ON THE FORMAL OBJECT OF FAITH.

S. Th. II-II, q. 1, a. 1 ; De Verit., q. 14, a. 8.

667. Thesis. The formal object of faith is the authority of God revealing, or the first truth in saying. — The formal object of faith is that on account of which that which is believed is believed. This, as the Vatican Council defines (sess. 3, c. 3, can. 3), is the authority of God revealing, who can neither deceive nor be deceived ; authority indeed not in commanding but in affirming and witnessing, that is, the truth of God in saying, and indeed the truth of God as revealing. These words indicate two things :

1° That God, when He speaks, by reason of His infinite perfection says nothing but the truth, and so has the right that we believe Him, whence the formal object of faith is said to be the first truth in saying.

2° But it is not enough that God, when He speaks, says what is true ; for faith it is also required that He has in fact spoken : hence the formal object of faith is said to be the authority of God as revealing, or the first revealing truth. For if one asks anyone why he believes, he will answer because God has said so (in 2°) ; and he believes what God has said, because God in speaking is true (in 1°). — But :

3° For the authority of God, whereby He is true in saying, it is not enough that God is infinitely true, i.e. that He cannot deceive anyone out of malice, but it is also required that He be infinitely wise, i.e. that He cannot be deceived in knowing out of ignorance. Hence theologians say that the formal object of faith is the first truth in saying, inasmuch as it presupposes the first truth in knowing. The immediate and ultimate motive of faith, however, is only the first revealing truth.

668. That the authority of God revealing is the formal object of faith is proved:

1. By reason : By divine faith we believe God in the same way as by human faith we believe a man. But by human faith we believe on account of the authority of the man in bearing witness : for if one asks anyone : why do you believe this? he will answer : because Peter said it ; and if one asks : why do you believe what Peter said? he will answer : because Peter is truthful in speaking.

2. From the manner of speaking of Holy Scripture : a) faith is said to be from hearing the word of God (Rom. X, 14 ; Jer. VII, 28), and the faithful are said to receive faith as the word or testimony of God (1 Thess. II, 13) ; — b) by faith we believe God (Gen. XV, 6) : to believe is to receive the testimony of God, just as to believe men is to receive the testimony of men (1 John V, 5-13) ; and indeed divine faith is compared to the faith given to witnesses in a trial (John V, 36 ; VIII, 17) ; — c) the prophets of the Old Testament, when they demand faith, appeal to the authority of God (Thus says the Lord), and Christ Himself explicitly to His truth and veracity (John VII, 16, 28 ; VIII, 26) ; whence by believing we signify that God is truthful (John III, 33). From all of which it is evident that we believe God in the same way as we believe men, and that faith is founded on the testimony and authority of God speaking. — And so d) faith is called the obedience and captivity of the intellect in obedience to Christ (2 Cor. X, 5) : for when a man by faith admits not what he himself but what Christ sees, because he voluntarily trusts Christ, therefore by the will the intellect is held captive to Christ's intellect, subjects itself to Him, and honors Him.

3. From Tradition : the same is taught clearly and openly by the Fathers from the beginning : Athenagoras, Leg. pro Christianis, n. 7 ; S. Theophilus of Antioch, ad Autolyc. I, 8 ; Clement of Alexandria, Strom. II, c. 2, n. 8 ; S. Chrysostom, in Mt. hom. I, n. 82 ; hom. 36 in Gen. 15, n. 6 ; Theodoret, Graec. affect. serm. I ; S. Cyprian, De Mortalitate, n. 6 ; S. Ambrose, in Luc. IV, 71 ; S. Augustine, ep. 47, n. 7 ; De Spiritu et Littera, XXXII, n. 5 ; S. Leo the Great, serm. 27, c. 1.

The arguments brought forward prove that faith is founded equally on revelation or testimony and on the truth of God, and therefore that not only the truth of God in saying is the formal object of faith, but that revelation also pertains to it, or is a motive positively influencing faith, and is not a mere condition without which the motive is applied, as Scotus taught. And indeed :

a) That which formally constitutes God as a witness, and which renders God's authority formally moving, pertains to the motive of faith. But revelation actually formally constitutes God as a witness and renders His authority formally moving, for an authority not speaking does not move the hearer. Therefore the formal motive of faith is the first truth as actually witnessing ; otherwise it would move in the first act, not in the second act.

b) For the partial motive is that by which reason sees the connection between the authority of God and the truth to be believed, just as the link of the conclusion with the principle moves one to scientific assent ; but this connection in the present case is the fact of revelation. Therefore revelation is a partial motive.

c) The adequate formal object is that which infallibly shows the revealed truth. Neither God's authority alone nor revelation alone shows this. Therefore the adequate formal object is both together. We do not believe, namely, only because God is truthful, nor only because God has revealed, but on account of both¹].

669. Faith is a theological, or purely divine, virtue, which accordingly has God alone as its formal object : for by habitual grace and the theological virtues we share in the life and operations proper to God Himself, which have God alone as their object. Hence the sole motive of faith is the truth of God revealing alone, nor can any created thing enter into its formal object, just as must be said also of the other theological virtues. Hence the following are not to be heard :

1. Those who, with De Lugo, hold that the formal object of faith is partially the proposition of the Church, saying that we believe because God has revealed, and this because the Church says so. For the proposition made by the Church is not the cause or motive why we believe, but only the ordinary means by which we know what has been revealed by God²]; having known which, we adhere to the revealed truths on account of God's authority alone. Thus when a teacher says : this is the opinion of Scripture or of S. Thomas, you believe the opinion not on account of the teacher but on account of the authority of Scripture or of S. Thomas.

Thus also the contents of a king's letter are not believed on account of the authority of the messenger.

2. Nor are those to be heard who, like Mazzella, teach that extrinsic revelation enters into the formal object of faith ; because for faith it is required that God has in fact spoken, as was said in n° 667. For God's speech can be considered either actively, as it is in God Himself the conception of a truth which He orders and directs to us and the will and command to reveal it, and thus it is nothing but God Himself and pertains to the motive of faith ; or it can be considered passively, as it is the manifestation and sign of this conception and will in creatures (an external voice, an imaginary vision, or an intelligible species infused in us), and this is not the formal object of faith but only a condition without which it would not be possible : for because we are not able to inspect God's speech, i.e. His intellect and will, therefore we need, in order to know it, signs external to God, which nevertheless are not the cause or motive why we believe, but a condition without which faith is not possible.

Thus the letter by which someone testifies is not the motive of believing, but only the condition of knowing his judgment and testimony internally.

670. Corollary. — Hence it appears that the opinions of the older theologians are false, among whom

1. Cajetan placed the formal object of faith in the divine essence, or God's truth in being, and William of Paris in God's supreme dominion : these are the ultimate ontological reason of the motive of faith itself, but not the proximate motive which moves to assent, or on which our intellect's assent rests ;

2. Báñez and Sylvester Maurus at least partially placed it in the light of faith, whether habitual or actual : grace causes as by an efficient cause, but it is not the motive of believing ;

3. Ripalda placed it, for revealed promises, in the fidelity of God : but this pertains to the motive of hope.