ON THE ACT OF FAITH.

ON THE INTERIOR ACT OF FAITH.

ON THE ESSENCE OF THE ACT OF FAITH.

S. Th. II-II, q. 2, a. 1 ; De Verit., q. 14, a. 1.

689. What it is to believe. — To believe, says S. Augustine, De Praed. SS. c. 2, is to think with assent. He is properly said to think who inquires with the intellect, not having full evidence of the truth ; but assent is the firm adherence of the intellect. To believe, therefore, is to assent, i.e. firmly to adhere to a thing as true, while not having evidence of it. Since, however, the intellect is not determined of itself except by evidence, it follows that when it believes, it is determined by the will. To believe, therefore, is an act elicited by the intellect, commanded by the will. Hence :

1. In the broadest sense, we are said to believe those things about which we have only a practical certitude, which excludes not every doubt but only a prudent one, namely, a conviction which suffices for acting prudently, although we do not have perfect evidence ; as many admit the existence of God on grounds which are not altogether evident to them¹],

2. More properly, we believe those things which are not evident to us, but which we admit on account of the testimony of men, even when they are not worthy of faith ; and therefore not on account of the testimony alone : for then we would admit everything they say, but on account of the evidence of the testimony (evidence in the witness, as the Scholastics say), because it is certain to us that this their testimony is in fact true. Such is often historical certainty.

3. Most properly, we believe those things which are not evident to us, but which we admit without doubting solely on account of the testimony or authority of another, i.e. because he himself is worthy of faith and deserves that we trust him (evidence of credibility), even if it does not appear that the testimony is true. Thus a child trusts his mother and an unlearned person a learned one. This is faith properly so called, because through it in the proper sense we trust another, and because for it especially it is required that the intellect be determined by the will ; hence no one believes unless willing. Of this faith it is true to say that it honors the one who testifies : for we could not believe unless we acknowledged the excellence of him to whom we believe.

690. What it is to believe God. — According to the foregoing explanation, to believe God is to admit those things which God has said, precisely because He has authority, i.e. the dignity and right that we acquiesce in Him as speaking. It is therefore the firm assent of the mind to truths revealed by God, on account of the authority of God Himself revealing. That this is the true notion of the act of faith we have already proved, when we treated of the formal object ; whence it is defined by S. Thomas, q. 2, a. 9 : « The act of the intellect assenting to divine truth from the command of the will moved by God through grace ».

691. Opposed errors. — To the foregoing definition is opposed :

1. The error of the Rationalists, Semi-rationalists, and Modernists, who do not have faith except

a) as rational science or philosophical knowledge of God (Günther) ; — or even

b) as religious truth, or a simple rational persuasion about divine things (Abelard, Wegscheider, Hermes), or any rational cognition whatsoever of God and divine things (Deists) ; — or

c) as an innermost religious instinct of the soul (i.e. of truths above the sensible), blind, e.g. from the Holy Spirit, leaning on the imagination and the senses, not on a rational motive (Pietists, Jacobi and the Sentimentalists, Fideism, Pseudo-mystics and Methodists) ; — or

d) as a mere spiritual instinct of religious dependence, vividly perceived, which coheres with rational nature (Schleiermacher), or a natural religious sense, whose motive is the conformity of religious truths with our aspirations and higher demands (Ritschl, Sabatier, Liberal Protestants) ; — or

e) as the sole exigency and irrefragable postulation of practical reason, as a common inclination of human nature (Reid, the Scottish school), the approval of religious truths on account of the practical truth of moral life (Kant, Harnack) or on account of the inclination of the whole man (Renouvier) ; — or

f) as a religious conscience and religious sense about divine things arising from the need of the divine (Modernists).

In one word, opposed is : a faith purely rational (a and b), a faith affective (c and d), a faith moral (e), a faith affective-moral (f). Cf. Vat. Counc., sess. 3, c. 2 and 3 ; and prop. 23 condemned by Innocent XI : « Faith, broadly so called, by a motive like to the testimony of creatures, suffices for justification ».

2. Also the doctrine of Protestants who are called orthodox. They distinguish a) the faith of miracles, or a great confidence in God which is obtained by a miracle (1 Cor. XIII, 2), b) the faith of dogmas, or historical faith in the narratives of the Gospel, and c) the faith of promises : that this is a trust in special mercy, and that it is justifying faith, they falsely contend (cf. treatise on grace) ; that the former is a simple knowledge and apprehension of revealed things, but not indeed an assent or firm judgment by which we hold them as true, they maintain, contradicting the Apostle who says that faith is the conviction of things not seen. Hence the Councils have declared that by faith we believe true things : so Trent, sess. 6, c. 6 and 9, or that we believe them to be true : so Vat., sess. 3, c. 3.

ON THE ANALYSIS OF THE ACT OF FAITH.

S. Th., in III Sent., d. 23, q. 2, a. 2, qc. 2.

692. Analysis or resolution of the act is its reduction to principles, both objective and subjective, i.e. to the motive and efficient causes which concur in its production. Now divine faith, as human faith, comprises several acts, for the act of faith itself presupposes two others : for it is the assent of the intellect commanded by the will, and so presupposes the motion and command of the will ; but the will cannot move the intellect to assent and command the assent of the intellect, unless the intellect itself previously judges that such an assent is to be given, whence it presupposes a judgment of credibility on the part of the intellect. Hence

1. three acts are required for believing : a) a judgment of credibility, by which we judge that such or such a truth, e.g. the Incarnation, is to be believed ; b) a pious affection of credulity, by which we will to believe that truth ; c) the act of faith itself, by which we properly believe, i.e. adhere to that truth and judge it to be true ;

2. consequently the question why we believe can be understood in a threefold sense, namely, a) dispositively : why do we judge that some truth is to be believed ? — b) affectively : why do we command the assent to that truth ? — c) formally : why do we adhere to it ? Therefore the analysis of this threefold act is to be undertaken.

S. Th. II-II, q. 1, a. 1 ; q. 2, a. 2 ; De Verit., q. 14, a. 1 ; III Sent. d. 23, q. 2, a. 2, qc. 2.

693. Thesis. The elicitive principle of faith is the intellect. — The ultimate act required for faith, which is essentially and properly the act of faith by which assent is given to revealed truth, is an act of the intellect ; hence the intellect is the proximate elicitive principle of faith. — It is certain from the Vat. Counc., sess. 3, c. 3, establishing faith « whereby we believe things to be true », and from the Creed of Pius X ; against many Protestants who hold faith as a trust which is more in the heart or will than in the intellect, and against the Rationalists, Semi-rationalists, and Modernists who place it principally in a tendency or inclination, or reduce it to a religious sense.

It is clear from Scripture in which

1. faith is called the argument, i.e. the conviction of things not seen (Heb. XI, 1) ;

2. which we admit something as true and indeed on account of testimony (Heb. XI, 3, 6, 8 ; Mk. XVI, 16 ; John VI, 70 ; XX, 31 ; Rom. X, 9 ; 1 John V, 1-10) ;

3. whence it is called the captivity of the intellect in obedience to Christ (2 Cor. X, 5).

Hence the profession of faith in which the Creed was explained was always required of catechumens (cf. Cyr. Hier. Cat. V, 7 ; Chrys. in Hebr., Aug. De Praed. SS. n. 5).

694. The analysis of the act of faith is simply this : we admit some truth, e.g. the Incarnation, i.e. we judge it to be true, because God has authority in revealing it (which is presupposed as already known beforehand) ; but we do not believe nor in any way affirm in this act the authority of God revealing itself. For just as in human faith the authority of Peter as a witness is in no way believed or affirmed, but is only the motive, or that on account of which I believe what he says, so in divine faith the authority of God revealing is only the motive on account of which it is believed, but is in no way what is believed or affirmed ; otherwise it would be to confuse the material and formal object. In other words : the knowledge of God's authority is presupposed beforehand as a condition, but is not the cause or motive of the assent ; this is not knowledge about God's authority but the sole authority known from elsewhere¹].

Hence 1) Suarez does not correctly teach²] that the motive, i.e. the authority of God revealing, is believed in the very act of faith, saying that the analysis of this act is : I believe the Incarnation, because I believe the authority of God revealing it, and I believe the authority of God revealing it, because I believe the authority of God revealing Himself, since it is impossible that God reveal something and not by that very fact say His own authority in revealing, or that He reveal Himself with authority. — For again one may ask : and why do you believe God saying that He reveals with authority, or revealing His authority ? Either you will answer, because I believe a new revelation of the authority of God, and then you believe this because you believe another, and then there will be a process to infinity ; or you will answer : I believe the authority of God revealing because I believe it, which is a blind affirmation without a given reason.

Nor should you say : the authority of God revealing is also revealed, therefore it too ought to be believed. — It is replied :

a) it is not therefore believed in every act of faith : for the intellect can abstract from the fact that God, by revealing, also revealed His authority, and consider only that He has revealed some truth, e.g. the Incarnation ; indeed ordinarily we act in this way ;

b) when we believe the authority of God revealing, it is at once what is believed and the motive on account of which it is believed, but it is not believed as it is the formal object or motive ; in other words : the authority of God is believed on its own account as a motive, but not on its own account as believed, otherwise we would arrive at this absurd analysis : I believe the authority of God revealing because I believe it !

Likewise 2) we do not admit what Lugo teaches³], that in the act of faith the authority of God and the very fact of revelation are affirmed by reason, saying that the act of faith is a reasoning or is equivalent to one : God is infallible in revealing, but God revealed the Incarnation, therefore the Incarnation took place. — For :

a) the conclusion of this syllogism is not : therefore the Incarnation took place, but : therefore God, by revealing the Incarnation, is infallible. This conclusion is not the act of faith, because it is not the adherence given to the Incarnation ; from it indeed follows the obligation of believing the Incarnation, but not necessarily that it is already believed⁴ ; b) that conclusion, since it is admitted on account of the nexus with the premises, is not an act of faith in the authority and testimony of another, but an act of science ; especially

c) that it is not admitted by trusting the dignity or authority of God revealing ; whence such reasoning could also be made by an infidel, who with a perverse will would not wish to believe.

Nor should you say : it is irrational, indeed impossible, for us to believe unless we know God to be infallible in revealing and that He has spoken. — For it is replied that the assertion is true, but it does not therefore follow that those truths are affirmed in the very act of faith : it suffices and is required that they be known before that act, as will be said in art. 3. Just as in human faith, it is required beforehand that I know the authority and testimony of Peter in order to believe him, but not that, while I believe him, I affirm his authority and testimony.

695. Corollaries. — From the foregoing doctrine it follows, and experience confirms,

1. the act of faith is simple, because it indivisibly attains the revealed truth as believed and the authority of the revealer as the reason for believing ; therefore

2. it is not complex and multiple, so that it is equivalent to two other acts (as Suarez says) or three (as Lugo says) ; therefore

3. nor is it formally or virtually discursive. Moreover, an assent which rests on a discourse has as its motive the goodness of the consequence, for it assents to the conclusion because it logically coheres and follows well from the antecedent ; but the assent of faith in no way rests on the goodness of the consequence, but the adequate motive of faith is the sole first truth of God revealing something.

S. Th. II-II, q. 2, a. 2 and 9 ; q. 1, a. 1 ; De Verit., q. 14, a. 2, ad 10 and 13 ; a. 3, ad 10 ; a. 7, ad 3 ; III Sent., d. 23, q.

696. Thesis. For the act of faith the command of the will is also required. — The second act required for faith, namely, is the motion of the will ; this is certain because it is explicitly taught by the Vat. Counc., sess. 3, c. 3, calling faith « the obedience of the will », and indeed it follows immediately from what it defined about the freedom of faith (can. 5).

The analysis of this is as follows : the will moves to assent to revealed things and commands it on account of its own proper motive ; but the proper motive of the will is the good ; hence it moves the intellect to believe, e.g. because it is good to believe, because to believe is useful, because it is good to tend to the ultimate end by faith, because it is good not to act irrationally. « That will, says S. Thomas, De Verit., q. 14, a. 2, ad 10, which determines the intellect to believe, is not an act of charity, nor an act of hope, but a certain appetite (or simple volition) of the good promised », e.g. John VI, 69. This act of the will moving the intellect to believe is called by theologians after the Council of Orange II the pious affection of credulity, i.e. a pious inclination to believe.

697. Corollary : What it is to believe God, to believe God, and to believe in God. — From the foregoing we understand, following S. Augustine in John, tr. 29, that S. Thomas teaches (a. 2) that by the act of faith we believe God, God, and in God. For to believe is an act of the intellect commanded by the will. On the part of the intellect, God is the primary material object, and this we signify by saying : I believe God ; He is also the formal object, and this we signify by saying : I believe God, namely, with authority speaking. On the part of the will, however, this commands the act of faith by tending to God as to an end, and this we signify by saying : I believe in God. We do not do this last perfectly except through charity, and so without this faith is called imperfect or unformed.

On the contrary, by divine faith we do not believe the Church, because the Church is not the formal object of this faith, although we may believe her by human faith, or indeed by divine faith insofar as she is proposed by God Himself as the organ of faith.

698. The freedom of faith. — From the part of the motion of the will the act of faith has a property, namely, freedom, as the Council of Orange II (can. 5) and Trent (sess. 6, c. 6) already taught, and the Vatican Council defined (sess. 3, c. 3, can. 5), against the Rationalists and Hermes, who confuse faith with science.

It is a free act 1) not indeed radically, remotely, and accidentally, because we can fail to consider the motives of credibility, — or because the motives of credibility do not make us altogether certain of the revelation, as Lugo falsely teaches (as will be said in the next art., n. 703), which would explain freedom in the preambles but not in the act of faith itself ; — but

2. formally, proximately, and of itself, because, although the fact of revelation and the obligation to believe can be altogether certain and evident, nevertheless the truths to be believed are not in themselves evident for us ; hence the intellect does not necessarily assent to them, but for this the motion of the free will is required, especially

3. because we admit those truths by trusting the divine authority. From which it follows

a) the act of faith is free not only as to exercise, i.e. as to the use (like science), because we can fail to consider the motive or turn attention away from the object of belief, but also as to specification, or as to the assent, because while we consider the object, there remains the possibility of doubting, of not assenting, indeed of denying ; whence S. Thomas, a. 10 : « the act of faith... is subject to the will not only as to use, but also as to assent » ;

b) the act of faith can be meritorious, with charity, however, being present (a. 9 and 10).

The freedom of faith is given in Holy Scripture : a) once the preaching of the Gospel has been put forth, some believe, some do not believe, which is a sign of freedom (Acts XVII, 32-34 ; Rom. X, 16 ; Is. LXV) ; they do not believe because they do not seek the light but love the darkness (John III, 18-21) ;

b) believers are praised, unbelievers are reproved (Rom. IV, 3 ; Mk. XVI, 14 ; Apoc. II, 19 ; Lk. XXIV, 25 ; Acts VII, 39) ;

c) faith falls under a precept and a reward is ascribed to it, whereas infidelity is held as a grave sin worthy of eternal punishment (1 John III, 23 ; John III, 15 ; Rom. IV, 3 ; Mk. XVI, 16) ;

d) whence faith is called voluntary obedience (Rom. I, 5 ; X, 16 ; Acts VI, 7 ; 2 Cor. X, 5-6), by which it is believed from the heart, indeed with the whole heart (Rom. X, 9-10 ; Acts VIII, 37). Hence Augustine, in John tr. 26, n. 2 : « None can believe unless willing » ; and Irenaeus, adv. Haer. IV, 37, 5 : « The Lord preserved the free and self-determined choice of man not only in works but also in faith ; and for this reason, if anyone believes in Him, he has eternal life, but he who does not believe the Son does not have eternal life, but the wrath of God remains upon him ».

Therefore the Church has never used force for the conversion of infidels.

S. Th. II-II, q. 1, a. 4, ad 2 ; q. 2, a. 1, ad 1 ; a. 9, ad 3 ; a. 10.

699. Thesis. For the act of faith a judgment of credibility is required beforehand. — The first act required for faith, which precedes the others, is the previous judgment of credibility (Ps. XCI, 5 according to the Greek and Latin [texts] ; John X, 25, 37-38). This is altogether required as a condition before the act of faith. The reason is that the will cannot move the intellect to believe something and command faith in something, unless this is proposed to it by the intellect as credible, and the intellect sees that it is to be believed. And indeed :

a) This judgment must be evident, because the will cannot prudently command an assent altogether certain and firm, unless some evidence, at least of credibility, is given, on account of which the intellect judges that it ought to be believed.

b) This judgment is the conclusion of a reasoning similar to that which Lugo said was the very act of faith : What God, infallible in speaking, says is credible and to be believed. But God, infallible in speaking, revealed the Incarnation. Therefore the Incarnation is credible and to be believed. — Or more reflectively : What, all things considered, after diligent examination, appears to me sufficiently as infallibly attested by God, is to be believed. But, all things considered, it sufficiently appears to me that God has revealed the Incarnation. Therefore it is to be believed.

c) Hence the premises of this reasoning, namely, that God is infallible in speaking and is to be believed, and that in fact He has spoken, must be known with at least practical certainty, not absolute, but relative, i.e. which, in respect to the capacity of each one's intellect, excludes all prudent doubt ; otherwise a certain judgment of credibility could not be founded on them¹].

Hence the 21st proposition was condemned by Innocent XI : « The assent of supernatural faith useful for salvation stands with only a probable knowledge of revelation, indeed with the fear lest God has not spoken » ; and prop. 25 of the Modernists by Pius X : « The assent of faith ultimately rests on a heap of probabilities ».

700. The judgment of credibility rests on the preambles of faith and on the motives of credibility. — Those things whose knowledge is required beforehand for faith, and on which the judgment of credibility rests, are called preambles of faith. The divine authority or infallibility in speaking is known by reason : for, supposing that God exists, it is easily deduced from the fact that He is a most perfect being. The fact of revelation, however, is known by different people through different arguments, as they are suited to their intellect ; these arguments are called motives of credibility.

The motives of credibility and the formal object or motive of faith therefore differ :

a) the former proximately demonstrate the motive of faith, namely, that God has revealed something, and so only remotely dispose, induce, impel, and lead one to faith ; the latter, on the contrary, formally moves the intellect to give the assent of faith ;

b) the former precede the act of faith, and are an extrinsic condition to it ; the latter enters into the act of faith as an essential element and intrinsic motive ;

c) the former show that faith is reasonable ; and they are not the formal motive why we believe something, but only why we judge that something is to be believed ; on the other hand, the formal motive of faith is why we actually believe, namely, the divine authority of God revealing.

701. The external motives of credibility are altogether certain. — There are most certain signs and external arguments, suited to the intelligence of all (Vat. Counc.), even of the men of this time (Creed against the Modernists), even for the wiser altogether apodictic, by which the existence of revelation is proved, as the Vat. Counc. defined, sess. 3, c. 3, can. 3 and 4, namely, certain facts which cannot be naturally explained, and which appear as supernatural and divine. They are, as the same Council teaches, c. 3, chiefly : 1) miracles and 2) prophecies ; — likewise 3) the Church which, by herself, on account of her admirable propagation, her exalted sanctity and her inexhaustible fruitfulness in good (confirmed by the testimony of innumerable martyrs), her Catholic unity and her unconquered stability, appears as a divine work and institution, and is an irrefragable witness of her divine legation ; and 4) the same Church which, marked with the signs and characters of her legation by Christ, evidently and easily appears to all as God's legate, and so as the guardian and mistress of revelation, proposing faith in the name of God.

Nor should you say : the Church is known by faith and revelation ; therefore she cannot be the means of knowing the revelation itself, and the motive of credibility ; otherwise we would fall into a vicious circle. — For the Church, inasmuch as she is the means of knowing revelation and the motive why we judge it is to be believed, is known not by revelation and faith but by reason and history, inasmuch as we can inspect her, e.g. as she is described in the Gospels and in the testimonies of ecclesiastical writers, not inasmuch as they are the word of God or the testimony of divine tradition, but inasmuch as they are historical books having human authority. Afterwards, however, the Church, as supernatural and divine, is known and believed by revelation and faith.

702. The internal motives of credibility are less certain. — The motives intrinsic to the Christian religion, such as the sanctity of Christ and the sublimity of Christian doctrine, even if considered by themselves also as divine external facts inexplicable naturally, do not seem to prove the existence of divine revelation with strictly demonstrative certitude, but only with the highest probability and practical certainty ; moreover they are arguments requiring much study and subject to great difficulties, and not suited to all intelligences. Hence they are not efficacious for convincing all, nor do they deserve to occupy the principal part in apologetics.

Still more grievously are deceived those who, having rejected or at least put aside the external motives of credibility, appeal solely or principally to merely internal motives for founding supernatural faith, such as internal experience, the need of the religious soul, the religious sense ; or even hold faith as something instinctive. For these motives :

a) are not evident, nor are they able to found practical certainty in all, indeed they are subjective in such a way that some in one way, some in another, believe or do not believe from them ;

b) are repugnant to the supernatural character of faith, if taken in the very word of what they say : that faith is a pleasing of nature, or that it alone satisfies the aspirations of nature or the necessities of society, since even natural religion satisfies sufficiently ;

c) are repugnant to the motive of faith, which would no longer be the testimony of God but a conformity with nature or society : for that God has spoken cannot be proved by any of the foregoing or by other internal criteria, but only by external divine facts. Hence those motives can prepare for faith by removing the obstacles of faith, dispose the will to receive revelation, and confirm it ; but they cannot demonstrate it.

703. The motives of credibility are sufficiently certain broadly speaking ; some, however, can found absolute certitude. — The motives of credibility, although for many they are not certain except by a practical and improperly so-called certitude, can nevertheless be absolutely certain. Hence it is false, that Lugo is forced to say the act of faith — which he thinks the conclusion of a reasoning — is obscure and free, because the premises, namely, God's authority and at least the fact of revelation, are obscure and are not known with evidence or certain demonstration, but only with great probability and practical certainty. For 1) the infallibility or authority of God revealing in speaking can be clearly perceived, as is done by philosophers ; — 2) about the fact of revelation, we seem able to acquire true historical certitude a) from the prophecies, or from the miracles of Christ, about whose life and deeds we have historical certitude, and physical certitude about the supernatural character of his acts, — and especially b) if all the motives of credibility are considered together, because if so many and all the indications concur in showing the truth of our religion, Providence itself would be deceived if this religion were not true : it is not only improbable, but impossible to explain the Catholic Church and the miracles of Christ and the Apostles, if the religion of Christ is not true ; — indeed 3) that God has spoken can be evident ; as it was for the Angels, the Apostles, and others who are immediately instructed by God in faith ; which does not impede faith, because the more evident the authority of God and the fact of revelation appear, the more evident the obligation to believe appears.

Hence the act of faith is only obscure and free because revelation does not make the revealed things appear, and chiefly because they are not believed except by trusting divine authority.

704. How can children and the unlearned form for themselves a judgment of credibility ? — By children and the unlearned, the fact of revelation is often known only through the human authority of parents, the wise, the pastor, etc., whom they trust : for right and prudent reason dictates to them that in things necessary which they cannot see by themselves, they should subject themselves to the authority of those who can and ought naturally to instruct them. They believe, therefore, by human faith those things which they have received from their parents or parish priest about the history of the revelation made by God, e.g. that God has taught such and such ; which being posited, they believe those things by divine faith on account of the sole authority of God revealing.

In general they have a judgment of credibility. This is formed fairly easily by the following or an equivalent reasoning, at least implicit : In necessary things which I cannot investigate, it is prudent or obligatory to admit the testimony of those who are naturally the guides or instructors. But by myself I cannot be certain that God has spoken these things. Therefore it is prudent and obligatory to admit this because it is said by those who are naturally the guides and instructors ; and therefore to believe on account of God's testimony.

Parents and priests, whose duty it is to instruct such persons, should therefore attend : 1) that the doctrine be proposed to them at least as the word or revelation of God, for otherwise they would believe by human faith alone, on account of the authority of those same persons, and not by divine faith on account of the authority of God revealing. Although 2) if they are instructed a little more, they easily recognize that the parents teach the same as their priests, and that these are united with the bishops, and the bishops are united with the Roman Pontiff, e.g. because all teach a similar catechism ; whence they will know that the doctrine proposed is not of private persons, but of the universal religious society, which is possessed of the greatest authority, and is taught by the pastors not in their own name but as ministers of the Church, sent by her and by Christ to preach ; — indeed 3) they easily recognize that this doctrine is the word of God, because of the miracles by which the revelation was confirmed, and because of the Church which, by her marks (great authority and truth, Catholic unity of doctrine, sanctity and fruitfulness in good, unconquered stability), easily appears to all as God's legate and guardian of the revealed word.

705. Observations. — 1st From the part of the judgment of credibility, faith is called reasonable, and a special property belongs to it, namely, that even from outside the Church no one is believed to be a believer unless he has first judged the things of faith to be credible, and therefore judges them to be true.

2nd Although the Holy Spirit can teach directly and immediately, and sometimes does teach even the unlearned, the Protestants are nevertheless wrong, who say that revelation is credible on account of the immediate and internal testimony of the Holy Spirit, which is given to all (cf. treatise on the Theological Loci).

3rd Lugo and those who hold the act of faith to be the conclusion of a reasoning which is admitted on account of the premises, to explain in their opinion how the proximate, immediate, and ultimate motive of faith is the authority and revelation of God, are forced to say that the premises, and notably the fact of revelation which is asserted in the minor, are known immediately by all and without a new reasoning, because the miracles, the fulfillments of prophecies, the proposition of the Church, etc., by which revelation is proved or shown and on account of which revelation is affirmed in the minor, are the complex part of the divine speech. — But

a) at the most all these are only the external speech of God, which is not the motive of faith, as was said above, n. 669 ;

b) probably they are not even the external speech of God itself except improperly ; properly they are only signs of the divine speech, just as a seal is a sign of the king's letter ;

c) we have known divine revelation for the first time not immediately, but only through several arguments.

ON THE NECESSITY OF FAITH.

S. Th. II-II, q. 2, a. 3 and 5-8 ; De Verit., q. 14, a. 10-12.

706. A twofold necessity: one of means, the other of precept. — It should be premised that something is said to be necessary for an end either by necessity of means, or by necessity of precept. What is necessary by necessity of means is the means which positively influences the attainment of the end, and indeed in such a way that without it, even involuntarily omitted, the end cannot be attained. What is necessary by necessity of precept is not a means for the end, but that which is imposed by precept, so that, when the precept is known, its observance is a condition, as voluntary transgression is an obstacle to attaining the end ; hence it does not positively but negatively influence, by not placing an obstacle. From which definition it follows that invincible ignorance excuses from the necessity of precept, because it excuses from the sin which would be an obstacle to attaining the end ; but it does not free from the necessity of means any kind of ignorance or impossibility, for this does not supply the necessary influence of the means to attain the end.

Necessity of means is either from the nature of the thing, or from positive institution ; likewise, necessity of means is either in the thing itself when the means itself is always necessary, or in desire when the defect of the means can be supplied by something else together with the desire of it. Examples for salvation are : sanctifying grace, and Baptism.

707. Faith is necessary by necessity of means.

I. By necessity of means for salvation, both for little ones and for adults, from the nature of the thing, the habit of faith is necessary, because without it charity cannot be had. Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 7.

II. By necessity of means for justification and in this way for salvation¹], for adults, i.e. those having the use of reason, from the nature of the thing, at all times for all, the act of faith properly so called is necessary, by which they explicitly believe, on account of divine revelation, that God, the institutor and end of the supernatural order, exists, and that He is a rewarder.

It is proved : 1° From Scripture, which frequently declares the absolute necessity of the voluntary reception of faith properly so called (for it recognizes no other as necessary) for obtaining justification (Heb. X, 38 ff. ; Rom. I, 17 ; III, 26 ; IV, 5 ; Gal. II, 16 ; Mk. XVI, 16), and expressly teaches in Heb. XI, 6, that « without faith it is impossible to please God. For he who comes to God (the act of faith) must believe that He is, and that He rewards those who seek Him ».

2° From the perpetual doctrine of the Church, which is evident from Trent, sess. 6, c. 6, 7, 8 ; from Vat., sess. 3, c. 3, can. 2 ; and from the condemnation of prop. 22 and 23 by Innocent XI²].

3° From reason : a) No one can order and tend himself to a supernatural end, which nevertheless is required for justification, unless he knows that end. But we cannot know the supernatural end by reason, but only by revelation, to which faith corresponds. Therefore.

b) Likewise no one can hope for salvation and have supernatural contrition for sin, unless he knows the supernatural end and reward. But for justification supernatural hope and contrition are required (Council of Trent, sess. 6 and 14). Therefore for justification it is required that we believe the supernatural end.

From what has been said it follows a) that a true concept of the one God is required, by which namely He is distinguished from creatures, and is known at least as creator, or almighty, or necessary or most perfect being ; otherwise we would not tend to the true God ; b) that a knowledge of God as natural end and rewarder does not suffice : for although it is not required that we distinctly and formally know as supernatural the end or the reward, nevertheless we must believe the reward which in fact is supernatural ;

c) in practice there is no difficulty in this : whoever believes by faith on account of the authority of God revealing that God exists and rewards, by that very fact believes that God is revealing Himself in a supernatural manner, i.e. communicating with us beyond the demands of nature, and believes God to be a rewarder of the reward which He has promised by His revelation.

III. Before the promulgation of the Gospel, explicit faith in the Incarnation (and at the same time in the Passion, death, redemption, resurrection, and glorious kingdom of Christ in heaven) and in the Holy Trinity was not necessary by necessity of means for justification, but implicit faith sufficed ; whether, however, after the promulgation of the Gospel it is required by positive divine institution, is disputed. Although the affirmative opinion of S. Thomas and S. Alphonsus is more probable and more conformed to the manner of speaking of Holy Scripture and the holy Fathers³], it is nevertheless not altogether certain, because the texts which are brought forward to prove it, and which preach the necessity of faith in Christ according to them, perhaps can also be understood either of the sole efficacy of faith in Christ ; — or of the sole necessity of precept ; — or of necessity of means, but of the merits and grace of Christ, or of the faith by which we are united to Christ, or at least of implicit faith in Christ. However, since in things necessary for the end, in the present case for salvation, it is illicit to choose a merely probable opinion, but the safer course must be followed (cf. n. 215 ; 3°), therefore in practice these two mysteries are to be considered as to be believed by necessity of means.

708. Practical corollaries. — 1. Since one who is ignorant of the existence of God as supernatural end and rewarder is incapable of justification and certainly indisposed, the sacraments, even of Baptism or Penance, can never be given to him. Indeed confessions made with ignorance, even invincible, of these truths are null (from defect of contrition) and therefore must be repeated.

2. Neither can these sacraments be administered to one who is ignorant of the mystery of the Incarnation or of the Trinity ; but he must first be instructed about these, because it is illicit to expose the sacrament to the danger of unfruitfulness, or Penance to the danger of nullity (Holy Off. 25 Jan. and 10 May 1703, renewed 30 March 1898 ; Innocent XI, prop. 64 and 65). The case of extreme necessity is excepted, when the means or time for instruction is lacking ; in which case the sacrament of Penance is administered under the condition : if you are capable, provided the other requisites are present, but with these given, the other sacraments absolutely.

3. Especially let can. 752, § 2 be noted : An adult « in danger of death, if he cannot be carefully instructed in the chief mysteries of faith, it is sufficient for the conferring of Baptism that he in some way show that he assents to them and seriously promise that he will keep the commands of the Christian religion ».

4. Since confessions made with ignorance, not through grave fault, of the Incarnation or of the Holy Trinity, by one who in good faith thought himself to be rightly disposed, are not certainly invalid, although they may more safely be repeated, nevertheless the faithful cannot be strictly obliged to this.

5. When it concerns the half-witted or very ignorant, an act of faith in the one and triune God, and in Christ the Redeemer, is to be suggested to them before they are absolved ; that the absolution may more safely become valid⁴].

6. Hence S. Alphonsus notes, Th. M., b. 2, c. 1, n. 2 : If someone were so unlearned that he could not in any way perceive the foregoing mysteries, and therefore does not explicitly believe them, as to this he would be likened to infants and the demented ; if he cannot retain them, it would suffice that he explicitly believe the individual articles as they are proposed to him. This case is otherwise rare, even in barbarous regions.

7. For justification, faith implicit on the part of the act, or faith in desire or broadly so called, is not sufficient, but faith in act is required, by which we explicitly believe God revealing ; nevertheless implicit faith on the part of the object suffices, inasmuch as the revealed truths are grasped in a confused way, but explicit faith is required as to the truths necessary by necessity of means.

709. Faith is necessary by necessity of precept.

A. By necessity of precept under grave obligation, the following must be explicitly known by all as to their substance, i.e. so that they have a common understanding of them, and when questioned about them can answer the substance, although they may not retain either the precise words or the order of the words in memory :

1° What is required for rightly believing and thinking, namely the Apostles' Creed, as is evident from the perpetual practice of the Church, which demanded this knowledge before Baptism ; moreover a Christian should have a summary knowledge of Christ's doctrine as to the chief truths, namely the articles of faith, and be able to distinguish it from that of others.

Those things, however, which are contained in the creed and are of lesser moment, are only obligatory under venial sin, such as the perpetual virginity of the B.M.V. ; the circumstances of time : under Pontius Pilate, on the third day ; the burial of Christ, and His descent into hell, and His sitting at the right hand of the Father ; the judgment of the living and the dead ; the communion of saints, etc.

2° What is required for rightly living, namely

a) the universal precepts of law, namely the precepts of the decalogue and the five precepts of the Church, which all are bound to keep ;

b) the duties proper to one's state or condition.

3° What is required for rightly using the special helps of salvation, namely

a) the Lord's prayer, about which they ought at least to know, for each of the goods to be acquired and evils to be avoided which are enumerated there, that God is to be prayed to and can help, and to ask the saints for their intercession for the things that are difficult for us ;

b) the sacraments, insofar as is necessary to receive them well, namely Baptism, Penance, and the Eucharist always, because they pertain to all, but the others when one wishes to receive them.

The Creed, the Lord's Prayer, and the sacraments are to be explicitly believed ; the rest can sufficiently also be explicitly known by reason alone ; the decalogue, as having been revealed, can be explicitly believed, and at least implicitly ought to be.

B. By necessity of precept under venial sin, the following must be explicitly known by all from custom and common usage of the faithful :

1° the sign of the cross, which is the distinctive sign of a Christian ;

2° the angelic salutation, at least as to its substance, because the B.V. is the mediatrix of grace ;

3° the Creed, the precepts of the decalogue and of the Church, the Lord's Prayer, as to the words.

710. Practical corollaries. — 1. Parents and superiors, whose duty it is to instruct others in the faith, are gravely bound, as soon as they have reached the use of reason, to teach them gradually those things which must be known by necessity of means and precept. This duty in parish priests is one of justice.

2. Hence greater explicit faith is required in some by reason of office, condition, and state, e.g. in those who must instruct others, such as a bishop, a parish priest, a preacher, a confessor, a man of greater learning, a judge, a magistrate, etc.

3. If the confessor, on probable grounds, doubts whether the penitent is ignorant of what must be known by necessity of means or precept, he is bound to question him about these. This often happens today.

4. « The confessor conjectures that ignorance from the weakness of younger or older age, from dullness of mind, from lack of education and literacy, and from the manner of confessing, from the confession itself, as from long-continued neglect of prayer, attendance at church, sermons, sacraments, and remaining in doubt from a prudent and discreet questioning » (Waffelaert, o.c. n. 191).

5. S. Alphonsus notes, however, Pr. Conf., n. 22 : « S. Leonard of Port Maurice, speaking of urban persons neglecting their own salvation, who consider it a great labor and insult to be questioned about these things, says it is fitting for the confessor to say to them : Come, let us elicit together the Christian acts, say with me... », adding namely the act of faith with the principal mysteries.

6. Those ignorant of what is necessary only by necessity of precept are to be admonished to learn it, and if they seriously propose it, they can be absolved. But if they have already been often admonished, it is to be investigated whether the previous confessions were not invalid from defect of purpose ; and sometimes absolution is to be absolutely deferred to them. — But if they do not have opportunity to learn those things, the confessor should propose to them the substance to be believed, with the burden of learning it more perfectly, or of applying themselves to learn it.

7. S. Alphonsus notes, Th. M., b. 2, n. 3, 30 : In practice, those who do not know the Creed, the prayers, etc., by heart, especially if they are unlearned, are to be admonished to learn them ; otherwise they expose themselves to the great danger of not even retaining the substance, and will scarcely otherwise satisfy the precept of prayer.

ON THE EXTERIOR ACT OF FAITH OR ITS CONFESSION.

S. Th. II-II, q. 3.

711. Confession of faith is its external manifestation by some sign suited to this. It is the external act of the virtue of faith, because it is immediately produced by faith with no other habit mediating ; hence the confession of faith according to its object and species is directly ordered to faith as to an end.

From natural-divine law there is a precept, obligating under grave sin, of externally confessing the faith ; this precept is at once affirmative and negative (can. 1325, § 1).

712. Insofar as the precept of confessing faith is negative, it forbids, in any case whatever or even danger of death, expressly or tacitly, by word, sign, or deed (by silence, for example), externally to deny the faith or to profess or feign a false one. For he who acted thus would at least implicitly say either that God reveals false things or that He has not revealed the dogmas of the Christian faith, both of which are most injurious to God. Hence Christ : « But he who shall deny me before men, I will also deny him before my Father who is in heaven » (Mt. X, 32, 33 ; cf. Lk. IX, 26 ; XII, 8-9 ; 2 Tim. II, 12).

This can be done in two ways : a) directly and explicitly, when one knowingly denies the faith or professes a false one ; b) indirectly and implicitly, if without the intention of denying one performs an action which is taken by others as a denial of faith, such as assisting at or participating in heretical rites (e.g. to take part in a Calvinist supper).

Therefore they sin against faith : 1° by words, who openly, seriously or fictitiously, deny even one article of faith, or deny that they are Christians or Catholics, or say they are disciples of another sect (Old Catholics, rationalists, positivists, Mohammedans), or deny that they are Papists, Ultramontanes, Clericals, ... in regions where those words mean nothing but the Catholic religion ;

2° by deeds : who, to hide the faith, use the rites or ceremonies of false worship, such as to offer incense, to genuflect or sacrifice before an idol (S. C. de Pr. F. 12 Sept. 1645), to take part in a Calvinist supper, to use circumcision as a religious rite, etc.

3° likewise those who buy with money the testimony that they professed a false religion (libellatici) ;

4° likewise those who perform an action which of itself or by its circumstances signifies the profession of a false religion, e.g. to drink to the death of Papists or to the health of the enemies of the Church, to pray or sing with them, to give one's name to a heretical, schismatic, Masonic, anti-Catholic, or Bible society, for whatever reason ;

5° in general, those who use vestments, gestures of the hands, or signs specifically professing a false religion, such as sacred vestments which exhibit honor to the Prophet, an idol, etc. (S. C. P. F. 23 March 1844) and the insignia or professing signs of the Freemasons ;

6° in general, those who, when questioned about the faith by name and personally by a public authority, keep silent or use ambiguous words (which, e.g., are taken by the interrogator as a denial) : for this, because of the circumstances, is considered by common estimation as a denial or shame of the faith, on account of an imminent punishment (prop. 18 condemned by Innocent XI).

I said : in general, because, if by certain altogether peculiar circumstances it were manifest to all that these things were not a denial or shame of religion, e.g. if the silence were taken by those present rather as a confession of faith, or if the law openly established that no public authority may intrude itself into the conscience of citizens, it would not be illicit. When, however, it is done, it is left to prudent estimation to determine.

713. Insofar as the precept of confessing faith is affirmative, it prescribes, even with some danger of life, the external confession of faith, and indeed in a twofold case : 1) when by the omission of this confession, privatively great honor due to God would be withdrawn, or positively or by contrast God would be greatly injured ; hence not only those questioned about the faith who by their silence are taken as infidels ought to confess and procure great honor to God, but also he who sees sacred things trampled under foot by infidels or heretics is bound to prevent it if he can, and he who hears the faith being attacked ought to contradict if he can or impose silence on the attackers, or profess the faith, if these things are judged useful or profitable ; 2) when, by not confessing the faith, grave spiritual harm would arise to the neighbor, such as contempt of religion, perversion of the faithful, scandal, e.g. if, by someone's silence, others would believe that the faith was not true and be turned away from the faith, or long delayed, or not converted to the faith. Hence Rom. X, 9, 10 : « If you confess with your mouth the Lord Jesus, and believe in your heart, ... you shall be saved : for with the heart one believes unto justice, but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation ».

Faith itself obliges us to confess it, when, by omitting the confession, an injury is done to faith in God, or the neighbor is harmed.

714. Applications. — Since the affirmative precept does not oblige for always, hence in itself and in general, they do not sin, at least against faith, by words, signs, or deeds :

1° those who hide or dissemble the faith for a grave reason ;

2° those who, when questioned by a private person, out of contempt either keep silent or use equivocal words ;

3° those who deny or are silent about being priests, religious, etc. ;

4° a fortiori those who, so that they not be recognized as Catholics, eat meat, or do not assist at Mass, do not pray before or after meals, unless this were expressly demanded in hatred of religion, in disobedience to the Church, or in profession of a false sect ;

5° indeed those who, for a graver reason, use the clothing or signs of a nation, and even probably those distinctive only of a false religion ;

6° likewise those who flee in time of persecution (Mt. X, 23) ; pastors of souls are excepted, who would flee with spiritual harm to their flock (John X, 11) ;

7° those who buy with money that no harm be done them or inquiry made about their faith ;

8° those who, when the ruler orders Catholics to betray or appear, refuse to appear or betray themselves.

I say : in general, for if the foregoing actions, by special circumstances, were taken by others as a denial or shame of the faith, or if great honor would be withdrawn from God, or grave scandal would arise, they would be sinful against the faith and are to be given up. When, however, it is so, it is left to prudent estimation to determine.

715. Observations. — 1° From other precepts or virtues we are also in some way bound to the external confession of faith, e.g. in receiving Baptism (cf. Ritual) or another sacrament, by reason of external worship and adherence to the Church, by the precept of the Church (S. Off. 20 July 1859 ; can. 1406-1408), etc. But in those cases it is not the precept of faith itself which obliges us.

2° Sometimes faith must be hidden, whenever, the precept of confessing faith not being urgent, from its confession religion would be more blasphemed, or disturbances would arise, or danger of death would have to be undergone, or other grave harms would follow (S. Th., a. 2, ad 3).

3° On communication with infidels and heretics, will be spoken in the 4th part.

4° Noldin notes : « Wherever the political power forbids conversion to the true faith before a certain age (16 or 18), the law is impious, nor is it lawful, for one who is persuaded of the truth of the Catholic religion, to delay the profession of faith longer on account of the civil law. Pastors of souls are bound to admit to the profession of faith those who ask to be received into the bosom of the Church, notwithstanding any temporal evil to themselves or to others. However, to avoid the evils which would then threaten both the parish priest and the convert from the civil law, it can be permitted, by mutual consent, that the conversion be delayed to the lawful age, or that the conversion once made be hidden up to that age, if it is now close at hand » Th. M., II, n. 14. But internal adherence to the faith must be given at once, nor can it be delayed.

5° However, union with the Church and profession of faith of themselves ought to be public, nor ought they to be hidden at least perpetually, as the constant practice of the Church bears. Hence :

a) « Outside the case of necessity, it is not lawful for an adult to be baptized or to be admitted to conversion secretly, with only the priest knowing, but this must be done publicly before others, at least two witnesses. Therefore the Church prescribes that the abjuration of heresy, which is required of new converts, be made before two witnesses and the conversion made be entered in the parish books, both to satisfy the obligation of professing the faith and so that the convert may be subject to the jurisdiction of the Church in the external forum... »

b) Therefore it has been established that a Mohammedan cannot be admitted to Baptism who, on account of danger to his life, wishes to be a Christian secretly and remain so, but that he must transfer himself to places where he can publicly profess the Christian religion (S. C. de Prop. F. 28 May 1635).

c) In case of necessity, where namely a dying person for a reasonable grave cause refuses public conversion to the faith, he can be received into the Church by any priest whenever encountered, so that his salvation may be provided for, unless a reason of avoiding scandal or promoting the neighbor's salvation demands otherwise, as in a man of great dignity and authority. But even in this case the conversion can be made before only two witnesses, who can later make the matter known if necessary » (ibid., n. 16, 2 ; cf. S. Off. 25 July 1630).

d) Likewise « sometimes heretics or pagans, who wish to embrace the true faith but cannot do so without great temporal inconveniences, can be received into the bosom of the Church secretly before two discreet witnesses, (and that for a time hidden. But after conversion they can no longer perform acts which are a profession of heresy or paganism, e.g. receive the Protestant supper, contract marriage before a non-Catholic minister, wear signs indicating idolatry, etc. But they could perform other things which are not a direct profession of heterodox faith, e.g. visit heretical temples, attend (merely) a non-Catholic funeral, indeed once or twice attend a non-Catholic sermon, provided there is no danger of perversion or scandal » Prümmer, Th. M. I, n. 507, resol. 1.

6° Prümmer notes, ib., n. 507, 5 : « In practice it is not always easy to distinguish whether the hiding of faith is licit or not. Generally speaking, it is much better to profess the faith openly, because the harms arising from the profession are not usually as great as they appear at first sight. On the contrary, from the open profession of faith the greatest goods usually result, both for the one professing it and for others admiring his good example ».