Summa Theologiae Moralis, vol. I: De Principiis

S. Th. I-II, q. 55; 56, a. 3; 57, a. 1; 65, a. 2; De Virt. q. 1, a. 1 and 2.

576. Virtue according to the name (ἰσχύς, δύναμις, deugd) is derived from force, and therefore designates the perfection of an operative potency or a complete potency¹. Hence

1. natural potencies, since they are altogether determined to one, of themselves are perfectly disposed to operation, and therefore are called virtues of nature (a. 1). But

2. potencies indifferent to many and diverse things, as rational potencies, of themselves can be better disposed through habit, and therefore in them the potency is distinguished from its perfection; and virtue in them is habit (a. 1). Since however

3. true perfection consists only in good, it follows that virtue is a good operative habit (a. 3). Whence Aristotle: Virtue is that which makes the one having it good and his work good (II Eth., c. 6; VII Phys., c. 3);

4. we treat of human virtue, which is proper to man, and which therefore is a good rational operative habit (a. 2).

577. Virtue is defined by words gathered from S. Augustine²: A good quality of mind by which one lives rightly, which no one uses badly, which God works in us without us. There is indicated

1°) genus: quality, because it is of the genus of habits; better however it would be called habit, which is the proximate genus;

2°) specific difference: good, by which it is specifically distinguished from evil habits;

3°) subject: of mind, because human virtue resides in reason or in the potency moved by reason; 4°) the end of virtue, namely operation: a) by which one lives rightly, i.e. by which man operates conformably to reason, that it may be indicated to be a properly operative habit, and it is distinguished from habits which always are disposed to evil; b) which no one uses badly, by which it is distinguished from habits which are sometimes for good, sometimes for evil, as opinion or human faith. Whence virtue cannot be a productive principle of an evil act, and the act of virtue cannot be evil, for virtue does not influence an evil act. No one namely can make virtue produce an evil act, no one can, using virtue as a principle, produce an evil work; — one can however use virtue badly as an object, when e.g. one is proud of it or hates it, but that act does not proceed from virtue as from an operative principle;

5°) the efficient cause is added: which God works in us without us, i.e. without our effecting, but not without our consenting as adults, or by the help of grace disposing us; which is true of the supernatural infused virtue of which Augustine speaks. If these last words are removed, the definition common to all acquired and infused virtues is had (a. 4).

That this definition is real, i.e. that such virtues exist in fact, will be shown throughout the treatise.

578. Virtue renders the potency perfect. — Hence:

1. Not every good habit is a virtue, but that only which includes no imperfection; whence opinion, human faith or hope, continence and constancy³ are not virtues (q. 58, a. 3, ad 2).

2. Neither are those good habits virtues which serve the action of the principal potency: for as long as the principal potency, which consummates the work, is not well disposed to operation, man will not yet be perfectly disposed to it, nor therefore will the operation be perfect. The habit therefore which is in the principal potency, consummative of a good work, is alone called virtue. Whence it is said by Aristotle: a disposition of the perfect to the best⁴, i.e. a stable disposition of a potency perfectly instructed for best exercising its operation.

579. The notion of virtue is analogous, which therefore does not equally perfectly belong to all, nor is said in the same sense of all. For some virtues render man perfect under some respect only and therefore are called virtues in a qualified sense; — some render man simply good inasmuch as he is man, and therefore are called simply and properly so called; to them in the full sense belongs Aristotle's definition: virtue is that which makes the one having it good and his work good. Hence:

A. In the natural order and for philosophers: merely intellectual virtues (arts and sciences) which render man good under some respect only, namely with respect to the good of one potency, e.g. which make a good architect, a good philosopher, etc., are called virtues in a qualified sense; but moral virtues render man simply perfect under the notion of good (namely the honest), namely with respect to the good of the whole man, and make a good man, and therefore are called virtues simply so called or virtues simply human. Of which there is a twofold difference:

a) the former, although they give aptitude for operating well, do not however incline to using their aptitude, whence he who does not use his art, is not for that reason considered an imperfect artist; the latter incline man to use his aptitude rightly, whence he who does not perform just or temperate acts does not have justice or temperance;

b) the former do not render man morally good, nor incline to living honestly; on the contrary the latter, whence they reside in the will or in the potency as moved by the will (q. 57, a. 1; 56, a. 3).

B. In the supernatural order and for theologians: virtues in a qualified sense are those which render man good with respect to a particular end (or the last in some genus) e.g. temperate, just, believing, etc.; virtues simply and properly so called are those by which man is perfect as to the supernatural last end. Whence natural and philosophical virtues, even strictly so called, are not in a perfect state of virtue nor are called by theologians virtues simply so called, unless in fact they are habitually ordered to the last end, which is done by charity: then they are called perfect or formed; but if they are present in a man turned away from the last end, they are called imperfect or unformed, since the ultimate or supreme perfection or form of morality is lacking to them. Formed virtues are virtues in the fullest sense (q. 65, a. 2).

580. Observation. — Just as in a good or evil human act (and in a passion), so also in a moral habit, virtue and vice, a twofold element can be distinguished:

1°) the material and physical, which is the mere inclination or physical propensity to acting well or ill;

2°) the formal or moral, which is rational ordination, namely a permanent deliberate adhesion to the object as good or evil, which perfects the habit in the moral being of virtue or vice.

Whence when a sinner is converted, that which has the character of the formal of vice is taken away from the evil habit, but not the material propensity although it is diminished and impeded; whence vice remains only as to the material, in a certain state of destruction. And likewise when a virtuous man sins gravely against the object of virtue, he loses the formal of virtue, but the good acquired habit remains as to its material⁵.

581. Corollary. — The doctrine proposed is contradicted by the followers of Americanism, whose ideas among some also in Germany, France, and England are found latent. They are said to distinguish two kinds of virtues, namely active virtues and passive, or: forces, such as independent of self, properly personal cult, vital, duties toward neighbor; and feminine, as humility, patience, meekness, self-denial, full confidence in God; — moreover natural virtues seem rather to have the active ones which respond more fitly to the customs and necessities of the present age, but the Christian and supernatural ones rather passive, which do not so much fit the present time as they did the middle ages.

Which doctrine was condemned by Leo XIII, in the letter of 22 Jan. 1899 to Card. Gibbons. And rightly; for it contradicts:

1° Scripture, where Prov. XVI, 32: « Better is the patient than the brave »; and Christ, our exemplar, is presented as meek and humble (Mt. XI, 29), and obedient (Phil. II, 5, 8), and crucified for the mortification of the flesh, wherefore those who are Christ's have crucified their flesh with the vices and concupiscences (Gal. V, 24).

2° Reason. For a) virtue cannot be passive, for, as Leo XIII says, « virtue is the perfection of potency..., the end of potency is act, and nothing else is the act of virtue than the good use of free choice »;

b) moreover that natural virtues are to be preferred to supernatural ones and are of greater efficacy or fecundity, cannot be understood, because nature, with grace added, does not become weaker, but is perfected. Whence also the saints from humility, obedience, abstinence became powerful in deed and word.

3° Experience. It is evident that to exercise passive virtues is of greater labor than to acquire active virtues; moreover it is established that the exercise of those virtues has brought great fruits both to individuals and to society, as Leo XIII shows.

4° Finally the very doctrine of the connection of virtues among themselves, with which it squares badly and can scarcely agree⁶.