Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

S. Th. q. 66, a. 1-5 ; De Virt. q. 5, a. 3.

607. The equality of virtues is threefold and can be understood :

1°) equality according to species ; 2) equality in the same species of virtue according to itself, as to those things to which it extends or according to its extension to diverse objects ; 3) equality in the same species according to degree and intensity, or according to the participation of virtue in the subject.

608. Principle I. According to species, virtues are not equal, but some are more perfect than others according as they have nobler objects.

A. Comparing intellectual and moral virtues :

1. The speculative intellectual virtues, because their object is the universal, are therefore as habits (or entities) simply nobler according to object or species than the moral virtues, whose object is the particular good ; moreover among the intellectual virtues wisdom excels, whose object : the highest cause, is the noblest of all. Whence wisdom judges of all the intellectual virtues and orders them, and therefore is called architectonic.

2. But the moral virtues and prudence are nobler in a qualified sense (under one respect, namely in relation to act), inasmuch as they more dispose for operating : for they not only give aptitude for operating well, but also dispose for using their aptitude well by. Whence as virtues they are more perfect.

B. Among the cardinal virtues : 1) the more perfect is prudence, which is in the reason, and therefore has as object the good of reason itself essentially, while the others are about the good of reason participated in others ; — 2) next is justice : a) because it is in the will, which is a potency closer to reason and therefore participates reason more ; and b) because it not only well orders man in himself but also toward another ; — 3) fortitude is preferred to temperance because the good of reason shines forth more in it, since its motive is not pleasing in itself ; moreover fortitude subjects the sensitive appetite to reason about what is greatest in man, namely about life itself and death ; — while 4) temperance is about those things which immediately serve life¹.

C. Comparing the special moral virtues, after prudence religion and penitence excel, which approach more closely to God.

609. Principle II. According to extension, prudence and the perfect moral virtues, as being connected, are equal, because they cannot be augmented extensively, since they dispose for doing good in all circumstances ; therefore in all men, and in the same man even at different times, according to extension they are equal (a. 1). — The contrary is to be said of the inchoations of virtues, and of the intellectual virtues, because they are not connected.

610. Principle III. According to intensity, the perfect moral virtues, because they are connected, are equal in the same man at the same time ; whence if one is increased, all are increased proportionally, as the fingers of the hand are unequal in quantity, but are equal in proportion when they are increased proportionally. This is to be understood a) on the part of prudence and according to the formal of virtue which is the ordering of reason to the good : for through prudence they adhere equally to the good of reason or the mean, which for all is established equally well by one and the same prudence. « The reason existing equally perfect in one and one and the same, the right mean must be constituted proportionally according to reason in every matter of the virtues » ; whence they conform equally to reason. However b) they are not always increased according to the material, i.e. according to the inclination and proneness of the subject to its proper acts, for man can be more prompt to certain virtues, whether from disposition of the body, or from custom, or from a gift of grace (a. 2).

However they can be unequal according to intensity in different men and in the same man at different tem-[^1. insidiatnr good works ; obedience, not on the part of the object, but on the part of him to whom it renounces ; fortitude because it defends and protects the common good, the adequation of which justice makes : it is the administration of justice ; liberality inasmuch as it intends the supplement and splendor of justice : thus an adornment of justice and in some sense greater, but simply it is less because it is ordered under the principal virtue of justice.]

poribus : for thus they are not connected. « But if virtue is considered on the part of the participating subject, thus it happens that virtue is greater or lesser, whether at different times in the same, or in different men ; because for attaining the mean of virtue, which is according to right reason, one is better disposed than another, either because of greater custom, or because of a better natural disposition, or because of a more perspicacious judgment of reason, or also because of a greater gift of grace » (a. 1).

611. Observation. — The merely intellectual virtues, because they are not connected, are not equal according to extension or intensity.