Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

ON THE ESSENCE OF THE ACT OF FAITH.

S. Th. II-II, q. 2, a. 1 ; De Verit., q. 14, a. 1.

689. What it is to believe. — To believe, says S. Augustine, De Praed. SS. c. 2, is to think with assent. He is properly said to think who inquires with the intellect, not having full evidence of the truth ; but assent is the firm adherence of the intellect. To believe, therefore, is to assent, i.e. firmly to adhere to a thing as true, while not having evidence of it. Since, however, the intellect is not determined of itself except by evidence, it follows that when it believes, it is determined by the will. To believe, therefore, is an act elicited by the intellect, commanded by the will. Hence :

1. In the broadest sense, we are said to believe those things about which we have only a practical certitude, which excludes not every doubt but only a prudent one, namely, a conviction which suffices for acting prudently, although we do not have perfect evidence ; as many admit the existence of God on grounds which are not altogether evident to them¹],

2. More properly, we believe those things which are not evident to us, but which we admit on account of the testimony of men, even when they are not worthy of faith ; and therefore not on account of the testimony alone : for then we would admit everything they say, but on account of the evidence of the testimony (evidence in the witness, as the Scholastics say), because it is certain to us that this their testimony is in fact true. Such is often historical certainty.

3. Most properly, we believe those things which are not evident to us, but which we admit without doubting solely on account of the testimony or authority of another, i.e. because he himself is worthy of faith and deserves that we trust him (evidence of credibility), even if it does not appear that the testimony is true. Thus a child trusts his mother and an unlearned person a learned one. This is faith properly so called, because through it in the proper sense we trust another, and because for it especially it is required that the intellect be determined by the will ; hence no one believes unless willing. Of this faith it is true to say that it honors the one who testifies : for we could not believe unless we acknowledged the excellence of him to whom we believe.

690. What it is to believe God. — According to the foregoing explanation, to believe God is to admit those things which God has said, precisely because He has authority, i.e. the dignity and right that we acquiesce in Him as speaking. It is therefore the firm assent of the mind to truths revealed by God, on account of the authority of God Himself revealing. That this is the true notion of the act of faith we have already proved, when we treated of the formal object ; whence it is defined by S. Thomas, q. 2, a. 9 : « The act of the intellect assenting to divine truth from the command of the will moved by God through grace ».

691. Opposed errors. — To the foregoing definition is opposed :

1. The error of the Rationalists, Semi-rationalists, and Modernists, who do not have faith except

a) as rational science or philosophical knowledge of God (Günther) ; — or even

b) as religious truth, or a simple rational persuasion about divine things (Abelard, Wegscheider, Hermes), or any rational cognition whatsoever of God and divine things (Deists) ; — or

c) as an innermost religious instinct of the soul (i.e. of truths above the sensible), blind, e.g. from the Holy Spirit, leaning on the imagination and the senses, not on a rational motive (Pietists, Jacobi and the Sentimentalists, Fideism, Pseudo-mystics and Methodists) ; — or

d) as a mere spiritual instinct of religious dependence, vividly perceived, which coheres with rational nature (Schleiermacher), or a natural religious sense, whose motive is the conformity of religious truths with our aspirations and higher demands (Ritschl, Sabatier, Liberal Protestants) ; — or

e) as the sole exigency and irrefragable postulation of practical reason, as a common inclination of human nature (Reid, the Scottish school), the approval of religious truths on account of the practical truth of moral life (Kant, Harnack) or on account of the inclination of the whole man (Renouvier) ; — or

f) as a religious conscience and religious sense about divine things arising from the need of the divine (Modernists).

In one word, opposed is : a faith purely rational (a and b), a faith affective (c and d), a faith moral (e), a faith affective-moral (f). Cf. Vat. Counc., sess. 3, c. 2 and 3 ; and prop. 23 condemned by Innocent XI : « Faith, broadly so called, by a motive like to the testimony of creatures, suffices for justification ».

2. Also the doctrine of Protestants who are called orthodox. They distinguish a) the faith of miracles, or a great confidence in God which is obtained by a miracle (1 Cor. XIII, 2), b) the faith of dogmas, or historical faith in the narratives of the Gospel, and c) the faith of promises : that this is a trust in special mercy, and that it is justifying faith, they falsely contend (cf. treatise on grace) ; that the former is a simple knowledge and apprehension of revealed things, but not indeed an assent or firm judgment by which we hold them as true, they maintain, contradicting the Apostle who says that faith is the conviction of things not seen. Hence the Councils have declared that by faith we believe true things : so Trent, sess. 6, c. 6 and 9, or that we believe them to be true : so Vat., sess. 3, c. 3.