Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

S. Th. II-II, q. 1, a. 1 and 2 ; a. 6, ad 1 ; De Verit., q. 14, a. 8.

671. Thesis I. The material object of faith is everything revealed by God. — The material object of faith is that which is believed on account of the authority of God revealing. This, as the Vatican Council teaches (sess. 3, c. 3), is everything and only what has been revealed by God. — It is proved :

The material object of faith is everything which can be attained through the formal object, which is the authority of God revealing. Now the authority of God extends equally to all revealed things, and God is equally worthy of faith, whether He makes manifest truths of greater moment or things of lesser moment ; on the other hand, the authority of God in speaking cannot extend to those things which He does not reveal. Therefore everything and only what God has revealed is the material object of faith.

672. Thesis II. The primary or principal material object of faith is God Himself as the supernatural end, or the first truth in being. — The primary or principal material object is that which is believed through itself and by reason of itself, and for the sake of which other things are believed. This is God Himself as the supernatural end ; for all other things, such as the humanity of Christ, the sacraments, and other things contained in Scripture, « fall under faith only insofar as they have some order to God », so that we may know Him more fully as the supernatural end and tend to Him more perfectly. Hence the primary material object is said to be God as He is the first truth in being.

Although the object of faith is the first truth which is altogether simple, since nevertheless we do not see it in itself, but conceive it in our own way according to some of its perfections, we distinguish in the object of faith a multiplicity of things, just as in God Himself we distinguish many perfections and attributes, which are really identical with the divine essence and with one another.

673. The secondary object of faith. — The following pertain to it :

1. those things which of themselves directly lead to the supernatural end, and which are called the matters of faith and morals : they are the object of faith properly and of themselves ;

2. those things which of themselves are indifferent to the supernatural end and without which the Christian doctrine about faith and morals is incomplete, but which in fact along with that doctrine were attested in Holy Scripture for its manifestation, e.g. the history of Abraham or the captivity of the Jewish people, and other such things which can be known by natural reason ; these too must be believed, but they are the object of faith only improperly and accidentally (q. 1, a. 6, ad 1).

674. Corollary on private revelations. — Since divine authority is equal in particular revelations directed to a private person and in public revelation, it follows that the former are an object of divine faith, and can be believed provided one is certain of them. In such a case, at least the person to whom they were directed is obliged to believe ; if he omits this, he commits a sin of infidelity, discerning God's authority, which subverts faith in him ; but for others it probably suffices that they do not despise them.

For private revelations, if approved by the Church, are not proposed to be believed with divine faith ; but the Church only declares 1) that they contain nothing contrary to faith and morals, 2) that there are sufficient indications that they may be prudently, piously, and without superstition believed with human faith; from which it follows 3) that it is not lawful to despise them.

675. The object of faith implicitly revealed. — Not only those things which are explicitly, i.e. in themselves, expressly and distinctly, are matters of divine faith, but also those which are implicitly revealed pertain to divine faith.

For some things are said to be revealed :

1. Formally and immediately, though implicitly, i.e. really and by a proper concept, although not expressed and distinct but in a confused way, and not by proper but by equivalent terms : these are the things which are contained in what is explicitly revealed as a part in a whole, e.g. the definition and the essentials of the defined thing in the defined thing (actual metaphysical whole and metaphysical parts, e.g. man = rational animal ; sacrament = practical sign of grace) ; — or the particular in the universal (potential whole and subjective parts, e.g. every man, John) ; — or the elements and essential properties in the whole (actual physical or integral whole, and constitutive or integral parts, e.g. man = body and soul ; head, brain, heart ; capable of laughter) ; — or the essential forces and powers in the essence (power whole and potential parts, e.g. soul, intellect, and will) ; — or one correlative, contradictory, or contrary in the other (e.g. John is the son of Zebedee, this one is the father of John). These are the object of faith because they are equivalent and as to the sense are said by God, and so truly, really, and properly are contained in revelation : He who reveals the whole, implicitly reveals the parts.

2. Things are said to be revealed virtually and mediately implicitly which are contained in revelation as effect in cause, and as consequence or conclusion in its principles. These are not the object of divine faith since they are not immediately and in themselves revealed¹], but only mediately, namely in the medium from which they can be deduced : for they are not admitted because God said them, but only on account of something else which God said, i.e. not solely on account of the word of God but also on account of the connection with what He said. He who enunciates the principle or cause does not enunciate the consequence or effect. They are nevertheless the object of the assent of scientific theology ; and if they are infallibly defined by the Church, they are to be admitted altogether as true and they are the object, not of divine faith, but of theological assent or even of ecclesiastical faith²] — Hence :

a) A conclusion from one revealed premise and from another naturally known premise is revealed and an object of faith, if the second only shows that the conclusion is contained formally implicitly in the first, e.g. Christ is a man, therefore He has a body or is a rational animal ; — Every man begotten from Adam contracts original sin, therefore Peter contracts it ; and also, as it seems, a conclusion whose knowledge depends on a contingent fact, e.g. Every legitimately elected pontiff is the vicar of Christ, therefore Pius XI is the vicar of Christ ; — this child rightly baptized has grace, this consecrated host contains Christ. In these examples, however, there is no true syllogism, because the process does not have illative force ; it is not a conclusion properly so called through a true demonstration and deduction of a new truth, but a merely explicative conclusion and a simple declaration of those things which were already actually contained in the premises.

b) A conclusion from one revealed premise and from another naturally known premise, if it is equally contained in each and is equally and truly deduced from each, is not revealed nor an object of faith, because it is not admitted solely on account of God's authority but on account of the deduction, e.g. Christ is God-man, but a God-man can never lack grace or the beatific vision ; — the B.V. is the Mother of Christ, but S. Anna is the mother of the B.V., therefore she is the grandmother of Christ ; — Christ died under Pontius Pilate, therefore under Tiberius. Then there is a true syllogism, a true and properly so-called deduction, and a true illative conclusion of those things which were contained in the premises only virtually and by force of the connection ; a conclusion of a distinct truth, not revealed, but connected with revelation. The conclusion, as the logicians say, follows the weaker part.

c) A conclusion from two revealed premises, according to many³], is revealed and an object of faith, both because the conclusion is formally contained in the two premises which in this case are revealed, and because God knows their connection and the conclusion, but he who enunciates two premises while seeing the conclusion intends to enunciate this and manifests it in a sufficient manner. These arguments, however, do not seem to prove : not the first, because a properly so-called conclusion is contained in the premises not formally but only virtually, which are the true means of arriving at the conclusion ; otherwise the conclusion would not express a new truth, nor would the reasoning be a means of increasing knowledge⁴], — not the second, because for a conclusion to be enunciated properly and formally, it is not enough that one know it in the premises and intend to say it, but it is also required that the connection with them be manifested in some way by human speech, namely, that one enunciate the premises not separately but as premises, inasmuch as they are compared to one another and lead to the conclusion. Therefore, for God, who uses human speech for men, to reveal a conclusion, it is not enough that He know the connection with the principles and see the consequence, but it is also required that He express this connection or consequence, and place one premise immediately after the other⁵].

Such conclusions, then, from two revealed premises, do not seem necessarily and always to be revealed ; for if they were, from them others could be deduced, and from these again others, and so revelation would extend itself as it were to infinity. In fact, however, they are often revealed, and the object of faith, either because they themselves are expressly revealed, or because one premise only shows what is contained formally implicitly in the other, in which case there is not a truly demonstrative syllogism but a merely explicative one, as was said under a) ; e.g. There is one God ; but the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are God ; therefore they are one God ; — All the Apostles received the Holy Spirit ; Peter is an apostle ; therefore d) All the foregoing conclusions, if they are looked at as conclusions, i.e. inasmuch as they have a nexus with premises also revealed and are deduced from them, are not the object of faith but of the assent of theological science, because then they are not admitted on account of the motive of faith, the authority of God revealing, but on account of the motive of science, namely, on account of the nexus with the principles and the rational deduction.

676. The object of faith in itself and in relation to us ; divine and Catholic faith. — The object of faith can be distinguished :

1. The object of divine faith in itself, is that which in fact is revealed and so in itself pertains to faith.

2. The object of faith in relation to us, is that which moreover is sufficiently proposed as revealed and whose revelation is known by us with certainty. Hence particular propositions whose knowledge depends on a contingent fact, e.g. this host contains Christ, this child has grace, often will not be the object of faith in relation to us when the existence of the fact is not known by us with absolute certainty⁶] : for then the nexus with the revealed proposition does not appear.

3. The object of Catholic or universal-for-all faith, and to be believed by all, is that which pertains to the public revelation directed by God to all men and to the universal Church (contained in Scripture and Tradition), and moreover which the Church proposes as divinely revealed and commands all to believe. Hence private revelations cannot pertain to Catholic faith, and the Immaculate Conception of the B.V. before the definition was an object of divine faith, but not of Catholic faith (Vat. Counc., sess. 3, c. 3 ; Codex Iuris Canonici 1323, § 1).

Hence something can a) be of faith in itself, and not in relation to us, if we are not certain that it is revealed : so today the question is raised whether the assumption of the B.V.

b) be of faith for one and not for another, e.g. a private revelation ;

c) be of faith only probably, if there is doubt about the revelation ; indeed probably of Catholic faith, if there is doubt about the Church's proposition ; d) begin to be of Catholic faith, after the definition ; indeed cease to be of Catholic faith in relation to us, if the definition or its sense is no longer certain.

Explicit faith, therefore, can grow.