Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

S. Th. I-II, q. 56; De Virt. q. 1, a. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7.

582. Principle I. Virtues are in the potencies of the soul. — Since virtue is 1) an operative habit, and 2) the perfection of an operative potency, and 3) a disposition to the best end, but the end is operation or the worked thing, it follows that it is in the operative potency of the soul as in a subject.

583. Principle II. In the intellect considered in itself there are only virtues in a qualified sense, by which man is perfect under some respect: thus science and art; but inasmuch as it is moved by the will, in it also are virtues simply and properly so called by which man is perfected for the last end: prudence and the virtues annexed to it, and in the supernatural order divine faith (q. 56, a. 3).

584. Principle III. In the will are virtues simply so called, but not all. — For in the will:

a) There are not the habits by which we are inclined to choose the good of our reason, proportioned to the will: for the will is appetite, whence by its nature, without habit, it sufficiently tends to its own good; it is rational appetite, therefore it tends to the good of reason, i.e. the honest. Whence in the will there is no virtue for choosing the good of reason in the passions (q. 56, a. 6).

b) There are however in the will habits for resisting passions, namely continence for resisting passions impelling to the delightful good against right reason, and constancy for resisting passions withdrawing from the good of reason because of sadness and arduousness; which however are not called virtues, because they do not render man perfect: for they do not make it so that the passions obey reason (q. 58, a. 3, ad 2).

c) There are in the will virtues simply so called, by which we are well ordered to an extrinsic good, which exceeds the proportion of the will either with respect to the individual, as the good of another to which justice orders, or with respect to the species or human nature, as the divine or supernatural good which is communicated to us, to which theological hope and charity order: for to these goods the will is not sufficiently inclined by its nature, and therefore the virtues which order the affection of man to God or neighbor are in the will (q. 56, a. 6).

585. Principle IV. In the sensitive appetite are true virtues. — For in the sensitive appetite

a) considered in itself there are not habits, nor therefore virtues;

b) inasmuch however as it is moved by reason and is the immediate principle of human acts, in it are habits by which the passions obey and are conformed to reason, as fortitude, temperance, meekness, etc.;

c) moreover those habits are virtues simply so called, because they include no imperfection, and because the good work is consummated in the sensitive appetite, namely the passion itself regulated (q. 56, a. 4).

586. Principle V. In other potencies there are not virtues. — In the internal senses indeed there are good habits, but those are not virtues, because the good work is not consummated in the internal senses, and therefore those habits are subordinate to others: thus the habit of good memory subserves the virtue of science, and good thought [subserves] prudence. In the other potencies of man (external senses, vegetative or locomotive forces) there are not properly operative habits, nor therefore virtues (a. 5).