Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis
Benedictus Henricus Merkelbach (1871–1942)
Summa Theologiae Moralis ad mentem D. Thomae et ad normam iuris novi
First published 1935
Volume I (De principiis) of Benedictus Henricus Merkelbach's Summa theologiae moralis sets out the foundations of Catholic moral theology within a Thomistic framework. It treats human acts, conscience, law, sin, and merit in relation to the canon law of its period. The present edition follows the Paris text published by Desclée de Brouwer in 1935 and includes the Latin text with an English translation. It comprises the first volume of the three-volume Summa.
Prologus
Introductio I: Theologia Moralis Generalis: Introductio
Tractatus I: Tractatus de ultimo actu humanorum fine seu de beatitudine
Introductio
Quaestio I: DE FINE ULTIMO IN COMMUNI
Quaestio II: DE BEATITUDINE OBIECTIVA
Quaestio III: DE BEATITUDINE FORMALI
Quaestio IV: DE QUALITATIBUS BEATITUDINIS
Quaestio V: DE MODO OBTINENDI BEATITUDINEM
Tractatus II: De actibus humanis in se
Introductio
Pars I: De actibus humanis secundum esse materiale et psychologicum
§ I: De conditione actuum humanorum
Caput I: De elemento subiectivo actus humani
Quaestio I: De voluntario
Articulus I: De voluntario in se
Articulus II: De voluntario tum positivo et directo, tum negativo et indirecto
Articulus III: De voluntario in se et in causa
Quaestio II: De impedimentis voluntarii seu de involuntario
Articulus I: De violentia
Articulus II: De metu
Articulus III: De concupiscentia
Articulus IV: De ignorantia
Quaestio III: De libero
Quaestio IV: De impedimentis liberi
Articulus I: De passionibus
Articulus II: De habitu et consuetudine
Articulus III: De impedimentis liberi remotioribus
Caput II: De elemento obiectivo actus humani
Quaestio I: De elemento essentiali seu obiecto
Quaestio II: De elemento accidentali seu de circumstantiis
§ II: De distinctione actuum humanorum
Quaestio I: De actibus elicitis
Quaestio II: De actibus imperatis
Pars II: De actibus humanis secundum esse morale
§ I: De moralitate actus humani in genere
Quaestio I: De essentia et speciebus moralitatis
Quaestio II: De fundamentis moralitatis
Articulus I: De intrinseca differentia boni inter et mali
Articulus II: De norma moralitatis
Articulus III: De fundamento obiectivo moralitatis
Articulus IV: De falsis systematibus circa fundamenta moralitatis
Articulus V: De facultate apprehensiva moralitatis
Quaestio III: De principiis seu fontibus moralitatis
Quaestio IV: De distinctione specifica inter actum bonum et malum
Quaestio V: De distinctione specifica inter varios actus bonos vel malos
Articulus I: De obiecto
Articulus II: De circumstantiis
Articulus III: De fine
§ II: De moralitate actuum humanorum in specie
Quaestio I: De bonitate et malitia actus interioris
Quaestio II: De bonitate et malitia actus exterioris
Quaestio III: De bonitate et malitia effectus externi
Quaestio IV: De bonitate et malitia passionum
Quaestio V: De bonitate et malitia circumstantiarum
Pars III: De actibus humanis secundum esse supernaturale et meritorium
Quaestio I: De merito praesertim supernaturali
Quaestio II: De conditionibus meriti supernaturalis
Tractatus III: De conscientia in generali
Introductio
Quaestio I: De conscientia morali secundum se in esse psychologico
Quaestio II: De conscientia prout est regula actuum moralium
Articulus I: De rectitudine conscientiae
Articulus II: De conscientiae certitudine
Quaestio III: De conscientia christiana prout est regula actuum supernaturalium
Tractatus IV: De legibus in genere
Introductio
§ I: De lege secundum esse psychologicum
Pars I: De lege in genere
Quaestio I: De ipsa lege in se
Articulus I: De essentia legis
Articulus II: De promulgatione legis
Quaestio II: De distinctione legum
Quaestio III: De effectibus legis
Articulus I: De vi directivâ seu obligatione legis
Articulus II: De vi coactivâ seu sanctione legis
Pars II: De lege aeterna quae est fundamentum omnis legis
Quaestio I: De essentia legis aeternae
Quaestio II: De potestate legis aeternae
Quaestio III: De mutabilitate legis aeternae
§ I: De legibus quae regunt actus morales
Pars III: De lege naturali
Quaestio I: De essentia legis naturalis
Quaestio II: De potestate legis naturalis
Articulus I: De vi directivâ seu obligatione legis naturalis
Articulus II: De vi coactivâ seu sanctione legis naturalis
Quaestio III: De mutabilitate legis naturalis
Quaestio IV: De Lege Humana in Se
Articulus I: De Auctore legis civilis
Articulus II: De Qualitate legis humanae
Articulus III: De Efformatione legis humanae
Articulus IV: De Divisione legis humanae
Quaestio V: De Potestate Legis Humanae
Articulus I: De Materia legis humanae
Articulus II: De Obligatione legis humanae
Articulus III: De Subditis legis civilis
Articulus IV: De Impletione et Interpretatione legis humanae
Quaestio VI: De Mutabilitate Legis Humanae
Caput I: De Lege Vetere
Quaestio I: De Lege Vetere Secundum Se
Quaestio II: De Potestate Legis Veteris
Quaestio III: De Mutabilitate Veteris Legis
Caput II: De Lege Nova
Quaestio I: De Essentia Legis Novae
Quaestio II: De Potestate Legis Novae
Quaestio III: De Lege Ecclesiastica Secundum Se
Articulus I: De Auctore legis ecclesiasticae
Articulus II: De Materia et Qualitate legis ecclesiasticae
Articulus III: De Efformatione legis ecclesiasticae
Articulus IV: De Divisione legis ecclesiasticae
Quaestio IV: De Potestate seu Obligatione Legis Ecclesiasticae
Articulus I: De Quantitate seu Gravitate Obligationis
Articulus II: De Qualitate et Extensione Obligationis legis praeceptivae
Articulus III: De Qualitate et Extensione Obligationis legis poenalis
Articulus IV: De Qualitate et Extensione Obligationis legis irritantis
Articulus V: De Subditis legis ecclesiasticae
Articulus VI: De Impletione legis ecclesiasticae
Articulus VII: De Interpretatione legis ecclesiasticae
Quaestio V: De Mutabilitate Legis Ecclesiasticae
Articulus I: De Ignorantia
Articulus II: De Impotentia
Articulus III: De Dispensatione
Articulus IV: De privilegio
Articulus V: De cessatione finis
Articulus VI: De abrogatione et derogatione
Articulus VII: De consuetudine
Tractatus V: De peccatis in genere
Introductio I: De Peccatis in Genere
Quaestio I: De essentia peccati
Articulus I: De notione et conditionibus peccati
Articulus II: De peccato omissionis negative voluntario
Articulus III: De peccato commissionis externo, indirecte aut in causa voluntario
Articulus IV: De elementis constitutivis peccati
Articulus V: De definitione peccati
Quaestio II: De distinctione peccatorum
Articulus I: De distinctione specifica
Articulus II: De distinctione numerica
Quaestio III: De comparatione et gravitate peccatorum
Quaestio IV: De subiecto peccati
Articulus I: De motibus seu peccatis sensualitatis
Articulus II: De consensu in delectationem seu de delectatione morosa
Articulus III: De consensu in actum seu de desiderio et gaudio
Pars I: De causis peccatorum
Quaestio I: De causis peccati interioribus
Articulus I: De ignorantia causa peccati ex parte rationis
Articulus II: De passione causa peccati ex parte appetitus sensitivi
Articulus III: De malitia causa peccati ex parte voluntatis
Quaestio II: De causis peccatorum exterioribus
Articulus I: De deo permittente
Articulus II: De diabolo tentante
Articulus III: De homine cooperante
Quaestio III: De peccato quod est causa alterius peccati
Articulus I: De modo quo unum peccatum alterum causat
Articulus II: De superbia et inani gloria
Articulus III: De avaritia
Articulus IV: De luxuria et gula
Articulus V: De invidia et ira
Articulus VI: De acedia
Pars II: De effectibus peccatorum
Quaestio I: De diminutione boni naturae
Quaestio II: De reatu culpae seu macula peccati
Quaestio III: De reatu poenae
Quaestio IV: De peccato mortali et veniali
Articulus I: De differentia inter peccatum mortale et veniale
Articulus II: De gravitate peccati mortalis
Articulus III: De conditionibus ad peccatum mortale requisitis
Articulus IV: De divisione peccati mortalis et venialis
Articulus V: De conversione peccati mortalis et venialis
Articulus VI: De peccato veniali secundum se
Tractatus VI: De habitibus et virtutibus in genere
Introductio I: De Habitibus et Virtutibus in Genere
Pars I: De habitibus in genere secundum esse psychologicum
Quaestio I: De essentia habitus
Quaestio II: De subiecto habitus
Quaestio III: De causa habituum
Quaestio IV: De distinctione habituum
Pars II: De habitibus secundum esse morale seu de virtutibus acquisitis
Quaestio I: De essentia virtutis
Quaestio II: De subiecto virtutis
Quaestio III: De distinctione virtutum
Articulus I: De virtutibus intellectualibus
Articulus II: De virtutibus moralibus
Articulus III: De virtutibus cardinalibus
Quaestio IV: De proprietatibus virtutum
Articulus I: De medio virtutis
Articulus II: De connexione virtutum
Articulus III: De aequalitate virtutum
Articulus IV: De duratione virtutum
Pars III: De habitibus secundum esse supernaturale seu de virtutibus infusis
Quaestio I: De existentia et essentia infusorum habituum ac virtutum
Quaestio II: De distinctione infusorum habituum et virtutum
Articulus I: De virtutibus theologicis
Articulus II: De virtutibus moralibus
Articulus III: De donis spiritus sancti
Quaestio III: De causa infusorum habituum et virtutum
Quaestio IV: De proprietatibus infusorum habituum et virtutum
Articulus I: De medio virtutum infusarum
S. Th. I-II, q. 64, a. 1, 2, 3 ; De Virt., q. 1, a. 13.
645. The theological virtues are not in a mean, properly and of themselves and according to the very notion of virtue, i.e. by reason of the object, because in their matter excess cannot be given : for the object and measure of the theological virtues is not a good of reason to be placed in acts (which is in a mean), but God Himself (an infinite perfection which exceeds every human faculty), toward whom we cannot tend too much, indeed whom we cannot love or in whom we cannot believe or hope as much as is due. There is namely no excess in attaining the measure.
However on our part and by reason of the subject and of the manner in which they are exercised, they are in a mean between two extreme vices, because we must tend toward God according to the measure of our nature and condition ; whence thus we must hope and believe so that our hope may be a mean between presumption and despair, and our faith between two opposite heresies, and therefore the presumptuous man sins who hopes for a good that exceeds his condition, and the despairing who does not hope for what he can hope for according to his condition ; likewise he sins who would give himself to contemplation when detriment would follow for society or when he ought to attend to family matters. But this is accidental as to the nature of the theological virtue, because it does not proceed from its proper acts considered in themselves, and from its proper matter, but from extrinsic circumstances of the subject in which it inheres. Whence improperly they are said to be in a mean.
646. The theological virtues therefore are summarily in the highest degree, i.e. they adhere to God above all things1 :
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Faith adheres to the divine authority above every other authority, hope adheres to the omnipotence above every other power ; charity to the divine goodness above every other goodness.
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Faith believes God more firmly than all others ; hope, immovable, hopes in God rather than in any others and loves above all things the lovable ; charity prefers God to all things and loves Him above all things lovable.
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Whence we are ready to lay down all things that are contrary to faith, hope or charity, rather than depart from them.
647. Infused moral virtues are in a mean, in the same way as was said of acquired virtues ; but the mean can be different because they are not determined by relation to human reason but to the divine law.
The gifts of the Holy Spirit are not in a mean because they are directed by the instinct of the Holy Spirit which cannot fail or exceed ; moreover the Holy Spirit is not something regulable.
Articulus II: De connexione habituum infusorum
S. Th. I-II, q. 65 et 68, a. 5 ; De Virt., q. 2, a. 3 ; q. 5, a. 2.
648. Principle I. Theological virtues according to their essence are not connected, but as virtues. Among the theological virtues : 1) Faith and hope according to their proper essence do not depend on charity, for they are presupposed to charity ; whence they can exist without charity, as is clear in the sinner who has not denied faith and hope. This for faith is defined by the Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 15 and can. 28 ; for hope it is certain from the unanimous opinion of theologians.
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However without charity they are not perfect virtues or forms, because in fact they are not referred to the last end. For it pertains to the notion of a perfect virtue not only that we do good, but also that we do well ; faith however is a voluntary assent, which will not be perfect unless it be made in the due manner and the will also be well disposed through charity ; hope is the expectation of beatitude from merits, which will not be perfect unless present merits are had, for which charity is required. Hence charity, by which we are ordered to the supernatural last end, is called the perfection and form (extrinsic) of all supernatural virtues ; and faith and hope without charity are unformed (q. 65, a. 4).
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Faith can be without hope because it is presupposed to hope according to reason.
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But charity cannot be without faith and hope, and hope cannot be without faith. Hence S. Thomas, q. 65, a. 5 : « As one could not have friendship with someone if he disbelieved or despaired of being able to have some society or familiar conversation with him ; so one cannot have friendship with God, which is charity, unless he have faith, through which he believes in such society and conversation with God, and hopes that he belongs to this society ».
649. Principle II. Infused moral virtues are connected :
A. Among themselves through prudence : for they incline us to the right choice of supernatural means for a good end, or to acting supernaturally well in all circumstances, which without perfect supernatural prudence is impossible ; — and conversely perfect prudence cannot exist for rightly ordering means in all circumstances, unless one is disposed for the particular good end in all circumstances, for which all the moral virtues are required. In the same way as was said of acquired virtues (q. 65, a. 1).
B. They are also connected with charity :
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They cannot exist without charity. For they cannot exist without supernatural prudence ; but supernatural prudence cannot exist without charity, for if for perfect prudence it is required that man be well disposed in relation to the particular ends due in such and such a matter, which is done through the moral virtues, much more is it required that he be well disposed in relation to the last end, which is done through charity : for an act rightly ordering means toward a particular end good but toward the last end evil becomes evil. Therefore infused moral virtues are connected with charity (a. 2).
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Likewise charity cannot exist without infused moral virtues. For a) charity is connected with sanctifying grace, which raises to supernatural being and is the remote principle of supernatural operations. But infused moral virtues are properties of sanctifying grace, for he who has supernatural being as remote principle, ought to be able to operate supernaturally and to have proximate principles for supernatural operations. Therefore — b) Grace and charity, inasmuch as they order man toward the last end, are the principle of all good works which can be ordered to the last end. But no work of his tends toward the end unless he has the potency of disposing means toward the end, and the principle of certain works is not found in some thing, unless those things which are necessary for accomplishing such works are also found. But the moral virtues give the potency of choosing the means necessary for the last end and of accomplishing each kind of good supernatural work. Therefore they are connected with grace and charity. For God namely does not operate less perfectly in the works of grace than in the works of nature.
Hence he who receives grace and charity receives the supernatural moral virtues ; and by every mortal sin charity and all supernatural moral virtues are lost (a. 3).
- Likewise the gifts of the Holy Spirit are connected with charity by which we are united to the Holy Spirit the mover, and therefore are granted together with charity, are increased intensively, and are lost (q. 68, a. 5).
650. Principle III. Natural acquired moral virtues can exist without charity, and conversely, for the sinner who is converted does not therefore have acquired virtues ; and he who sins mortally does not therefore lose them (q. 63, a. 2, ad 2).
651. Observation. — S. Thomas says : Charity is the form of all the virtues because it gives and impresses on the acts of the other virtues their form and ultimate perfection ; according as it orders them to the last end ; it is their root because it nourishes and sustains them ; end because it orders all the other virtues to its end ; and mother « because from the appetite of the last end it conceives the acts of the other virtues by commanding them » (II-II, q. 23, a. 8). Prudence therefore is the form of the moral virtues because it gives the ordering toward the particular end according to reason ; charity is the form of the theological virtues and of prudence because it gives the perfect ordering toward the last end ; grace is the form of charity because it gives the divine being and thus confers on it dignity and a right to the last end (De Virt., q. 2, a. 3, ad 19)1.
Articulus III: De aequalitate habituum infusorum
S. Th. I-II, q. 66, a. 1, 2, 6 ; q. 68, a. 7 et 8 ; II-II, q. 23, a. 6. De Virt., q. 5, a. 3.
652. Principle I. According to species, theological virtues are more perfect than others. — For as object they have God Himself the supernatural end and attain immediately the very primary rule of human acts, namely God ; and so they are more perfect according to species than the other virtues which attain only human reason. Among themselves however charity excels, for faith and hope include a distance from God and imperfection, since faith is about God not seen and hope about God not possessed, but charity is about God who is already in some way possessed through the love of friendship,
and will be fully possessed1. Whence the Apostle, I Cor. XIII, 13 : The greatest of these is charity (q. 66, a. 6).
Faith, entitatively as habit, is more perfect than hope because it is in the intellect, whose object is nobler ; but hope, as virtue, is more perfect because it approaches God more.
Moral infused virtues are less perfect than the theological virtues, because they are immediately about the means alone toward the end ; they have however a diverse degree of perfection in the way which was said of acquired virtues.
The gifts of the Holy Spirit are less perfect than the theological virtues which are their principles and roots, and which immediately unite to God as the last end ; while the gifts only perfect man so that he be subject to God moving : but it is more perfect to be united to God than to be subject to a mover. But they are more perfect than the other virtues which perfect either reason itself or dispose us to follow the motion of reason, while by the gifts we are subjected to the nobler mover, the Holy Spirit. « But it is manifest that to a higher mover the mobile must be disposed with greater perfection » (q. 68, a. 8). — Among the gifts, the more excellent are the intellectual ones over those in the appetite, and indeed 1) wisdom is the more worthy, 2) understanding, 3) knowledge, 4) counsel, 5) piety, 6) fortitude, 7) fear, according to the order of the natural virtues2.
653. Principle II. According to extension and intensity, infused habits are equal. — Infused virtues — likewise the gifts of the Holy Spirit — cannot be increased extensively, but they dispose for all the corresponding supernatural acts ; and therefore in all men and in the same man even at different times they are equal according to extension. Likewise, because according to their formal nature they are connected, they are infused together, and they are also equal according to intensity in the same man at the same time : thus all infused habits are equally ordered to the supernatural end through charity, just as also the moral virtues through infused prudence adhere equally to the good of reason and conform to reason. Hence if charity is increased, all are increased proportionally at the same time ; just as, with prudence increased, all the moral virtues are increased proportionally.
Articulus IV: De duratione habituum infusorum
S. Th. I-II, q. 67 ; q. 68, a. 6 ; De Virt., q. 5, a. 4.
654. Principle. In the blessed there remain those infused habits which include no imperfection repugnant to their state. — Whence :
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Faith and hope do not remain, which include imperfection because they are about the unseen and the not yet possessed ; whence when vision and possession come, they are emptied away.
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Charity remains, because love by its nature includes no imperfection ; it can be about what is possessed and not possessed, about what is seen and not seen.
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The supernatural moral virtues remain according to essence, but they will have other acts conformed to the heavenly life, as was said of acquired virtues ; before the resurrection however the virtues which are about passions will exist only in root, because they are in the sensitive appetite, which cannot exist without a body.
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The gifts of the Holy Spirit according to essence remain in the other life because the blessed perfectly follow the leading of the Holy Spirit, and are most perfectly subjected to Him ; but they will have other acts befitting the heavenly life.
655. Observation. — In the souls of purgatory there remain besides faith and hope because they do not yet see nor possess God. In the damned no supernatural habit or virtue can exist, because they are no longer destined for the supernatural life.
SPECIAL MORAL THEOLOGY.
On the Matter, Method and Order of Special Moral Theology.
656. Matter. — After general moral theology, which comprises the treatises on the last end, on human acts in themselves, on their rules namely conscience and laws, on sins, and on habits and virtues, considered in general, we begin special moral theology which treats in particular
1° of the individual good acts, and of the evil or sins opposed to them,
2° of the individual habits, virtues or gifts of the Holy Spirit, and of the vices opposed to them,
3° of the individual precepts whether affirmative, which pertain to good works and virtues, or negative, which pertain to sins and vices.
Moreover, among all these, some pertain to the state of all men, some to a determined state, namely clerics, religious, bishops, etc.
657. Method. — Now however all the aforesaid things can be explained separately, or even several of them together, as many modern authors do, who with S. Alphonsus divide moral theology according to precepts. But the scientific and more perfect method of S. Thomas, as being more complete at the same time and more compendious, is to consider all these together so that in the same treatise we examine both the virtue with its proper acts, and the vices and sins opposed, and the gift of the Holy Spirit corresponding to this virtue, and the affirmative or negative precepts pertaining to all these.
« It must be considered, says S. Thomas1, ... that if we determined separately about virtues, gifts, vices and precepts, we would have to say the same thing many times... The way of consideration will therefore be more compendious and expeditious, if under the same treatise consideration proceeds together about the virtue and the gift corresponding to it, and about the opposite vices, and about the affirmative or negative precepts. This mode of consideration will however be more fitting for the vices themselves according to their proper species. For it has been shown above that vices and sins are diversified in species according to their matter or object... It is however the same matter about which both the virtue operates rightly, and the vices depart from rectitude in the opposite way ».
In reality the order of precepts does not favor a scientific exposition, by which all things are logically joined together among themselves and reduced to principles. For
a) there are many acts, which are reduced to precepts in a rather arbitrary and very remote way, e.g. imprecation, anger, even gluttony and drunkenness, which are born to harm the body, to the 5th precept ; all the sacraments to the 3rd ; the obligation of alms to the 4th or to the 5th ; humility to the 8th ;
b) there are acts or virtues, which must be reduced to several precepts, e.g. charity to the 1st for the love of God, to the 5th for the love of neighbor, to the 4th or 5th for the duty of almsgiving ; likewise restitution to justice, fortitude and temperance to diverse precepts according to various matters ; — and thus many things are mixed whose morality proceeds from very diverse reasons, or conversely things are separated which pertain to the same virtues ;
c) moreover the said method gives place to an incomplete treatment : those treating expressly about the acts of precepts omit those which are of counsel and which pertain to perfection, and more or even uniquely consider sins, not virtues.
Whence the division according to virtues is altogether to be preferred.
658. Order of division. — There are seven virtues, to which all others are reduced : three theological and four cardinal. Special moral theology therefore comprises seven treatises : on faith, on hope, on charity, on prudence, on justice, on fortitude, on temperance, which pertain to all states ; to which is added an eighth : on particular states2].
We begin to speak about the theological virtues.