Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis
Benedictus Henricus Merkelbach (1871–1942)
Summa Theologiae Moralis ad mentem D. Thomae et ad normam iuris novi
First published 1935
Volume I (De principiis) of Benedictus Henricus Merkelbach's Summa theologiae moralis sets out the foundations of Catholic moral theology within a Thomistic framework. It treats human acts, conscience, law, sin, and merit in relation to the canon law of its period. The present edition follows the Paris text published by Desclée de Brouwer in 1935 and includes the Latin text with an English translation. It comprises the first volume of the three-volume Summa.
Prologus
Introductio I: Theologia Moralis Generalis: Introductio
Tractatus I: Tractatus de ultimo actu humanorum fine seu de beatitudine
Introductio
Quaestio I: DE FINE ULTIMO IN COMMUNI
Quaestio II: DE BEATITUDINE OBIECTIVA
Quaestio III: DE BEATITUDINE FORMALI
Quaestio IV: DE QUALITATIBUS BEATITUDINIS
Quaestio V: DE MODO OBTINENDI BEATITUDINEM
Tractatus II: De actibus humanis in se
Introductio
Pars I: De actibus humanis secundum esse materiale et psychologicum
§ I: De conditione actuum humanorum
Caput I: De elemento subiectivo actus humani
Quaestio I: De voluntario
Articulus I: De voluntario in se
Articulus II: De voluntario tum positivo et directo, tum negativo et indirecto
Articulus III: De voluntario in se et in causa
Quaestio II: De impedimentis voluntarii seu de involuntario
Articulus I: De violentia
Articulus II: De metu
Articulus III: De concupiscentia
Articulus IV: De ignorantia
Quaestio III: De libero
Quaestio IV: De impedimentis liberi
Articulus I: De passionibus
Articulus II: De habitu et consuetudine
Articulus III: De impedimentis liberi remotioribus
Caput II: De elemento obiectivo actus humani
Quaestio I: De elemento essentiali seu obiecto
Quaestio II: De elemento accidentali seu de circumstantiis
§ II: De distinctione actuum humanorum
Quaestio I: De actibus elicitis
Quaestio II: De actibus imperatis
Pars II: De actibus humanis secundum esse morale
§ I: De moralitate actus humani in genere
Quaestio I: De essentia et speciebus moralitatis
Quaestio II: De fundamentis moralitatis
Articulus I: De intrinseca differentia boni inter et mali
Articulus II: De norma moralitatis
Articulus III: De fundamento obiectivo moralitatis
Articulus IV: De falsis systematibus circa fundamenta moralitatis
Articulus V: De facultate apprehensiva moralitatis
Quaestio III: De principiis seu fontibus moralitatis
Quaestio IV: De distinctione specifica inter actum bonum et malum
Quaestio V: De distinctione specifica inter varios actus bonos vel malos
Articulus I: De obiecto
Articulus II: De circumstantiis
Articulus III: De fine
§ II: De moralitate actuum humanorum in specie
Quaestio I: De bonitate et malitia actus interioris
Quaestio II: De bonitate et malitia actus exterioris
Quaestio III: De bonitate et malitia effectus externi
Quaestio IV: De bonitate et malitia passionum
Quaestio V: De bonitate et malitia circumstantiarum
Pars III: De actibus humanis secundum esse supernaturale et meritorium
Quaestio I: De merito praesertim supernaturali
Quaestio II: De conditionibus meriti supernaturalis
Tractatus III: De conscientia in generali
Introductio
Quaestio I: De conscientia morali secundum se in esse psychologico
Quaestio II: De conscientia prout est regula actuum moralium
Articulus I: De rectitudine conscientiae
Articulus II: De conscientiae certitudine
Quaestio III: De conscientia christiana prout est regula actuum supernaturalium
Tractatus IV: De legibus in genere
Introductio
§ I: De lege secundum esse psychologicum
Pars I: De lege in genere
Quaestio I: De ipsa lege in se
Articulus I: De essentia legis
Articulus II: De promulgatione legis
Quaestio II: De distinctione legum
Quaestio III: De effectibus legis
Articulus I: De vi directivâ seu obligatione legis
Articulus II: De vi coactivâ seu sanctione legis
Pars II: De lege aeterna quae est fundamentum omnis legis
Quaestio I: De essentia legis aeternae
Quaestio II: De potestate legis aeternae
Quaestio III: De mutabilitate legis aeternae
§ I: De legibus quae regunt actus morales
Pars III: De lege naturali
Quaestio I: De essentia legis naturalis
Quaestio II: De potestate legis naturalis
Articulus I: De vi directivâ seu obligatione legis naturalis
Articulus II: De vi coactivâ seu sanctione legis naturalis
Quaestio III: De mutabilitate legis naturalis
Quaestio IV: De Lege Humana in Se
Articulus I: De Auctore legis civilis
Articulus II: De Qualitate legis humanae
Articulus III: De Efformatione legis humanae
Articulus IV: De Divisione legis humanae
Quaestio V: De Potestate Legis Humanae
Articulus I: De Materia legis humanae
Articulus II: De Obligatione legis humanae
Articulus III: De Subditis legis civilis
Articulus IV: De Impletione et Interpretatione legis humanae
Quaestio VI: De Mutabilitate Legis Humanae
Caput I: De Lege Vetere
Quaestio I: De Lege Vetere Secundum Se
Quaestio II: De Potestate Legis Veteris
Quaestio III: De Mutabilitate Veteris Legis
Caput II: De Lege Nova
Quaestio I: De Essentia Legis Novae
Quaestio II: De Potestate Legis Novae
Quaestio III: De Lege Ecclesiastica Secundum Se
Articulus I: De Auctore legis ecclesiasticae
Articulus II: De Materia et Qualitate legis ecclesiasticae
Articulus III: De Efformatione legis ecclesiasticae
Articulus IV: De Divisione legis ecclesiasticae
Quaestio IV: De Potestate seu Obligatione Legis Ecclesiasticae
Articulus I: De Quantitate seu Gravitate Obligationis
Articulus II: De Qualitate et Extensione Obligationis legis praeceptivae
Articulus III: De Qualitate et Extensione Obligationis legis poenalis
Articulus IV: De Qualitate et Extensione Obligationis legis irritantis
Articulus V: De Subditis legis ecclesiasticae
Articulus VI: De Impletione legis ecclesiasticae
Articulus VII: De Interpretatione legis ecclesiasticae
Quaestio V: De Mutabilitate Legis Ecclesiasticae
Articulus I: De Ignorantia
Articulus II: De Impotentia
Articulus III: De Dispensatione
Articulus IV: De privilegio
Articulus V: De cessatione finis
Articulus VI: De abrogatione et derogatione
Articulus VII: De consuetudine
Tractatus V: De peccatis in genere
Introductio I: De Peccatis in Genere
Quaestio I: De essentia peccati
Articulus I: De notione et conditionibus peccati
Articulus II: De peccato omissionis negative voluntario
Articulus III: De peccato commissionis externo, indirecte aut in causa voluntario
Articulus IV: De elementis constitutivis peccati
Articulus V: De definitione peccati
Quaestio II: De distinctione peccatorum
Articulus I: De distinctione specifica
Articulus II: De distinctione numerica
Quaestio III: De comparatione et gravitate peccatorum
Quaestio IV: De subiecto peccati
Articulus I: De motibus seu peccatis sensualitatis
Articulus II: De consensu in delectationem seu de delectatione morosa
Articulus III: De consensu in actum seu de desiderio et gaudio
Pars I: De causis peccatorum
Quaestio I: De causis peccati interioribus
Articulus I: De ignorantia causa peccati ex parte rationis
Articulus II: De passione causa peccati ex parte appetitus sensitivi
Articulus III: De malitia causa peccati ex parte voluntatis
Quaestio II: De causis peccatorum exterioribus
Articulus I: De deo permittente
Articulus II: De diabolo tentante
Articulus III: De homine cooperante
Quaestio III: De peccato quod est causa alterius peccati
Articulus I: De modo quo unum peccatum alterum causat
Articulus II: De superbia et inani gloria
Articulus III: De avaritia
Articulus IV: De luxuria et gula
Articulus V: De invidia et ira
Articulus VI: De acedia
Pars II: De effectibus peccatorum
Quaestio I: De diminutione boni naturae
Quaestio II: De reatu culpae seu macula peccati
Quaestio III: De reatu poenae
Quaestio IV: De peccato mortali et veniali
Articulus I: De differentia inter peccatum mortale et veniale
Articulus II: De gravitate peccati mortalis
Articulus III: De conditionibus ad peccatum mortale requisitis
Articulus IV: De divisione peccati mortalis et venialis
Articulus V: De conversione peccati mortalis et venialis
Articulus VI: De peccato veniali secundum se
Tractatus VI: De habitibus et virtutibus in genere
Introductio I: De Habitibus et Virtutibus in Genere
Pars I: De habitibus in genere secundum esse psychologicum
Quaestio I: De essentia habitus
Quaestio II: De subiecto habitus
Quaestio III: De causa habituum
Quaestio IV: De distinctione habituum
Pars II: De habitibus secundum esse morale seu de virtutibus acquisitis
Quaestio I: De essentia virtutis
Quaestio II: De subiecto virtutis
Quaestio III: De distinctione virtutum
Articulus I: De virtutibus intellectualibus
Articulus II: De virtutibus moralibus
Articulus III: De virtutibus cardinalibus
Quaestio IV: De proprietatibus virtutum
Articulus I: De medio virtutis
Articulus II: De connexione virtutum
Articulus III: De aequalitate virtutum
Articulus IV: De duratione virtutum
Pars III: De habitibus secundum esse supernaturale seu de virtutibus infusis
Quaestio I: De existentia et essentia infusorum habituum ac virtutum
Quaestio II: De distinctione infusorum habituum et virtutum
Articulus I: De virtutibus theologicis
Articulus II: De virtutibus moralibus
S. Th. I-II, q. 63, a. 3 et 4 ; De Virt., q. 1, a. 10.
626. Thesis. Besides the theological virtues, supernatural moral virtues are to be admitted, as Saints Augustine, Gregory and Thomas teach, against Scotus and the Nominalists, and as the quasi common opinion of theologians now admits. For :
In the natural order man would not only be well disposed habitually toward the last end, but also concerning the means to the end through acquired moral virtues. Therefore, also in the supernatural order, about which God certainly provides no less, it will not suffice that man be habitually well disposed toward the supernatural last end, but it is also necessary that he be habitually well disposed concerning the supernatural means to be ordered toward the last end, which is done through infused moral virtues (q. 65, a. 3). — Otherwise a) there would be lacking the proportion between the soul raised to the divine being and its moral life, between the supernatural end and the moral virtues, between the theological virtues about the end and the moral virtues about the means : for there would not be of the same order, but the divine effects of theology would have to be operated through instruments not proportioned and defective. Whence b) supernatural moral acts would not be elicited by us connaturally, but the faculties would be moved to them as it were violently (q. 63, a. 3).
This is supposed by Innocent III and the Council of Vienne (n. 624,3) and by Leo XIII, ep. to Card. Gibbons (n. 581) ; and Scripture hints at it (Wis. VIII, 7) : « She teaches sobriety and prudence (eternal Wisdom), justice and virtue, than which nothing is more useful in the life of men » (Cf. II Peter I, 5-7).
627. Infused moral virtues are operative principles by which we are ordered toward the right choice of human acts as means to the supernatural last end, and therefore they are not immediately about God the supernatural end, but about our acts and the whole life to be ordered, for which reason they are called moral.
Whence 1) they also pertain to the divine life participated in us, inasmuch as they mediate pursue the supernatural end itself : for under the influence of the theological virtues they in some way order all works toward God the end and His glory, as God orders all things to Himself.
- They are therefore as many as the many and diverse human acts ; in general theologians say that as many supernatural moral virtues are infused as natural virtues can be acquired1]. They can however all be reduced to the four cardinal ones, in the same way as was said about acquired virtues.
**628. Supernatural moral virtues are distinguished from natural ones, as was said above, q. I, n° 620, and indeed not only
a) according to essence, as habits less properly so called from those properly so called ; and
b) according to the efficient cause, which is God alone, not our acts ; and
c) according to the end and nature, namely that man be well disposed for the heavenly city and eternal life, and not only for human things ; but also
d) according to the formal object : in natural virtues the good is according to the rule of human reason ; in supernatural ones the good is according to the rule of the divine law, or of human reason raised through faith. Thus e.g. natural prudence dictates what is good according to reason, supernatural prudence what is good according to the supernatural law of faith ; justice chooses the mean by a higher title, preserves peace and society, that peace and society be as it were deiform and heavenly ; by natural abstinence man uses food moderately for the sake of human reason, e.g. lest it harm his health, by supernatural for the sake of the reason of faith, e.g. that he may chastise his body and reduce it to servitude and himself more freely attend to divine things ; supernatural patience is to be exercised not from the reason of human wisdom, but that he may be conformed to Christ, etc. Whence infused prudence does not always dictate the same mean as acquired prudence, and therefore infused moral virtues do not have the same act as acquired virtues (q. 63, art. 4). Whence they differ in species.
629. Corollary. — From which can be understood how the virtues are distinguished as political, purgative, and of the purified soul, as S. Thomas teaches, q. 61, a. 5 :
« A. Because man according to his nature is a political animal,
- virtues,... insofar as they exist in man according to the condition of his nature, are called political, inasmuch as man according to these virtues behaves rightly in the conduct of human affairs...
B. But because it pertains to man that he also draw himself toward divine things as much as he can... and this is commended to us in Scripture in many ways, as is that Mt. V, 48 : Be perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect, it is necessary to posit certain virtues intermediate between the political ones, which are human virtues, and the exemplary ones, which are divine virtues (in God Himself) ; ... so namely that 2) certain virtues are of those tending toward divine likeness, and these are called purgative virtues : so namely that prudence despises all worldly things by the contemplation of divine things and directs every thought of the soul to divine things alone ; temperance indeed leaves, inasmuch as nature allows, what the use of the body requires ; fortitude is that the soul not be terrified by the departure from the body and the approach to heavenly things ; justice is that the whole soul consent to such a proposed life.
- Certain virtues however are of those already attaining divine likeness, which are called virtues of the already purified soul, so namely that prudence contemplates divine things alone, temperance knows nothing of earthly desires, fortitude is ignorant of passions, justice is allied with the divine mind in perpetual covenant, namely by imitating it ; which virtues indeed we say are those of the blessed and of the most perfect in this life ».
Whence virtues are distinguished as political, purgative, and of the already purified soul.