Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

S. Th. I-II, q. 57-63; De Virt. q. 1, a. 12.

587. Principles. Virtues are distinguished:

1. By reason of the subject or potency in which they principally are, into intellectual which are in the intellect, and moral (or appetitive) which are in the appetite.

2. By reason of the nature to which they have order, into natural which are fitting to human nature as such, and to the natural end; and supernatural which are fitting to the divine nature participated in us, and to the supernatural end: the beatific vision; of which will be spoken in the 3rd part.

3. By reason of the cause, into acquired which are acquired by our natural acts, in the way explained in part 1, q. 3, n. 567; and infused of themselves, which God alone can give us.

4. By reason of the object and matter about which they are concerned, intellectual are divided into speculative and practical, and moral according to various objects; likewise supernatural are distinguished into theological which are concerned with God himself, and moral which order our life: these last, just as the natural virtues strictly so called which render man morally good, are distinguished into cardinal which are concerned with the principal matter, and annexed which are concerned with the secondary matter.

It is to be noted that virtues can be distinguished from several heads; in fact, however many there are, they are distinguished by reason of the object which gives the lowest species.

Specially we shall say in the present about the intellectual, moral, and cardinal virtues.

S. Th. I-II, q. 57; De Virt. q. 1, a. 6 and 7.

588. Principle. Five distinct species of intellectual virtues are enumerated:

A. Three are in the speculative intellect which stops at the contemplation of truth, by which namely it is perfected for knowing the true:

1°) Habit of principles, by which it is disposed for knowing first principles, whether speculative: then it is called simply intellect (νοῦς), or practical: then it is called synderesis.

2°) Science (ἐπιστήμη), which is perfected for knowing conclusions evident in some genus of knowable things through their proper causes.

3°) Wisdom (σοφία), which is perfected for knowing conclusions of any genus whatsoever through the highest causes, by which it also judges of the principles.

B. In the practical intellect, which orders truth to work, there are two, by which it is perfected for directing and regulating human operations:

4°) Art (τέχνη), which directs transient operations, by which one makes something in exterior matter, as to build, to cut, etc.

5°) Prudence (φρόνησις), which directs operations remaining in the agent itself, as to will, to love, to be angry, etc.

Art is defined as right reason of the makeable, which directs the works themselves or effects to be made according to certain rules; prudence as right reason of the doable, which directs human acts.

589. In what sense they are virtues. — The four former are virtues in a qualified sense, because they do not incline to acting honestly: for they give only aptitude for operating well, not good use, because this pertains to the appetite, whence the work of art can be morally most evil; — on the contrary, prudence by which human reason is well disposed for ordering human acts in the appetite, as means to the honest end, is a virtue simply so called.

This virtue is most necessary for man. For for living honestly, it does not suffice that man wills some good end (what he does), but also that he order suitable means to the end is most required (how he does it). For the due end man is disposed in the appetite through moral virtue; but for the means being conveniently ordered to the end, reason also must be well disposed, moved by the will, which is done by prudence: for precisely about the means to be chosen to deliberate, and to judge, and to command are acts of reason; for doing these rightly prudence disposes us well.

590. Corollary. — Hence, although prudence according to essence and by reason of subject is an intellectual virtue, by reason of matter which is the honest human act it agrees with the moral virtues. Whence it is numbered among them, when they are opposed to the theological virtues.

S. Th. I-II, q. 58-60; De Virt. q. 1, a. 4, 5, 12.

591. Moral virtue is named from mores i.e. inclination to acting, which properly pertains to the appetite; whence moral virtue is the habit by which the appetite is well disposed to be conformed to reason. In fact it is the habitual conformity to right reason. Since however to choose is the act proper to the human appetite, hence moral virtue is an elective habit according to right reason, and is defined by Aristotle, Eth. VI, c. 6: an elective habit consisting in a mean with respect to us, determined by reason as the wise man will determine¹. It is called

1°) elective habit, because choice is the proper act of moral virtue, and because moral habit is the principle of choice;

2°) consisting in a mean with respect to us: this is the object or term of this action. The moral good which is the object of virtue is a mean between excess and defect, which is to be estimated not in itself, but with respect to the one choosing, so that he chooses what is fitting for him according to right reason, neither more nor less;

3°) determined by reason: this is the cause of goodness. For it is reason which determines the mean between excess and defect, that it be good. And because it happens that reason is not always right but also sometimes erroneous, is added: as the wise man, i.e. prudent, will determine; reason namely through prudence will rightly estimate what is good or evil in the acts of the appetite (q. 58, a. 1 and 59, a. 1).

592. Principle I. Moral virtues are necessary. — For both the rational and sensitive appetite does not obey reason entirely at its nod, but can contradict it, because it is properly operative i.e. has its own movements and actions. Whence for operating well it is required that not only the intellect through prudence, but also the appetite be well disposed, to obey reason, through the habits of moral virtues; otherwise it would be moved as if by force and with sadness (q. 58, a. 2).

593. Principle II. Moral virtue is not one in species but multiple, both by reason of the subject or diverse potency in which it is, and by reason of the object (formal principle), which can be related in diverse ways to reason, to which it can participate more or less, and so it says a diverse relation to the directing reason (q. 59, a. 2 and 4; q. 60, a. 1).

For reason directs both the operations of the will by which man is disposed, even externally, toward another, and the passions of the sensitive appetite, both concupiscible and irascible, that they may consent to reason and so man be well disposed internally, in relation to himself. Whence in three ways: and a) by reason of the matter about which principally², and b) by reason of the subject in which they are (will, concupiscible appetite, irascible appetite), and c) by reason of the formal object (good according to commensuration toward another, or good according to mere commensuration toward the agent whether as delightful, or as arduous) the virtues are specifically distinguished — virtues about operations of the will — virtues about passions of the concupiscible, — and virtues about passions of the irascible (q. 60, a. 2).

594. Principle III. Diverse are the virtues about operations. — All the virtues which are about operations agree in the general notion of what is due to another. But the notion of what is due is not of one notion in all: in one way something is due strictly by pact, in another way not strictly by promise or benefit received; in one way something is due to an equal, in another to a superior, in another to a lesser. Whence according to diverse notions of what is due, there are diverse virtues about operations, e.g. justice, religion, piety, gratitude, truthfulness, etc. (q. 60, a. 3).

595. Principle IV. Diverse also are the virtues about the passions of the concupiscible or irascible, not indeed because the passions are diverse, but when they say a diverse relation to reason.

Hence a) the same virtue is concerned with contrary passions between which it holds the mean, e.g. fortitude between fear and daring (q. 60, a. 4);

b) moreover diverse passions in a certain order to one another and to one [end] can be ordered, and in the same way be repugnant to reason (or agree with it), as happens for the passions of the concupiscible: love, desire, and delight of the same good (and consequently also for hatred, flight, sadness of the opposite evil); whence all these passions pertain not to different virtues but to the same virtue, e.g. temperance (a., 4); c) on the contrary, when passions are ordered to a diverse good of reason, and so say a diverse relation to reason, as happens for the passions of the irascible, which « are not of one order but are ordered to diverse things. For daring and fear are ordered to some great danger; hope and despair to some good that is arduous; anger however to overcoming some contrary which has brought harm. And therefore about these passions there are diverse virtues, namely... fortitude about fears and audacities, magnanimity about hope and despair, meekness about angers » (q. 60, a. 4);

d) a fortiori when they pertain to diverse potencies, because then they are concerned with diverse objects, whence other virtues are concerned with the passions of the concupiscible (good as such), others with the passions of the irascible (good as arduous), e.g. temperance and fortitude, love of honor and magnanimity, liberality and magnificence, temperance and meekness, etc.³ (a. 5).

596. Corollaries. — From what has been said it follows:

1° « That of all human operations the first principle is reason,..., whence just as the appetite (rational or sensitive) is the principle of a human act according to this that it participates reason in some way, so the moral habit has the character of human virtue inasmuch as it is conformed to reason » (q. 58, a. 2).

2° Hence, just as intellectual virtue is rational by essence, so moral virtue is rational by participation, inasmuch as the appetite whether the superior of the will or the inferior of the sensitive life participates reason (q.60, a. 1; q.56, a. 4 and ad 1; a. 6, ad 2; q. 58, a. 2; q. 59, a. 4, ad 2; q. 61, a. 2).

3° Moral virtues can be without the intellectual virtues of wisdom, science, and art; not however without prudence, which is necessary for rightly taking the means to the end and which itself presupposes the intellect of practical principles (q. 58, a. 4).

4° Intellectual virtues can be without moral virtues; not however without these is prudence. For that the work be the work of the virtue of prudence, it must be done for the right end, or for good; the right end the moral virtue procures (a. 5).

S. Th. I-II, q. 61; De Virt. q. 5, a. 1; q. 1, a. 12, ad 26.

597. Principle I. Certain virtues are called cardinal, as it were principal on which others are founded: thus metaphorically from the hinge on which the door turns; whence those are so called on which as on hinges the moral life turns and on which the whole right human life is founded¹. Since they are principal in human life, they are not merely intellectual virtues and in a qualified sense, but they are simply so called and moral, which alone contain the rectitude of the appetite and which excel the intellectual ones with respect to good.

That there are four cardinal virtues is proved:

1. By reason of the object: The good of reason which is the object of virtue, can be considered either in the very act of reason which considers it, or in the various matters in which it must be produced, namely in operations and in passions. Some passions however impel to something contrary to reason, others withdraw from what reason dictates. Thus therefore there will be one principal virtue which makes good in reason itself: prudence; and one which makes good in operations: justice; and one which moderates and represses the passions impelling to the contrary of reason: temperance; and one which strengthens us against the passions withdrawing from the order of reason: fortitude.

2. By reason of the subject: There are four faculties of the soul in which virtues reside and in each a principal virtue ought to be present: in reason therefore is prudence; in will justice; in concupiscible temperance; in irascible is fortitude, 598. The cardinal virtues are not always understood by all in the same sense. — For some take them in a generic sense, as general modes which are found in several, indeed in all virtues²; either

a) as four genera or collections of virtues, under which all others are contained as species, so that whatever virtue makes good in the consideration of reason is called prudence (e.g. eubulia), and whatever virtue makes rectitude in operations is called justice (e.g. religion, piety, gratitude), and whatever virtue restrains and represses passions is called temperance (e.g. meekness, humility), and whatever virtue makes firmness of soul against certain passions is called fortitude (e.g. magnificence, magnanimity); — or even

b) as general conditions required for every virtue, inasmuch as every virtue must be prudent, and just, and strong, and moderate.

But, although these are true, nevertheless they do not describe the proper nature of the cardinal virtues in the strict sense.

599. Principle II. The cardinal virtues are to be taken in a specific sense and are special virtues, which have a determined matter and are distinguished from all others. For:

a) In each genus of virtues (of which was said above) there is something greatest, principal, and more difficult, about which there is a special virtue: thus in the act by which reason considers, the chief and more difficult is to command well rather than to take counsel and judge well; in operations toward another, the principal is the rectitude of strict equality in which rectitude most shines forth, namely in commutations and distributions; likewise it is more difficult to restrain the more vehement delights, namely the delights of touch, and to strengthen man against the greatest dangers, namely the dangers of death. Whence there are four principal virtues, inasmuch as they are concerned with the principal matter: prudence strictly so called which is preceptive of good, justice properly so called which is about due actions among equals, temperance properly so called which represses the concupiscences of the delights of touch, and fortitude strictly so called which strengthens against the dangers of death.

b) Since however he who is well disposed to doing the principal, and more difficult, by that very fact has a certain inchoate disposition and facility for what is less difficult, according to the adage: He who can do more, can do less (just as he who can restrain the concupiscences of the flesh, which is more difficult, by that very fact is more able to restrain other passions, which is easier; and he who is just can already become liberal, grateful, pious, which otherwise he could not), hence he who has these four special virtues has, at least according to a beginning, all the other moral ones, and therefore they are the foundation of all the others, and are rightly called cardinal³.

The others are called annexed which are concerned with secondary acts or matters, or potential parts, as it were not having the whole power of the principal virtue.