Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

S. Th. I-II, q. 64, a. 1, 2, 3 ; De Virt. q. 1, a. 13.

600. Adage : « Moral virtue is in a mean » :

1. It is not to be understood of a mean according to essence and the notion of habit, as if it signified that virtue is essentially between two extreme vices, one of which is opposed to it by excess, the other by defect : for this is false of the virtue of justice, to which only injustice is opposed. For the rest, by the same sin one sins at once by excess and by defect, for he who gives to one less than he owes, gives to another or to himself more than he can ; and if anyone gives to another more than he owes, he is no longer just but liberal.

2. But it is to be understood causally, of a mean according to effect and the notion of object, and it signifies that virtue has for its object a mean between excess (more) and defect (less) in its proper matter : for it makes our appetite choose operations or passions neither more nor less, but precisely in the measure which right reason dictates : thus for temperance, excess in the matter consists in using pleasures more than is fitting, defect in not using them when one should ; the mean, which is the object of temperance, is to use pleasures, as, when, in the manner,... one ought.

It is proved : The good of moral virtue is in adequation or conformity to the rule, i.e. to right reason, without departing from it. But adequation is a mean between excess, by which something exceeds the measure, and defect, by which it falls short of it or does not attain it. Therefore the good of moral virtue is in a mean.

But if virtue is called the ultimate of a potency, which indicates a summit, not a mean ; — this is to be understood according to the perfection of the act, for thus virtue is at the summit of perfection ; not however according to the quantity of the matter, for thus virtue is in a mean.

3. But the sense is not of a mean by reason of the subject and according to the sole measure of our weak condition, namely that virtue is to be exercised moderately so that man cannot tend toward any maximum ; — for the maximum is sometimes conformed to reason, as is clear of fortitude, magnanimity, virginity, etc., and yet in this case virtue is still in a mean, because excess is to tend toward that maximum when one ought not.

601. The mean of virtue is the mean of reason, because it is conformity to the measure of right reason, which measure it does not exceed and from which it does not depart : between excess and defect, adequation to the measure holds the mean. Hence it is defined : the property of virtue whereby it so moves about its matter as to beware of excess and defect. Reason constitutes, dictates, and imposes that mean upon the moral virtues through prudence ; whence S. Thomas says that « that mean belongs to prudence as regulating and measuring, to moral virtue as measured and regulated » (a. 3) ; therefore prudence is in the mean because it itself is the measure of moral virtue.

602. The mean of reason is sometimes the mean of the thing, namely in justice, inasmuch as reason dictates to justice that it pay what is due to equality, or give a thing equal to the person of another or to the thing (whether arithmetically or proportionally), neither more nor less.

For reason determines the mean of virtue in its proper matter. But justice is about operations which consist in external things without regard to the diverse conditions of the agent. Therefore the mean of justice consists in a thing determined according to itself, without regard to the agent, inasmuch as it gives to each one what is due, neither more nor less. And thus the mean of reason is the mean of the thing.

But in the other moral virtues, which are about interior passions, the mean of reason is taken by comparison to us, whence it varies according to persons, qualities, circumstances, and diverse attitudes toward passions. Thus excess in drinking for one is not for another.

603. Observations. — 1°) Even the intellectual virtues are in the mean of the thing. The good of the intellect is the true, which depends on things which are the measure of our intellect. « Thus therefore the good of an intellectual virtue consists in a certain mean by conformity to the thing itself, according as it says that a thing is what it is or is not what it is not ; in which the notion of the true consists. Excess is taken according to a false affirmation by which what is not is said to be ; defect however is taken according to a false negation by which what is is said not to be » (a. 3).

2°) Moreover the practical intellectual virtues have the character of a rule with regard to our works, and so they are in the mean of reason just as the rule itself which imposes a mean. Thus prudence imposes a mean on the acts and moral virtues, and art on artifacts.

3°) Certain theologians say that the virtues of Religion and Penitence are not in a mean, but this is false : for although under one respect excess cannot be given in their matter, inasmuch as the worship rendered to God and satisfaction for sins cannot be excessive in quantity, under other respects however : quality, manner, time, etc. in their matter excess is given.

S. Th. I-II, q. 65, a. 1 ; De Virt. q. 5, a. 2.

604. Principle I. Imperfect moral virtues are not connected. — For the inchoations of moral virtues, which dispose us to choose this or that in certain circumstances, whether they are in us from nature because of a disposition of the body, or come from custom, are not connected, as experience shows : for one can be prompt to liberality who is not prompt to chastity. Those inclinations are sometimes called imperfect virtues ; but they are not true and properly so called virtues, because they do not render one perfect.

605. Principle II. Perfect moral virtues are connected, which incline us to do good steadfastly and in all circumstances, notwithstanding any difficulties. Thus according to the mind of SS. Augustine and Thomas, against Scotus. For :

a) Moral virtue, which is the habit making a good choice, cannot be without prudence, because for choosing rightly the intention of the due end, to which moral virtue disposes, is not sufficient, but good counsel, judgment, and precept about the good means to the end are also required, to which prudence disposes : for to do evil for the sake of a good end is morally evil ; whence for always acting rightly a perfect prudence is required.

b) Prudence cannot be without moral virtues ; for :

1° For the honest ordering of means, the intention of some good end is required, to which moral virtue disposes : for to order good means to an evil end is morally evil ; and the ordering of means will not be always and in all circumstances honest unless in all circumstances the intention of the due end be had, to which we are disposed only through all the perfect moral virtues.

2° Each one judges how to order according as he is affected ; therefore moral virtues are necessary that man may judge always well and in every case¹.

c) Which besides experience confirms, for a judge well disposed to justice but greedy of money, on money being offered, will judge unjustly ; and a woman chaste but timid, from fear of some evil, will consent to fornication ; and many brave, liberal, devout,... from lack of prudence choose badly the means to the end of virtue².

Hence prudence and moral virtues are mutually included, and therefore through prudence all virtues are connected. Prudence is of the essence of the definition of moral virtue, and moral virtue is of the definition of prudence insofar as this must be for a good end.

606. Observation. — The merely intellectual virtues are neither all connected among themselves nor with the moral virtues, because they are about diverse matters not ordered to one another, as is clear from the diverse sciences and arts ; all however depend on the intellect of principles, but this in turn does not depend on the others.

S. Th. q. 66, a. 1-5 ; De Virt. q. 5, a. 3.

607. The equality of virtues is threefold and can be understood :

1°) equality according to species ; 2) equality in the same species of virtue according to itself, as to those things to which it extends or according to its extension to diverse objects ; 3) equality in the same species according to degree and intensity, or according to the participation of virtue in the subject.

608. Principle I. According to species, virtues are not equal, but some are more perfect than others according as they have nobler objects.

A. Comparing intellectual and moral virtues :

1. The speculative intellectual virtues, because their object is the universal, are therefore as habits (or entities) simply nobler according to object or species than the moral virtues, whose object is the particular good ; moreover among the intellectual virtues wisdom excels, whose object : the highest cause, is the noblest of all. Whence wisdom judges of all the intellectual virtues and orders them, and therefore is called architectonic.

2. But the moral virtues and prudence are nobler in a qualified sense (under one respect, namely in relation to act), inasmuch as they more dispose for operating : for they not only give aptitude for operating well, but also dispose for using their aptitude well by. Whence as virtues they are more perfect.

B. Among the cardinal virtues : 1) the more perfect is prudence, which is in the reason, and therefore has as object the good of reason itself essentially, while the others are about the good of reason participated in others ; — 2) next is justice : a) because it is in the will, which is a potency closer to reason and therefore participates reason more ; and b) because it not only well orders man in himself but also toward another ; — 3) fortitude is preferred to temperance because the good of reason shines forth more in it, since its motive is not pleasing in itself ; moreover fortitude subjects the sensitive appetite to reason about what is greatest in man, namely about life itself and death ; — while 4) temperance is about those things which immediately serve life¹.

C. Comparing the special moral virtues, after prudence religion and penitence excel, which approach more closely to God.

609. Principle II. According to extension, prudence and the perfect moral virtues, as being connected, are equal, because they cannot be augmented extensively, since they dispose for doing good in all circumstances ; therefore in all men, and in the same man even at different times, according to extension they are equal (a. 1). — The contrary is to be said of the inchoations of virtues, and of the intellectual virtues, because they are not connected.

610. Principle III. According to intensity, the perfect moral virtues, because they are connected, are equal in the same man at the same time ; whence if one is increased, all are increased proportionally, as the fingers of the hand are unequal in quantity, but are equal in proportion when they are increased proportionally. This is to be understood a) on the part of prudence and according to the formal of virtue which is the ordering of reason to the good : for through prudence they adhere equally to the good of reason or the mean, which for all is established equally well by one and the same prudence. « The reason existing equally perfect in one and one and the same, the right mean must be constituted proportionally according to reason in every matter of the virtues » ; whence they conform equally to reason. However b) they are not always increased according to the material, i.e. according to the inclination and proneness of the subject to its proper acts, for man can be more prompt to certain virtues, whether from disposition of the body, or from custom, or from a gift of grace (a. 2).

However they can be unequal according to intensity in different men and in the same man at different tem-[^1. insidiatnr good works ; obedience, not on the part of the object, but on the part of him to whom it renounces ; fortitude because it defends and protects the common good, the adequation of which justice makes : it is the administration of justice ; liberality inasmuch as it intends the supplement and splendor of justice : thus an adornment of justice and in some sense greater, but simply it is less because it is ordered under the principal virtue of justice.]

poribus : for thus they are not connected. « But if virtue is considered on the part of the participating subject, thus it happens that virtue is greater or lesser, whether at different times in the same, or in different men ; because for attaining the mean of virtue, which is according to right reason, one is better disposed than another, either because of greater custom, or because of a better natural disposition, or because of a more perspicacious judgment of reason, or also because of a greater gift of grace » (a. 1).

611. Observation. — The merely intellectual virtues, because they are not connected, are not equal according to extension or intensity.

S. Th. I-II, q. 67, art. 1-2 ; De Virt., q. 5, a. 4.

612. Principle. In the blessed there remain those virtues which include no imperfection repugnant to their state. — Whence the moral virtues remain, not indeed

a) as to the material element or inclination to their acts, for in the future life there will be no exchanges and distributions of goods, nor dangers of death, nor pleasures of foods and venereal things, etc. ; — but

b) as to the formal, which is conformity to right reason, or as to their essence, inasmuch as the appetite, whether rational or sensitive, will in all things and altogether be conformed to reason ; whence those virtues will exercise other acts, conformed to the heavenly life. The same is to be said of prudence, which moves about the same matter as the moral virtues. Whence, according to Augustine, De Trin., b. XIV, c. 9, « it will be of prudence to prefer or equal nothing to God, of fortitude to cleave firmly to Him, of temperance to be delighted by no harmful defect », likewise of justice to be subject to God. — However

c) before the resurrection they will be only in root, temperance, fortitude, and the other virtues about passions, because they are in the sensitive appetite, concupiscible and irascible ; which appetite cannot be without a body.

The same is to be said of the souls of purgatory ; in the damned however no virtue properly so called or perfect can be.

613. Corollary. — Likewise the intellectual virtues remain according to the formal element, or essence, because their subject, the intellect, is incorruptible, and always preserves the intelligible species on which the intellectual virtues depend. Not however according to the material, i.e. according to the images of imagination which we use in the sciences, nor according to the acts of this life, because for these images are required which cannot be without a body. And in this sense the Apostle says, I. Cor. XIII, 8 : knowledge shall be destroyed,*, namely as to the manner of working of this life, but it will have another act.