rom. IV, 3 ; Mk. XVI, 16) ;

d) whence faith is called voluntary obedience (Rom. I, 5 ; X, 16 ; Acts VI, 7 ; 2 Cor. X, 5-6), by which it is believed from the heart, indeed with the whole heart (Rom. X, 9-10 ; Acts VIII, 37). Hence Augustine, in John tr. 26, n. 2 : « None can believe unless willing » ; and Irenaeus, adv. Haer. IV, 37, 5 : « The Lord preserved the free and self-determined choice of man not only in works but also in faith ; and for this reason, if anyone believes in Him, he has eternal life, but he who does not believe the Son does not have eternal life, but the wrath of God remains upon him ».

Therefore the Church has never used force for the conversion of infidels.

S. Th. II-II, q. 1, a. 4, ad 2 ; q. 2, a. 1, ad 1 ; a. 9, ad 3 ; a. 10.

699. Thesis. For the act of faith a judgment of credibility is required beforehand. — The first act required for faith, which precedes the others, is the previous judgment of credibility (Ps. XCI, 5 according to the Greek and Latin [texts] ; John X, 25, 37-38). This is altogether required as a condition before the act of faith. The reason is that the will cannot move the intellect to believe something and command faith in something, unless this is proposed to it by the intellect as credible, and the intellect sees that it is to be believed. And indeed :

a) This judgment must be evident, because the will cannot prudently command an assent altogether certain and firm, unless some evidence, at least of credibility, is given, on account of which the intellect judges that it ought to be believed.

b) This judgment is the conclusion of a reasoning similar to that which Lugo said was the very act of faith : What God, infallible in speaking, says is credible and to be believed. But God, infallible in speaking, revealed the Incarnation. Therefore the Incarnation is credible and to be believed. — Or more reflectively : What, all things considered, after diligent examination, appears to me sufficiently as infallibly attested by God, is to be believed. But, all things considered, it sufficiently appears to me that God has revealed the Incarnation. Therefore it is to be believed.

c) Hence the premises of this reasoning, namely, that God is infallible in speaking and is to be believed, and that in fact He has spoken, must be known with at least practical certainty, not absolute, but relative, i.e. which, in respect to the capacity of each one's intellect, excludes all prudent doubt ; otherwise a certain judgment of credibility could not be founded on them¹].

Hence the 21st proposition was condemned by Innocent XI : « The assent of supernatural faith useful for salvation stands with only a probable knowledge of revelation, indeed with the fear lest God has not spoken » ; and prop. 25 of the Modernists by Pius X : « The assent of faith ultimately rests on a heap of probabilities ».

700. The judgment of credibility rests on the preambles of faith and on the motives of credibility. — Those things whose knowledge is required beforehand for faith, and on which the judgment of credibility rests, are called preambles of faith. The divine authority or infallibility in speaking is known by reason : for, supposing that God exists, it is easily deduced from the fact that He is a most perfect being. The fact of revelation, however, is known by different people through different arguments, as they are suited to their intellect ; these arguments are called motives of credibility.

The motives of credibility and the formal object or motive of faith therefore differ :

a) the former proximately demonstrate the motive of faith, namely, that God has revealed something, and so only remotely dispose, induce, impel, and lead one to faith ; the latter, on the contrary, formally moves the intellect to give the assent of faith ;

b) the former precede the act of faith, and are an extrinsic condition to it ; the latter enters into the act of faith as an essential element and intrinsic motive ;

c) the former show that faith is reasonable ; and they are not the formal motive why we believe something, but only why we judge that something is to be believed ; on the other hand, the formal motive of faith is why we actually believe, namely, the divine authority of God revealing.

701. The external motives of credibility are altogether certain. — There are most certain signs and external arguments, suited to the intelligence of all (Vat. Counc.), even of the men of this time (Creed against the Modernists), even for the wiser altogether apodictic, by which the existence of revelation is proved, as the Vat. Counc. defined, sess. 3, c. 3, can. 3 and 4, namely, certain facts which cannot be naturally explained, and which appear as supernatural and divine. They are, as the same Council teaches, c. 3, chiefly : 1) miracles and 2) prophecies ; — likewise 3) the Church which, by herself, on account of her admirable propagation, her exalted sanctity and her inexhaustible fruitfulness in good (confirmed by the testimony of innumerable martyrs), her Catholic unity and her unconquered stability, appears as a divine work and institution, and is an irrefragable witness of her divine legation ; and 4) the same Church which, marked with the signs and characters of her legation by Christ, evidently and easily appears to all as God's legate, and so as the guardian and mistress of revelation, proposing faith in the name of God.

Nor should you say : the Church is known by faith and revelation ; therefore she cannot be the means of knowing the revelation itself, and the motive of credibility ; otherwise we would fall into a vicious circle. — For the Church, inasmuch as she is the means of knowing revelation and the motive why we judge it is to be believed, is known not by revelation and faith but by reason and history, inasmuch as we can inspect her, e.g. as she is described in the Gospels and in the testimonies of ecclesiastical writers, not inasmuch as they are the word of God or the testimony of divine tradition, but inasmuch as they are historical books having human authority. Afterwards, however, the Church, as supernatural and divine, is known and believed by revelation and faith.

702. The internal motives of credibility are less certain. — The motives intrinsic to the Christian religion, such as the sanctity of Christ and the sublimity of Christian doctrine, even if considered by themselves also as divine external facts inexplicable naturally, do not seem to prove the existence of divine revelation with strictly demonstrative certitude, but only with the highest probability and practical certainty ; moreover they are arguments requiring much study and subject to great difficulties, and not suited to all intelligences. Hence they are not efficacious for convincing all, nor do they deserve to occupy the principal part in apologetics.

Still more grievously are deceived those who, having rejected or at least put aside the external motives of credibility, appeal solely or principally to merely internal motives for founding supernatural faith, such as internal experience, the need of the religious soul, the religious sense ; or even hold faith as something instinctive. For these motives :

a) are not evident, nor are they able to found practical certainty in all, indeed they are subjective in such a way that some in one way, some in another, believe or do not believe from them ;

b) are repugnant to the supernatural character of faith, if taken in the very word of what they say : that faith is a pleasing of nature, or that it alone satisfies the aspirations of nature or the necessities of society, since even natural religion satisfies sufficiently ;

c) are repugnant to the motive of faith, which would no longer be the testimony of God but a conformity with nature or society : for that God has spoken cannot be proved by any of the foregoing or by other internal criteria, but only by external divine facts. Hence those motives can prepare for faith by removing the obstacles of faith, dispose the will to receive revelation, and confirm it ; but they cannot demonstrate it.

703. The motives of credibility are sufficiently certain broadly speaking ; some, however, can found absolute certitude. — The motives of credibility, although for many they are not certain except by a practical and improperly so-called certitude, can nevertheless be absolutely certain. Hence it is false, that Lugo is forced to say the act of faith — which he thinks the conclusion of a reasoning — is obscure and free, because the premises, namely, God's authority and at least the fact of revelation, are obscure and are not known with evidence or certain demonstration, but only with great probability and practical certainty. For 1) the infallibility or authority of God revealing in speaking can be clearly perceived, as is done by philosophers ; — 2) about the fact of revelation, we seem able to acquire true historical certitude a) from the prophecies, or from the miracles of Christ, about whose life and deeds we have historical certitude, and physical certitude about the supernatural character of his acts, — and especially b) if all the motives of credibility are considered together, because if so many and all the indications concur in showing the truth of our religion, Providence itself would be deceived if this religion were not true : it is not only improbable, but impossible to explain the Catholic Church and the miracles of Christ and the Apostles, if the religion of Christ is not true ; — indeed 3) that God has spoken can be evident ; as it was for the Angels, the Apostles, and others who are immediately instructed by God in faith ; which does not impede faith, because the more evident the authority of God and the fact of revelation appear, the more evident the obligation to believe appears.

Hence the act of faith is only obscure and free because revelation does not make the revealed things appear, and chiefly because they are not believed except by trusting divine authority.

704. How can children and the unlearned form for themselves a judgment of credibility ? — By children and the unlearned, the fact of revelation is often known only through the human authority of parents, the wise, the pastor, etc., whom they trust : for right and prudent reason dictates to them that in things necessary which they cannot see by themselves, they should subject themselves to the authority of those who can and ought naturally to instruct them. They believe, therefore, by human faith those things which they have received from their parents or parish priest about the history of the revelation made by God, e.g. that God has taught such and such ; which being posited, they believe those things by divine faith on account of the sole authority of God revealing.

In general they have a judgment of credibility. This is formed fairly easily by the following or an equivalent reasoning, at least implicit : In necessary things which I cannot investigate, it is prudent or obligatory to admit the testimony of those who are naturally the guides or instructors. But by myself I cannot be certain that God has spoken these things. Therefore it is prudent and obligatory to admit this because it is said by those who are naturally the guides and instructors ; and therefore to believe on account of God's testimony.

Parents and priests, whose duty it is to instruct such persons, should therefore attend : 1) that the doctrine be proposed to them at least as the word or revelation of God, for otherwise they would believe by human faith alone, on account of the authority of those same persons, and not by divine faith on account of the authority of God revealing. Although 2) if they are instructed a little more, they easily recognize that the parents teach the same as their priests, and that these are united with the bishops, and the bishops are united with the Roman Pontiff, e.g. because all teach a similar catechism ; whence they will know that the doctrine proposed is not of private persons, but of the universal religious society, which is possessed of the greatest authority, and is taught by the pastors not in their own name but as ministers of the Church, sent by her and by Christ to preach ; — indeed 3) they easily recognize that this doctrine is the word of God, because of the miracles by which the revelation was confirmed, and because of the Church which, by her marks (great authority and truth, Catholic unity of doctrine, sanctity and fruitfulness in good, unconquered stability), easily appears to all as God's legate and guardian of the revealed word.

705. Observations. — 1st From the part of the judgment of credibility, faith is called reasonable, and a special property belongs to it, namely, that even from outside the Church no one is believed to be a believer unless he has first judged the things of faith to be credible, and therefore judges them to be true.

2nd Although the Holy Spirit can teach directly and immediately, and sometimes does teach even the unlearned, the Protestants are nevertheless wrong, who say that revelation is credible on account of the immediate and internal testimony of the Holy Spirit, which is given to all (cf. treatise on the Theological Loci).

3rd Lugo and those who hold the act of faith to be the conclusion of a reasoning which is admitted on account of the premises, to explain in their opinion how the proximate, immediate, and ultimate motive of faith is the authority and revelation of God, are forced to say that the premises, and notably the fact of revelation which is asserted in the minor, are known immediately by all and without a new reasoning, because the miracles, the fulfillments of prophecies, the proposition of the Church, etc., by which revelation is proved or shown and on account of which revelation is affirmed in the minor, are the complex part of the divine speech. — But

a) at the most all these are only the external speech of God, which is not the motive of faith, as was said above, n. 669 ;

b) probably they are not even the external speech of God itself except improperly ; properly they are only signs of the divine speech, just as a seal is a sign of the king's letter ;

c) we have known divine revelation for the first time not immediately, but only through several arguments.